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The Transfer of Institutions

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The Transfer of Institutions

Daniel Lerner, Bert F. Hoselitz, Alexander Brady,
Richard A. Preston, Robert I. Crane, Joseph
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Frank T. de Vyver, William E.
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Preface

The great migrations of peoples and cultures offer fascinating fields of inquiry to students in all disciplines, from theology to sociology. The central factor in modern history is the expansion of Europe, through which the peoples of the little peninsula on the Eurasian land mass, of the western fringes of it in particular, spread throughout the world, restlessly transporting people, ideas, fauna and flora, technology, and language hither and thither. Turn up Indian nationalism and one finds the stamp "Made in Europe." The potato is marked "Product of America." The South American continent follows, as best it can, Iberian languages and a Mediterranean religion, and grows coffee berries brought to it from the fringes of the Indian Ocean. The bulk of Asia fancies that it operates its societies on political and economic principles formulated by two Germans observing nineteenth-century British society and adapted by some Russian dictators.

Coming late into this astonishing activity, the people of the little island of Britain exhibited a flair for it. The vastness and the variety of the Commonwealth and other areas populated or once controlled by those islanders make what used to be called the British Empire a laboratory with endless possibilities for the student of the transmission of cultures. It is a complicated and hazardous field of study. The exported product suffers a sea change as it voyages. The soil into which it is transplanted affects it, may kill it altogether, or work transmutations. The dimensions of time and space (geography) have to be considered always, and the conditions of the receiving society, and the vagaries of individual human beings, both importers and consumers. Take for example the transmission of English law into

the old American colonies, *relatively* simple because the law of the natives was rudely thrust aside and did not have to be considered at all. Some of the emigrants brought local law, e.g., the custom of Kent with them, some the law of Westminster. Some consciously rejected equity, others consciously or unconsciously welcomed both it and the common law. There was limited space for law books in the chests of migrants, and limited or erroneous storage of law in their brains. Furthermore, as the transmission continued over a period of about 200 years, there was profound change and development at home in the institutions being transmitted and an enormous growth of published legal material, and the evolution in America continued. So that we had wheels spinning at different speeds in two continents, with a constantly moving transmission belt 3,000 miles long between them.

The essays in this book can merely pluck at the fringes of segments of so vast a story. (That is not an admission but a statement.) Except for that of Professor Gledhill, they were presented at a seminar held in 1962 by the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, which was instituted to sponsor studies of the politics and economy of the Commonwealth. Since the scenes to which the contributors turn their attention in this volume are changing so fast, the literature is piling up so rapidly, and the very techniques of social scientists evolve nowadays with some rapidity, it is only fair to the authors to point out that they wrote over two years ago.

The book opens with two basic papers on general aspects of the theory and problems of the transfer of institutions. It moves on to two aspects of the subject as related to Canada, typifying the older Commonwealth, and then to seven on India and British Africa, illustrating the current preoccupation of scholars with non-Western cultures and with the problems of underdeveloped economies. Most of the essays therefore consider aspects of the transmission of institutions and practices to areas already settled, with ancient cultures of their own, rather than to areas "open" to colonization. They thus encounter the additional complication of the impact of the import on established institutions. Daniel Lerner is therefore right in objecting to the title of the book, if

"transfer" is thought of as simply dumping an institution on foreign docks, sending in techniques to install it, and then switching on the power to run it.

He argues cogently that a more accurate and meaningful phrase for what we are discussing is "the *transformation* of institutions." Mr. Lerner bears down on the thesis that "the intrusions have to be internalized"—digested and adapted, and he asserts that in an older society with traditional ways of viewing things, the transformation has to be very broad indeed to be effective. "If any one . . . institution is transferred into a traditional setting without the others, the odds are great that it will not work efficiently. Modernization is likely to produce abortive monstrosities, in sum, unless it entails comprehensive transformation of institutions—a new framework within which men can work out new lifeways." It is his observation that there is occurring throughout the world a massive internal abandonment of traditional codes of behavior.

Bert F. Hoselitz considers how far it may be possible for economic development in the underdeveloped countries to follow the remarkable growth in nineteenth-century Europe. The prospects are gloomy, in comparison, for agricultural space, for capital formation, for overpopulation. There are fewer economically-minded aspirants for power and status, and the entire social structure, which profoundly affects development, is less favorable for advances than that in which the industrial revolution occurred. The new states may even approach the whole of industrialization differently from the West, the latter using scientists and applying scientific generalizations, the former using a more intuitive, aesthetically-oriented approach.

Alexander Brady finds that, of course with differences, Canada has adopted the model of Westminster in parliamentism, in which he includes Parliament, the cabinet, the civil service, law and courts, and fundamental attitudes. She has adhered "to the essential elements." The same, writes Richard A. Preston, is true of military institutions. There has been a considerable degree of transfer of British ones to Canada, one not incompatible with nationalism. The two countries hold common military doctrine, organization, and attitudes, a circumstance that

makes for free interchange with British units when they are engaged in common enterprises.

The introduction of Western educational institutions into India, writes R. I. Crane, has had profound effects, although under the British it touched only a low percentage of the people, there is too much emphasis on the arts (such science and technology as has been introduced has had great effects), there is a high rate of dropping-out at the end of primary school, the lower castes have a low percentage of enrollment in secondary and higher institutions, and illiteracy is still high. So few people were affected that education created a new elite, in danger of being alienated from the masses, and constituting, by the substitution of achievement for status, a threat to the caste system. English-type education in English has, however, been of utility to a self-governing India as a unifying force.

In a case study of the effects of another modernizing force in India, Joseph W. Elder poses the question of whether or not the demands of Hinduism and of industrialization are fundamentally conflicting ones. Brahmans in a certain mill could apparently maintain their ritual of purity, their awareness of the Hindu philosophical tradition, the status of their priests, and their superior social position, but their caste views were being eroded. Perhaps by entering secular occupations they may lose status and be thrown into competition with persons of lesser caste.

A. Gledhill finds that English law has found a firm place in India. The Law Commission, revising the codes after independence, adopted large sections of the prefreedom law, statute and other. In fact, independent India adopted English law that had not been imported prior to 1947, e.g., prerogative writs which protect the individual. Among other refinements the reader will perceive in this paper are the difficulties in the last century of accommodating Muslim and Hindu law and custom, much of it decaying under change and court decisions, and the fact that the British effort to preserve custom by incorporating it in case law frequently embalmed a custom that was decaying or outmoded. The essay begins with a review of the establishment of courts under the East India Company.

Alfred Mayer discusses in human terms the problems of planning which involves stirring up change in the Indian countryside, change in people that has to be directed by people. He recounts that some of the lessons learned in India, and some of the procedures employed, were retransferred to a planning project in the United States, in the Pittsburgh area.

In British Africa, as F. T. de Vyver sees it, the transplantation of trade unionism has been attempted from the outside, on British and American models, and the transplant remains weak and political, rather than economic, in its uses. Most African economic institutions, writes W. E. Moran, Jr., are simply an overlay of Western on indigenous ones, the Western ones being transferred to Africa but not to Africans until recently. There is pressing need to develop entrepreneurs, a national outlook, capital, and finance. He sees a socialist trend in African thinking. M. Yudelman, in a paper on problems of raising agricultural productivity in Africa, makes the same point as other authors in this volume: before Western advances are going to be received, the indigenous social structure will have to be changed. There must be fundamental and sweeping change in outlook, in the use of land and in land tenure, in inducing production for the market rather than subsistence, and in the provision of education, credit, and transportation.

Duke's Commonwealth program was launched and has been maintained largely on grants from the Carnegie Corporation, the benefactor of so many scholars resident in, or interested in, the Commonwealth. The foundation, of course, bears no responsibility for the utterances of its beneficiaries.

W. B. Hamilton

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The Transfer of Institutions

• 1 •

The Transformation of Institutions

*Daniel Lerner**

I

Institutions are the behavioral patterns performed by people whose goal is to enhance as much as possible the values which they hold important. The process involves an expenditure of available skills and knowledge upon the raw materials at hand; the process is actually one of conversion. The process becomes an institution when the application of techniques to the resources is formulated into a set pattern which is productively efficient. Routine behavior which conforms to a maximizing principle is rational. An institution, in short, is a code of rational, routine activity.

The style of such codes is various. They may be prescribed by statute or be made routine through custom. The rules may be numerous and detailed, hence rigid; or they may fix only scant rules-of-the-game within which behavioral variation is permitted, hence flexible. A code is coercive if it prescribes mandatory sanctions against all specific transgressions, or persuasive if its motivating mechanism is inducement rather than retribution. Finally, codes vary widely in their efficiency—i.e., the ratio of cost to gain in the conversion process.

For example, consider the marital institution, which regulates the behavior of spouses seeking mutual values by the application of mutual techniques to mutual resources. No institution is

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more universal; no codes are more various. Their diversity derives from the varying conceptions of the values which are to be enhanced by marriage. The differing values attached to marriage, in turn, diversify the conceptions of the basic resource which is to be converted. Where greatest importance is attached to conjugal bliss, there affection is the raw material. Where self-reproduction is the primary goal, the genetic resource becomes salient. On the other hand, joint income and social status are fundamental to the marriage which is identified with socio-economic gain.

Underlying these variations, which anthropology has elaborated in a formidable inventory, marital codes exhibit one remarkable regularity: they always stipulate the conditions of authorized participation in marital routines. However widely the codes may differ in their definitions of the values of marriage, they all join in recognizing that rational formulation of marital behavior requires the explicit stipulation of "*who* does what to *whom*" (to adapt a phrase from Harold Lasswell). Furthermore, this functional component is present in all marital codes, though their structural stipulations may vary widely in rigidity, coerciveness, and efficiency.

Interest in this regularity is indicated by a case study by Professor John Kemeny, who is a mathematician and not an anthropologist. He sought to discover how efficiently the rules designed to prevent incestuous and consanguineous marriages operate in certain primitive societies. The efficacy of these rules is extremely important in societies where no written records are kept, for here family relationships may be confused or forgotten, making possible innocent mistakes. A conventional procedure is to assign to each person in the society a certain "marriage type" and to rule that only men and women of the same type may marry. If every son and daughter is assigned a type which differs from the parents' and from each others', then incestuous marriage can be stopped effectively.

A problem arises, however, in designing an efficient rule to prevent intermarriage between persons of the next degree of blood-relationship, e.g., uncles, aunts, first cousins. Most primi-

tive societies which incorporate this purpose in their marital code have devised some rule to accomplish it—more or less. The elusive quantum of error in these codes, which otherwise do rationally govern marriage choices, may perpetuate through generations and centuries a less than optimally-efficient rule that causes deep and *unnecessary* unhappiness to individuals in these folk societies.

It was doubtless the plight of these people that stimulated Professor Kemeny to work out a mathematical-type model for improving the "more or less" efficient operation of marital codes. He did this by perceiving the algebraic common characteristic of these codes (their "'parameter"):

> The marriage group must be a regular permutation group which is generated by the parent-to-son transformation and by the parent-to-daughter transformation. Since regular permutation groups are relatively rare, this theorem enables one to find easily all possible marriage rules for a given number of marriage types. For example, it is shown that there are but six possible sets of rules for a society having four marriage types.[1]

Applying this general model to societies wishing to prohibit all first-cousin marriages, Kemeny states that "the necessary and sufficient condition for this is that parent-to-son and parent-to-daughter transformations should not commute and that their squares should not be equal."[2] Relating the new general rule to the two particular institutional codes which focused his attention on this problem, Kemeny concludes: "The Kariera and Tarau societies could not possibly have eliminated all first-cousin marriages if they wanted to use only four types."[3]

Professor Kemeny, a humane as well as brilliant man, then reflects on the human meaning of the problem he has solved. He writes:

> It is most impressive that a society that is unable to keep precise records should have been able to solve, through trial and error, a problem

1. J. G. Kemeny, "Mathematics Without Numbers," in D. Lerner, ed., *Quantity and Quality: The Hayden Colloquium on Scientific Method and Concept* (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 41. See also the essay by J. J. Spengler.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

that requires fairly intricate mathematical operations for formal analysis. It also shows, however, that their procedures could have been considerably improved if they had been in a position to use modern algebra to design the rules.[4]

This conclusion is, in my judgment, intellectually correct and morally good. Yet, it leaves the hardest problem untouched for those of us interested in the transfer of institutions. Let us be clear about why I have presented the Kemeny case study to you. I am no specialist in the codification of marriage rules, having never gotten beyond amateur status in marital relations. Nor do I pretend to be expert in the mathematization of "anybody's problems." Since I am more preoccupied with *who* has *which* problems and *why,* I particularly ask those of you who have expressed interest in the latent-structure analysis of my Middle Eastern materials, to probe deeper than the merely marital and mathematical surface of the present case.

I invite you to consider, rather, the poignancy of Kemeny's condition: "... if they had been in a position to use modern algebra to design the rules." I further invite you, in this roundabout but pointed way, to consider the deep question: What would such societies as Kariera and Tarau have to *become* in order to put themselves in a position to use modern algebra to improve their marriage rules? This, I believe, is the *basic* question for those of us concerned with the transfer of institutions from more to less developed societies.

II

Kemeny's encounter with the untutored peoples suggests two lessons of general import for the transfer of institutions. One is that the behavioral patterns routinized in traditional societies *are* rational in some sense—i.e., they do apply the best available techniques to available resources in order to maximize their values. The Kariera and Tarau "marriage types" became traditional, over many centuries of usage, precisely because they did perform

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43.

their function of preventing consanguineous marriages with tolerable efficiency. Had the margin of error inherent in these types produced more first-cousin marriages than could be tolerated, these societies doubtless would have worked out in due course some appropriate alterations of their marital code. It is not even implausible, given the history of other untutored peoples, that these alterations unwittingly would have moved their code further in the direction of Kemeny's "regular permutation groups." The lesson, then, is that traditional societies can adapt to internally generated needs and can formulate indigenous solutions to problems of dysfunction within their own system of institutions. (When they can no longer do this they degenerate and disappear through disease, emigration, or conquest.)

The second lesson is that traditional societies cannot respond so readily to challenges external to their institutional system. Any institution requires, since it operates by the routinized activity of its constituents, a sufficient quantum of behaviorial *inertia* to minimize frictional deviations from routine. In traditional societies, the mean quantum of behavioral inertia is very high. This reflects the shaping influence of behavioral codes that are customary rather than statutory. Customary codes evolved through centuries of lived-through experience that make them "feel right" are less adaptive to external challenges than statutory codes, which, being based on some explicitly articulated rationale for their behavioral prescriptions, are more readily modified when the reasons change.

There is more than legal formalism intended by this distinction. Its historical voucher is the plain fact that societies moving from the traditional to modern system *invariably* add the statutory to the customary codification of behavioral rules. (I underscore the invariance of this association because it puts us on the track of a "parameter"—or, in a stricter version of my present hypothesis, an item which belongs in an index that, when adequately tested in empirical cases, will yield a parameter.) Our interest in the codes embodying behavioral regulation—whether legal or ethical, statutory or customary—is sociological in the sense of societal. We are concerned with the process by which

the behavioral codes of more developed societies are communicated to less developed societies. This means, in my view, a process that is typically (were I not leery of the metaphysical resonance, I would say essentially) *intrusive* upon the less developed societies.

To focus this point, we pause to pick a terminological bone. Note that our preferred phrase is "communication of codes," not "transfer of institutions." We insist upon the behavioral meaning of "institution" because any other sense of this highly ambiguous term misleads us into a preoccupation with pseudo-problems, i.e., problems incapable of empirical diagnosis and therefore, a fortiori, of empirical solution. We reject utterly the term "transfer" because it is the contrary (possibly even the contradictory) of the process that concerns us. Oxford tells us that to transfer is to "convey, remove, hand over . . . ; make over possession . . . ; convey . . . from one surface to another . . ."[5] None of these meanings corresponds with the always intrusive, often disruptive, and usually violent process that is on our agenda. Indeed, the last definition suggests how superficial any notion of "transfer of institutions" turns out to be—i.e., "convey from one surface to another"!

We can exonerate David Apter, who first gave currency to this unfortunate phrase, on the ground that he abandoned it first. Apter's renunciation of the phrase comes at the beginning of the only chapter which uses it as a title, i.e.: "*Political institutional transfer, involving secular parliamentary structures, requires and in fact achieves disruption of traditional societies and is in fact composed of elements some of which are dysfunctional to the maintenance of traditional systems.*"[6] Any process which "requires and in fact achieves disruption" has little or nothing in common with activities defined as "convey, hand over, make over possession." This point, while terminological, is not trivial. The root of our understanding of the modernization process is embedded in just this terminological terrain.

5. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English* (3rd ed.; Oxford, 1934), p. 1304.
6. David E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton, 1955), p. 274.

The process whereby more developed societies influence less developed societies always involves some institutional "discontinuity" in the less developed societies (some "break" with the past).[7] This is so because traditional societies, while adaptive to internally generated problems, lack efficient mechanisms of consensual response to external challenge. The traditional code's available stock of responses typically provides no compelling behavioral directive for meeting an unprecedented new challenge. Some enthusiastically accept; others uncompromisingly reject. With such dissension, which calls into question the suddenly inadequate code of traditional lifeways, intrusion occurs and disruption begins.

Note, however, that the controlling component of this sequence is *internal* to the traditional society. The initial intrusion comes, it is true, from the outside. But its impact depends upon the reaction of the indigenous people. An intrusion that is widely ignored or evaded or rejected has little or no impact. It is only an intrusion which is "internalized" by a significant fraction of the population that can have any lasting effect. The formation of dissent thus is the fulcrum of the attitudinal-behavioral sequence, which, on this analysis, presents itself primarily as a communication sequence.

III

The view of modernization as primarily a communication process is not new. Over a century ago, in his preface to *Capital,* Karl Marx wrote: "The more developed society presents to the

7. Note the comment on this discussion by J.J. Spengler: "Suppose we are in advanced country A and wish to transfer to underdeveloped country U a given institution I. I is imbedded in a loosely or a tightly integrated culture complex Ca, and there performs a set of functions Fa. If the culture complex Cu in country U is not very different from Ca and the objective is the performance of the same kind of function Fu (~Fa), we can speak of transfer. But as we depart from these conditions, because Ca differs from Cu or because the set of functions Fu differs somewhat from Fa (because some are otherwise performed), we have more than a transfer problem. We have a transformation indicated. It is essential, therefore, to contrast Ca and Cu and Fa and Fu and determine when it is transfer that suffices and when it is more."

less developed society a picture of its own future." This insight, had he explored its meaning more empirically and comparatively, might have made Marx the father of twentieth-century communication studies. If the dynamic mechanism of social change is a "picture," then the relevant questions concern its form, content, and transmission from the more to the less developed society: who transmits what picture to whom by what means and with what effects? A picture exerts no influence simply by being presented. It must be perceived, evaluated, acted upon. Indeed, as in most communications, it is the response side of the process that determines its effectiveness—i.e., how the less developed society responds to the incoming stimulus from the more developed society determines whether, as Marx postulated, this becomes "a picture of its own future."

Marx inhibited the articulation of his own insight, and stultified research on the process through which it operates, by his parochial focus on the social class that happened to be most salient in his own time and place—the new class of urban industrial workers which preoccupied much of European social thought throughout the nineteenth century. This was the "spectre haunting Europe," in Marx's splendid propaganda phrase, that diverted European sociology from empirical observation to ideological theorizing until Pareto—equipped with an Italian title, a French education, a European engineering experience, and a Swiss chair of mathematical economics—decided, as the old century was turning into the new, that it was time to put sterile polemics aside and have a fresh hard look at how European society was operating. As a cosmopolitan with roots in Tuscany, which had seen the ebb and flow of interregional and international power over centuries, Pareto was highly sensitized to the problem of transfer from more to less developed societies. As an intellectual with roots in science and technology, Pareto was sufficiently motivated and endowed to give the inherited polemics of his day an austere no-nonsense treatment.

Pareto's conception of the "circulation of the elites" provided the most potent antidote yet articulated to Marx's parochialism of the proletariat and liberated new observational perspectives

and research preoccupations among European sociologists. Mosca next focused attention on the "ruling elite"—the political class toward whose recruitment and composition the ownership of the means of production formed but one, and not necessarily the decisive, component. Michels then demonstrated the critical role of intellectuals in the formation and sustenance of both elites and counterelites in the political process. Lasswell brought this new tradition squarely into the twentieth-century context by showing that psychological variables often outweighed economic variables in the distribution of power. He thereby became what a less parochial Marx might have been—the father of communication studies.

I repress my passion for the history of social science at this point (begging your pardon for the curt take-it-or-leave-it style of these few condensed remarks) to talk about another problem that is only partially illuminated by its prehistory. What post-Marxian social science has accomplished enables us, as it were, to investigate systematically who gets what, when, how, and why. This is crucial legislation, for it guides us—as we turn to consider the impact of our own developed societies upon the less developed societies today—in enriching economic sociology with communication sociology, in framing institutional change within the larger context of individual behavior.

So, we are more concerned with the transformation of institutions as they pass from more to less developed societies in the contemporary world. We focus on the sociological communication of ideas and give particular attention to the characteristics of individuals *actually* recruited into the elites and counterelites (rather than ideologically attributed to these categories). We now recognize the plain fact that the Marxian proletariat has played a relatively small role in the process of social change since history took leave of nineteenth-century Europe. Other modes, other codes have played the key role in the present century. Contemporary social research, with all its flaws and blemishes, has at least the virtue—since the Marxian "spectre haunting Europe" was laid away—of looking history straighter in the face.

Thus, Everett Hagen, a first-class economist with a curiosity

for finding out how things really are sociologically, which is uncommon in his discipline, put many years of effort into detecting how economic growth begins. Although Hagen first applied his general model only to Japan, he has shown that its applicability goes beyond this in principle. For its key concept is a reformulation of the Lasswellian counterelite, which Hagen calls the "subordinated class," in terms that encompass the urban proletariat of nineteenth-century Europe as a particular case and go beyond it to include other social formations that have engineered a transformation of institutions.

What Hagen's study offers us is an account of the psychosocial process whereby a developing society—stimulated by the picture of its own future from abroad—accomplishes the internal redistribution of power (which presumably is what is meant by the transfer of institutions). His "subordinated class" is composed of individuals who want larger shares in the distribution of social values than existing institutions are prepared to give them. They learn to articulate individually their frustrated desires, to aggregate their interests interpersonally with frustrated others, and to coalesce the power thus aggregated in political action designed to reshape institutions according to their plans. So conceived, the "subordinated class" can perform its transference function whatever may be the particular recruitment and composition of its membership.

In Hagen's treatise, the subordinated merchant class played a pivotal role in the perception, evaluation, and application of new ideas which ultimately transformed Japanese society.[8] In Turkey, the crucial function was performed by the military class.[9] In the ideological revolutions of the twentieth century, the intelligentsia took the lead in articulating and aggregating the interests of a counterelite in political transformation.[10] Our

8. Everett E. Hagen, "How Economic Growth Begins: A General Model Applied to Japan," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXII (Fall, 1958), 373–390; also his *On The Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Ill., 1962).
9. D. Lerner and R. D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics*, XIII (Oct., 1960), 19–44.
10. George K. Schueller, *The Politburo* (Stanford, 1951); Daniel Lerner, *The Nazi Elite* (Stanford, 1951); Robert Carver North, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites* (Stanford, 1952). These three studies form a part of the Hoover Institute Studies, Series B.

study group at the M.I.T. Center For International Studies has concluded that in the contemporary world durable transformation of institutions is likely to be accomplished by the coalition of intellectuals, soldiers, and bureaucrats, with entrepreneurs, workers, and peasants playing differential roles in the vanguard and rear guard.[11]

IV

The intellectuals play their pivotal role in the contemporary transformation of institutions because they are distinctively the literate and informed sector of their societies. It is with the literate and informed members of the military and bureaucratic formations that they are likely to make their revolutionary coalitions. This is because the transformation of institutions, in our time, has been quickened and broadened by the unprecedented transfer of ideas around the world's surface. We have reference here to the notorious communication revolution which, over the past two decades, has altered the basic conditions of political behavior within and between nations. Most dramatic has been its impact upon the flow of influence from more to less developed nations.

Colonel Nasser, prime example of the military intellectual as contemporary transformer of traditional institutions, has stated his version of the communication revolution in these terms: "It is true that most of our people are still illiterate. But politically that counts far less than it did 20 years ago. . . . Radio has changed everything. . . . Today people in the most remote villages hear of what is happening and form their opinions. Leaders cannot govern as they once did. We live in a new world."[12]

"Radio has changed everything!" What does Colonel Nasser intend us to understand by this emphatic statement? What, precisely, has changed? My own studies of the Middle East de-

11. Max F. Millikan and Donald L.M. Blackmer, eds., *The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy* (Boston, 1961).
12. Quoted in D. Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), p. 214.

scribed in considerable detail the sequence of changes which, I believe, has transformed the style of life of traditional societies around the globe. I shall not recapitulate these findings here but rather focus on the main conclusion relating to our present concern with the transformation of institutions—namely, that traditional societies are passing from the face of the earth because the people in them *no longer want to live by their rules.* This massive and simultaneous abandonment of traditional codes of behavior in every part of the world raises problems of unprecedented scale and scope for the transformation of institutions.

I have already indicated why I consider that no significant *transfer* of institutions from more to less developed societies is taking place in our time. The notion of an orderly procedure to "convey, hand over, make over possession; convey from one surface to another . . ." is incompatible with the intrusive, disruptive, violent process *already* at work in the less developed societies. My diagnosis of this process embodies the forecast that, in the lifetime of the present generation, the disruptive process must continue and its political consequences must deepen.

This follows from the communication component of the process. Among past generations, modernist inspiration was conveyed from more to less developed societies via the discreet discourse of a few in Oxford colleges and Paris salons. Transformation of traditional institutions was the work of generations of educated individuals in the higher strata. Today the traditional multitudes, exposed to the broadcast exhortations of the mass media, have been infused with the disquieting rationalist and positivist spirit against which, scholars seem agreed, "Islam is absolutely defenseless."[13] I would generalize this conclusion to assert that all traditional behavioral codes have shown themselves to be "defenseless" in the sense that peoples everywhere are refusing to live by their rules any longer.

We are today in the full flow of what was baptized, a decade ago, as the "revolution of rising expectations." In some places, indeed, the ebb has set in motion an equally disruptive backwash

13. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

that might more appropriately be labeled the "revolution of rising frustrations." The living generation of transitional peoples, caught in this turbulent ebb and flow, is more intensely involved with the destruction than the transformation (not to mention transfer) of institutions.

V

Why has the communication revolution produced such sombre consequences, and such a gloomy outlook, for institution-building in the transitional societies? A general theoretical answer may be adapted from a formula for self-esteem devised by William James:

$$\text{Self-esteem} = \frac{\text{Success}}{\text{Pretensions}}$$

James went on to elucidate the equation as follows: "Such a fraction may be increased as well by diminishing the denominator as by increasing the numerator. To give up pretensions is as blessed a relief as to get them gratified, and where disappointment is incessant and the struggle unending, this is what men will always do."[14]

There are doubtless cases where disappointment ceases and struggle ends, and here stable growth may occur. But "incessant disappointment and unending struggle" fairly represent the situation in much of the transitional world today. Aspiration has been raised to levels that far exceed any plausible hopes of achievement. In terms of the consumption-production reciprocal that stabilized the distribution of all social values, the desire to consume has far outrun the capacity to produce satisfactions. I shall pursue this badly turned economic metaphor only long enough to add that a chronic long-term disequilibrium has been induced by the communication revolution that is beyond equilibration, in many transitional societies, by any economic and political development projects that have been programmed or even projected. I have presented this vicious circle in detail for Egypt and the

14. William James, *Psychology: A Briefer Course* (New York, 1892), p. 187.

Middle East. My M.I.T. colleagues have exhibited similar situations in Africa and Asia. The conclusion appears relevant even in some of the more developed countries of Latin America.

The dysfunctional influence of excessive aspiration may be perceived with reference to two major features of the modern style of life that are now universally desired: urbanism and education. In the modern West, the urban revolution which transferred the bulk of population from villages to cities occurred over several centuries. Moreover, it was functionally related to the occupational redistribution needed by industrializing societies: the urban migration was, in large measure, a shift from farms to factories. The service sector grew as an historical concomitant of the evolving institutions of industrial societies.

Education pervaded the modern West even later and more slowly. Whereas urbanization was well under way by the seventeenth century, the drive toward free and compulsory public education did not get properly started until the eighteenth nor complete its victory until the nineteenth century. Here, again, the growth of free public education was functionally related to industrial society, with its ever growing need for literates to perform the skilled and semiskilled functions of industrial production, distribution, and even consumption. In the modern West, literacy developed initially as a skill with a ready pay-off to the ambitious individual who acquired it. Only later, and at a much higher level, did it become a personal and cultural adornment.

The case is quite different—almost the reverse—in much of the transitional world today. The dysfunctionality of contemporary urbanization is vividly exhibited by the tin-can cities, *bidonvilles*, and *ranchos* that engulf virtually every metropolis of the underdeveloped societies. Squalor and poverty accompanied urbanization in the modern West—as every reader of Frederic Le Play, Charles Booth, and Jane Hull is aware—but it was nothing compared to the scope and scale of urban misery that has come into being over the past two decades in the rest of the world. A comparison of the differential rates of urbanization and industrialization in underdeveloped countries over these twenty years will reveal how dysfunctional urbanism has become—and how rapidly

it is worsening. (A systematic statistical analysis of these two indices would, incidentally, be a valuable contribution to the literature of development.)

People move to cities nowadays without prospect of jobs, even without hope of jobs. These are the agrarian jetsam who become the urban flotsam. They do not enter into the life of the city; they do not even, in many cases, enter the city limits proper. Jobless, skill-less, hopeless, they languish on the city periphery in unspeakable misery. So, during the past decade, over 1,000,000 (repeat 1,000,000) people have populated the outskirts of Cairo with no home but the city streets. So, in the hillside *ranchos* of Caracas where 300,000 people dwell, a nine-week-old baby, while I was there recently, was eaten alive by a rat.

This is not urbanization in anything like the sense the term acquired in the modern West. This bears more resemblance to the mass migrations of human hordes driven by famine and pestilence in the centuries preceding the modern epoch. These massive internal migrations bear no visible relation to the *transfer* of urban-industrial institutions. On the contrary, they operate dysfunctionally upon the industrial development of transitional societies today. Rational and equilibrated growth is hardly abetted in Cuba and Uruguay by the presence of half of their national populations in the metropolitan areas of Havana and Montevideo, or in Argentina and Venezuela by the concentration of about a quarter of their populations in Buenos Aires and Caracas. The high growth potential of Venezuela is positively impeded by the concentration of nearly nine-tenths of the national population in about one-tenth of the national territory—the small area extending from Maracaibo to Caracas, where the national unemployment rate of 11 per cent rises to a whopping 18 per cent.

Also dysfunctional, in subtler ways, is the massive growth of education at all levels. A decade ago, according to UNESCO estimates, the world was adding over 25,000,000 new literates to its population each year. At this rate (which has doubtless increased) the world has acquired over a *quarter-billion* new literates in the past decade—the bulk of these in the transitional societies, where, a generation ago, most of them would have been illiterate.

Now, I am about to tread on sensitive ideological ground, and I shall try to say only what I mean to say. It is obviously difficult for people raised in the traditions of liberal democracy to be *against* literacy in principle, and I shall make no such outrageous demand upon our collective conscience. It is, however, possible for people committed to scientific canons of judgment to reconsider their social values in situations that cast doubt upon their universality. Thus, it is quite easy nowadays for a social scientist (or humanist) to favor birth control in Japan, China, India, and Egypt without being against babies in principle—or even against any particular combination of love and marriage and babies in principle. Similarly, any reasonable American (and many unreasonable ones) finds it easy to perceive the horrible human waste disposed through tin-can cities, *bidonvilles*, and *ranchos* without being opposed to urban living in principle.

It is difficult, however, for Americans (and others raised in the modern style) to consider dispassionately that literacy may be dysfunctional—indeed a serious impediment—to modernization in the societies now seeking (all too rapidly) to transform their institutions. Yet, I submit, the "literacy explosion" may constitute a more serious threat to human hopes for a rational world order than the highly publicized "population explosion"—just as the urbanizing furor in transitional societies has already passed the limits of what we tranquilly, in the United States, refer to as the "expanding metropolis."

Please understand the intention of these remarks. I am *not* opposed to literacy in principle, any more than I am opposed to babies or urbanity in principle. I *am* opposed to dysfunctional literacy—dysfunctionality signifying, in this context, the behavioral consequences which do more harm than good to the individuals acquiring literacy as well as the harmful sociological consequences of an excessively rapid increase of literacy rates in many transitional societies.

The point I wish to stress is that transitional societies can use only a certain amount of literacy within a certain time. We must remind ourselves that literacy first pervaded the modern West as a skill with a payoff before it became a psychocultural adorn-

ment. We must recall that literacy was a passport, for newly mobile men, to jobs and other satisfying opportunities for achieving a better life. We must, in sum, recall the penetrating question raised by George Bernard Shaw (who was, after all, a Fabian socialist): "How can you dare to teach a man how to read before you have taught him everything else?"

VI

The disruption of transitional societies—the factor which makes an orderly transfer of institutions impossible in much of the world today—is an outcome of, among other things, widespread disregard of Shaw's prudent query. Many millions of people around the world are being taught to read long before they have learned "everything else," indeed long before they have the opportunity to acquire *anything* else in the historical "literacy syndrome" of the West.

Since I have described this syndrome elsewhere in great detail, let me here recapitulate only its principal features:

> Literacy is the basic personal skill that underlies the whole modernizing sequence. With literacy people acquire more than the simple skill of reading. Professor Becker concludes that the written word first equipped men with a "transpersonal memory"; Professor Innis writes that, historically, "man's activities and powers were roughly extended in proportion to the increased use of written records." The very act of achieving distance and control over a formal language gives people access to the world of vicarious experience and trains them to use the complicated mechanism of empathy which is needed to cope with this world. It supplies media consumers, who stimulate media production, thereby activating the reciprocal relationship whose consequences for modernization we have noted. This is why media participation, in every country we have studied, exhibits a centripetal tendency. Those who read newspapers also tend to be the heaviest consumers of movies, broadcasts, and all other media products. Throughout the Middle East illiterate respondents said of their literate compatriots: "They live in another world." Thus literacy becomes the sociological pivot in the activation of psychic mobility, the publicly shared skill which binds modern man's varied daily round into a consistent participant lifestyle.[15]

15. Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, p. 64.

My own empirical studies confirmed the focal role here attributed to literacy. Historically, it is distinctively the literate who has become the newspaper reader, the opinion giver, the cash customer, the voter—i.e., the *participant* in the modern sectors of his society such as the communication network, the opinion forum, the market economy, the electoral polity. The gradual and conjoint growth of urbanism and literacy evolved the modern code of participant behavior—a code which, since it requires the transformation of millions of individual life-histories through generations, cannot simply be *transferred* from one society to another.

The "systemic" interaction of four indices of modernity was revealed by a series of simple and multiple correlations of data supplied by countries ranging from fifty-four to seventy-three in number. The countries represented all continents, colors, creeds, cultures. The indices were urbanization, literacy, media participation (based on newspaper, radio, movie consumption), and political participation (based on voting in five last elections). Multiple correlation of these indices on data for fifty-four countries —rotating each index in turn as the dependent variable—gave us the following coefficients:

Dependent variable	*Multiple correlation coefficient*
Urbanization	.61
Literacy*	.91
Media participation	.84
Political participation	.82

* A notable feature of all literacy correlations was their stability, regardless of sample size. The correlation of .82 with media participation was for $N = 54$ countries; for $N = 73$ countries it was .84. (Standard deviation was 31.4.) UNESCO literacy data come grouped in five categories, each covering 20 percentage points. All other data were ungrouped.

Without pausing to review the interpretation of these results which has been published elsewhere,[16] we stress two conclusions that are especially relevant to the present discussion. First, the demonstration that the indices of modernity go together so regu-

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 55–65. Also, Lerner, "Communication Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science*, II (Oct., 1957), 266–275.

larly in all countries—regardless of their great differences in geography, climate, race, culture, and other presumably "basic" traits —supports the hypothesis that, in some sense, they *had* to go together. The components of modern participant society form a genuinely interdependent "system," in which significant variation of one component must entail significant variation of all the others. This conclusion is further supported by the findings of Almond, Coleman, and their collaborators, who have applied a similar matrix of factors to five major transitional regions of the world.[17]

The second conclusion we stress is that imbalance among the components of modernization is disruptive in the transitional society. By disruptive I mean more than some transitory impediment, or tactical delay, in the process of modernization. I mean, rather, the incorporation of some stochastic element which is likely to render the process abortive or turn it in a direction quite different from modernization as represented by western Europe and North America. This is so because the components of modernity, as we have defined them, are built into the life-history of individuals—and, once there, they are not easily rearranged. People who move into cities, for example, are likely to stay there. (Back-to-the-soil movements, before and since the New England utopians of the nineteenth century, have usually attracted only alienated intellectuals and other deviant cases.) Urbanization is a secular trend that has not, in modern times, been successfully reversed.

The same is true of literacy, media participation, and political participation. These are behavioral codes which, once incorporated in the daily round of life by a community of individuals, are not easily revised. Indeed, the great despotisms of twentieth-century Europe—Bolshevik, Fascist, Nazi—were able to reimpose authoritarian controls upon populations that had gained some measure of political participation only by revolutionary bloodletting. In each of these cases, I believe, a stochastic process had disrupted the "system" of modernity and inhibited its efficient functioning.

17. G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), p. 536.

A similar revolutionary situation—the revolution of rising frustrations—exists in the transitional world today. Its symptom is the military take-over. This symptom has appeared, during the past five years, in every major transitional region of the world. In Asia, military take-over has occurred in Laos and Vietnam, Burma and Pakistan. In the Middle East, virtually every Arab country as well as Iran and even Turkey have manifested the symptom. Both the Sudan and the Congo have, in Africa, exhibited the pattern of military take-over to a continent that is likely to multiply examples rapidly. I need hardly illustrate the case in Latin America.

If military take-over is the symptom, then disruptive imbalance in the modernizing process is the etiology of the revolutionary disease that now pervades the transitional world. Since this situation inhibits the transfer of institutions—and, in my judgment, even distorts the transformation of institutions—it is fitting that we turn, in the concluding section of this paper, to a closer look at the matter.

VII

Disruptive imbalance occurs when a substantial fraction of the transitional population acquires one of the characteristics of modernity but not the other elements. Since modernity is a style of life—a set of interdependent behavioral codes—the absence of any element in the set tends to be disruptive upon the individual. When a sufficient number of individuals are so affected, then disruptive imbalance is felt in the community as a whole.

Thus, in our typology, the modern person is an urbane literate who participates fully in the public forum, market place, political arena. It is characteristic of the transitional world that most individuals do not exhibit all of these characteristics. The transitional world has, by definition, a tendency toward imbalance built into it. The tendency becomes disruptive when the proportion of individuals who acquire one characteristic without acquiring the others becomes too high.

In one study we were able to establish critical ratios between the four components of modernity in seventy-three countries. Thus, it could be shown that no significant increase in literacy rates could be expected before a country was more than 10 per cent urbanized. Thereafter, when urbanization passed beyond the 10 per cent mark, literacy tended to increase rather steadily —in a direct monotonic relationship with urbanization. This relationship remained constant until the country was 25 per cent urbanized, by which time its literacy rate typically was 50 per cent or better. Thereafter literacy continued to grow independently of further increases in urbanization.

We are not particularly concerned here with the numerical values obtained by our study. Clearly, the critical minimum ratio of 10 per cent and the critical optimum ratio of 25 per cent are artifacts of our statistical inputs—i.e., if urbanization were defined differently (we used the proportion of population living in cities over 50,000) then the numerical values would be different. Our concern is rather with the demonstration that critical ratios *can* be established that demonstrate a constant relationship between urbanization and literacy, however defined, in seventy-three countries that are so different in most other respects.

We consider that these ratios demonstrate the limits within which imbalance can be tolerated in most countries without becoming disruptive. A disruptive imbalance would exist, in this view, in a society that was over 25 per cent urban but significantly less than 50 per cent literate. Conversely, a society that was better than 50 per cent literate while still under 10 per cent urban would exhibit a disruptive imbalance.

I have not replicated this analysis of 1950 data, but inspection of statistical relationships in the transitional countries as of 1960 strongly suggests to me that the imbalances already observable a decade ago have widened and deepened. It is my hunch that across the full range of transitional countries—from the tribal societies of the new nations in Africa to the more urban and developed societies of Latin America—disruptive imbalances are present, have been taking their political toll (largely in the form of military take-over), and will continue to do so until some toler-

ably balanced relationship between the components of modernization is restored.

Imbalance can and does take a variety of forms. There are the illiterate urbanites to whom we have already referred—the urban flotsam overflowing every major city from Cairo to Caracas. There are the illiterate and rural radio listeners who, in Nasser's words, have created a "new world" for political leadership. There are the illiterate "voters" who, in many transitional countries are encouraged to enjoy the spectacle of participant politics without sharing in its substance.

All of these forms of imbalance are weighty in the political disruption of the transitional world. The crucial imbalance, however, is the case cited by Shaw—i.e., the literate who has *not* been "taught everything else." We have spoken only of the new literates, those who have acquired a bare minimum skill in handling their native language. We have suggested that there is an overproduction of new literates in terms of the capacity of traditional society to absorb this skill. A similar overproduction exists on every level of the educational ladder. Indeed, in many cases, it is even more dramatic at the college level. For example, over the past decade, Egypt and Iran have produced proportionately more college graduates than Britain and France. What is to be done with them? The civil service and the army (the employment sought by most college graduates in these countries) are chronically overstaffed. Those who go into the professions tend to remain in the metropolitan center, where there is an oversupply of professionals, while the rest of the country goes begging for doctors and engineers.

Typically, most of these surplus college graduates remain frustratingly underemployed or completely unemployed. In Teheran, in 1958, there were thirty-six licensed "film companies." Each of these companies consisted of a group of surplus college graduates who had managed to acquire a 35 millimeter camera. However, only one of these thirty-six companies had as yet produced a single full-length film.

The old moralist tells us that the devil finds work for idle hands. And so it is with this rapidly swelling core of surplus

college graduates. It is they who swell the radical revolutionary political parties that are growing in every transitional society. Typically imbued with an ideology that is quite irrelevant to the real needs of their society, typically eager for any kind of action to enliven their idle days, these unhappy young people are a chronically disruptive force in their societies. Incapable of taking the reins of government themselves, they make rational government by those in power difficult or virtually impossible.

In Teheran, the linkages formed between idle students, the Tudeh (Communist) party, and the management of street mobs were forged during the days of Dr. Mossadegh and have remained strong. In Damascus, during the year preceding the union with Egypt, the radical factions of students and alumni so disrupted the university operation that classes were held on only twenty-seven days of the academic year. In Caracas not too long ago, the Central University was being run largely as a direct-action section of the Communist party. Examples have been multiplied throughout the transitional world.

The unemployed and alienated intelligentsia becomes the focal point for disruptive activity throughout the society. They forge direct-action links with the illiterate and also unemployed urban flotsam—as in Teheran and Caracas. They run the communication networks which maintain contact with the rural hinterland, as in Egypt and Syria. The crucial linkage occurs, however, when the radical intelligentsia establishes a political coalition with the military. The outcome, typically, is the pattern of military takeover which we have sketched. The political consequences include a sharp increase in violence, a sharp decrease in political participation, and a radical disruption of existing institutions—only rarely followed by any sustained transfer or transformation of more efficient new institutions. Under present circumstances, this is what much of the transitional world is in for during the years ahead.[18]

It is no business of this essay to recommend policies or devise

18. A replication with 1960 data has now been made by Wilbur Schramm. See the forth coming volume edited by D. Lerner and W. Schramm, published by the East-West Center Press (Honolulu, Hawaii: scheduled for 1965).

programs. It is not inappropriate, however, to point the simple lesson of the disruptive imbalances that waylay efforts to modernize the traditional world. The lesson is that modernity is a style of life—a whole composed of parts that have to go together. Hence, it does not work merely to *transfer* an institution—such as a constitutional code, or an electoral device, or a school system, or a farming technique, or a public-health program. If any one such institution is transferred into a traditional setting without the others, the odds are great that it will not work efficiently. If you teach a man to read, you must teach him nearly everything else. New literates must have new work and new ways. New voters must have a stake in the issues they adjudicate. Modernization is likely to produce abortive monstrosities, in sum, unless it entails a comprehensive transformation of institutions—a new framework within which men can work out new lifeways.

• 2 •

Advanced and Underdeveloped Countries: A Study in Development Contrasts*

*Bert F. Hoselitz***

I. Introduction

In the Preface to his last and much too little-known book, *From Field to Factory,* my late colleague, James Sydney Slotkin, says that "culturally speaking, the so-called 'underdeveloped areas' are those which have not adopted the body of customs constituting industrialism."[1] Thus he implies that the process of modernization of poor and economically less advanced nations may be interpreted principally as a process in cultural change and cultural diffusion. And, in fact, his entire book is an elaboration of this interpretation. This interpretation also is implied in a study of transfer of institutions, whether in the legal, educational, political, or economic fields. For institutions may be considered as clusters of social actions with a special, relatively well-defined objective, and for this reason each institution becomes an expression of the cultural meanings and understandings attributed to each set of

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1. James S. Slotkin, *From Field to Factory* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), p. 9.

actions.[2] Hence the process of transfer of institutions may be considered, in the most general way, as a process of acculturation or cultural diffusion, and we will be concerned in this paper with the external conditions under which certain culture traits come to be diffused. In particular, I shall endeavor to present the major conditions, describing traits characteristic of the culture of industrialism, and will attempt to compare the situation in western European nations at a time when these countries adopted industrialism with that in the presently developing countries of Asia and Africa. In brief, I will try to re-examine a point which has been examined by others, notably by S. Kuznets and—at least by implication—by A. J. Youngson.[3] In fact, I am fortunate in having these predecessors since there are substantial areas of enquiry in which it will suffice to summarize their findings.

But before we go into this theme it may be useful to consider the process of diffusion of culture traits in its general setting. Although a good deal has been written by anthropologists on the diffusion process, a broad theoretical statement of it has not come to my attention. Perhaps the most penetrating analysis, with special reference to economic change, is the treatment of Raymond Firth in his study of the New Zealand Maori.[4] Firth examines the generally accepted principle in acculturation theory, which states that the first and easiest transfers between societies are in the field of material culture, that transfers of forms of social organization are more difficult and slower, and that transfers of

2. For those not familiar with the modern sociological interpretation of an institution, an example may be desirable. A school, for example, is an institution because it forms a nucleus around which social actions cluster, all with the objective of providing instruction and information of certain kinds. Similarly a court may be defined as an institution implying a set of actions designed to implement the laws of the land in certain ways and to adjudicate disputes, etc. It is quite clear that, if institutions are regarded in this fashion, the meanings attributed to the gathering of information or the adjudication of disputes in a given culture will affect the nature and form of a given institution.

3. Simon Kuznets, "Underdeveloped Countries: Present Characteristics in the Light of Past Growth Patterns," in Eastin Nelson, ed., *Economic Growth: Rationale, Problems, Cases* (Austin, 1960), pp. 17–31; and "Underdeveloped Countries and the Pre-Industrial Phase in the Advanced Countries: An Attempt at Comparison," in United Nations, *Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1954* (6 vols.; New York, 1955), V, 947–970; also A. J. Youngson, *Possibilities of Economic Progress* (Cambridge, 1959).

4. Raymond W. Firth, *Economics of the New Zealand Maori* (2nd ed.; Wellington, 1959).

beliefs and values are slowest and meet the greatest obstacles. Though he arrives at the proposition that diffused culture traits cannot be separated out quite sharply, he does not embrace an extreme functional position. He concludes his discussion of the diffusion problem by saying that "material culture, technique, economic organization, and belief are so intimately related, that changes in one react upon all the others."[5] At the same time his concrete illustrations do show that diffusion of techniques, economic and social organizations, and beliefs may be attempted piecemeal and, in fact, have sometimes been diffused by themselves, although they have, in these instances, produced an adaptation and alteration of related institutions of the society adopting the new ways.

This must be borne in mind in the subsequent discussion, since I shall discuss economic, socio-structural, and value factors separately. Yet, it must be clearly understood that none of these factors stand by themselves or are unrelated to associated aspects of a total culture. A change in productive techniques is clearly associated with institutional changes and ultimately also with value changes, but at the same time the change in productive technology can be studied as an isolated process, and its impact upon changes in other spheres of social action can be sketched and evaluated in very general and rough terms, rather than with the same degree of detail with which the change in productive technology itself is drawn. Hence, we will be on relatively safe ground if we discuss the more strictly economic, the socio-structural, and the value and belief systems of economically advanced Western and of underdeveloped countries by themselves, and if we compare the situation and conditions of the three subsystems in present-day developing countries of Africa and Asia with the past of European societies, especially with that period in their past in which, from the viewpoint of occupational distribution and the provision of their material livelihood, they had the greatest similarities with the present underdeveloped countries.

The periods of comparison I will choose are those when in the

5. *Ibid.*, p. 490.

economically more advanced countries the proportion of their labor force engaged in agriculture was around two-thirds of the total labor force. This appears to be the most valid point of comparison, especially if we are interested in the growth of industrialization. There appears to be a rather close correlation between the rate of economic growth and a country's labor force distribution. Counties which have attained a more advanced level of output also have a larger sector of their labor force in secondary and tertiary occupations. These countries also have shown a faster rate of growth than those in which agriculture predominates. Though there appears to be no intrinsic reason why high rates of economic development can not be achieved in a predominantly agricultural country, we have no record that this actually happened; countries, like New Zealand or Denmark, which reached high levels of economic performance even though a relatively large portion of the labor force remained in primary production, have been able to do so because they maintained close trading relations with highly industrialized countries, exchanging specialized farm commodities against goods produced in industry.

The actual dates, when these patterns in the distribution of the labor force between different branches of economic activity prevailed in different countries, vary a good deal. In Britain we would probably have to go back to the late seventeenth century to find more than 60 per cent of the labor force in agriculture. In France this level of occupational distribution appears to have been reached by the end of the Napoleonic period, in Germany in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, and in Sweden only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In other words, if we use the distribution of the work force between primary and other occupations as a standard, we find that Britain and perhaps the Netherlands were the forerunners in the development of industrialism and that the complex of industrial culture traits was diffused in the course of the nineteenth century from these countries, but especially Britain, to the rest of Europe and, of course, also to countries of more recent European settlement in North America and Oceania.[6]

6. I shall omit a discussion of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand not because the experience of these countries is inadequately recorded,

II. Economic Structure and Activity

In the most general way, then, what I want to compare are the conditions in western and central Europe during the nineteenth century with those prevailing today in Asia and Africa. As already pointed out, the bulk of the relevant comparisons in the realm of economic activities has been presented by Simon Kuznets, and all I will do here is to summarize his findings and add a few observations on facts which have come to light since he wrote his essays on this topic.

The main economic differences between the present underdeveloped countries and the countries of western Europe in their preindustrial phase may be summarized as follows:[7]

1. Present levels of per capita incomes in the underdeveloped countries are much lower than were those in the developed countries at the time before industrialization on a sizeable scale actually set in. On the basis of backward projections of national income data to that period it is found that per capita incomes in western Europe probably were around $200 or more (in 1952–54 prices), whereas in the underdeveloped countries they were less than $100 in the postwar period.

2. The supply of agricultural land in underdeveloped countries of Asia today is significantly lower than in most currently advanced countries of western and central Europe in their preindustrial period. As I have shown elsewhere, the corresponding figures of arable land per male engaged in agriculture or per agricultural household in nineteenth-century Europe was between

but because they present very different problems from those facing the underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa, since they were relatively "empty" lands which were settled rapidly by a population bringing its European culture with it. In an earlier context, I have singled out these countries as representing primarily an expansionist pattern of economic growth, as contrasted with the intrinsic patterns characteristic of most European countries and of most underdeveloped countries in Asia today. See Bert F. Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), pp. 87 ff.

7. This summary is based on S. Kuznets, "Underdeveloped Countries," in Nelson, ed., *Economic Growth*, pp. 18–23.

three and five times the acreage at the disposal of similar units in Asian and Middle Eastern countries today.[8] Since these data were computed some new quantitative historical series on French agriculture and its development have been published. From these data we find that in 1815 about 64 per cent of the population of France depended for its livelihood on agriculture. The number of active males in agriculture in that year was estimated to have been 4.4 million persons, and the total agricultural acreage (i.e., land used for crops, fruit trees, vineyards, and gardens, but excluding natural meadows and pastures) amounted to approximately 27 million hectares. Hence the number of hectares per active male in French agriculture in 1815 came to 6.14, whereas the corresponding acreages today in many countries of southern Asia and the Middle East are between 1 and 2½ hectares.[9]

3. The lower income per capita and lower output per worker in present underdeveloped countries, as compared to the preindustrial phase of currently more advanced countries, is probably due mainly to the lower productivity of the agricultural sector. Apart from the lower endowment with land per worker, already mentioned in the previous paragraph, and probably also the lesser quantity of other capital, we find on the basis of international comparisons for recent years that the shortage in per worker income in agriculture is negatively associated with per capita income for the economy as a whole. In other words, though in almost all countries at the present time agricultural incomes are lower than incomes in other sectors of the economy, the difference between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes is greater the lower the average income of the population as a whole. This tends to suggest that since over-all incomes in the present underdeveloped countries are lower than in the corresponding preindustrial phase of Western countries, agriculture is especially backward and unproductive.

4. Income distribution by size may be more unequal in the

8. Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth*, p. 121.
9. J. C. Toutain, *Le produit de l'agriculture française de 1700 à 1958* (Paris, 1961), II, 200–201 and 213–214, provides the data from France.

present underdeveloped countries than was the case in the preindustrial phase of Western countries. We only have indirect evidence for this. On the one hand, there is some evidence that income distribution in our day in advanced countries is more equal than in underdeveloped countries. Some of this evidence is provided by Kuznets, who shows that in the postwar period the uppermost 20 per cent of income receivers in the United States obtained 44 per cent and in the United Kingdom 45 per cent of total income, whereas the corresponding shares of the same group in India was 55 per cent, in Ceylon 50 per cent, and in Puerto Rico 56 per cent. At the same time, the lowest 40 per cent of income receivers earned 18 per cent of total income in the United States, whereas the corresponding figures were 17 per cent for India, 16 per cent for Ceylon, and 11 per cent for Puerto Rico.[10] Though it may be argued on the one hand that in the more advanced countries income distribution has become more equal in the last few decades, it may, on the other hand, be assumed that it was probably not too different in their preindustrial phase from what it was in the recent past. Though this is not certain, it tends to suggest the possibility that incomes are less equally distributed in the currently underdeveloped countries than they were in Western countries before the onset of the industrial revolution.

So far I have followed Kuznets, but it may be useful to add some further items showing significant differences in the economic aspects of presently underdeveloped countries and the preindustrial phase of economically more advanced Western countries.

5. An important difference lies in the interrelation between population and its growth and the growth of non-human capital. I have already shown that in agriculture the initial endowment with land differed substantially between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe and present-day Asia and the Middle East. But it should be noted that the relative growth of the absolute size of the agricultural labor force over time shows great

10. Simon Kuznets, "Regional Economic Trends and Levels of Living," in Philip M. Hauser, ed., *Population and World Politics* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), p. 94. All income shares are estimated before direct taxes.

differences in the earlier phase of the economically more advanced countries and, in recent decades, in underdeveloped countries. In Table 1 the data of the growth of the agricultural labor force in Britain, France, and Japan during part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are presented. These data show that there was in all countries a moderate rise in the absolute number of the agricultural labor force and that after reaching a plateau at a time when industrialization had progressed to a certain point, the absolute number of persons dependent upon agriculture declined in absolute terms.

Table 1. ***Absolute Number of Workers in Agriculture in Great Britain, France, and Japan 1831–1931***

Year	*Britain*°° *(in millions)*	*France (in millions)*	*Japan (in 1000's)*
1831	1.8	4.8	
1841	1.9	5.0	
1851	2.1	5.3	
1861	2.0	5.34	
1871	1.8	5.28	14,000°
1881	1.7	5.47	15,810
1891	1.6	5.04	16,784
1901	1.5	5.52	16,799
1911	1.6	5.33	15,824
1921	1.4	4.99	14,271
1931	1.3	4.45	14,217

Sources: For Great Britain: Phyllis Deane and W.A. Cole, *British Economic Growth 1688–1959* (Cambridge, University Press, 1962), Table 31, p. 143.
For France: J.C. Toutain, *Le produit de l'agriculture française de 1700 à 1958*, II (Paris, 1961), 200–201.
For Japan: K. Ohkawa, *The Growth Rate of the Japanese Economy since 1878* (Tokyo, 1957), pp. 240–246.
° 1872
°° Forestry and fishing included

All three countries, but particularly Britain and Japan, had rapid rates of population growth during the years presented in this table, the European countries especially during the first half of the nineteenth century, and Japan during the first few decades after the Meiji restoration. Although the growth rate of the total

population—and hence of the labor force—was high, though not quite as high as in some underdeveloped countries today, the growth of the agricultural labor force was moderate, and soon a plateau was reached, in Britain around the 1850's, in France from the 1860's to the end of the century, and in Japan in the 1890's; after that date a decline in absolute numbers of workers in agriculture set in. These facts imply that (1) capital formation in industry proceeded at a fast enough rate to provide opportunities for productive employment for the additions of the labor force outside of agriculture, and (2) with the maintenance of a relatively stable agricultural labor force the growth of demand for food and other agricultural raw materials caused capital applied to agricultural production to flow into uses which raised productivity of farm labor. Hence it appears that this quantitative development of the agricultural labor force over time explains, at least in part, the relatively higher level of income earned by Western farmers in the preindustrial and early industrial phases of these countries, as compared with the peasants of presently underdeveloped countries. The general history of the agricultural labor force in the countries of Asia has been different from that of western Europe in the nineteenth century. In Asia the absolute number of persons dependent upon agriculture has risen sharply in recent years as is exhibited, for example, in the figures from India presented in Table 2.

This discussion has brought us already somewhat beyond the periods which we set out to compare, i.e., those in which in the countries of western Europe approximately two-thirds of the labor force was engaged in primary production. But, as we will see a little later, present growth rates of the population of underdeveloped countries are so high as to make it very probable that the patterns exhibited by the western European countries in the early phases of their industrialization cannot be followed by the Asian countries of today, since capital formation outside of agriculture (even with extensive foreign aid) is not likely to proceed at a high enough rate to allow the withdrawal of the total or even the major part of the additions to the population in working ages from agricultural occupations. But if the farm labor force becomes

Table 2. ***Agricultural Labor Force in India, 1881 to 1961 (all figures in thousands)***

	Agricultural labor force		
Year	*Total (1) (British India)*	*Males (2) (British India)*	*Males (3) (India)*
1881			
1901	87,762	51,326	48,583
1911	97,574	61,061	54,499
1921		66,637	54,351
1931	96,420	65,970	57,073
1951		68,182	66,241
1961		83,136*	83,718

Sources: Columns (1) and (2) Daniel and Alice Thorner, *Comparability of Census Economic Data, 1881–1952* (Calcutta, I.S.I., 1958), (mimeographed), p. 26.
Data for 1951 in Column (2) computed from Thorner's data for India and from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Production Yearbook, 1959* (Rome, 1960), XIII, 23.
Column (3) India, Registrar General, *Paper No. 1, Census of India, 1961* (New Delhi, 1962), Appendix I, p. 395.
* Republic of India and Pakistan

larger in absolute terms most of the incentives for technological progress in agriculture are removed. We encounter here one of the problems which underdeveloped countries face as a consequence of the rapid rise in population, a feature to which we will return later.

6. In spite of the growing pressure of rural people on employment opportunities in agriculture in the developing countries, secondary and tertiary occupations, though not absent altogether from the countryside, are concentrated mainly in urban areas. A comparison of urban and rural occupational structures in Asia and western Europe was presented at a conference on urban growth in India which met at Berkeley, California, in 1960. According to the 1951 census the urban population of India (in towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants) was 11.9 per cent of the total population. At that time 70.6 per cent of the population derived its livelihood from agriculture and the remainder from industry and services. If we compare this with a number of

European countries in the nineteenth century, at a time when the share of their urban population was 11 per cent, we find that only 52.1 per cent of the labor force was in agriculture, whereas 47.9 per cent were employed in secondary and tertiary occupations. The difference is especially great between the present Indian and past European labor force in industry, for in India only 10.7 per cent of the total labor force was in industry in 1951, whereas in the western and central European countries at a corresponding stage of urbanization in the nineteenth century 27.3 per cent were in industry.

These findings lead to the following argument: one of the characteristics of India's economy, as compared with that of late nineteenth-century Europe, is its lower level of industrialization, not only in the rural areas, but also in the cities. This means that urban growth has proceeded with a smaller relative accumulation of industrial capital in urban centers, and this in turn strongly implies that relatively fewer employment opportunities in manufacturing and related occupations become available for immigrants to the cities.[11]

These data, therefore, confirm the point already made: capital formation in secondary and tertiary industry is relatively slower—in relation to the growth of the total labor force—than during the corresponding period of European early industrialization. But, in addition, the scale of industrial plant is apparently very different. Although the element of large-scale production in the European industrialization process has been sometimes exaggerated, there is a relatively larger portion of the labor force in secondary production employed in small-scale and cottage industries in presently underdeveloped countries than was the case in the preindustrial and early industrial phase of European countries. In part, this is a consequence of the extreme imperfections of the market for capital in underdeveloped countries, but it appears also to be an outflow of the much greater abundance of labor and the relative slowness with which capital is

11. Bert F. Hoselitz, "The Role of Urbanization in Economic Development: Some International Comparisons," in Roy Turner, ed., *India's Urban Future* (Berkeley, 1962), pp. 165–169.

formed in secondary and tertiary productive branches. It finally appears to be the result of technological conditions in modern industry which require substantially more capital-intensive investments than corresponding types of installations in the early industrial phase of western European countries.

III. Social Organization and Demographic Patterns

The discussion of the last few paragraphs has carried us into the realm of problems of social organization. Although here some preliminary findings are also available, we are in a much less well-worked field than in the realm of comparisons of the more strictly economic factors. Among the major features to which attention has already been given is the pattern of demographic developments, the question of urbanization and rural-urban migration, and certain rather obvious differences in political background, particularly the capacity for self-government and the efficiency of public administration. I shall discuss these points in turn and will add some further observations on related aspects of social organization and political structure.

1. Since population growth is a basic variable exerting an influence on the discussion, and in the analysis of all other factors, it may be useful to discuss this point first. In Table 3 are presented the population growth rates of most European countries during the nineteenth century; i.e. from 1815 to 1925. The period is divided into two equal parts; in Britain and some countries of western Europe (Belgium, Netherlands, France, and the Rhineland) industrialization began and was carried to a rather high level in the first half of the period between 1815 and 1870. In the rest of Germany, in Austria, Switzerland, and Scandinavia, industrialization began in the period shortly before or soon after 1870, and the major upsurge of the industrialization process took place in the second half of our period. In the remaining countries industrialization either began after the turn of the century or only after the end of the First World War. Some countries,

e.g., Yugoslavia, Greece, or Portugal, were still very little industrialized at the end of the period considered in Table 3.

Though we do not have corresponding population growth rates for the underdeveloped countries relating to periods of equal length as those presented in Table 3, we do have ample information—partly based on actual census data and partly based on "informed guesses" about birth and death rates—on current population growth rates in underdeveloped countries.

Table 3. ***Equivalent Average Annual Rates of Growth Expressed in Per Cent Per Annum, Selected European Countries, 1815–1925***

Country [a]	*Period* *1815–1870*	*1870–1925*
Germany	1.01 [b]	0.98 [b]
Austria	0.72	0.60
Hungary	0.58	0.67
Switzerland	0.84	0.76
France	0.41	0.14
Belgium	0.85	0.68
Netherlands	0.95	1.37
Great Britain and Ireland	1.11	0.77
Scandinavia	1.09	0.82
Spain and Portugal	0.79	0.47
Italy	0.68	0.60
Balkan Peninsula	0.61	0.83
Roumania	1.70	1.27
Poland	1.30	1.13
Russia	0.43	1.06
Europe, Total	0.71	0.78

Source: Computed from Helmut Haufe, *Die Bevolkerung Europas* (Berlin, 1936), Table 9, p. 227, by use of the formula $P_z = P_o\ (1 + r)^z$, where P_o = initial population, P_z = population at final date, z = number of years elapsed between observations, and r = equivalent annual rate of growth.

[a] The boundaries of the countries in this table are, in most cases, those of 1914. For more detailed description see Haufe.

[b] Only the first two digits are significant owing to rounding error. (Applies to all figures.)

It would take us too far to go into an elaborate and detailed analysis of these figures, but it is quite commonly known that all over Asia, Africa, and Latin America the growth rates

are between 2 and 3 per cent per year and in some countries are even above 3 per cent per year. It is possible that some of these very high rates of growth will not continue for a long time, but there are no signs as yet anywhere that population growth rates show a tendency to fall below 2 per cent per year. The annual growth rate of the population of all Latin America for the period 1953–1958 has been estimated at 2.5 per cent, but this average is the result of such extremes as an annual growth rate of 4 per cent in Costa Rica and of 3.5 per cent in El Salvador, on the one hand, and of 1.2 per cent in Haiti and 1.3 per cent in Uruguay, on the other.[12]

Annual growth rates in South and East Asian countries were approximately of the same order of magnitude as those of Latin America. On the basis of censuses in 1950 and 1951, on the one hand, and 1960 or 1961, on the other, the following annual rates of population growth can be established: India, 2.0 per cent; South Korea, 2.9 per cent; Pakistan, 2.2 per cent; Philippines, 3.2 per cent; and Thailand, 3.0 per cent. In Taiwan, Malaya, and Ceylon natural growth rates (i.e., barring the impact of migration) were of the same general magnitude, that is, between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent per year.[13] Comparable data for Africa are almost unobtainable, but what evidence we do have tends to show that population growth there also approaches Asian and Latin American magnitudes.

A comparison of these figures for recent years in underdeveloped countries with the data presented in Table 3 shows quite conclusively that population growth rates in the former are substantially above those experienced in most European countries in the past. The reasons for this difference are not difficult to find. During the nineteenth century the European countries found a world more open to international migration than that of the postwar period. Whenever serious population pressures threatened to develop, some overseas migration could—and did—take place. Though it is not suggested that overseas migra-

12. University of California at Los Angeles, Center for Latin American Studies, *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1961* (Los Angeles, 1961), p. 9.
13. United Nations, *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1961* (Bangkok, United Nations, 1962), pp. 119, 169.

tion actually had a very important influence on total population levels in the European countries, it did constitute a "safety valve" in extreme situations and affected especially those areas in the European countries in which population pressures were greatest. The emigration from Ireland to North America or from southern Italy to both North and South America are clear cases in point.

Secondly, though birth rates remained quite high for some time after the onset of industrialization and though death rates began to decline, the decline in death rates was not so sharp and deep as is the case at present in underdeveloped countries. The implementation of various measures of "death control" is a function of technology. Since underdeveloped countries today can introduce many of the most modern methods of medical science and public health, they can make use of a highly efficient modern technology of death control. They are faced with an analogous advantage in the adoption of medical technology as in that of productive technology. They can jump, as it were, from the antiquated methods customary in the indigenous societies to the most modern methods, without stopping at intermediate procedures characteristic of the earlier stages of medical —and productive technological—developments of western Europe. These facts appear to account for the higher population growth rates in underdeveloped countries than those of nineteenth-century western Europe, and they are likely to lead to situations which, as is so often pointed out, will be difficult to control, unless the level of birth rates is drastically lowered.

2. Closely related to the trends in population growth are trends in rural-urban migration. This phenomenon is apparently characteristic of all countries in the process of industrialization. The countries of the Western world have experienced this migration, and the same patterns may be observed in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America today. Rural-urban migration is one of the least well-understood phenomena. In some cases it has been explained as a response to wage or income incentives, and these do play a limited role in some cases in in-

ducing people to leave their rural homes and try their luck in the city.[14] But the gap between rural and urban incomes has been found to amount to a fairly large size before migration on a sizeable scale will occur, and it is probable that in many instances non-economic factors have played a much more important role than income differences. Another issue in the discussion of rural-urban migration has been the conflict between persons who argue that migrants are pushed out of the rural areas by poverty and those who maintain that migrants are attracted by the higher incomes, the greater glamor, and other real or imagined advantages of the city. On the whole, it is not easy to provide a clear-cut answer to this problem, since the few empirical studies we have show that both push and pull factors play a role in the migration process, though it is likely that the push factors predominate. Indications for this would be the high incidence of migration as a consequence of religious or political persecution in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or the large-scale refugee movements, e.g., in India and Pakistan, in West Africa in the postwar period, or the massive migrations to cities as a consequence of rural political insecurity in countries like Burma or Vietnam.

It is difficult to place great emphasis on the pull factor in currently underdeveloped countries, since in most of them there is a large pool of unemployed persons in the urban areas. It is true that urban wages are, on the whole, higher than rural wages, but in view of the higher urban costs of living, actual living standards are probably not much higher for urban than for rural workers, given the same level of skill. It is, of course, true that these facts may be unknown to prospective migrants, but even this may be doubtful, since many immigrants to the urban areas have friends or relatives in the cities. The lack of adequate employment opportunities must have been known to many cityward migrants and their coming cannot be interpreted in any other way but that conditions in the countryside were truly desperate.

14. The most extensive study of income differentials and their impact on rural-urban migration is the book by J. R. Bellerby, *Agriculture and Relative Income* (London, 1956).

We have here, however, also an important distinction between the underdeveloped countries and the Western countries in their preindustrial and early industrial phases. It appears, mainly from indirect evidence, that in Western countries the attraction of income differentials seems to have played a definite role, and that, on the whole, the expectations of cityward migrants were realized, if not immediately upon their arrival, at least after some time. There were extended periods of unemployment throughout the nineteenth century, mainly due to cyclical fluctuations in general business conditions, but in Western countries the migrants from the country came to the cities to stay, and they actually stayed there.

In developing countries the situation is different. Many immigrants to cities do not find regular employment, even for many years. Many of them do not come with the intention to stay. Many do not bring their families, and even those who may bring family members often do not sever their ties to the countryside. We have extensive information of the life of recent migrants in many cities of India (e.g., Calcutta) and Africa (e.g., Jinja), which amply confirm this.[15] To these two examples many others could be added, and the same patterns as those discerned in Calcutta and Jinja would be found over and over again. The consequence of this imperfect and only partial integration of the rural population into the urban matrix is threefold.

In the first place, it creates within the urban area a population with contradictory attachments, i.e., one group with primary interests in and affiliation with the city, and another which has no genuine sense of participation in the urban community and regards its stay there as temporary and impermanent. Secondly, this immigrant group does not form a "bridge" between the urban and rural populations. On the contrary, the mass of persons in this group remain at the very bottom edge of the urban social structure, and since they often do not attain regular employment, they do not settle down permanently and do not form a lasting loyalty towards other groups or institutions in the city.

15. On Calcutta: S. N. Sen, *The City of Calcutta* (Calcutta, Bookland Private Ltd., n.d., [ca. 1960]), pp. 191 ff.; on Jinja: Cyril and Rhona Sofer, *Jinja Transformed* (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1955), *passim.*

The urban center is a place where they happen to be, but not one where they have found anything to hold them. A third result of this situation is that there continues to exist a wide cultural chasm between urban areas and the countryside. Not only are many cities in underdeveloped countries the creations of foreigners, notably the former colonial overlords, but the functions of these new cities are predominantly determined by the culture of industrialism which is being diffused to the developing countries. Hence the cities form, as it were, cultural, and often also economic, exclaves of the more highly industrialized countries located within an environment as yet little touched by industrialism. This accounts for the wide cultural and intellectual gap between urban and rural areas in underdeveloped countries, but it also explains why industrialism is so heavily concentrated in urban areas.

If the migrants to the city were a group which became increasingly committed to urban and industrial life, they could perform an important function as a transitional social element in the diffusion process. But since they are culturally far removed from the regular urbanites, they do not—as did their counterparts in the early phase of European industrialization—perform the function of transmitters of the new culture and hence they make the spread of industrialism and its cultural traits among the population at large more difficult.

3. In the preceding discussion, especially in the treatment of differences between rural and urban areas, some implicit comments had already been made on social structure as a whole. It appears that the general pattern of social structure, notably of occupational structure, differs also between presently underdeveloped countries and European countries in an earlier, preindustrial phase. It is extremely difficult to say anything final and decisive about these differences. In part, our knowledge of social structure is very imperfect both in the underdeveloped countries and in past periods of Western countries. Above all, our knowledge of quantitative aspects of social structure is almost non-existent. Nevertheless, there appear to be a few indi-

cations providing tentative and mainly indirect evidence that the differences in social structure are great.

First, as was pointed out earlier, the income distribution in presently underdeveloped countries appears to be more unequal than that of preindustrial Western countries. Some supporting evidence relating to social structure is the fact that most underdeveloped countries have very small middle classes, i.e., they have a bimodal distribution of social classes. On top they have a small but powerful and wealthy upper class, which also contributes the bulk of the political elite, and at the bottom they have a large mass of poor peasants. Middle classes are only now in formation, and—as we shall see later—these middle classes differ substantially in economic origin from the corresponding social groups in Western societies during their early industrial phase. This sharp distinction between the elite and the popular masses is, in turn, one of the causes of the highly unequal distribution of income.

Secondly, as we have just observed, the difference between urban and rural areas is profound in developing countries, and probably more so than in earlier stages of socioeconomic development of Western countries. We cannot be sure of this, for several authors writing during the early part of the nineteenth century pointed to the great contrast between city and country. For example, as acute a student of social conditions as Karl Marx said that the "foundation of every division of labor . . . is the separation between town and country. It may be said, that the whole economical history of society is summed up in the movement."[16] But since Marx does not enlarge on this point, it is difficult to say how he would have proceeded to show the significance of this difference.

But it is likely that this difference is substantially greater in present-day underdeveloped countries than in earlier periods in Europe, not only because, as was pointed out, the underlying culture of rural areas in underdeveloped countries is still preindustrial, whereas that of urban centers is an off-shoot of

16. Karl Marx, *Capital* (2 vols.; Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1906), I, 387.

industrialism; but also because it appears that among the migrants to cities are not only the poorest and most degraded individuals in the countryside, but also some of the best educated inhabitants of rural areas. It is a notorious fact that in underdeveloped countries all persons even with a small amount of education try to move to towns and cities, and it is equally notorious that one of the most difficult tasks faced by the governments of these countries is to find teachers, agricultural extension workers, administrators, and other educated persons who will voluntarily serve in rural areas. One only has to read the novels of Jane Austen to realize that this "flight from the countryside" by educated persons was not characteristic of early nineteenth-century Britain, and this impression is strongly confirmed by accounts of travelers on the European continent during the time before and long after the Napoleonic wars.

A third point of difference between the social structures of present underdeveloped countries and Western countries in an earlier phase of their economic development is the major source of recruitment of the different social classes, above all, the middle class. Though wealth is a weighty factor determining social status in most societies, its role in Western societies appears to have been considerably more important than in contemporary developing countries. In underdeveloped countries wealth was and is usually a consequence of political power and sometimes of educational achievement or religious rank. In Western societies it was a much more independent status-conferring factor. This contrast is exhibited rather well by the social background of Western middle classes and those in developing countries. During the preindustrial phase in Western societies, and even more so during the early industrial phase, business success, the acquisition of wealth, and the growth of income were the most important socially relevant factors in determining the rise of the mercantile and industrial entrepreneurs in the social scale. In underdeveloped countries the major avenues through which to rise in the social scale are political power and educational achievement, or a combination of certain aspects of the two, particularly through participation in the governmental bureaucracy.

A very revealing instance of the formation of the new middle

class through participation in political processes is provided by Turkey. The decline of Ottoman power during the eighteenth century led to various reform movements in Turkey which had their first culmination during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II. Under these sultans the formation of a new middle class did not take place, but the foundation for its evolution was laid, and it gradually began to emerge during the Tanzimat period which stretched from the death of Mahmud II in 1839 to the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877. The newly emerging reform leaders and the men who supported them all attained their positions through participation in politics. The older leading social groups, the Janizaries, old-style Ottomans, and high religious officials gradually lost to the newly rising class of intellectuals and politicians, bureaucrats and middle-rank officers. This was the new middle class, whose dominant role persisted through the subsequent period, the First World War, and into the phase of republican rule, and is, in fact, still eminently prominent today.

The businessmen and entrepreneurs—to the extent to which they existed—did not have any recognized position of prestige in the social structure. Few Turks entered into positions of commercial or industrial leadership, and the exchange of populations after 1923 left the country almost without any business leaders. To the extent to which economic growth was stimulated, the role of the state was paramount and positions of business leadership were at first almost entirely in the hands of public officials and bureaucrats. Only during the postwar years independent entrepreneurs have gradually come to the fore and have begun to gain occasional positions of prominence in the middle class. But even today a political or intellectual career tends to provide a higher social status than success in business, and the change in the composition of the middle class and the middle class ideology is only slowly taking place.[17]

17. On the Turkish developments see the two as yet unpublished papers submitted to the conference arranged by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council on Political Modernization of Japan and Turkey: Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society in Turkey," and Peter F. Sugar, "The Relationship of Economic and Political Development in Turkey." Both papers were scheduled for publication in 1963.

The development in Turkey in the last hundred years could only be sketched briefly in this place and would deserve more extended discussion. But observation of related developments in other underdeveloped countries would show a not too dissimilar course of events. In China, the official ideology under the Empire tended to place merchants and artisans at the bottom of the social scale and to provide middle-class status to officials and intellectuals, i.e., scholars who successfully passed various examinations. In Japan the situation was similar, though there even under the Tokugawa, the acquisition of wealth tended to confer some social status. In India, under British rule, government service and intellectual occupations were among the favored avenues of upward social mobility, and only the growing enmity against Brahman monopolies in political and administrative positions has led some Indians to turn to economic achievement as a way of maintaining status. The list of such examples could be extended, and would include developments in Indonesia, parts of Africa, and Latin America.[18]

This means that the composition of the middle class in underdeveloped countries differs significantly from that in Western countries. It means also that the position of an individual in the class structure is tied much more closely to his position in the political power structure than is the case in Western countries. To be sure, there are correlations between social status and political power in all societies and there existed such a correlation in western Europe at the time of the first impact of industrialization. But the channels of upward social mobility were more numerous and apparently more closely associated with economic achievement, and—what is most important—often far removed from the acquisition of political power. In fact, contrary to the assertion by certain socialists that the government of capitalist countries is the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," it has been shown many times that many business leaders in Western countries were relatively far re-

18. Robert M. Marsh, *The Mandarins* (New York, 1961); James J. Berna, *Industrial Entrepreneurship in Madras State* (London, 1960), esp. chapter iii; Clifford Geertz, "Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian Towns" (unpublished mimeographed manuscript).

moved from politics, and though they exerted an influence in numerous cases upon political development, their social status was ordinarily fully assured without their participating in any way in the political decision-making process.[19]

It would lead us too far afield to belabor this point further. I am confident that a careful study of the comparative patterns of upward social mobility in underdeveloped countries and of Western countries in the nineteenth century would provide extensive support for the differences sketched here. This is a topic which still requires a good deal of further research, but it should be obvious that the findings would have considerable bearing upon our understanding of the development process in poor countries. I indicated in an earlier paper the significance of this difference when I compared the apparently greater vigor of the Mexican and Brazilian economies with those of Argentina and Chile in terms of the much higher rates of economic growth of the two former.[20] I suggested that the explanation may lie in the difference of the composition of the middle classes in the two sets of countries; in Mexico and Brazil the entrepreneurial element in the middle class appears substantially stronger than in Chile and Argentina. These reflections are merely suggestive; it is necessary to adduce a good deal of further evidence to make them fully convincing.

4. In the discussion in the preceding paragraphs repeated allusion was made to the interrelation between social structure and the distribution of political power in developing countries. This idea may be pursued also into another direction which again tends to point to an important difference between the underdeveloped countries of today and the Western nations in their preindustrial phase. One of the important trends in the social

19. For an analysis of a fundamentally economically-oriented middle-class ideology, see Reinhard Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry* (New York, 1956), pp. 90 ff.; also Asa Briggs, *Victorian People* (Chicago, 1954), pp. 19 ff.
20. Bert F. Hoselitz, "Economic Growth in Latin America," in First International Conference of Economic History, *Contributions* (Paris, 1960), pp. 87–101. Very much the same point is also made in William Glade, "Social Backwardness, Social Reform, and Productivity in Latin America," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XV (Winter, 1961), 3–32.

reorientation of underdeveloped countries is the need for a break with many particularisms which still exist and replacement by a more universalistically oriented structure. These particularist formations have been especially visible in the political organization of underdeveloped countries in which, for most purposes, the tribal or village community was the effective political and social unit. Even under colonial rule, and often because of colonial rule, certain centralistic tendencies were superimposed in a more or less external fashion, without ever producing a genuine sense of loyalty to the nation as a whole or fashioning a group which developed an ideology representing the entire national community. The average man regarded anyone outside the small particularistic group to which he belonged as a stranger. His primary loyalty was to those with whom he maintained some form of ascriptive relations, and he gave deference to those who occupied positions of high status in terms of the customs and traditions of his own particularistic group. With the formation of nation states, compelled to act in the environment of the modern world, new and different roles developed, and a new sociopolitical structure, one in which new forms of responsibility and authority were elaborated, was superimposed upon the traditional social structure. This created not only conflict, but in many countries a serious confusion in the pattern of social relations which is still far from clear. It explains, in part, why social mobility is tied so strongly to the political structure and why there is such a close association between control of power and social status.

In Western countries the process of universalization of social relations had anticipated the development of industrialism by several centuries. The most noteworthy examples are the countries of western Europe, where integrated nation states had been formed two or three centuries before the onset of the industrial revolution. Even in Germany and Italy, where national unification was retarded, the elements of social structure similar to that of Britain and France had been elaborated, and political disunity had merely the effect of dispersing power rather than of affecting strongly the pattern of social relations.

Though a final verdict is not possible in view of the fluctuating situation in the social relations of developing countries, it appears that the differences in social structure summarized in this section have an important impact upon the facility with which economic development may occur. An explanation, such as that of W.W. Rostow, that this is characteristic of a preparatory stage for a take-off, is really inadequate, for it merely describes the fact that certain apparently necessary socio-structural ingredients are lacking in the presently underdeveloped countries, without specifying in detail what these variables are and how those that are strategic for economic growth may be manipulated. It is admitted that these questions are not dealt with in this paper with the detail they deserve. But I have tried at least to indicate several dimensions in which further information must be collected and further research undertaken before we can arrive at a genuine evaluation of the interaction between changes in social structure and economic advancement.

IV. Values and Beliefs

A number of further points relating primarily to the analysis of political structures could be made, but we shall pass over them and turn briefly to the most difficult problem of all, the question of what differences there are in the values and beliefs of Western and non-Western societies which may have crucial significance for the comparative rates of economic development in the two sets of societies.

On one level this difference appears to have been extensively discussed already, in particular in the various essays on religious sociology by Weber and the writers who followed him on this topic. Weber had shown, on the one hand, how the Calvinist religious doctrine had been instrumental in helping the development of an economic ethic which was extremely favorable to economic advancement, notably under conditions of private enterprise and initiative. He had shown, on the other, how the religious doctrines of Eastern creeds, in particular Buddhism,

Hinduism, and Confucianism, had failed to produce such an economic ethic and how, in spite of the greed and open urge for gain displayed in market transactions in Asian countries, these motives were expressions not of a rationalized economic ethic, but of personal idiosyncrasies or magical beliefs.[21]

But to many students these explanations have not been wholly satisfactory and have left certain doubts unanswered, particularly since the dichotomy between rationalism and traditionalism, which forms the basis of many of Weber's distinctions, constitutes only a partially closed system. For although the one extreme of the dichotomy is extensively elaborated, its counterpart, the discussion of tradition and of traditionalism, is left essentially unexplored, and many of the finer distinctions between different types and roles of tradition are barely sketched and often not discussed in detail. It is for this reason that I have tried, in an earlier paper in this series, to throw somewhat more light on the concept of tradition and its varieties and, in particular, the effects exerted by tradition on the economic development process.[22] But the views expressed in that essay were only a beginning in the fuller analysis of the differential impact of value systems on economic development, and more specifically on the question of what differences in Western and non-Western value systems appear to be crucial in the evolution of those economic motives and economic behavior which are likely to support self-sustained growth.

Any attempt at a general solution of this problem meets with extreme difficulties because of the wide variety in cultural values and beliefs. One of the great advantages of the rationalism-traditionalism dichotomy was to bring many widely diverse cultures into a relatively tight framework of analysis, in which emphasis was placed upon the examination of a rather small, though crucial, set of variables which were considered the determinants of the major characteristics of the social system and its

21. Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber, an Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), pp. 117–211.
22. Bert F. Hoselitz, "Tradition and Economic Growth," in Ralph Braibanti and J. J. Spengler, eds., *Tradition, Values, and Socio-economic Development* (Durham, N.C., 1961), pp. 83 ff.

values as a whole. The various somewhat more complex schemes which were designed by Parsons and others on the basis of Weber's rationalism-traditionalism dichotomy allow the introduction of a somewhat greater complexity of analysis, but have only made more precise the nature and selection of the crucial variables and have not replaced the original Weberian theory by a "revolutionary" new theory.

One shortcoming of the Weberian analysis, and other theories of social change based upon it, is the implicit assumption of unilinearity, that is, the assumption that the destruction of tradition will lead gradually or abruptly to its replacement by rationalism and that the crucial phase of this process is the breakdown of traditional modes of belief or attitudes and their change into rational ones. Yet it is reasonable to assume that the process of culture change is not unilinear, but multilinear, i.e., that the destruction of a simple traditional belief system does not lead in all instances to the same outcome, but may produce quite different outcomes. I shall attempt to suggest one alternative to this system by contrasting Western and Eastern systems of values.

A new dimension is introduced, if we consider the suggestion made by F.S.C. Northrop that, in addition to the Weberian dichotomy between traditional and rational action, we should consider also the difference between East and West. The new dimension which is added by Northrop's analysis is the contrast between what he calls the aesthetic and conceptual patterns of thinking, and it is this contrast around which one of his works largely turns.[23]

In the Orient a basic value attitude is discernible which is in stark contrast to the theoretical orientation of the West. Northrop calls it the aesthetic orientation, but this concept requires explanation. Unlike Western thought, which contains a substantial ingredient of theoretical reasoning, Eastern aesthetic thought is directly empirical and immediately self-expressive. Northrop uses as an example a comparison between the complex grammar

23. F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (New York, 1960).

in Western scientific exposition and Chinese writing, in which each idea is expressed by a picture showing in its original, primitive form with direct immediacy the general sense impression of an object. The same contrast can be traced through Chinese and Western painting: the latter with its insistence upon providing the illusion of three-dimensional space, the rules of perspective, the insistence upon appropriate effects of lighting and color, and the former with its naïve and direct expression of an immediately aesthetic principle characteristic of the object depicted. Finally it can be studied by contrasting Western and Eastern philosophy, and hence Western and Eastern systems of beliefs.[24]

In this last area the contrast between aesthetic and theoretical approaches becomes most apparent, for here we deal with the explanation of manipulations of basic thoughts and even ultimately determinative approaches to thought. In truth, neither Western nor Eastern systems of thought or philosophies are purely aesthetic or purely theoretical but contain both elements mixed with the other, though the two elements are mixed in different proportions. In Eastern belief systems and ways of thinking, aesthetic tendencies prevail, whereas in the West theoretical tendencies prevail. Thus we may reinterpret Northrop's system as delineating a continuum with purely theoretical and purely aesthetic patterns at either end and with a series of intermediate stages, each representing a mixture of elements of both extremes in different proportions.

If we combine the contrasts in value systems proposed by Weber and Northrop, we obtain a scheme which may be divided into four fields, each of which presents a combination of two value characteristics. The least controversial of these four combinations will be the traditional-aesthetic and the rational-theoretical orientations. The first of these represents the simple societies in which theoretical speculation has not progressed far and in which the immediacy of direct empirical experience is the guiding fundament of social values as well as human thought

24. For a more extensive discussion of the "intuitive aesthetic character" of Eastern values, see *ibid.*, pp. 315 ff.

and reasoning. The second combination represents the value systems of the highly developed Western societies in which scientific theories and the application of rational thought to all problems of social action have influenced men's attitudes, behavior, and thought.

There are, however, two rather controversial and, at first sight, contradictory combinations, one the rational-aesthetic and the other the traditional-theoretical. Let us examine the second of these combinations first. Is it possible to have a system in which traditional values predominate and yet in which theoretical patterns of thought are common? I suggest that the social system which fits this combination of values and reflections best is that which in an earlier paper I designated as traditionalistic. This is a social system in which a society turns to traditionally transmitted norms as an ideology rather than for the reason that certain traditional action patterns best fill a set of strongly felt needs in the society. As I have shown in this earlier essay, traditionalism as an ideology becomes attractive in a situation of crisis in a social group or a social elite.[25] This group carefully reflects upon the selection of those strands of tradition which it can use to weave into a more widely accepted ideology in order to avert or mitigate the crisis, or to maintain its elite position. In brief, a traditional-theoretical combination comes into existence mainly in highly unstable situations and is in itself a basically contradictory, unstable system of values and principles of thought. It is not likely that this system comes to prominence except in certain special cases, and it can be thought of as the basis for thought patterns, not of dynamic total societies, but, at best, of special crisis-ridden groups in such societies.

The situation is somewhat different with the other apparently contradictory combination, the rational-aesthetic system of values and thought. Here we have a situation which was anticipated by Weber, himself, and which constitutes the transitional phase in the evolution of a social system dominated by tradition to one fully dominated by theoretical rationalism. Societies ex-

25. See my essay referred to in n. 22, esp. pp. 99 ff.

hibiting a combination of aesthetic and rational thought patterns normally are the result of social and economic progress, on the one hand, and the refusal to move away from the predominance of an aesthetic orientation, on the other. In these systems, complex and quite productive entities in the realm of economic activity or complex and large social groups often have become accepted and institutionalized. Within these entities individuals react and think in terms of immediate, strictly isolated issues and events, rather than in response to an integrated system of abstract analysis of these events or to a generalized schema of expectations. In practical terms this has the consequence that, in spite of official efforts of planning and programming, the implementation of plans is highly unco-ordinated. Conflicts arise because each project is judged in its own terms rather than as a part of a whole, and those conflicts which do arise tend to lead often to violence. The participants in a conflict tend to interpret it as an issue made up of indivisible wholes rather than one in which the various component parts supporting each side can be partially adjusted or in which compromises are found for a portion of the issues under debate. This is likely to lead to different political and economic institutions from those characteristic of western European countries, and hence possibly to new forms of political and economic organization.

But the major point which we may derive from this discussion is that even in the event of economic progress of comparative degree and magnitude as that attained in the West, the change in values in Asian and African societies may differ profoundly from that which took place in Europe. In Europe the growth of industrial society was founded upon the application of generalized scientific solutions to technical problems of production. It is characteristic of this mode of thinking when J. B. Say says of the entrepreneur that he not merely combines factors of production with one another, but that he also introduces the services of the scientist into the production process.[26] In other words,

26. I have discussed this aspect of Say's views in "The Early History of Entrepreneurial Theory," in Joseph J. Spengler and William R. Allen, eds., *Essays in Economic Thought: Aristotle to Marshall* (Chicago, 1960), p. 251.

economic production, as other activities in Western industrial society, was increasingly subjected to the application of principles characteristic of scientific enquiry and theoretical generalization.

This process may also take place ultimately in Eastern countries. In fact, Northrop maintains that the only certain point of meeting between East and West is one in which gradually the underlying principles of belief of the two parts of mankind come to be jointly integrated in some fashion. But it should be noted that though fairly complex and many-sided economic structures may be developed in the countries of Asia and Africa, the generalized principles of scientific analysis may not be applied to their management; instead these structures may be administered on a more intuitive, *ad hoc,* immediate, aesthetically-oriented basis. Here again we have a sharp contrast in values between Western industrialized countries and the countries of Asia and Africa which now experience the early phases of industrialization.

The combined impact of these differences, in the economy, the social structure, and the patterns of values has important consequences. It makes inapplicable to the problems of present-day Eastern countries many policy measures which may have had most fruitful results in the Western countries. It also makes difficult any general propositions on patterns, rates, and particular strategies of economic growth. Finally it makes questionable the easy generalization of the European experience to the present developing nations. We may find that policies which would have been unsuccessful in eighteenth- or nineteenth-century Britain may be most successful in contemporary Africa, and vice versa, that economic and political policies of great merit in the nineteenth-century Western world may have disastrous results in contemporary Asia and Africa. It is not enough to blame the differences on the different distribution of power in the world today. The differences in the "initial" situation of the developing countries, as contrasted with that of the earlier phases of development of the more advanced nations of the West, are too pronounced to be neglected.

I have introduced this essay by pointing to the fact that in-

dustrialism, no matter where it appears, combines several cultural traits into a distinctive culture complex. We also have found that countries with very different economic equipment, social structures, and even value and belief systems attempt to achieve successful industrialized structures. It is an as yet unsolved problem to what extent some of the culture traits characteristic of the advanced Western countries must be present, and to what extent the "initial conditions" of the industrialization process must resemble one another, in order for "imitative" industrialization to take place in Asia and Africa. It is certain that quite varied social and value structures may be combined with a system of industrialism. The main problem before us is to determine the degree of freedom within which certain important variables may operate in order to permit successful industrialization to take place.

• 3 •

Canada and the Model of Westminster

*Alexander Brady**

The theme of this paper is the transfer of the parliamentary polity from Britain to Canada. The British parliamentary system in any comprehensive sense consists of the legislature, the Crown, the active executive composed of members who sit in the legislature and work in close conjunction with it, the civil service, the independent judiciary, and the intricate body of attitudes and understandings, including a devotion to ancient precedent and a respect for minority rights, which enables the whole to operate effectively.

The transplanting of certain constitutional forms from Britain to the colonies was already an established practice long before Canada was acquired from France. In the old American empire before its disruption and in the chief West Indian islands that had come under the Crown since the early seventeenth century, the political model was that of Westminster. Representative assemblies were promptly constituted whenever the colonists were influential enough and their pressures potent enough. Eighteenth-century Whiggery proclaimed as a sacred tenet that colonial institutions should be tenderly and constantly encouraged to grow from roots in the mother state. The rights of Englishmen accompanied them when they settled abroad. Lord Shelburne criticized the war waged against the Americans as unjust in principle because "it militated against that great maxim of our constitution, which declares that English subjects,

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in whatever quarter of the globe, had a right to the benefit of the British constitution, the most boasted and peculiar franchise of which was to be governed by those laws only, which they themselves had enacted either in person or through their representatives."[1] Before 1776 the colonists on the Atlantic seaboard so greatly prized their inherited rights that they resorted to arms when they feared the denial of those rights.

Canada's experiment in operating parliamentary institutions derived from Britain exhibited important features never precisely duplicated elsewhere. It had a long history, reached a more genuine fulfilment than was possible in the colonies of the first empire, progressed with much difficulty in a society of dual cultures, withstood the rivalry of republican institutions on the same continent, and in due course was dexterously and successfully combined with the devices of a federal and continental state.

The genesis of the experiment antedated the American Revolution in the assembly established in Nova Scotia in 1758. Canadian parliamentarism had thus at least one root extending back into the old empire. The early assembly in Halifax, however, was hardly an impressive example of the representative principle. Parochial in spirit and restricted in powers, it doubtless merited a historian's unflattering characterization of being crude and immature in its ideas of self-government and financial management.[2] Yet it was a beginning, and in the next century was destined to demonstrate through a succession of able and distinguished men a sustained energy in public affairs.

Canada's parliamentary system evolved after the American Revolution and partly as its consequence. In the years 1763–1783, Britain's new colony in the valley of the St. Lawrence was still peopled mainly by French. Although British sovereignty was complete, ministers in London hesitated to introduce to a people ignorant of them the representative institutions normally established in settlement colonies. After some vacillations

1. [Wm. Cobbett and T. C. Hansard, eds.] *The Parliamentary History* (36 vols.; London, 1806–1820), XXIII, 196.
2. Helen Taft Manning, *British Colonial Government After the American Revolution, 1782–1820* (New Haven, 1933), p. 55.

they decided in the Quebec Act of 1774 that the French could best be ruled without an elected assembly. It seemed more expedient that these new subjects of George III should receive guarantees for their traditional religion, ecclesiastical practices, local customs, and civil law, rather than a portion of the British political heritage which they had not possessed before, did not understand, did not demand, and might abuse. In brief, to remain British the colony must continue to be French.

This decision, however valid at the time and crucial for the future, could not endure unmodified after the American Revolution. Into the St. Lawrence valley came a stream of Loyalists, who being already accustomed to self-government at all levels, were determined to enjoy it in the new land. The British government tried to meet their requests as a reward for their sacrifices in the interest of a united empire. But concessions to the Loyalists could not be denied to the French. Distinct types of government were hardly possible for two peoples living in such close proximity. Hence, in a well-intentioned attempt to avoid discord, the Constitutional Act of 1791 recognized the fact of cultural pluralism by dividing the old province of Quebec into Upper Canada and Lower Canada, the former predominantly English and the latter predominantly French, but both endowed with the attributes of monarchical and representative institutions. "We will not pretend," said Henry Dundas in defending the act, "to give Canada the same constitution as we ourselves live under. All we can do is to lay the foundations for the same constitution when increased population and time shall have made Canadians ripe to receive it." Dundas and his colleagues clearly intended to concede at the outset only that portion of the constitution deemed suitable for colonists, and were determined that through the executive it must operate under strict imperial supervision. However conditional the gift, its consequences were profound. A start was made in providing representative institutions for two peoples with different traditions, culture, and temperament, who as close neighbors were compelled to learn the difficult ways of collaboration. On this basis Canada's parliamentary experiment began.

The most critical period in its development occurred during

the sixty-odd years after the passage of the Constitutional Act. For most of this time the imperial authorities and the colonists were at loggerheads on how much of the British system should be transferred and how much voice the colony should have about the scope of the transfer. The issue was ultimately reduced to a struggle for responsible government: e.g., for a system that made the executive directly accountable to the legislature and ultimately to the electorate. This political contest had not the simplicity with which it has usually been endowed by hindsight. It was complicated by the fact that the British constitution itself was then in transition from royal to parliamentary government. Under George III it was still formally assumed that the sovereign selected his own ministers rather than having them imposed on him by the Commons. Only gradually after the Reform Bill of 1832 did it come to be clearly acknowledged that, through the instrumentality of a party, Parliament had the final voice in deciding the personnel and measures of a ministry. While this major change was occurring in London, Canadian reformers began to advocate responsible government. Naturally, at first their ideas and remarks on the subject were vague. They groped for a system that even in Britain was not as clear and explicit as it later became with the emergence of modern cabinet rule. Moreover, in Lower Canada the whole issue of executive responsibility was confused by the conflict of culture and nationality between the two peoples. Throughout this long contentious era, the example of American republican institutions was a serious rival to the British political regime in the colony, and this rivalry accelerated the pace of Canadian constitutional demands and change.

The colonial struggle between the executive and the assembly has some resemblance to the English contest in the seventeenth century between Crown and Parliament. The majorities in the local assemblies, anxious to decide the personnel and policies of the executive, felt frustrated by the fact that, whatever their triumphs at the polls, they were still impotent to change the decisions of the executive on important things. They could not alter a single line in the instructions sent to governors from the Colonial Office, yet these broadly guided the course of executive

action. They were especially annoyed that the assemblies had no genuine authority over the higher officials entrusted with administrative power, no complete control of the public purse, and no command of the spoils of office.[3] The members of the executive and legislative councils, as nominees of the governor, seemed to the assembly merely an oligarchy of arrogant officeholders, who fought tenaciously for every shred of privilege. With much of the responsibility for what was done still widely diffused in London throughout a number of departments, interminable delays sometimes hampered the efficient transaction of public business. When in the early 1830's new regulations, inspired by principles of financial reform, strengthened the control of the Exchequer over expenditures, the result bore harshly on the colonies because the Treasury might require two years to answer a simple query from the Colonial Office.[4]

The most effective colonial advocates of reform in this inflexible and bureaucratic regime, Robert Baldwin, Francis Hincks, and Joseph Howe, patiently buttressed with British precedents their argument for an executive accountable to the majority in the elected legislature. They put their case in strictly empirical terms. Unlike the Americans of 1776, they did not question the sovereignty of the imperial Parliament, nor did they seek support for their cause in the law of nature. Only the more radical and impatient who precipitated the rebellion of 1837, especially William Lyon Mackenzie and Joseph Papineau, were inspired by such revolutionary documents as the American Declaration of Independence. The bulk of the reformers spoke and wrote in the idioms and spirit of contemporary British liberalism. Their movement was largely an extension of such liberalism to North American soil. In 1836 Baldwin, in an able memorandum to Lord Glenelg, then colonial secretary, pleaded that the domestic affairs of the province should be conducted by the lieutenant-governor, advised and assisted by an executive council acting as a provincial

3. On the prominent place of patronage in the struggle for responsible government: J. B. Brebner, "Patronage and Parliamentary Government," *Annual Report of the Canadian Historical Association* (1938), pp. 22–30.

4. Paul Knaplund, *James Stephen and the British Colonial System, 1813–1847* (Madison, 1953), p. 42. Such delays convinced James Stephen's efficient mind of the need for colonial autonomy.

cabinet and respecting the conventions which governed the formation, continuance, and removal of cabinets in Britain. "The Upper Canadians," he said, "see this principle in full and beneficial operation in the Mother Country, and they will not be satisfied with being told that though very good for their fellow subjects in England it is very unfit for them."[5]

Similarly, in 1839 Joseph Howe, in open letters to Lord John Russell, extolled responsible government as the only workable system for the colonies since it was the only workable system for Britain. "Why," he asked, "should we run counter to the whole stream of British experience?" Brushing aside theoretical objections, he appealed, not to abstract rights, but to actual practice, and sought to persuade Russell that British fears were invalidated by the concrete facts of British politics. When Howe argued that governors fresh to the colony resembled ignorant, overgrown schoolboys, requiring the instruction of schoolmasters chosen by and in the confidence of the people, the broad analogy with British monarchs after 1688 was plain to see. Canadians wanted to secure the essentials of that constitution for which Russell's forefathers had labored and which the colonists had come to revere.

It is evident why, between 1792 and 1847, British ministers were often hesitant about fully assimilating the colonial to the British political system. They feared that if extended far enough it must reach a point where the colonies would cease to be dependent, and become wholly separate entities. They assumed that unless Britain were prepared to strip herself of colonial possessions, the assimilative principle had to be limited. During the perilous era of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the whole idea was understandably deprecated by leading figures at Westminster. In 1795 the Duke of Portland cautioned the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada that "to assimilate a colony in all respects to its mother-country is not possible, and, if possible, would not be prudent." Within the next three decades similar opinions were frequently expressed by other British leaders. Even as late as 1829 Sir George Murray, the secretary of state

5. Quoted in full in Gustave Lanctot, *Report of the Public Archives of Canada for the Year 1936* (Ottawa, 1937), pp. 431–440.

for the colonies in Wellington's Government, declared that "the analogy between this country and the Canadas must be given up." In the middle thirties Lord John Russell, confronted by the arguments of Baldwin and Howe, was still unable to see how the colonies could be given responsible government without acknowledging their independence, and like most contemporary British statesmen, he shrank from this drastic step. The members of the governing class still linked the retention of colonies with national power and prestige.[6]

Nevertheless, from 1830 onwards, owing to the concurrent progress of liberalism in both Britain and Canada, the idea of extending the form and substance of parliamentary government to the colonies made firm headway. In Britain it was aided by profound economic and political changes—the growth of industrialism, the expansion in trade, the multiplication of commercial and financial links with many lands overseas, the growing strength of liberal thought, and the rapid advance in the ideas and policies of free trade, which in turn was made possible by a new climate of opinion. These related factors tended to put the position of colonies in a fresh perspective, and especially to lessen the case for their dependence. The Whigs and their allies were the chief proponents of liberal innovations. In 1831 Lord Goderich as secretary of state asserted that the ministers accepted the propriety of transferring to the Canadas "every institution which the more ample experience of Great Britain recommends." Not all the holders of office in the next decade, however, so fully subscribed to the idea, at least in its application to responsible government. But among Whigs and Radicals its logic was increasingly accepted, and behind the scenes the outlook of politicians was reinforced by that of enlightened and influential civil servants, such as James Stephen.[7] Some Philosophic Radicals, such as Joseph Hume, with a single-minded absorption in public economy, were concerned that the colonies should sustain themselves without reliance on the British Treasury. This view naturally implied

6. Klaus E. Knorr, *British Colonial Theories, 1570–1850* (Toronto, 1944), chap. ii.
7. Stephen's influence is carefully documented in Knaplund, *James Stephen and the British Colonial System.* Useful on the ideas and policies of the time is W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell* (Oxford, 1930).

colonial autonomy and perhaps even separation. Others, including John Stuart Mill, Charles Buller, and Lord Durham, had deeper perceptions of colonial and imperial interests.

It is their opinions, which find vigorous expression in Durham's Report, the most distinguished plea for assimilating colonial institutions to those of Britain and for making the executive responsible to the representative assembly. "Administer the colonies," it pleaded, "on those principles which have been found perfectly efficacious in Great Britain." Durham's prescription conformed with the views of the moderate reformers in Canada. The kinship of thought between his case for a responsible executive and that of Robert Baldwin is manifest, for Baldwin's able memorandum of 1836 had impressed him as it had signally failed to impress Glenelg. Durham, like Baldwin, emphasized that, unless the Canadian political system were closely assimilated to the British, the colony would ultimately be lost to the empire. He believed that in their frustration many colonists were led "to look with envy at the material prosperity of their neighbours in the United States under a perfectly free and eminently responsible Government; and, in despair of obtaining such benefits under their present institutions, to desire the adoption of the Republican constitution or even an incorporation with the American Union." If the British type of government in the colony were to meet and survive American rivalry, it must be made to work effectively.

During the 1840's, as the Government at Westminster gradually and, at first, very haltingly came to recognize the principles for which Durham argued, the Canadian constitution was reshaped closer to the British model. In all this the logic of facts was more telling than the force of theory. In order to achieve tranquil and salutary rule, the executive authority of the governor had somehow to be harmonized with the legislative power of the assembly, and the simplest method was to accept British precedent. At the same time the haphazard and chaotic administrative system that Durham had found in the Canadas had to be reorganized in order to make ministerial responsibility ultimately possible.[8] Lord Durham's son-in-law, Lord Elgin, as governor-general (1847–1854),

8. J. E. Hodgetts, *Pioneer Public Service. Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841–1867* (Toronto, 1955), is a careful study.

was commissioned to establish the basic conventions on which responsible government in the British tradition could rest. Foremost among these was that the governor, whatever his personal predilections, must choose advisers from those politicians who commanded a disciplined majority in the assembly and continue to rely on them as long as they had a majority. To his ministers he surrendered political power for political influence. Although he remained an important influence on the executive and an expositor of British constitutional principles, his office henceforth, as Elgin himself said, was gradually transformed from an agency of governors into a "link which connects the mother country and the colony."

The role of the colonial secretary in Britain likewise changed. No longer was he to advise on the domestic policies of the colony. although he still retained interest in their effect on imperial affairs. Earl Grey, who had appointed Elgin to his critical mission, established in the Colonial Office this new convention.[9] The Lafontaine and Baldwin Ministry of 1848, constituted sixty years after the introduction of representative institutions to the Canadas, has been rightly viewed as the first Canadian cabinet, representing the two different peoples in the St. Lawrence valley and operating in harmony with the principles of responsible government.[10] The transfer of this significant and distinctive feature of the British constitution was achieved, not by a parliamentary enactment, but merely by a verbal change in the instructions to the governor. Although nothing new appeared on the statute book, henceforth new rules became the unwritten usage of the constitution.

The consequences of the triumph of responsible government are many, but one commands particular attention. Canadians could henceforth feel confident that the essential fabric of the British constitution was their own acquisition, secured through their persistent advocacy, fitted to their peculiar circumstances, and fostered as the substance and symbol of their political identity

9. Arthur G. Doughty, ed., *The Elgin-Grey Papers, 1846–1852* (4 vols.; Ottawa, 1937), provide illuminating correspondence between these two partners on the transfer of British practices to Canada.

10. In Nova Scotia a like development occurred at the same time. Chester Martin, *Foundations of Canadian Nationhood* (Toronto, 1955), pp. 22, 100–101.

in North America. Before the achievement of autonomy some Canadians, as Durham had perceived, could not avoid comparing unfavorably their inferior position with the robust independence of the neighboring republic. As late as 1848 Elgin warned Downing Street that "Britain and British institutions have no hold whatever on the affections of certain classes of the inhabitants of this province. Powerful influences are at work, dragging it towards the United States." But the autonomy that Elgin successfully helped to establish counteracted these economic and political influences and reduced the attraction of American institutions.

The strength of the growing devotion to the British parliamentary model was notably exhibited at the Quebec Conference of 1864, where the colonial leaders unanimously sought a federation designed, in part, to protect the monarchical and parliamentary government as the political foundation of their projected nationhood. In debating the Quebec Resolutions in Canada's legislature, the assembled representatives, as George Brown asserted, were "earnestly deliberating how we shall best extend the blessings of British institutions." John A. Macdonald and others extolled the superiority of the parliamentary executive over the presidential in the belief that it produced greater political stability and less confusion.[11] To them a constitutional sovereign seemed a more dignified head for the state than an elected and transient president, inevitably associated with the passionate warfare of party politics. "We should have a distinct form of government," said Georges Cartier, "the characteristic of which would be to possess the monarchical element." Appointment to most offices was preferred to election because, as John A. Macdonald declared, "Nomination by the Crown is of course the system which is most in accordance with the British constitution." In particular, nomination for life with a property qualification was applied to the Senate in order to make it resemble as closely as Canadian conditions permitted the House of Lords. Like the Lords, it was expected to conform to the British principle that

11. *Parliamentary Debates on Confederation of British North American Provinces* (Quebec, 1865). Of particular interest are the opening speeches of John A. Macdonald, pp. 25–45, and Georges Cartier, pp. 53–62.

"classes and property should be represented as well as numbers." Macdonald also emphasized that to ensure the full benefits of the British constitution in Canada, no financial measures could be voted by Parliament unless introduced to the lower house by a responsible minister of the Crown. At Ottawa, as at Westminster, the executive was given a firm control over the public purse.

The Canadian leaders were anxious to obtain not merely the external forms of the British system, but what they interpreted as its inner and pervasive spirit: the sense of continuity, the capacity for slow and secure change, and the protection of minority rights and social diversities. To these qualities Macdonald and Cartier in particular were as devoted as any nineteenth-century British Whigs. In harmony with their own feelings and those of their colleagues, they wanted the new federation to be called the "Kingdom of Canada." In this, however, their intentions were frustrated in London by Lord Derby, the foreign secretary, who feared that the term "Kingdom" would irritate Americans and hamper Downing Street's current endeavour to appease Washington.

The establishment of a Canadian federal state helped, as its framers desired, to insure the survival of parliamentary institutions by consolidating and strengthening the weak and scattered communities of British North America into the nucleus of a continental nation. But the marriage of federalism and parliamentarianism created its own difficult problems. In Britain the parliamentary and cabinet system had evolved in a unitary state. In Canada it had to be fitted to a federal structure, and in the process some of its British features were necessarily modified. Indeed, certain Nova Scotians in the sixties opposed Confederation because it seemed to imply a sharp departure from the British principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Who ever believed, the *Acadian Recorder* asked indignantly, "that North American statesmen, trained in British institutions and traditions, would 'attempt to write the duties and functions of government in a list' "?[12]

The founding fathers, very mindful of the problem involved in

12. Quoted in Peter B. Waite, "Halifax Newspapers and the Federal Principle, 1864–1865," *Dalhousie Review,* XXXVII (Spring, 1957), 80.

adapting parliamentary sovereignty to a federal framework, attacked it directly. They endowed the national Parliament and provincial legislatures with full legislative power in their respective spheres, and reserved no sovereignty to the people. They guaranteed no rights of property, no "due process" clause, and no prescribed separation of powers to prevent a delegation of the legislature's authority to the executive, or an assertion of its control over the executive. The only restrictions they imposed on the principle of a sovereign Parliament are those explicit in the federal division of powers and in the authority of the national executive to reserve and disallow provincial acts, which was intended as analogous to the power exercisable by the imperial executive over the acts of the national Parliament. In the British North America Act the assumption of dual sovereigns, conspicuous in the American Constitution and its first amendments, is given no recognition. The preamble of the Act, on the contrary, expressed the desire of the colonies "to be federally united into one Dominion under the Crown . . . with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom."[13]

Confederation, next to the grant of responsible government, was the chief landmark in the development of British constitutional practice in Canada. The establishment of a large national Parliament provided an impetus to examine, apply, and protect the precedents of Westminster. But since 1867 the physical and social circumstances of the country have profoundly affected many of the institutions and usages derived from Britain. Canadian political life is obviously shaped not merely by the model of Westminster but by the environment of North America. Constitutional monarchy and parliamentarianism in Ottawa and the provincial capitals have worked in some distinctive ways, determined by local forces and circumstances. In Britain the Queen wields authority and influence on the spot. In Canada her role is mainly played by a substitute, nominated for a limited interval, and without the traditional and indefinable mystique of royalty. A remote sovereign exerts less influence. Yet the monarchical form is a significant fea-

13. The meaning of these pregnant phrases has been explained among others by Mr. Justice Duff in the Persons Case of 1928, 276 S.C.R. 291.

ture of the Canadian state, expressing the attachment to constitutional traditions and symbols that gives it a special political distinction in the Western hemisphere, without impairing its popular character or diminishing its political freedom.

On cabinet and Parliament the influence of local environment is manifest. In essentials the cabinet in Ottawa retains an obvious and close resemblance to its British namesake: it derives authority from the Crown, holds a pivotal position in political life, rules the country as the instrument of a victorious party, and has steadily grown in power with the progress of modern collectivism. Its wide range of authority is reflected in the strict discipline imposed on members of its own party in Parliament and the manner whereby it allocates the time and dominates the proceedings of the House. Here, as in Britain, there is a like solicitude for cabinet solidarity, outward unanimity despite internal differences, responsibility of members to one another, and collective responsibility to the House of Commons. Here too the cabinet is prodigal of claims for infallibility before Parliament, the party, and the electorate. It must constantly display a supreme confidence as the price of leadership.

Another important similarity of the Canadian to the British cabinet is the predominance of its chairman. The prime minister determines its size, selects its personnel, supervises and co-ordinates the relations of the ministers, moves them when expedient from one portfolio to another, requests their resignations when they seriously fumble, and animates them to present a common front. Although his ascendancy always depends on the collective loyalty of colleagues, his own aptitude for leadership largely determines the measure of this loyalty. He is required to do more than strike attitudes: he must produce results, and especially, of course, win and retain the support of the electorate.

In these and other respects we find in Canada what we find in Britain. But we also observe notable distinctions and omissions. In a large country, with regional rifts in attitude and opinion, a paramount and constant aim of national leaders is to pacify and reconcile divergent interests. This fact, evident in every facet of Canada's parliamentary regime, is well illustrated in the feder-

alized cabinet, designed to represent the chief cultural groups, religions, provinces, and regions of the nation. The cabinet is distinctly a coalition of interests. To an extent greater than in Britain, ministers are not merely administrators, but politicians, responsive especially to regional pressures. "The time has come," wrote Sir John Macdonald in 1888, "when we must choose men for their qualifications rather than for their locality." The goal was admirable, but only to a limited degree did Macdonald or any of his successors reach it. "I feel," said Mackenzie King in 1922, "that the whole purpose of Confederation itself would be menaced if any great body of opinion, any considerable section of this Dominion of Canada, should have reason to think that it was without due representation in the shaping of national policies." Every prime minister, eager to cultivate friends and avoid making enemies, must consider carefully what heterogeneous interests are entitled to a voice in his ministry. He decides on a Protestant and English-speaking representative from Quebec, three or four French from the same province, four or more representatives from Ontario, and a number from the West larger or smaller than that selected from the Atlantic provinces. He may have to accept a mediocrity from a region because mediocrities only were elected. Occasionally he is compelled to draw ministers from existing provincial governments of the same party stripe in order to demonstrate his concern for provincial interests and to secure able colleagues not otherwise available. Within ten years of Confederation Goldwin Smith wrote in words still relevant: "From the composition of a cabinet to the composition of a rifle-team, sectionalism is the rule."[14]

In the functioning of Parliament there are evident departures from British convention and practice owing to the pressure of the local environment. In some matters cultural dualism is respected as a practical necessity. In the British North America Act the equality of the French and English languages in parliamentary debates is recognized, and since 1959 simultaneous translation has given this formal equality more substance. Moreover, certain unwritten conventions acknowledge the fact of two peoples and

14. *The Political Destiny of Canada* (Toronto, 1878), p. 17.

two languages. Custom requires that the English speaker of one Parliament is replaced by a French speaker in the next and vice versa, while the deputy speaker helps to maintain an ethnic equilibrium, since he is selected on the ground that his mother tongue differs from the speaker's. These are elementary devices for acknowledging the presence of two cultures, and do not imply that most parliamentarians are bilingual. The reverse is actually the case, for English as the language of the majority remains the chief medium of debate.

No office reflects better the spirit and temper of Parliament than that of the speaker, who interprets the rules and insures freedom of discussion. Since 1867, in Ottawa as at Westminster, the proclaimed ideal is the speaker's strict political neutrality. "Impartiality on the part of the Speaker," declared Ernest Lapointe in 1926, "is the supreme law of his office. It is essential that every member should have the conviction that when our colleague ascends the throne of the Speaker he ceases to be the man of the party and becomes the man of the whole house." Yet, although in the chair the speaker may conduct himself with all the rectitude necessary to his high office, he has not hitherto enjoyed as fully as his counterpart in Britain the status of a political neutral, for never has he been completely and finally divorced from party connections. His release from partisanship is at best temporary. Chosen for a given Parliament, he commonly changes with the next election and always when the party complexion of the new Parliament differs from the old. Unlike the British speaker, he cannot on his nomination look forward to a secure and wholly non-partisan position. Since his constituency is contested, he must for re-election and future preferment rely on his party's support. To these facts is added another: under Canadian rules, which in this matter differ from the British, the speaker's decisions are not final, for they may be submitted to a vote of the House in which the attitude of the Government may be decisive.

Parliamentary institutions operate according to the nature of the society, and from the outset the Canadian society differed from the British. A notable distinction is that Canada, like Aus-

tralia and New Zealand but unlike Britain, has never had a governing class, endowed with the necessary leisure, political interest, and intellectual cultivation, from which members of Parliament might be freely recruited. Aside from prosperous farmers, most members of the national Parliament must first achieve success in trade or the professions before facing the financial hazards of a political career. Electoral interests and political life always involve a costly drain on time and money, severe sacrifices for those with no income beyond a sessional indemnity. By convention, members are usually expected to reside in their constituencies, sustain numerous personal contacts there, exhibit an eager interest in local affairs, and spend six months of the year in Ottawa, which may be hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Although the national capital itself no longer merits Goldwin Smith's description as "the nearest lumber village to the North Pole," it is not a large metropolis sustaining a vigorous life and providing abundant openings for the employment of talent in the professions, journalism, or business. These circumstances obviously restrict the opportunity for candidates to enter Parliament at an early age and master its diverse arts and procedures.

In the absence of anything like the modern British governing class, the legal profession in both the French and English sections of the country is a partial substitute. From the birth of the federation the role of lawyers in the national Parliament has been conspicuously more important than at Westminster. Of the thirteen prime ministers since 1867, nine have been lawyers, and usually self-made men. Mr. John Diefenbaker, reared on a western farm, boasted that as an impecunious book salesman and student he had slept in every haystack in Saskatchewan. Many of his predecessors as prime minister could lay similar claim to the credentials of humble origins, as indeed could most members of the Commons, where the social norm has been that of self-made men of middle-class standards. Lawyers commonly constitute about a third of the House. They climb into the bar, and from the bar into Parliament. In 1867 eight held office in Canada's first ministry of thirteen members. In subsequent ministries they have not always maintained this high proportion, but have been consistently

prominent among the chief architects of policy. In provincial cabinets and legislatures in eastern if not in western Canada they are equally evident and influential.

Lawyers have acquired this conspicuous place in public life because they find it less inconvenient than the representatives of other occupations to combine a profession with politics and their special skills appeal to the public. Their practice may sometimes suffer from membership in the House, but they do not lose their legal knowledge, and, unless they enter a Government, they retain a law office or some association with one. Indeed, activity in politics may often be positively advantageous as an acceptable form of professional advertisement. Legal practice, especially in a city or town, introduces them to varied elements in the community, sharpens their understanding of diverse interests, and shapes the flexibility of mind which enables them to make a persuasive appeal to electors. To the ordinary citizens in town and country they thus appear peculiarly well-equipped for the craft of politics and for representing local interests in the counsels of the nation.

In the twentieth century, parliamentary and cabinet government in Canada, no less than in Britain, relies heavily on the permanent civil service. As the ministry grows in power with progressive collectivism, the civil service grows in importance as its daily mentor, reliable handmaid, gleaner of knowledge, and purveyor of information and fresh ideas. Ministers meet officials at the critical point where policy is determined, and hence the political and the official minds collaborate in ruling the country.

Throughout its evolution, the Canadian civil service has been profoundly influenced by the model of Whitehall, although local environment has constantly modified the manner whereby the model has been adapted. In the first quarter-century after Confederation, when other elements of the parliamentary state were being fashioned, political conditions hampered a ready and generous response to the important idea then current in Britain, derived from the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of the fifties and expressed in Gladstone's reforms of the seventies: namely, that the

civil service should be recruited and promoted on merit. This British conception had advocates, but for long made little headway against the entrenched conviction that patronage was the legitimate and necessary reward of a party's triumph at the polls. Political leaders believed, not only that the privilege of appointing their own deserving henchmen to the public service was needed to preserve their party and the beneficence of party government, but that it was also indispensable to satisfy regional feelings and strengthen the political cohesion of a large and disjointed federation. This mode of achieving national unity was an easy excuse for partisan gain. An astute master in employing patronage was Sir John Macdonald. "Every government," he remarked, "selected for the civil service their own friends and no one could object to it." Therein he expressed, as he never failed to practice, the view prevalent among colonial politicians of what responsible government meant.

Yet the system of political patronage had defects too obvious to remain immune from attack: inflated staffs, frustrated officials, incompetent favorites, and low efficiency. It was condemned by the advocates of a rationally organized and efficient state. Britain's method of coping with it appealed to the thoughtful portion of the Canadian public no less strongly than to contemporary reformers in the neighboring United States. Effective reform was delayed, however, until 1908, when an independent Civil Service Commission was appointed with adequate power to recruit the officials employed in Ottawa. Henceforth development proceeded on the basis of the Commission's selection of staff through open competition and suitable tests. In 1918 its jurisdiction was enlarged to embrace federal personnel outside as well as within the national capital.

Since then the attempt to develop a civil service recruited and promoted by merit has in many matters of procedure and organization departed from British precedents. The Treasury as a controlling agency has played a somewhat less conspicuous part in the Canadian than in the British system, whereas the ostensibly independent Civil Service Commission has wielded wider if not greater authority than its namesake in London. The influence of

Washington and the American states is evident in a comprehensive Civil Service Act, vertical and detailed classification of personnel, and recruitment on the basis of special training rather than general ability or natural aptitude. Yet, although the British administrative inheritance is modified by American example, it still remains significant. In Ottawa, no less than in London, the dividing line between the politician craving publicity and the permanent official cherishing anonymity is drawn higher in the administrative hierarchy than in Washington. A political party replacing another in power does not, as in the United States, introduce to public office a new and large retinue of top advisers and administrators. It assumes that in the civil service it will find a reliable and competent corps of officials to supplement its thinking and implement its decisions. The deputy-minister as the permanent chief of a department is a non-political figure who normally brings to the aid of his minister the resources of seasoned experience and knowledge. He advises and the minister decides. He is expected to identify himself wholeheartedly with the desires and fortunes of his current political master, and when an able man his intimate partnership with the politician is an invaluable influence on public policy.

Although the model of Westminster is primarily reflected in the institutions of Parliament, cabinet, and civil service, the courts and modes of securing justice and civil liberty are hardly less characteristic and significant. Canada, too, inherited the English common law and judicial system, with such modifications as the social circumstances and political needs of a federal state demand. In this respect it has somewhat resembled the United States except that its legal inheritance is more recent and more constantly nourished by close constitutional relations with Britain. Formally the migration of the common law to the country was continuous until 1949, when the Supreme Court in Ottawa became the final appellate tribunal. It did not, however, cease then since the influence of British judicial decisions survived and will likely endure into an indefinite future.

We are not concerned here wth the details of Canadian judicature but only its salient features, of which the most notable is its

relatively unified character on a strictly British pattern within the federal framework. The national government appoints from the bar the members of the Supreme Court of Canada and of the superior and county courts in the provinces, assures their independence by secure tenure and fixed salary, and can remove them only on an address of the Senate and House of Commons. There has been no disposition, in conflict with the British tradition, to imitate experiments in an elected judiciary on short tenures like those in some neighboring states of the republic. In all provinces except Quebec, procedure in civil trials is derived directly from the rules of the English courts. The common-law doctrine of precedent is no less respected, and has been the guarantor of a substantial uniformity in the common law of most provinces save when modified by local statute. In the substance of the law no less than in the procedures of the courts, a close kinship with Britain endures. In the law of negotiable instruments, torts and contracts, wills, partnerships, companies, the criminal code, and many other matters the intimacy of the kinship is conspicuous.

Yet in this legal inheritance accommodations have been necessarily made with the facts of federalism and the character of the country. In securing to the French of Quebec their special property and civil rights, Canada has preserved in one province a civil code alongside the common law in the other provinces. It has also recognized devolution in making the provinces explicitly responsible for administering the courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction, which consequently have a provincial character, even though the judges are appointed and paid by the federal authority. Aside from the senior judicial bodies, there is an intricate network of local jurisdictions presided over by justices of the peace and police magistrates, who are appointed and paid by the provinces and interpret provincial statutes and municipal by-laws. A Canadian magistracy, originally patterned on the British, has come to wield wide authority, embracing some 90 per cent of all criminal cases that reach the courts. The Fathers of Confederation assumed that they were making the national government primarily accountable for the instruments

of justice, but had not calculated on the growth of an industrial and urban society wherein local jurisdictions would become increasingly important.

In conclusion, it may be emphasized that in salient traits the government of Canada resembles that of the other older dominions of the Commonwealth which have also taken Westminster as a model. As in these lands the system of government is not prescribed in a single constitutional document: it rests in numerous laws, conventions, and accepted practices. The British North America Act contains some of its indispensable elements, but remains silent on others hardly less indispensable. A literate and inquisitive foreigner who purused this Act in order to learn the kind of constitution whereby Canadians enjoyed their liberties would often be gravely misled and greatly confused. From the sections on executive power, for example, he would be disposed to conclude that Canada was under the dictatorship of a person called a governor-general, who represented the authority of the Queen. The governor-general, he would find (in section 11), is assisted by a council, which he himself chooses, summons, and removes. The governor may assent to legislation, refuse assent, or reserve it for the signification of the Queen's pleasure (section 55). The inquisitive foreigner would doubtless also read with astonishment that the Queen is commander in chief of all naval and military forces in Canada (section 15).

These sections of the statute certainly do not reflect realities, and must be read in the light of conventions and usages not listed therein. The Canadian constitution is thus aptly described as similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom because in it also law and practice often radically differ. It has accumulated a large body of conventions basic to its real operations and character, which sometimes render the formal law a dead letter. This conventional structure has throughout been influenced by and closely resembles that in Britain. It exhibits the same persistent form of pragmatism: a tendency to place trust in practice and in understandings about practice rather than in statutory enactments. It shows the same tender tolerance to those anomalies which came with the passage of time. From 1791 to the present

is a long span, but the continuity in development from the Constitutional Act has been virtually uninterrupted. Amid all the intervening political changes, Canada's adherence to the essential elements in the model of Westminster has endured.

• 4 •

The Transfer of British Military Institutions to Canada in the Nineteenth Century

*Richard A. Preston**

The spread of institutions from Europe across the face of the globe, the most pregnant feature of modern history, has included military institutions—the means by which, to greater or lesser degrees, the process of imperial expansion took place. While that transfer of military capacity is not, in itself, the cause of the disintegration of empires, it will obviously have far-reaching consequences. As the transfer of institutions happens to coincide with a vast increase in the power of weapons, the use which emergent states make of an increased power of offense will determine the future, perhaps the fate, of man.

The military institutions which carry with them these awesome potentialities include the structure and organization of well-led forces for conventional and ultimately for unconventional and nuclear warfare. They include also the political framework set up within the state for the regulation of those armed forces; and, in the armed forces themselves, they include the development of an intangible quality called morale, or the will-to-win, and the means by which it is fostered. The latter depends on such things as patriotic and nationalistic feeling, love of liberty, discipline, self-confidence, and response to leadership. It also grows from the

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careful cultivation of a military tradition which in turn is associated with what often seems to the civilian observer to be trivial detail of uniform and custom, of antiquarian rather than historical interest.

As is apparently the case with other transfers of institutions discussed in this book, the problems connected with the development of Western-type armed forces in colonial territories and new states vary according to whether the graft is being made on a stock that consists of colonists who have emigrated from the motherland, or of ancient civilizations, or of primitive peoples. Superficially there may be great similarity in the fruit of such grafts; but beneath the skin there may be significant differences. The existence of similarity as well as of dissimilarity makes worthwhile the study of the transfer of military institutions in a sample of the first of the three types mentioned above. The problems connected with the influence of British military ideas and organization upon the Canadian army will not necessarily have exact parallels in the growth of modern armies elsewhere. But one thing that will be seen is that this is not merely a simple case of transplanting an old institution from the motherland to another place. Presumably the process of transplantation will be even more complicated in other places where results may be proportionately more different and also more difficult to understand and to forecast.

The military tradition upon which the Canadian army is built has four important elements: a militia or part-time citizen-soldier tradition, a voluntary tradition, the British regular army tradition, and a tradition of the subordination of the military to civil control. Not all these elements have been equally effective at all times. For instance, the Canadian militia has recently been assigned a role to aid in survival after an atomic attack, and only when the Canadian regular army was shortly afterwards also assigned survival duties was it possible to reassure the militia that it was not being swept into the discard. Yet it seems unlikely that the militia will, in the future, play the major part that it once had in Canada's organization for defense.

All four elements of the Canadian military tradition listed

above have been shared with other countries and, indeed, all are to be found, in one form or another, in Britain. Nevertheless, there is good reason to suggest that not all are direct transplantations from the motherland. Insofar as they are found to be indigenous growths in North America, it may be argued that similar transferences of military institutions to other colonies and subject peoples, especially those of different types, may be less effective unless they can put down strong roots into genial soil.

The militia tradition

The first element in the Canadian military tradition, reliance upon a part-time citizen-soldier force, has roots which go back deep into the prehistory of Canada in the thirteen colonies. That it was largely an indigenous growth is suggested immediately by the fact that at the time of the first plantations in America in the seventeenth century, England was virtually without any effective military system at all, and certainly had nothing ready for transfer to the fledgling communities across the Atlantic. During the Middle Ages the ancient practice of universal military service, inherited from the barbarian German tribes, had died out almost everywhere in Europe except in England and Scandinavia. But although it had survived in England and had been revitalized for a time by Philip and Mary so that Elizabeth could use it for home defense and even as a source of recruits for continental expeditions, the militia had become dormant by the early seventeenth century. The forms existed, but the institution itself was practically a dead letter.

In the colonies, however, in the face of the Indian menace, the militia came very much alive again. Experienced soldiers such as Captain John Smith and Captain Myles Standish came out to train and lead the settlers. Every colony posessed a militia except Pennsylvaina, which for religious reasons turned the other cheek, or a blind eye, until 1750. Methods of enlistment, terms of service, grounds for exemption, systems of training, organization, standards of efficiency, and the appointment or election of officers

varied greatly from one colony to another and cannot be ascribed to English contemporary practice. Whenever and wherever the danger was less immediate, the militia organization decayed proportionately. Clearly the development of colonial militias was a direct response to environment. That it was so is confirmed by the development of similar citizen-soldier systems in other parts of the world although the respective mother countries in Europe had been without any such military institution for a very long time, for instance, in New France and among the Boers. The important point is that, by spontaneous generation, the principle of universal military service on a part-time basis was firmly established in America.[1]

Meanwhile, in England the military system had come to consist almost entirely of a professional regular army. After the (English) Civil War the citizen militia based on universal service was, in the words of the historian of the British army, "a thoroughly inefficient force" until it was reorganized in 1757–1758 with the introduction of a supplementary voluntary system.[2] Even after that date the British militia was definitely secondary and still full of dry rot.

In America, for a while, colonial militias were effective. They proved capable of dealing with the Indian menace. Only with the struggle with France for possession of the continent, which began in 1690 and lasted for nearly a century, did it come slowly to be realized that the militias were unsuitable for imperial wars. Various expedients were tried: provincial regiments of volunteers, largely recruited from the militias; regiments raised by British officers in America; and recruitment of Americans into older British formations. All were almost equally unsatisfactory. Ultimately the elder Pitt was compelled to send regiments from Europe to give the deathblow to the French Empire.[3] The professional military system which had become dominant in Europe was thus projected to America.

1. Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," *Military Affairs*, XXII (Spring, 1958), 77–82.
2. John W. Fortescue, *The British Army, 1783–1802* (London, 1905), p. 2.
3. Stanley M. Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun in North America* (London, 1933), pp. 6–44.

The American colonists were apparently not greatly impressed. They had inherited the Englishman's deep suspicion that standing armies were inevitably a threat to liberty, and they were disturbed by the failure of the earlier expeditions in which American forces were led by British generals. They were convinced that American militiamen were better fighting material, especially in the defense of their own homes. The military system, in the form which had developed, proved inadequate to maintain British control of the thirteen colonies.[4] Therefore the militia tradition endured and was undeterred not only by the opposing evidence of the Seven Years' War and the confirmatory experiences of the American War of Independence but even by the more obvious conclusions about its inadequacy that could be drawn from the War of 1812 and the Civil War. It remained to condition military policy in both the United States and Canada until the twentieth century.

The militia tradition was carried to Canada by the Loyalists and was there reinforced by the even more powerful, and far more effective, militia tradition of New France.[5] The settlement of members of the disbanded Loyalist regiments together in the same area, the retention of their weapons "for the use of the Messes in the Pigeon and Wild fowle Seasons," Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe's introduction into Upper Canada of the county-lieutenant in direct imitation of the lord-lieutenant who commanded the English county militia, all testify to a deliberate British intention to foster reliance upon a colonial militia.[6] The Militia Act of 1803 in Lower Canada and its counterpart of 1808 in the upper province were straightforward and effective

4. John C. Miller, *Origins of the American Revolution* (Boston, 1955), pp. 429, 431, 440.
5. George F. G. Stanley, "The Canadian Militia during the Ancien Regime," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research,* XXII (1944), 157–168; and by the same author, "The Canadian Militia during the Colonial Period," *ibid.,* XXIV (1946), 33–41.
6. Richard A. Preston, *Kingston Before the War of 1812: A Collection of Documents* (Toronto, 1959), pp. 69, 238, 241, 254. These documents prove that, contrary to what Canadian military historians have believed, Simcoe's county-lieutenants were active until the Militia Act of 1808 replaced them by militia colonels.

measures. They were not a mere reproduction of the confused legislation of 1802 in Britain.[7] They set up the militia as a secondary defense force to back up the British garrison. When General Brock in 1812 obtained the power to call out the militia "flank companies" for service in either province, or in the United States if necessary, that part of the Canadian active militia became, for operational purposes, virtually a part of the British regular army for the duration of the war.[8]

The voluntary principle

Although universal obligation of service for a militia force remained in Canadian law until 1950, for all practical purposes it had been replaced for almost a century by voluntary enlistment. Once again this was not a case of direct borrowing from Britain. It is true that the voluntary principle had been grafted on to the British militia during emergencies in the middle of the eighteenth century and at the time of the Napoleonic wars, and the ballot was being used in 1855 only if insufficient volunteers came forward.[9] But the real introduction of the volunteer movement in Britain, the result of a spontaneous demand upon the part of the citizens to be trained for home defense, did not come until 1859 when Napoleon III seemed to threaten that England might be invaded.[10] Twenty years before that time, patriotic Canadians had begun voluntary training for defense with little official

7. John W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (13 vols.; London, 1899–1930) V, 198–213.
8. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, VIII, 523. Flank Companies constituted about one-third of the strength of the militia regiment in Upper Canada. They were the younger, fitter men selected by ballot if insufficient volunteers came forward. (George F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People* [Toronto, 1960], p. 149). The terminology was a little different in Lower Canada and the Maritime Provinces but the principles were similar. Flank companies were called "detachments" in the Upper Canada Militia Act of 1808 which first authorized their creation. (Canadian Military Institute, *Selected Papers from the Transactions of the Institute, 1910* [Toronto, 1910], No. 18, p. 26.) Later usage distinguished between the "sedentary militia," which was little more than a nominal roll of men of military age, and the "active militia," which was more liable for training and service.
9. U. S. Congress, Senate, *Military Commission to Europe in 1855 and 1856. Report of Major Alfred Mordecai, of the Ordnance Department*, 36 Cong. 1st Sess., Senate Ex. Doc. 60, 1860, p. 58. A companion piece is Senate Ex. Doc. 59, *Report on the Art of War in Europe in 1854, 1855, and 1856, by Major Richard Delafield. . . .*
10. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, XIII, 527.

encouragement. George Taylor Denison, who had commanded a troop of dragoons in the troubles of 1837, reorganized it on a voluntary basis when it was disbanded in 1839. In 1846, the voluntary Montreal Fire Brigade was officially authorized to train as an infantry unit. When Canada was left exposed in 1855 by the withdrawal of regular British regiments for the Crimea, this voluntary enthusiasm was tapped by the establishment of volunteer companies under the Militia Act.[11] The volunteer spirit, although reinvigorated in the usual way by winds which blew from home,[12] had actually developed much earlier in Canada than in Britain because the danger there seemed more real.

The end products of the volunteer movement were for a long time quite different in Canada and Britain. The War Office heartily disliked volunteers in part-time forces and was willing to tolerate them in England only if kept quite distinct from the regular army and the ancient militia. The British volunteer's connection with the army, and even his role in the event of an invasion, thus remained nebulous even after Cardwell had reformed the whole military structure in the 1870's. On the other hand the Canadian militia, now a voluntary force, was the only immediately available reinforcement for the regular regiments of the British garrison in Canada. When those regiments were withdrawn in 1871, the refusal of the government of Canada to face up to the cost of providing more effective defense forces left the Canadian militia the only protection for British North America except for the tiny British garrisons in Halifax and Esquimalt.

The Canadian active militia, as opposed to the sedentary militia which was now only a paper force, was different from the British militia in another respect. It included other branches of the service in addition to "rifles," as most volunteer and colonial infantry units liked to be called in imitation of the rifle regiments of the British army. From the first the Canadian ac-

11. C. F. Hamilton, "Defence, 1812–1912," in Adam Shortt and Arthur Doughty, eds., *Canada and Its Provinces* (23 vols.; Toronto, 1914–1917), VII, 395.
12. Walter Richards, *Her Majesty's Army* (3 vols.; London, 1888–1891), III, *Indian and Colonial Forces*, p. 269, says that the "war-like spirit . . . engendered in 1859 in Britain soon spread to the dependencies of Great Britain and was taken up in a practical manner." This seems to have been the order of things in Nova Scotia, perhaps because fear of an American invasion was less urgent there.

tive militia had included, not only cavalry descended from Denison's Horse, but also artillery. The British militia was merely an infantry force. The British yeomanry, or part-time cavalry, was an independent organization with a status not unlike the volunteers, although less despised in official military circles because they were mainly country gentlemen and their tenants. And there was no militia or volunteer artillery in Britain. Thus, fifty years before Haldane created the British Territorial Army in 1907 to include all arms in a citizen part-time force, Canadian citizen soldiers were mastering the technical mysteries of artillery training.[13] It took the Boer War to show the War Office that it was possible to make clerks and farmers into first-class mounted artillerymen in their spare time.

Nevertheless, the Canadian militia was not yet organized as a force ready to take the field on a moment's notice. The adjutant-generals, seconded from the British army to command it until 1873, were, as the name of their appointment suggests, regarded chiefly as responsible for the training of a force that would be, in emergency, handed over to the British commander-in-chief in North America and would need to be reorganized by him for active service. Even when the adjutant-generals were subordinated to British general officers commanding the Canadian militia, and although those officers proceeded to reorganize the militia to make it more like an army rather than a mere training command, it was, until after the South African War, without the staff and services necessary for it to be able to operate as a distinct entity. It is important to realize, however, that not only did it have cavalry and artillery which the British militia lacked, but also it never came to act in the same way as a source of recruits for the regular army.

The British army and Canada

The model for the Canadian militia was not the British militia, but the British regular army garrison. This created a situation

13. The Bombardier (pseud.), "The Father of the Canadian Artillery," *Canadian Defence Quarterly,* II (Oct., 1924), 8.

quite different from that which had existed in the old thirteen colonies. There, the few miserable and neglected companies in New York, almost the only British regulars in America before the Seven Years' War, can have had no useful influence upon the colonial militia or upon the provincial regiments.[14] When American provincial regiments were embodied before the Revolution they often were dependent upon the British for the technical services; *e.g.*, engineers and even artillery. The colonists usually provided the unconventional troops required by the peculiar circumstances of war in the North American forests: boatmen, rangers, riflemen, light infantry, and the like. The British regulars and American provincials were thus often complementary rather than parallel forces. Presumably the provincial infantry regiments organized themselves more or less on the lines of the British regulars after the latter appeared in America during the Seven Years' War; but it is probable that there was no close assimilation and little affection. The ranking of all provincial commissions below those granted by the king or the commander-in-chief created a sense of difference as well as of ill-feeling.[15]

The presence of a permanent garrison for the first century of the British regime in Canada shaped the Canadian military tradition. It was a relatively large garrison, in the earlier days as big as the whole American army. Thus, on the eve of the War of 1812, despite British involvement in a European war, there were in Upper and Lower Canada no less than four regiments of the line and a battalion of veterans, besides three battalions of Canadian Fencibles (provincial regiments in British pay). Throughout the century, British soldiers were popular. Their officers gave tone to provincial society and played a great part

14. Stanley M. Pargellis, "The Four Independent Companies of New York," *Essays in Colonial History Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by his Students* (New Haven, 1931), pp. 96–123.

15. Stanley M. Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs in North America, 1748–1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (New York, 1936) pp. xv, xxi, 44, etc. Instead of being a model for the provincials, the regulars actually learned from them in certain fields. British light infantry regiments and rifle corps were born in America but it took the experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars to confirm the need for them in official British eyes (E. M. Lloyd, *A Review of the History of Infantry* [London, 1908], pp. 177, 221).

in its social life. They were much sought after as husbands. Furthermore, many officers and men settled in Canada when they left the service and so helped to carry British military practices into the militia, in which they often took a great interest. Hence, the British garrison not only saved Canada in 1812 but also, from the first, exercised an important informal influence on the old militia, setting standards of military efficiency and providing the British army as its model. Accounts of the roistering on annual muster days suggest, however, that the lessons were not always taken very seriously.

Much attention has been paid to the reluctance of Canada to make adequate provision for its own defense after the gaining of responsible government. British Liberals continually emphasized the interdependence of self-government and self-defense. Canadian ministers, however, pleaded the burden of public works in a new country. Military historians have criticized the narrow-mindedness of most Canadian politicians (with John A. Macdonald as a rare exception) and have indicated that expenditure on defense was unpopular, especially with the French-Canadian voter, who at times held the balance.[16] As a result of the lack of interest in military matters at this and in later periods there has grown up a myth that Canadians are "an unmilitary people," a peculiar claim to special virtue in view of their military record. One critic of this myth has argued that it was not that they were unmilitary but that they were badly led, that is to say, that politicians were at fault.[17] But the fundamental reason for Canadian unpreparedness was always that the Canadian people were not ready to admit that there was danger. And it should at least be said on behalf of the politicians that they had no ambition to use military power either within or outside the state.

Although the American Civil War forced politicians in the Province of Canada at last to face up to the need to budget

16. Canadian reluctance to spend money on defense is fully examined in Charles P. Stacey, *Canada and the British Army, 1846–71* (London, 1936), *passim;* and in his *The Military Problems of Canada* (Toronto, 1940), pp. 58–61.
17. Arnold Warren, *Wait for the Wagon: The Story of the Royal Canadian Army Services Corps* (Toronto, 1961), p. 120.

for defense, it resulted in a political crisis about the question of compulsory, as opposed to voluntary, service. Sandfield Macdonald's Militia Act of 1863, however, appropriated $100,000 for "schools of military instruction" for volunteer and militia officers. Schools were at once set up in Toronto and Quebec City. The British regulars at those places furnished the instruction, the Province paying bonuses to the instructing officers and men, but the British government bearing the normal costs of the regiments concerned. By January, 1865, five hundred militia officers had taken certificates of qualification and two hundred were in attendance.[18]

The Governor General, however, persuaded his ministers "to place all the local forces upon some better established military system, and, above all things, to model them upon the lines of our Regular Army, with which they would have to act in the event of war."[19] They therefore agreed to appoint a distinguished British officer as adjutant-general, a post which had been left vacant as an economy measure. The Commander-in-Chief in Britain, the Duke of Cambridge, selected for this appointment General Patrick MacDougall, a Crimean veteran who, as superintendent of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, had been a strong advocate of the need for a staff college and had been appointed the first commandant when one was set up at Camberley. He was a son-in-law of the historian Napier and was himself a military intellectual who had written several volumes on the science of war. Coming to Canada in 1865, MacDougall collected an excellent militia staff and set up more schools for training in the garrison towns of Kingston, Montreal, Hamilton, and London. For militia officers who had passed through the schools, a cadet training camp was established at La Prairie, and Colonel Garnet Wolseley, a future commander-in-chief of the British army, was put in charge. By April 30, 1866, the military schools had issued 2,113 certificates.[20] Wolseley gave Mac-

18. C. F. Hamilton, "The Canadian Militia: From 1861 to Confederation," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, VI (April, 1929), 209–210.
19. Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life* (2 vols.; New York, 1903), II, 145.
20. Stacey, *Canada and the British Army*, p. 188 n.

Dougall the credit for the ease with which two Canadian battalions co-operated with a regular battalion in the Red River expedition which he commanded in 1870. "No commander could wish for better soldiers than those two [Canadian] infantry battalions."[21]

The final withdrawal of the British garrison in 1871 made it necessary for the Canadian government to set up its own training schools for the militia. With Canadian militia officers for instructors these soon declined. However, in 1871, two batteries of permanent artillery were established at Quebec and Kingston, and two skilled British gunners, Captains T. B. Strange and G. B. French, were appointed Inspectors of Artillery and Warlike Stores. French soon left to organize the Northwest Mounted Police, but Strange remained to father the Canadian artillery. The batteries were at first self-perpetuating schools through which successive groups of militia men passed and handed on their training to new classes as they came in.[22]

When the Royal Military College was founded in Kingston in 1876, a British Royal Engineers officer, Colonel E. O. Hewett, was appointed to its command and his staff, apart from civilian professors for non-military and non-scientific officers, were British regular officers. When the adjutants-general gave way to general officers commanding the militia in 1874, British generals were loaned from the active army. Then, in 1883, to staff the schools for cavalry and infantry that were planned to open the following year, Canadian officers were sent to train in England. From 1893 training in England became a regular practice.[23]

The Canadian government, uninterested as it apparently was in military affairs, was thus quite willing, when stirred to action, to borrow from Britain. The *Regulations and Orders for the Ac-*

21. Wolseley, II, 145–151. On his return to Britain, MacDougall was employed at the War Office where he presided over the committee charged with the reorganization of the British army and later became first director of the newly formed Intelligence Department. It is tempting to assume that this most able man carried back with him to "one of the most important committees that have ever sat at the War Office" something from his experiences in Canada. (*Canadian Illustrated News*, Oct. 26, 1878; also *Dictionary of National Biography: Supplement* [Oxford, 1921–22], pp. 93–94.)
22. The Bombardier, pp. 5–9.
23. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, pp. 266–267.

tive Militia were drawn directly from the British *Queen's Regulations* but given a few changes in the earlier paragraphs to make them applicable to Canada. The most noticeable difference was that there was a parallel French translation.[24] The Canadian militia also used such British training manuals as were then available. At that time manuals were concerned mainly with peacetime drill and were not as detailed even in that sphere as they became later. Nor were they obligatory or universally used. They were prepared by individuals rather than officially by a staff. How far he would use them was left to the individual commanding officer. Wolseley's *The Soldier's Pocket Book,* a manual of military organization and tactics published in 1869, was the first to break new ground. It was probably followed as closely in the Canadian militia as in the British army where it was unpopular among senior generals.[25]

Military interest in Canada

British military instruction would have been barren had it not fallen on fertile soil. It was not only retired British officers and men who flocked to the militia schools. Canadian enthusiasm for things military, when there seemed to be need, had not been lost since the great wars of the past. The Crimean War and the Mutiny had brought a flood of English-speaking Canadians to volunteer for service in the British army, as had also the recruiting for the "Royal Canadians" (100th Regiment of Foot) raised for imperial service in 1858. The enlistment of French-Canadians for a regiment of Zouaves to defend the Pope in 1868 told a similar tale in Quebec.[26] Some Canadians already were, in fact, military experts. The best books on cavalry written anywhere in the nineteenth century were the work of a Toronto lawyer, Colonel George Taylor Denison, son of the founder of Denison's Horse, whose family had lived in Canada for gener-

24. *Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia, 1870* (Ottawa, 1870).
25. Wolseley, II, 226.
26. Leopold Lamontagne, "The Ninth Crusade," *Canadian Historical Review,* XXXII (1951), 220–235.

ations.[27] Lord Wolseley described him as "one of the ablest and . . . best read officers I ever knew. . . . [, who] would have been a military leader of note in any army he joined. . . . He was a man in a thousand, and a born cavalry leader."[28] Toronto was undoubtedly the home of the martial spirit in Canada. The Canadian Military Institute, organized there on January 14, 1890, was closely patterned on the Royal United Services Institution in London and, like it, possessed a military library, held meetings for papers and discussion, and published the more important of its transactions. It claimed to draw its members from militia officers in all parts of the Dominion though there were at first few from Quebec.[29] Talks were given at the Institute by British officers serving in Canada or retired or passing through. These helped to reinforce the British army influence.

There seems to have been a conspiracy of silence among Canadian historians of both languages to hide the fact that French Canadians also played a part. They were, of course, not as deeply involved as the Torontonians. But militia battalions were organized in 1862 (the 9th Voltigeurs de Québec and 11th Argenteuil Rangers), in 1863 (17th Lévis Battalion of Infantry), in 1869 (three battalions of Les Fusiliers de St. Laurent and two of Le Régiment de la Chaudière), and in 1871 (Le Régiment de Trois Rivieres, Le Regiment de Joliette, and St. Hyacinthe Provisional Battalion of Infantry, now the 6th Battalion of the famous Van Doos, or Royal 22nd) which must have been largely French Canadian in composition.[30] Furthermore, from the early days there were French-speaking cadets at Royal Military College; and one of them, Sir Percy Girouard, was probably its most distinguished graduate.[31] British officers such as Colonel Strange,

27. *Modern Cavalry: Its Organization, Armament, and Employment in War* (London, 1868); *A History of Cavalry from the Earliest Times, with Lessons for the Future* (London, 1877).
28. Wolseley, II, 148–149.
29. Canadian Military Institute, "Summary of the Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting, January, 1891," *Selected Papers . . . 1890–91*, pp. 49–50; "List of Members," *ibid., 1892–93*, pp. 196–204.
30. Leopold Lamontagne, *Les Archives Regimentaires des Fuseliers du St. Laurent* (privately printed, [1943]), pp. 63–64.
31. Sir Percy Girouard, a brilliant soldier engineer, built military railways in the Sudan and South Africa, became Governor of Nigeria, and was Director General of Munitions Supply in Britain in 1915.

who could speak French and knew the Quebec militia units, found the *Canadien* a first-class fighting soldier.[32] Lord Dundonald, who left under a cloud as a result of his stirring up martial enthusiasm in Canada, wrote in his memoirs about the friendly greetings tendered him by French Canadians, officers and others, when he departed the country.[33]

British uniforms and equipment

Major R. M. Barnes, who has made himself the established expert on British army uniforms, states that early in the nineteenth century, Canadian forces were given permission to wear uniforms like those of the British army.[34] It seems unlikely that there was a general permissive order. More probably, authorization for British-type uniforms was given in individual instances. Troops raised in India and America in the eighteenth century had worn British-type uniforms.[35] The extension of this principle to the Canadian militia would be a natural process, and it is the fiction of personal royal command over British forces that probably accounts for the statement that royal permission was given. The Canadian militia and militia staff followed British developments in uniform as closely as was possible, within the restrictions imposed by financial stringency. Thus, when the Military College was founded in 1876, the cadets wore a shako. But in 1878 the shako was replaced in the British army by a spiked helmet. The Canadian gentlemen-cadets do not appear to have worn a shako after 1878 and soon afterwards had the spiked helmet for full-dress wear.

Muskets and rifles, the most important equipment of the infantry in the nineteenth century, were ordered from England. There was a tendency for Canadian forces to be dressed and equipped in out-of-date style as a result of the parsimony of the

32. The Bombardier, p. 8.
33. Lt-Gen. the Earl of Dundonald, *My Army Life* (London, 1934), pp. 286, 289.
34. Robert M. Barnes, *Military Uniforms of Britain and the Empire: 1742 to the Present Time* (London, 1960), p. 198.
35. *E.g.*, Madras and Bombay Sepoys, The King's Royal New York Regiment, the Queens Rangers, First American Regiment (Canada), and the 1st Madras Light-Cavalry (*Ibid.*, pp. 42, 44, 46, 76.)

government. When the Royal Canadians arrived in England in July, 1858, their 1812 and 1837 uniforms and equipment caused amusement.[36] And Canadian troops in the South African and First World wars were at first behind the British in practicability of their equipment, especially the infantry's Oliver equipment, designed by a Canadian doctor, which chafed and pinched the wearer. However, it was found that Canadian orders for equipment placed in England through the War Office were filled tardily. Failure to persuade British small arms manufacturers to locate a plant in Canada led to the most serious departure from British equipment, the manufacture of the Ross rifle in Canada. The Ross took the same calibre of round as the British Lee-Enfield (.303) but with slightly different tolerance standards. And it was a less robust weapon, more suitable for the rifle range than for service in the field. Nevertheless, despite these disparities, the Canadian forces on the whole followed British leads in uniform and equipment.

Minor details of similarity in uniform may not appear important in considering the transfer of institutions from one society to another. But it should be remembered that they are closely identified in the soldier's mind with military tradition and are an important element in the building of morale. Despite the fact that details of uniform actually change extremely frequently, retention of historic uniforms is jealously guarded by tradition-minded soldiers.[37] The adoption of British uniforms, especially as it was also associated with the adoption of the regimental system which, perhaps more than in any other army, has been used as a source of inspiration through the appeal to past tradi-

36. Lt.-Col. Frederick E. Whitton, ed., *The History of the Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)* (2 vols.; Aldershot, 1924), I, 51–52.
37. The frequency of changes and the value of adhering to old traditions are mentioned in Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer's Foreword to W. Y. Carman, *British Military Uniforms from Contemporary Pictures* (London, 1957), pp. v–vi. The fact that "the badge of today is the antique of tomorrow" (R. D. M. Cleaver, "The Badges of the Free State Army," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research,* XVI, 23) does not deter the soldier from insisting upon the fact that retention of ancient symbols bolsters the army's morale (Lt.-Col. A. Wilson, "Old Army Customs," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research,* VI, 134–38.)

tion, has therefore a particular significance for the Canadian army.

The regimental system

In spite of the efforts of British instructors and British visitors and the enthusiasm of many Canadians, the task of fashioning upon the lines of a regular army a part-time militia that was scattered in small units across a large country presented great difficulties. The Militia Act of 1859 had authorized the amalgamation of any six companies in the same place to form a regiment. One regiment was authorized in Montreal immediately. Four Toronto companies succeeded in obtaining approval for organization as a regiment by incorporating two others stationed as far away as Barrie and Whitby. Major-General Ivor Herbert, the G.O.C. of the militia from 1890 to 1895, went a step further. The artillery was already organized as a regiment rather than as a school. Herbert reorganized on a regimental basis the small permanent force that had composed schools for the other branches of the service. In 1893 Lt.-Col. Otter, a Canadian officer, said that although there were differences between the Canadian militia and the British army in recruiting and in the nature of the individuals who were recruited and who were its officers, and although he would not recommend the adoption of either imperial rates of pay or imperial scales of punishment, there was "nothing in the administrative organization of a battalion in the British Army that should not be adopted and faithfully imitated in the Canadian Militia."[38]

With the British regimental system, the Canadian militia and permanent force inherited the whole paraphernalia of regimental traditions, including the mythology connected with regimental colors, the symbol of the regiment's corporate life and unity. Much of the special significance of colors arises from the fact

38. Lt.-Col. W. D. Otter, "The Administrative System of a British Regiment (Infantry) and the adaptation of the Principles of that system to the Active Militia of Canada," Canadian Military Institute, *Selected Papers . . . 1892–3*, No. 5, pp. 32–46.

that on them are inscribed the battle honors that the regiment guards jealously. The peculiar mythology of colors is illustrated by a statement in a recent issue of the *Canadian Army Journal.* Artillery regiments do not carry colors and their guns are traditionally regarded as an equivalent. "To lose a gun has been considered as disastrous as to lose a colour."[39] From a practical point of view this seems an inversion. But it apparently does not appear so to soldiery steeped in regimental tradition.

An American mission which reported on contemporary European armies at the end of the Crimean War, having commented upon the valuable practice in all European armies of distributing decorations to individuals and the association of individual regiments with royal and other eminent personages, spoke of the regimental traditions of the British army with particular reference to its custom of awarding battle honors:

> The pride and ambition of regiments and corps [in the British army] is . . . fostered by the practice of permitting them, by general order, to bear inscribed on their colours the names of the actions in which they have distinguished themselves. This seems to be a perfectly unexceptionable distinction to confer even in a republican country; having nothing personal or mercenary in its nature and appealing to the most honorable feelings of the soldier, by offering a high inducement to good conduct, in order to deserve and retain this mark of approbation. Whatever may be the material with which the ranks of a regiment are filled, it cannot be doubted that the men would be sensible of the obligation to maintain a reputation acquired on the field of battle by the regiment to which they belong, if its individuality were retained by any mark of distinction.[40]

The earliest battle honor won by a Canadian unit was "Eccles Hill," in the course of a Fenian raid in Vermont in 1870.[41] Today

39. Canadian Army H.Q., Historical Section, "Colours in the Armed Forces," *Canadian Army Journal,* VIII (Jan., 1954), 8.
40. *Military Commissions to Europe in 1855 and 1856,* p. 58 (see n. 9 above). Only one battle honor had been granted in the British army prior to the American Revolution, "Ernsdorf, 1760," to the 15th Dragoons in 1768. The second award, "Gibraltar," was made to several units on April 28, 1784 (Major T. J. Edwards, *Standards, Guidons, and Colours* [Aldershot, 1953], p. 88.) The American army had therefore not inherited this practice directly. Honors for earlier engagements were granted to British regiments at later dates (Lt.-Col. H. M. Jackson, "North American Battle Honours," *Canadian Army Journal,* I (Aug., 1947), 21–23.
41. Canadian Army H. Q., Historical Section, "Colours in the Armed Forces," p. 16.

a Commonwealth "Battle Nomenclature Committee," on which there is a Canadian representative, decides which engagements merit the grant of honors; but the Canadian army itself decides which of its units participated and are therefore entitled to the award.

Alliances of British and Canadian regiments

The adoption of British uniforms and regimental traditions was expedited by the growth of "alliances" between Canadian and British regiments. Although the Earl of Dundonald, general officer commanding the militia from 1902 to 1904, claimed that he originated the idea,[42] alliances actually have a longer history. The Governor General's Foot Guards, organized in 1872 as the Civil Service Rifle Regiment, had been an "honorary company" of the Civil Service Rifle Battalion of London, England, with whom they had shared a royal colonel.[43] In 1890 they were said to have with the Coldstream Guards "a sentiment of that camaraderie which we have often had to notice as forming a bond between regiments widely separated."[44] Among the first affiliations that resulted from Dundonald's initiative was that of the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment of Canada), or rather of the 5th Regiment, Royal Highlanders of Canada, as they were then known, with the British Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment). But the Montrealers had been wearing the Scottish unit's famous and jealously prized "red hackle" for ten years before that time.[45] Dundonald's proposal of "sister regiments" seems only to have led to official recognition of a practice that already existed.

Scottish regimental tradition, or Scottish military dress, has had a great fascination for Canadians, and many of the Cana-

42. Dundonald, pp. 217–221. Dundonald suspected that his political superiors were opposed to the idea and that they delayed its introduction.
43. *History of the Governor General's Foot Guards* (Ottawa, 1948), p. 2; Lieut. Col. R. J. Birdwhistle, "The Civil Service Rifle Regiment," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, VI (1928–29), 514–515.
44. Richards, III, 250.
45. The red hackle was a plume allegedly presented on the field of battle in 1795 to men of the Black Watch who had recovered some guns lost by dragoons.

dian wearers of the kilt are men whose ancestral origins lay far from the Highlands. But with the dress goes the spirit. Highland troops come to be regarded, whatever their origin, as men who live "strictly on rations, theology, and fechtin, and whose Commanding Officer takes whisky with his porridge." Thus, the Canadian Camerons were played ashore at Dieppe by their pipers. All the instruments were lost and some of the bandsmen. But the Camerons penetrated further inland than any other Canadian unit.[46] Who can be sure that there is no connection between these facts? The Black Watch of Canada regards itself as more than allied with its Scottish counterpart. Canadian names appear on the Edinburgh War Memorial of the British unit.[47] Seven other Canadian regiments wear almost the same uniforms, have the same mottoes and the same regimental marches, as allied Scottish regiments.

Civil supremacy

The fourth element of the Canadian military tradition, civil supremacy, had been transferred from Britain to Canada as a general principle during the nineteenth century, but it was not at first necessary to implement it by direct borrowing. The Canadian Militia Act, unlike the British Army Act, was not reenacted annually, because a militia did not appear to present the same menace to constitutional liberty as a regular force, and the legislature's control of the purse strings seemed all that was needed. As for the British regulars, Canadian politicians regarded them as a convenience and an economy and were sorry to see them depart.

At the turn of the century, however, civil-military relations did become an issue. Two British general officers commanding the militia, Generals Hutton and Dundonald, found that political interference and patronage impinged upon their concepts of

46. R. W. Queen-Hughes, *Whatever Men Dare: A History of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, 1935–60* (Winnipeg: Privately printed, 1960), pp. 2, 64, 71.
47. Bernard Fergusson, *The Black Watch and the King's Enemies* (London, 1950), pp. 343, 345; Robert M. Barnes, *Uniforms and History of the Scottish Regiments in Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa* (London, n.d.), p. 319.

military efficiency and military control. There had been earlier proposals for the appointment of a Canadian to command the militia, but Britishers had seemed less likely to be involved in politics. The dismissal of Dundonald was, however, not so much an expression of Canadian nationalism as an assertion of the principle of civil supremacy. He had virtually appealed to the military enthusiasts and to imperially-minded Canadians against his political superiors in the government. Years afterwards, writing about Canadian participation in the South African War in the time of one of his predecessors, Dundonald said:

> Several officers told me that if the Canadian Government had continued obstinate on this matter of sending contingents to South Africa, the temper of the officers and men of their regiments was such that instead of the sound of only constitutional protest being heard in the Parliament Buildings at Ottawa, soon would have been heard another sound, that of the butt end of rifles on the floor as armed men were told to stand at ease. The portion of Canada whence these regiments came is peopled by a martial race, permeated with the spirit of the United Empire Loyalists. . . .[48]

A man who could listen to talk like this had no place in command of the army of a constitutional democracy. After the Dundonald "incident," the permanence of civil control was finally ensured in 1904 by the device of putting the Canadian militia under a Militia Council modeled on the new British Army Council. This was a direct transfer and an effective retort to Dundonald's claim that in Britain the military had a freer hand.

Variations in British military institutions transferred to Canada

The adaptation of British military practice to Canadians was obviously bound to be affected by differences in temperament between the two peoples. A Canadian regimental historian comments that General French, in his report in 1910, found Canadian horses half-broken and Canadian soldiers but little more; but the historian went on to argue that, if the traces are occasionally kicked over, Canadians "get there" and that, after all, is the

48. Dundonald, p. 204.

Canadian doctrine.[49] It is not surprising that, despite the zealous transference of traditions and the fervent emphasis upon the need for careful conformity to uniforms and customs, there were actually many sea-changes. Thus, when *Regulations and Orders for the Active Militia* was first published in the Dominion it departed from British practice in one striking respect. It outlined an order of precedence of eight kinds of military formation of which the last were the naval brigades.[50] The "Senior Service" in Britain thus came last in Canada, a status which would have made a British admiral apoplectic.

With increasing autonomy, the possibility of further variation was always present, however strong might be the desire to conform. Lt.-Col. William Otter, commanding officer of the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, published a book on the organization and interior economy of a militia regiment. "Otter's *Guide*" became the standard work on military organization in Canada.[51] Its existence showed the possibility that, in the course of time, Canadian soldiers might produce works that would lead to divergence between British and Canadian military practice.

Sometimes, indeed, British traditions had already been incorrectly applied. Thus the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada was organized in 1860 as a rifle regiment and had rifle-green uniforms, regimental badges, and cross-belt ornaments like a British rifle regiment. A group of ladies, friends, and relatives of the officers presented the regiment on May 24, 1863, with a silver mace for the use of the band. But a rifle regiment does not have a drum-major with the accoutrements pertaining to that appointment. The mace, therefore, now reposes in the officers' mess in the Armouries in Toronto.[52] Here British tradition prevailed. But on the other hand, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, a regular unit, has never adopted the distinctive drill of a British light in-

49. Captain Frederick C. Currey, *From the St. Lawrence to the Yser with the 1st Canadian Brigade* (Toronto, 1916), p. 3.
50. Canada, Department of Militia, *Regulations and Orders for the Active Militia* (1870), p. 4
51. J. F. C., "General Sir William Otter," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, III (1925), 25.
52. Lt.-Col. William T. Barnard, *The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, 1860–1960* (Don Mills, Ont., 1960), pp. 10, 12.

fantry regiment. Many Canadians have regretted this departure on the grounds that the fluid movements of light infantry drill would be more natural to Canadians.[53] Another more recent departure from British traditions is that, since only heavy cavalry are entitled to colors, in 1927 Canadian Light Horse and Mounted Rifles were classified as "dragoons" for the purpose of the regulations governing the carrying of standards and guidons.[54]

The Halifax Rifles were presented with regimental colors by the Halifax City Council in 1862, two years after the regiment was organized, although they were informed by the College of Heralds that rifle regiments, since they fought dispersed among other units, never had colors. The colors were, like the Queen's Own's mace, not used, except for one parade in 1881. Then in 1933, they were "paraded" and deposited in the officers' mess. In 1939, when the regiment went on active service, the colors were duly laid up in the chapel of King's College.[55]

These departures from "rifles" traditions might shock an orthodox British rifleman, but they were unimportant beside other differences that had appeared or developed during and after the South African War. As a rule Canadian units, starved by penny pinching, had been old-fashioned in their equipment. It was only when the Canadian government began to take an interest in the militia that equipment peculiar to Canada was introduced. The most serious examples have been mentioned: Oliver equipment and the Ross rifle. There were also some differences in transport vehicles, and the Canadians even had a different terminology. They used "regiment" for the operational unit which the British called a "battalion."[56]

53. G. R. Stevens, *The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1919–1957* (Griesbach, Alberta, n.d.), p. 4. The name "light infantry" was said to have been adopted because the founder thought it had an "irregular tang."
54. Canadian Army H.Q., Historical Section, "Colours in the Armed Forces," p. 8.
55. John Gordon Quigley, *A Century of Rifles, 1860–1960: The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) (M): "Cede Nullis"* (Halifax: William Macnab, 1961), pp. 5, 72, 101–103, 214.
56. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers* 1907, Vol. LV (*Accounts and Papers*, Vol. IX), Cd. 3524, May, 1907, "Papers Laid Before the Colonial Conference, 1907," Serial No. V, memorandum by the General Staff on the "Possibility of Assimilating War Organization Throughout the Empire," pp. 22–27 (722–727); Maurice Ollivier, *The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887–1937* (3 vols.; Ottawa, 1954) I, 178.

The introduction of standardization

After the Boer War, at the very time when Canada was beginning to build up a small permanent force, to reform the militia, and to assert her complete autonomy in military matters, there happened to be a simultaneous reorganization and reform of the British army. In these circumstances the divergence between the British and Canadian forces might well have become great. Furthermore, there was an increasing realization of the danger in which Britain stood. Hence the colonial and imperial conferences in the decade after the Boer War came to agree upon the need for standardization. The new manuals being produced by the War Office in Britain, which went into far more detail about the training of the individual soldier, were to be used throughout all the dominions.[57] Tendencies to divergence were therefore summarily halted.

The adoption by Britain of the Prussian general staff system with suitable modifications to fit it for a democracy, was also, by agreement at the imperial conferences, to be extended to the dominions. But the Imperial General Staff did not become as much a directing body as the War Office would have liked. Although sections of the Imperial General Staff were established in Australia and New Zealand, the imperial staff officers sent to Canada were scattered across the country, and the functions that the Imperial General Staff would have undertaken were performed by a recently formed Canadian General Staff. This may, in fact, have helped rather than hindered conformity to the British pattern, for the Canadian General Staff was not, like the British, a planning and instructing body of the new type. Rather it consisted of the heads of the various departments at militia headquarters much as the British General Staff had been in the nineteenth century before its transformation. It is probable,

57. There was an interesting exception. The new Canadian Army Service Corps, whose functions would be affected by Canadian tastes and the Canadian economy, developed its own manual, known as *Biggars' Manual,* which was, in view of the standardization agreements, used "unofficially." (Warren, *Wait for the Wagon,* p. 38.)

therefore, that British ideas were more easily disseminated in Canada because they had, in effect, no native rivals. The Imperial General Staff in London, aided by the Staff College and by a system of exchanges of officers which began in 1905, acted as a central military educational body. Thus the tendency which had always existed for the Canadian army to pattern itself on the British army became formalized shortly before the First World War.[58]

Conclusion

It seems typical of the Commonwealth that when political centrifugal forces are apparently successful, co-operation and cohesion may become more effective. The tendency to adopt a uniform pattern of military organization, albeit with a distinctive Canadian flavor in Canada, has grown rather than diminished. Since 1945, the introduction of American equipment, American manuals, and Canadian variations thereof, has ended the earlier exclusive use of British manuals and British methods. Nevertheless, when it was announced that American equipment would probably lead to alterations in Canadian military organization, there was widespread alarm lest traditional regimental associations might be lost. The trend since that time has actually been in the opposite direction, as is suggested by the creation of the Canadian Guards Regiment, a unit whose historical antecedents seem far more European than North American.

Whether standardization in military procedures with Britain has affected the political orientation of Canada is a matter that would need another paper to explore. The direct communication that has taken place on a large scale between British and Canadian military departments and units since the first decade of the century has been limited to questions that have no political bearing. Many Canadian soldiers have, it is true, been more "imperially-minded" than the average Canadian. But that they also possess a peculiar dichotomy and can be, at the same time,

58. Richard A. Preston, "The Military Structure of the Old Commonwealth," *International Journal*, XVII (1962), 101–109.

fervent Canadian nationalists is forcefully illustrated in the regimental history of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps. Warren noticed that the officers of the corps invariably spoke of British officers as "Brits" and obviously regarded them as a people foreign to Canadian ways of thinking and Canadian ways of doing things. At the same time many of the Service Corps officers pronounced "clerk" with the un-Canadian style of "clark" and used the word "whilst." Until recently "lorry" and "petrol" were official coinage in the RCASC and the convenient "POL" for petrol, oil, and lubricants is still used.[59] These are minor points, but they could be matched a thousand times.

The most important result of the development of British influence on the Canadian army has undoubtedly been not so much the determination of Canadian policy, as the enabling of armies from two politically independent countries to co-operate freely by the use of a common military doctrine and organization and by the free exchange of individuals and of units in a manner which has never before been possible between ordinary military allies. But they are separate and independent armies and the Canadian soldier does not, as a Canadian historian alleged during the Second World War, "occupy [a] proud position in the British Army of today."[60]

A transference of military institutions and traditions similar to that between Britain and Canada has occurred in rather more surprising circumstances between Britain and non-European parts of the Commonwealth. The question whether that transference is as lasting and as effective as in the case of Canada, and whether it will survive such great political divergences as India's tendency to neutralism, is another question that this paper cannot attempt to answer. Even more difficult than the question whether military efficiency will remain is the question whether it can be controlled. The history of the growth of a Canadian army is written mainly in terms of a suspicion of the army as potential threat to liberty as well as a tool of imperialism. However efficient Canadian military force may become, it is unlikely

59. Warren, *Wait for the Wagon*, p. xxiii.
60. Stanley, "Canadian Militia during the Ancien Regime," p. 168.

that it will ever threaten to dominate the political scene. But will military efficiency transferred to other parts of the Commonwealth, where the history of self-government has been briefer, be similarly docile? This is, perhaps, the most serious, the most difficult, and the most important of the unanswered questions which this paper raises.

• 5 •

The Transfer of Western Education to India

Robert I. Crane°

I

This paper is designed to examine the implications of the transfer of Western education to India during the period of British rule. It will raise questions concerning the objectives entertained by those who decided to establish Western education in India and the implications of their aims for the ways in which the resulting system of education developed, the ways in which the Indian setting shaped and modified the system of Western education, and finally, the effects of Western education in India. Hopefully, the study will illuminate an underlying issue: with what degree of effectiveness and under what kinds of limitations can the Western system of education be said to have been transplanted to India?

The paper proceeds from two basic and related assumptions. The first holds that men organize their behavior, their institutions, their interrelationships, and their values in terms of a body of knowledge, i.e., a conception of their universe.[1] From this it follows that changes in the body of knowledge will be of crucial

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1. This statement does not presuppose the validity or accuracy of elements in a given body of knowledge. Men may base their conception of their universe on assumptions that are palpably false without in any way affecting our judgment of the role of a body of knowledge in organizing a way of life.

importance in the development of societies.[2] This viewpoint has been emphasized by J. J. Spengler:

> ... the state of a people's politico-economic development, together with its rate and direction, depends largely upon what is in the minds of its members, and above all upon the content of the minds of its elites, which reflects in part, as do civilizations, the conceptions men form of the universe. The content of men's minds is looked upon as the potentially dynamic element, as the source whence issue change and novelty, in a world or universe that is otherwise essentially passive.[3]

If this viewpoint be accepted, it follows that the creation of a new system of education, or its importation from an alien environment, must potentially be of major significance for the society which undergoes the experience. Such a view finds at least tacit approval among a variety of observers.[4] R. C. Majumdar, for example, speaks of that impact of English education "which was the most important factor in the cultural evolution of India in the 19th century."[5]

The second, and related, assumption holds that the past century has in fact been a period of rapid and increasingly intense social change in India, and that the creation of a system of Western education played a prominent role in stimulating and shaping the changes which took place. It should, however, be noted that social change in modern India has been uneven and relatively haphazard: uneven, in the sense that the factors making for change have not affected all parts of India with equal intensity

2. Ralph E. Turner has presented this viewpoint in a variety of his writings, as, for instance, in his contribution to *The Social Sciences in Historical Study, A Report of the Committee* (New York: Social Science Research Council, Committee on Historiography, 1954), pp. 97–105.
3. J. J. Spengler, "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values, and Politico-Economic Development" in R. Braibanti and J. J. Spengler, eds., *Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development* (Durham, N. C., 1961), pp. 4–5.
4. Thus Daniel Lerner points to literacy and to values associated with literacy as crucial to modernization in the Middle East in *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), pp. 3–6, 43–47, 50–54. Again, R. K. Lamb, "Political Elites and the Process of Economic Development" in B. F. Hoselitz, ed., *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 34–35. Similarly, in his chapter in this book, Joseph Elder selects "secular education" as the crucial characteristic of modernity (see his n. 12).
5. R. C. Majumdar, *Glimpses of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century* (Calcutta, 1960), p. 3. Kingsley Davis in his *Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 150–161, demonstrates the importance of education in modifying the traditional order.

and in the sense that different segments of the population of the subcontinent responded in different ways to change-inducing experiences;[6] haphazard, in the sense that the process of modernization under British rule was by no means carefully thought out or planned.

It is, of course, assumed that changes would have taken place in Indian society even if there had been little or no contact with Europe. Under those circumstances we would have to assume that the history of change in India would have been different from what it has been. The fact of foreign domination meant certain kinds of induced changes. These induced changes proceeded from a variety of European importations. Furthermore, the fact of European *domination* influenced the ability of Indians to select freely from among change-producing alternatives. Each major importation of any kind from Europe requires careful analysis if the nature of the changes which have ensued is to be understood. This paper concentrates, accordingly, on a leading element in Western contact with India: the European system of education.

Whether our interest in Western education in India arises from a desire to discover how effectively institutions and values can be transferred across cultures or from a desire to evaluate the role of education in the modernization of life in the subcontinent, the questions raised in the opening paragraph of this paper are relevant. Though the questions there raised refer only to education, it should be kept in mind that the changes which will be discussed often carried "multiplier" effects that spread rather widely throughout Indian society. Such effects could, of course, link up with other change-producing importations or confrontations in such a fashion as to create secondary and tertiary results quite beyond the legitimate scope of this account.

6. The literature on India abounds with references to the diversity in indigenous society and to the fact that European contact had differential effects in various regions and on different segments of the population. See K. Chattopadhyay, ed., *Study of Changes in Traditional Culture* (Calcutta, 1957); R. I. Crane, "India: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization," *Social Education,* XV (1951), 365–370, 374; B. Cohn, "The Initial British Impact on India: A Case Study of the Benares Region," *Journal of Asian Studies,* XIX (1960), 418–431. Also, Davis, pp. 153–155.

A final prefatory remark seems in order. The focus of attention in this paper is placed upon Western education as a factor for change, while the major concern of the paper is with the kinds of changes which flowed therefrom. At first glance this would seem to imply an undue emphasis on English agency. Such is not, however, intended. An early effect of Western education was the creation of a group of Indians who, imbued with a new, European set of values, entered actively into the spread of new ideas and of a Western curriculum in India.[7] The study fully recognizes the role of indigenous agents in habituating Indians to European ideas.

II

We must begin by asking questions about the objectives held by those who sought to create a Western system of education in India. As is clear from the literature, several alternative courses could have been followed, and the selection of the course which was followed reflects the goals of the men who established the system. Their objectives had an important effect upon the nature of the education which was made available to Indians and upon the consequences of that education.

Almost from the first there were various schools of thought regarding the aims of education in India. During the formative period there were two major differences of opinion. To begin with, there was disagreement between the evangelicals and missionaries on one side and secular reformers on the other. Though these two groups could agree on certain issues, they were divided on the matter of ultimate aims. At the same time, there was controversy between those who favored an oriental education and those who demanded creation of an English education, an English curriculum, and the use of English as the medium of instruction. Subordinate to the conflict between Orientalists and

7. An interesting account of some early Western-educated Indians who helped diffuse European ideas is found in B. Majumdar, *History of Political Thought, from Rammohan to Dayananda (1821–84)* (Calcutta, 1934), pp. 1–45, 78–155.

Anglicists, was the interest of the government in English education which would produce trained personnel for government service.[8]

Western education was first provided in India through missionary agency. The intention of the missionaries was to convert the heathen to Christianity. In their judgment, Western education was essential to effective proselytism.[9] This view was shared by the lay evangelicals who were active in India after the revision of the East India Company's charter by Parliament in 1813.[10] Lay evangelicals, not directly involved in efforts to proselytise, fafored Western education for its moral effect upon a society which they viewed as hopelessly backward. "The point which must be emphasized is that from about 1830 onwards English officials were imbued with the idea that they were, in Macaulay's phrase, undertaking the 'stupendous process' of reconstructing a 'decomposed society.' "[11]

The Utilitarians, who had no interest in the missionary work of proselytism, held that Western education would diffuse "useful knowledge" which could remake a stagnant Indian society. They thought to secure for India "the vast moral and material blessings" which would result from useful knowledge diffused through

8. Arthur Mayhew, *The Education of India, A Study of British Educational Policy in India, 1835–1920* (London, 1926), p. 18.

9. On the early work of the Christian missionaries in India, see K. Ingham, *Reformers in India, 1793–1833* (Cambridge, 1956). Mayhew, p. 12: "In India itself, despite a chilly official atmosphere of licenses and checks the great missionary pioneers were at work with no illusions as to the significance of oriental culture and with a firm conviction that western learning would most effectively win India for Christ."

10. For the attitudes of evangelicals and reformers, see G. D. Bearce, *British Attitudes Towards India, 1784–1858* (London, 1961). Also, K. Ballhatchet, *Social Policy and Social Change in Western India, 1817–1830* (London, 1957). One of the most famous of the lay evangelicals was Charles Grant who returned to London after Company service in India to become a director of the Company and a member of Parliament. Grant pushed evangelical and reforming ideas for India.

11. E. Thompson and G. Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India* (London, 1934), p. 330. *Ibid.*, p. 319: "Many Englishmen of that period would have subscribed to Macaulay's view . . . that 'if our plans of education are followed up, there will not be a singe idolater among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence.' " Also, L. S. S. O'Malley, ed., *Modern India and the West: A Study of the Interaction of Their Civilizations* (London, 1941), p. 658: "High hopes were entertained by the promoters of English education. . . . India . . . would become quite another country. The knowledge derived from the West would be an engine of intellectual and moral regeneration. It would effect a religious revolution, as Hinduism would give way before the light of European science." Also, R. C. Majumdar, pp. 23–27.

the English connection.[12] When criticized by those among the Orientalists who thought Indian classical learning should be supported and who opposed the substitution of English knowledge for native systems of education, the evangelicals and Utilitarians tended to draw together. As a result, the difference between the two over ends was submerged and became part of the controversy between Orientalists and Anglicists.

> In 1813 an annual allotment of one lakh of rupees had been provided . . . in accordance with a clause in the Act of that year which renewed the charter, for 'the revival and improvement of literature and encouragement of the learned natives of India and for the introduction and improvement of a knowledge of the Sciences.'[13]

Pursuant to that Act, the government of India had created a Committee of Public Instruction. It was over the uses to which the money should be put that the controversy raged. "The Orientalists, as they were called, on the Committee had visions of a union of Hindu and European learning; and of the engrafting of European science . . . on the carefully tended tree of Indian culture."[14] Their opponents, the Anglicists, desired instead the replacement of native learning by Western knowledge. In 1834, Thomas Babington Macaulay went to India. Once there he refused to undertake his duties on the Committee of Public Instruction until the argument was settled.[15] Macaulay favored the Anglicists and his famous Minute of February 2, 1835, struck the decisive blow. Lord William Bentinck, the governor-general, approved Macaulay's view and settled the matter by an executive order. "Bentinck finally gave his decision that the 'object of the British Government should be the promotion of English literature and science.' "[16]

Bentinck's order not only settled the matter in favor of a thoroughly Western curriculum, it also provided that grants which

12. India, Bureau of Education, *Selections from Educational Records: Part II, 1840–1859*, ed. J. A. Richey (Calcutta, 1922), p. 365. On the Utilitarians and India, Bearce, pp. 69–78, 154–160. Also, Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (Oxford, 1959), *passim*.
13. Mayhew, pp. 9–10.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
16. Thompson and Garratt, pp. 314–315.

had been made to Oriental schools and colleges in India were to be terminated. The decision was hailed by missionaries, Utilitarians, and rationalists alike. Indians who had obtained an English education by private means prior to this date joined with the English in support of Bentinck's decision. These Indians, such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, desired English education because they were convinced that it alone could provide the basis for an enlightened reformation of their own society.[17] They were, of course, a tiny handful in number.

The Macaulay judgment on the aims of education was accompanied by another, and in certain respects equally important, decision. It was to concentrate the bulk of the funds available at the level of higher education. This was justified by Macaulay and others by reference to what has been called the "filtration theory." It proposed that government funds should educate the upper classes and rely upon them to extend enlightenment and education to the masses.[18] The paucity of funds, the magnitude of the numbers involved in mass education, and the theory of a native elite spreading wisdom on its own accord combined to make the filtration theory sound plausible. The theory was, however, invalid. Mass education did not spread outward or downward as had been hoped. In fact, as has been observed, the government policy had the opposite effect of separating the educated classes from the rest of the population. Arthur Mayhew summed the results up nicely, saying:

> The use of English as a means of instruction and the inability of Government to develop the vernaculars have widened the gulf that separates the intelligentsia of India from the masses. The conditions of India, but more particularly of Hindu life, have always favored such separation. . . .

17. R. C. Majumdar, pp. 23–46. Also, Percival Spear, ed., *The Oxford History of India* (3rd ed.; Oxford, 1958), pp. 649–652. Mayhew, pp. 91–92. Thompson and Garratt, pp. 314–315.
18. O'Malley, p. 63: "When Government proceeded to implement Lord William Bentinck's decision, it merely set about establishing one high school at the headquarters of each district. English education was intended for the upper and middle classes in urban areas, though there was an idea that it would gradually spread . . . and also filter down to the lower classes. . . ." Also, H. A. Stark, *Vernacular Education in Bengal from 1813 to 1912* (Calcutta, 1916), p. 55; Mayhew, pp. 92–93.

In the optimistic circles of 1835 these (Hindu) lines of cleavage were marked down for extinction. Every man endowed with western languages and learning would be an apostle eager to spread the good news. . . . They seem to have envisaged Indian squire or parson returning from his University career to open village schools, tract depots, and lecture halls. But the Indian landholder or temple priest was not easily attracted to western learning. And those who find their way from villages or the crowded artisan quarters of great cities have been more anxious to use their learning for their own advantage than for the good of those from whom they have sprung. Their western knowledge removed them from the masses for many years. . . . Their knowledge of English confined them for a time to speech and writing unintelligible to the masses. . . .[19]

The intentions expressed by Macaulay and the emphasis upon an English education received important reinforcement in 1844, when the Governor-General, Lord Hardinge, decreed that preference would be given to persons who had secured Western education and literacy for all government positions.[20] Service in the bureaucracy carried high prestige, status, and secure compensation. Those higher Hindu castes which had an ancient tradition of clerical and bureaucratic employment—especially Brahmans and Kayasths—flocked into the new schools.

During the period prior to the Indian Mutiny there were established only a relatively few government schools. These followed Bentinck's aim of preparing Indians for administrative posts. Indians who sought the new knowledge, however, created a demand for schooling which government schools could not fill. As a result, "many English-teaching mushroom schools sprang up. . . . Even in those days, the knowledge of English was prized. . . . The desire for making a better living was present. . . . These motives gave good opportunity for adventurous Eurasians to establish their own schools."[21] While we have little information on these schools, it seems that many of them barely deserved the

19. Mayhew, pp. 91–92. Also, S. N. Mukerji, *History of Education in India (Modern Period)* (Baroda: Acharya Book Depot, 1961), p. 87: "As Horace Wilson in his evidence before . . . Commons observed on July 5, 1853, 'In fact, we created a separate class of English scholars, who no longer had any sympathy, or very little sympathy with their countrymen.' "
20. Mukerji, p. 95.
21. Mukerji, p. 26.

title. Nonetheless, their creation indicates the popularity of the new learning, and suggests that what passed as Western training may have often been grossly inadequate.

One of the aims present in the formative period was the desire to spread knowledge of European science. At the outset this had the general liberalizing objective common to Utilitarians and social reformers. Unfortunately, as will be noted, not enough was done in the ensuing years to provide that kind of instruction. As one writer puts it,

> What India required from England at the start was not its literature, history, or philosophy, but men able to give them not only the results but the methods of western science and to stimulate them to apply these methods. . . .
>
> Instead of this it was possible up to comparatively recent times for a student [in India] to graduate without any knowledge of scientific method . . . without ever having come into contact with a trained scientific mind. . . .[22]

There were a limited number of early efforts at scientific training. In 1822, the Company opened the Calcutta Native Medical School to train Indian assistants for its medical officers, and in 1826 medical classes were attached to the Sanskrit College.[23] In 1835 the Calcutta Medical College was established to teach medical science on European lines and in the English language. In 1845 Grant Medical College was opened in Bombay. It secured recognition from the Royal College of Surgeons in 1855.[24] In general, these schools had vocational aims and were organized largely "to satisfy the administrative requirements of the East India Company which needed trained persons like engineers, artisans, medical doctors, judges, etc., for government jobs."[25] Bentinck had stressed the preparation of Indians for posts in an administrative bureaucracy, and attempts at scientific instruction fell into the same vein of preparation for government service. Macaulay, meanwhile, had compounded the situation by emphasizing higher training for the upper castes.

22. Mayhew, pp. 60–61.
23. India, Bureau of Education, *Selections from Educational Records: Part I, 1781–1839*, ed. H. Sharp (Calcutta, 1920), p. 184.
24. Mukerji, p. 294.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

In 1853 the Company's charter received further revision by Parliament. The revisions were preceded by lengthy hearings. The hearings included a fairly exhaustive review of what had been accomplished in the field of education. An important result of the charter revision was the preparation of the Educational Despatch of 1854, associated with the name of Sir Charles Wood, then president of the Board of Control.[26] It was upon the objectives highlighted by this despatch that the modern educational system of British India was based. The first of these was to guarantee the general diffusion of Western knowledge, while the second was to ensure the intellectual and moral improvement of the students. The third aim was to supply the Company with capable public servants, and the fourth was to secure an improved supply of commodities needed for English manufacturing and an improved market for British goods. In the words of the despatch: "The education that we desire to see extended in India is that which has for its object the diffusion of the improved arts, science, philosophy and literature of Europe; in short of European knowledge."[27]

The force of the despatch was to emphasize public control of education, to which end it created a department of public instruction in each province of British India. In addition, universities were to be established by government in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. These universities were to be modeled upon the London university, under senates composed of government officials and nominees. Like the University of London, they were to be primarily examining and degree-granting universities. Existing colleges were to be affiliated with the universities.

The despatch of 1854 pointed to the fact that the education of the public had been virtually ignored and stipulated that greater efforts should be placed on the development of lower schools. Because this kind of expansion would exhaust public funds, it was

26. For a sound discussion of the events leading up to the despatch of 1854 and its effects see, S. Nurullah and J. P. Naik, *A History of Education in India* (Bombay, 1951), pp. 164–216. Also the invaluable, B. T. McCully, *English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism* (New York, 1940), pp. 131–166. Lord Dalhousie was at this time governor-general of India and played an active role in promotion of education. See: Gt. Britain. House of Commons. *Sessional Papers*, XLV, Paper No. 245, 1856.
27. Mukerji, p. 128.

urged that a system of grants-in-aid be utilized. By this means, it was hoped, Indian education would be nurtured from the primary through the university level. According to the despatch, grants were to be given to those schools and colleges which would:

1. satisfy government about the stability of their management,
2. impart good secular education,
3. be open to state inspection, and
4. agree to any conditions which might be laid down for the regulation of such grants.[28]

In addition, the despatch criticized the "filtration theory" and suggested means of drawing the populace into the lower schools. "Concentration on western studies remained the watchword and was confirmed. . . ." but effort was to be spread more widely.[29] Speaking of the effects of the despatch, Thompson and Garratt say "The English certainly did not bring to India any predilection for a unified secular educational system, yet this was what was actually developed during the twenty years preceding the Mutiny and was defined in the Directors' despatch of 1854, which determined the organization of education throughout British India."[30]

28. Mukerji, p. 130.
29. Mayhew, p. 26.
30. Thompson and Garratt, p. 311. Mayhew remarks on the effects of the despatch as follows, pp. 62–63: "Education in India from 1854 has meant a system of schools, colleges, and examinations, ultimately controlled by the Government. Administration, though always provincial, was subject to the general control of the Government of India up to 1920. As the quinquennial report for 1917–22 proudly points out, 'it was possible under a number of codes and systems to discover the same essentials of structure.' Many of the institutions have been directly maintained from public funds, managed by the education department and staffed by teachers who were government officials. Another class has been maintained and managed by local authorities subject until recently to close control and supervision by the Government. The third class, under private management . . . has depended on the Government either for grants in aid, which give financial security, and 'recognition' which ultimately qualifies their students for examinations and government service, or for recognition alone. Regular inspection and submission to rules and regulations governing curriculum, text-books and all details of organization and equipment have been the conditions of such support and recognition. It is true that the provincial Governments have delegated to Universities . . . the control or partial control of higher education. . . . But these Universities have been the creation of the Government with governing bodies constituted and controlled by Government, aware always of the government policy as declared by officials. . . ."

Not only was the system to become central and official,[31] but also it was decreed that it was to be entirely secular. The results of secularization were unintentional. India's Muslims had remained aloof from the new education prior to 1854, partly because Persian, their classical language, had been replaced by English.[32] The system consolidated by the educational despatch further inhibited their willingness to enrol, for a secular education was alien to the spirit and practice of Islam. As a result, the Muslim community fell decidedly behind the Hindus in the acquisition of Western knowledge. This had a marked effect upon their position in modern India.

In 1857 there were established in India three English-style universities, and from that time forward the growth of Western education, though limited for some years by financial stringency and by a desire to spread education quite widely as well as by an initial public apathy, was steady. The universities capped the system and served to centralize and routinize its leading characteristics.[33] By 1882, the system was well established and its major

31. Mayhew, p. 67: "That government control involves centralisation, and necessitates a constant struggle against uniformity as well as rigid insistence on rules and regulations obstructive to natural growth, has also been suggested." *Ibid.*, p. 72: "The master enmeshed in the network of our Indian system works with code in hand. For him, there is no 'unwritten law' or tradition. There are 'returns' to be submitted periodically, regulations to be followed, examinations in which a percentage of passes is to be obtained, and an inspector, more regular in his visitation than famine or the plague, who, in the course of a few minutes, must be convinced that no rule has been broken and that something practical has been done."
32. J. R. Cunningham, "Education," in O'Malley, p. 158: "Amongst Hindus, the enrolment of higher schools and colleges consisted mainly of the clerkly and professional classes. . . . For Muslims the old road to employment had been closed by the substitution of English and the vernaculars for Persian in the courts and offices. The community was falling behind. The new ways were not their ways." O'Malley, "The Impact of European Civilization," in *Ibid.*, p. 64: "The Muslim community was bitterly opposed to . . . (English education). In 1835, as soon as the new educational policy was announced, it made known its views in a memorial. . . . There was scarcely any relaxation from this attitude of suspicion and hostility for half a century. The Muslims remained attached to their traditional culture. . . ." Also, Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan, the Formative Phase* (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1960), p. 5, *et seq.*
33. O'Malley, "General Survey," *ibid.*, p. 656: "They [the universities] were intended to be not so much seats of learning or places of instruction as to test the value of education elsewhere. Their main function was simply to hold examinations and to confer degrees on successful candidates coming from 'affiliated' colleges, for which they could prescribe courses but over whose methods of teaching they had no control." Cunningham, "Education," *ibid.*, p. 167: "They [the

results were becoming increasingly apparent. In 1882 there were sixty-one arts colleges in India which provided Western education and in which the medium of instruction was English. Of these, thirty-eight were government arts colleges, while twenty-three were managed by private agencies. There were 4,252 students enrolled in the government arts colleges and an unreported number in the private colleges.[34] From this it would appear that less than 10,000 students were enrolled in Western-style colleges in that year. The population of British India in 1881 has been estimated to have been 257,380,000.[35] Thus college enrollments accounted for much less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the population.

In the same year there were 3,916 secondary schools with a combined enrollment of 214,077 students.[36] The vast majority of these schools were designed to prepare their graduates for enrollment in Western-style colleges. As a result the core of education in most high schools was instruction in English in college-entrance subjects. These were primarily literary in character. Very close to one-tenth of 1 per cent of the population was enrolled in the secondary schools.

Primary education, mostly in the vernacular languages, was largely education in what we know as "the three R's." In 1881 there were apparently 2,061,541 pupils in primary schools. This was less than 1 per cent of the total population. Available evidence suggests that approximately 10 per cent of the students

universities] set no other aim than that of passing examinations and qualifying for employment. Teachers, instead of thinking only of the moral and mental development of their pupils, were absorbed with percentages and passes and tabulated results. Standards were everywhere in need of improvement. . . ." Mayhew, pp. 79–80: "For the very justifiable aim of Government seems to involve either the recognition of certain courses as qualifying for government service, or the setting up of a separate qualifying examination. The former procedure means the stereotyping, popularization and ultimate predominance of the selected courses. The latter . . . means the adaptation of all schools and colleges to the qualifying examination syllabus and the creation of cramming establishments solely to meet its demands." O'Malley, "General Survey," O'Malley, p. 657, "The whole system was directed to one end—the study of prescribed subjects by means of prescribed English text-books in order to pass examinations and obtain degrees. This, and not the acquisition of general knowledge, was the be-all and the end-all. Instruction was looked upon solely as a means to matriculating at a university and then of obtaining a degree. Success in examinations was confused with education."

34. Nurullah and Naik, p. 255.

35. Davis, Table 7, p. 27.

36. *Report of the Indian Education Commission appointed by the Resolution of the Government of India dated 3rd February, 1882* (Calcutta, 1883), p. 193.

enrolled in primary schools continued as students in the secondary schools where Western-style education was emphasized. The drop-out rate, that is to say, was quite high and the bulk of the drop-outs came prior to contact with a distinctively Western education.[37]

In 1881 there were four English-model universities in India, with a fifth to be established just five years later. The universities supervised collegiate educational institutions, set curricula for the affiliated colleges and prescribed and administered the Matriculation Examination as well as the First Arts Examination and the Final or B. A. Examination. These examinations were taken by all students who desired to enter an arts college and graduate therefrom.[38] Since the universities awarded the prized degrees, only those colleges which were affiliated to them could hope to attract substantial enrollments.

There were, in 1882, 83 government normal schools for the training of secondary school teachers. These had an enrollment of 2,814 students. What may be called technical education was less well-developed than other branches of training. In 1884 there were 14 law colleges, 3 medical colleges and 4 engineering colleges. In addition there were 133 schools which offered training in art, medicine, engineering and surveying, industrial skills, and agriculture.[39] Information is so scanty as to make it very difficult to estimate what proportion of these schools gave professional training. It seems that most of them were distinctly of a secondary or of a trades-school character. A total of 7,407 students were reported to be enrolled in the 133 schools referred to, while 864 were enrolled in the law, medical, and engineering colleges. It

37. On the drop-out problem in Indian education, see the comments in Davis, p. 160. Cunningham, "Education," in O'Malley, p. 175, says: "The waste in the village schools was appalling, time, energy, and money being spent on the schooling of children the majority of whom did not stay long enough at school to remain literate." Zellner, p. 175, reports that in 1938, "of 100 boys who enter the first form, only 16 survive to the fourth form, which is considered a minimum to achieve literacy."

38. On the control exercised by the universities over the colleges see, V. Chirol, *Indian Unrest* (London, 1910), p. 212. Also, Mayhew, p. 153. J. R. Cunningham, "Education," in O'Malley, pp. 164–165. *Report of the Indian Universities Commission, 1902* (Simla, 1902), pp. 2–7, 14–20.

39. Murkerji, p. 297. The engineering colleges primarily trained personnel for the Department of Public Works of the Government of India.

is quite clear that technical education had scarcely gained a foothold in the subcontinent.[40]

Taken all together, in 1882 there were 2,640,000 Indians in schools of all kinds from the primary to the university and professional level. This represents virtually 1 per cent of the total population, though it has been estimated to have been about 15 per cent of the male population of school-going age and 0.80 per cent of the female population of similar age.[41]

It should be noted that Western education was not distributed in a uniform fashion among the various segments of the Indian population. The estimates just given reveal a wide disparity between the proportion of males and of females who received schooling. Similarly, especially at the collegiate level, there is considerable evidence that a vast majority of the enrollees were Hindus and that, among the Hindus, the Brahmans held a clearly disproportionate majority. While less than 10 per cent of all enrollees in Western education were Muslims, the Brahmans—though a small minority in the population—numbered approximately 35 per cent of the enrolled, while non-Brahman Hindus accounted for some 45 per cent of the total enrollment.[42]

Western education was provided primarily in high schools and in colleges, and these institutions were almost invariably situated in the larger towns and cities. Western education was basically an urban phenomenon and access to Western-style schools was greater for the urban than for the rural sector of the population.[43]

40. The weakness of technical and scientific training is referred to in many sources: Mukerji, pp. 298–300; Cunningham, "Education," in O'Malley, p. 165; Thompson and Garratt, p. 316; Mayhew, pp. 103, 149, 154, 161–162.
41. *Report of the Indian Education Commission,* p. 584. As there are no reliable data for Indian population in 1882, these are no more than informed estimates. Furthermore, there is some evidence that at the lower levels enrollment figures were put in the best possible light in order to secure credit for sincere effort.
42. Calculated from a table on number of scholars in colleges in 1902 in Nurullah and Naik, p. 287. This is a well-estabished fact. Later the Muslim community based its claims for special representation on the backwardness of the community in Western education (McCulley, pp. 179–185). In 1891 only 4.2 per cent of the Muslims of India were literate, while 6.3 per cent of the Hindus were literate. At that time Muslims comprised 20.4 per cent of the population of India, while Hindus were 74.2 per cent of the total. Thus, both in absolute and in relative numbers, the Muslims trailed behind the Hindus (Davis, pp. 155, 178). The Brahmans numbered approximately 7 per cent of the population, but represented 35 per cent of the student population.
43. Davis, pp. 153–154, 159.

Beyond this, it is evident that the province of Bengal had a disproportionately high share of the Western-style educational institutions of India. Though less true in later years, Bengal secured an initial advantage in the race for Western training with its promise of public service and professional careers.[44]

If this was the general situation in Indian education in 1881, what trends can be discerned for the ensuing forty years, by 1921? How far had developments served to confirm the directions established by 1881? The year 1921 is selected for comparison with the earlier date because it was in 1921 that education was turned over to ministries responsible to the elected majorities in the provincial legislatures as a result of the system of dyarchy enthroned in the Government of India Act of 1919. British responsibility for education declined abruptly in 1921.

To begin with, the emphasis upon higher education had grown even more pronounced. In 1921 there were ten universities rather than four as in 1881. By 1921 there were a total of 165 arts colleges in British India with 45,418 students enrolled. This compares with less than 10,000 students in 1881. Furthermore, by 1921 there were approximately 30 arts colleges in the Indian native states and these colleges enrolled upwards of 10,000 students. This means that college enrollments and the consequent exposure to a Western curriculum had increased fivefold during the years under discussion. By 1921, however, the population of India stood at 306 millions, with the result that college students accounted for something less than two-tenths of 1 per cent of the population as compared with considerably less than one-tenth of 1 per cent in the earlier year. The college population remained a tiny minority.[45] Their training remained predominantly literary.[46] Concerning the colleges, Arthur Mayhew comments:

44. R. C. Majumdar, p. 3.
45. Nurullah and Naik, p. 444.
46. Thus Thompson and Garratt, p. 316, remarks, "the higher castes have shown an overwhelming preference for literary and legal studies, which they are not likely to impart to others." Mayhew, p. 103, says, "That our higher schools and colleges prepare for an obviously limited number of 'vocations' and largely, though by no means exclusively, for the clerical, administrative, legal, medical, journalistic, and political professions, is due to no fault of the educational authorities, but to the absence of other 'vocations' providing a living for a large number of trained men. Education must provide men where they are wanted and can be supported."

Essentially practical and utilitarian, they have aimed at the production of government officials, lawyers, doctors, and commercial clerks and, within this narrow range, they have succeeded remarkably well. Where they have failed, almost completely, is on the cultural side. They have trained their students to earn a living in occupations congenial to their traditions and antecedents and increased in number and attractiveness by British administration. But they have not taught them to enjoy life. . . . They have also failed partially to develop what may be called a 'pre-vocational' aptitude, a spirit of enterprise, a fitness to undertake and readiness to consider training for other occuptions not so closely associated with their traditions.[47]

In 1921, there were sixty-four recognized professional colleges in British India with an enrollment of 13,662. The students in these professional colleges were in pursuit of legal, medical, and engineering degrees, predominantly, and should be added to those in arts colleges in terms of their involvement in Western-style education. These data reflect a pronounced increase in high-level professional training and indicate an important development.

There were 7,530 recognized secondary schools in British India in 1921, with a total of 1,100,000 students. This can be compared with the figure of 3,461 secondary schools in India in 1882. The number of secondary schools had more than doubled in the intervening years, as had the number of enrollments. As before, the bulk of these students were in courses preparatory to college entrance. An attempt had been made to introduce a non-literary curriculum in a number of high schools, but it was reportedly a failure. It is said that the students preferred to enrol in the literary course, and it is said that the Matriculation Examinations continued to favor such a course.[48]

The same picture emerges for primary schools. By 1921 there were 155,017 recognized primary schools, as compared with 70,386 in 1881, and the 1921 enrollments stood at 6,109,752. Thus approximately 2 per cent of the population was in primary education. Interestingly, the drop-out rate is reported to have declined. In 1881 some 10 per cent of school children went into high school, in 1921 at least 15 per cent continued into the secondary level.

47. Mayhew, p. 149.
48. Cunningham, "Education," in O'Malley, pp. 164–165. Also, Chirol, pp. 211–212. Mayhew, p. 154.

Nonetheless, it is clear that mass education was still a remote prospect for India. By 1921 only 8.3 per cent of the population over the age of 10 were reported as literate.[49]

Two interesting trends in education in India can be noticed by 1921. The first of these was the acceleration of Muslim enrollment. Shortly after the turn of the century and increasingly after the First World War, the Muslim community began to make valiant efforts to repair their backward educational situation. Of all of the religious groups in the subcontinent, the Muslims had the highest rate of growth in literacy between 1891 and 1931.[50] Cunningham comments, "The pressure [on school facilities] was intensified [after 1917] by the competition of the Muslim community, who were growing increasingly alive to their own interests and pushing rapidly to the front."[51] To a smaller degree, the Hindu lower castes began to emulate the Muslims in the demand for literacy and education.[52] The second new trend was in the rapid growth of business and commercial courses and schools.

> In the world of commerce most significant and encouraging progress has been effected by the close cooperation of the educational and mercantile communities. Commercial schools and courses, some under University patronage, have grown in size and number. The five years that ended in 1922 doubled the number of commercial students, bringing it to a total of over 7500, or five times the strength of ten years ago, and trebled the expenditure.[53]

This reflected, in part, the impact of the First World War upon the Indian economy and the concomitant growth of business and industrial undertakings under Indian management. However, there is also indirect evidence that it represented an increased willingness on the part of students to enter fields which had in the past not been so attractive.

With the transfer of education to popular ministers in 1921, decision-making regarding education entered a new phase. Indian political opinion could now operate rather directly on trends in

49. Davis, p. 151.
50. Davis, pp. 155–156.
51. Cunningham, "Education," in O'Malley, p. 169.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 169, 182.
53. Mayhew, p. 167.

education. It is true that under Dyarchy the matters transferred to ministers responsible to the legislative assemblies were faced with fiscal difficulties. This fact doubtless hampered efforts to aid education and may well have led to a decline in the quality of the education due to an effort to increase the quantity available. But the interesting aspect of education under popular control was the extent to which the efforts made reinforced and perpetuated the tendencies which were already clearly apparent. Western education and, in particular, Western higher education continued to be favored. The demand was not to undo what the British had done, but to do more of it. Educational statistics for the period between the two wars demonstrate this fact.

During the first five years of the operation of the Government of India Act of 1919, there were noteworthy gains in numbers of persons undergoing instruction. Table 1 gives a summary picture

Table 1. ***Stages of Instruction in Recognized Institutions****

	Number of students		
Year	*Collegiate*	*Secondary*	*Primary*
1922	58,837	653,416	6,897,147
1927	83,890	868,271	9,247,617
Per cent increase	42.6	32.9	34.1

* The table is taken from Cunningham in O'Malley, p. 172. It should be clearly noted that statistics for education, as for a number of other aspects of Indian life, are hardly satisfactory. Apart from errors in collection and in reporting of data, there is a serious problem in the literature which reflects the authors' lack of concern to specify which data they have used or to define their terms. Two different authors discussing the same topic will usually present different figures and any one author may have tables that are internally inconsistent. Sources are often very difficult to check.

of trends. The increase in number of college students is the most pronounced. In one respect, at least, this is quite interesting. For years educated Indians, especially the nationalists, had criticized government for concentrating too much of their effort at the higher levels. Dyarchy witnessed no change in this respect. This was, in fact, an era in which the number of universities in India was materially enhanced, with fourteen new universities opened

between 1920 and 1947.[55] Technical education did not, however, keep pace with the growth of literary and professional training.[56] The general literacy rate of the population improved in the decade between 1921 and 1931, but not in a dramatic fashion. In 1921 8.3 per cent of the population was literate, in 1931 the figure had risen to 9.2 per cent. In absolute numbers the figures would be somewhat more impressive, because the population of India in 1931 was 338 millions, as compared with 306 millions in 1921.[57] The Muslims, meanwhile, continued to gain in literacy. By 1931, 7.2 per cent of the Muslims over the age of 10 were literate, as compared with 9.3 per cent of the Hindus. This reflected a 70.7 per cent increase in Muslim literacy for the years from 1891 to 1931.[58] Female education also showed distinct gains by comparison with previous decades.

There was, as has been suggested, some question as to the significance of enrollment figures in view of the danger that a concern for quantity had vitiated achievement of quality. When the Royal Commission under Sir John Simon was appointed to survey constitutional progress in 1929, it was instructed to study developments in education. The Simon commission appointed the Indian Auxiliary Committee on Education under Sir Philip Hartog. Its *Report*, presented in 1929, made some major criticisms of the existing educational situation, and proposed certain remedies. The major criticism confirmed the fear that quantity had been pushed at the expense of quality. The committee insisted upon a policy of consolidation by which poor schools would be shut down and resources used to strengthen the better schools. It was also pointed out that primary education had been largely overlooked and badly needed strengthening. Similarly, the inadequate preparation of primary and secondary school teachers was scored. The committee expressed deep concern over the serious wastage due to early drop-outs in the lower grades as well as over

55. Mukerji, p. 250.
56. Data on the growth of technical education are sparse and scattered. The general impression given, however, is of slow gains compared with those registered in liberal arts or in the profession such as law. See, Mukerji, pp. 292–308. Also, Cunningham in O'Malley, pp. 164–165; Mayhew p. 136; Chirol, pp. 266–267.
57. Davis, p. 27.
58. Davis, p. 551.

the widespread practice of holding pupils so long in a lower grade as to cause stagnation and loss of interest. The committee deplored the fact that the great majority of children who went to secondary school prepared for college entrance.[59]

The consolidation urged by the Hartog committee was soon forced by the advent of an unparalleled economic crisis which severely limited the funds available for education, public or private. The first and most obvious effect was a setback in the quantitative advance of education, required by serious retrenchment of government expenditure on education at all levels. In 1932 there were 12,766,537 students in all levels of education in British India. This figure represented 4.7 per cent of the total population. Of these students 12,122,466 were enrolled in recognized institutions. In 1933 there were 12,853,532 students in all institutions, or 4.73 per cent of the population. At that time, 12,192,127 were in recognized schools and colleges.[60] In 1934 total enrollments stood at 13,172,890 (4.8 per cent of the population), of whom 12,491,796 were in recognized institutions.[61]

In 1935 enrollments inched up to 13,506,869 (5.0 per cent of the population), of whom 12,820,760 were in recognized institutions. The increase in recorded enrollments was, however, to some extent negatived by the official finding that 74 per cent of the boys and 87 per cent of the girls failed to remain in school long enough to secure literacy.[62] In the same year, government stated that large numbers of those who were in college were "unfit for higher literary or scientific education"[63] and should have been diverted to practical studies prior to matriculation. Between 1935 and 1936 there was a noticeable drop in the number of recognized institutions. More than 2,200 vanished, due to vigorous efforts to elimi-

59. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1929–1930, Vol. X (*Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors, and Others*, Vol. 3), Cmd. 3407, Sept., 1929, "Indian Statutory Commission, Interim Report . . . (Reveiw of the Growth of Education in British India by the Auxiliary Committee . . .)," pp. 99–401.
60. India, Bureau of Education, *Education in India in 1932–33* (Delhi, 1935), pp. 4–5.
61. India, Bureau of Education, *Education in India in 1933–34* (Delhi, 1936), pp. 4–5.
62. India, Bureau of Education, *Education in India in 1934–35* (Delhi, 1937), pp. 3–5.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

nate inefficient and incompetent primary schools. Many of those reported closed were of the single teacher type.[64] Enrollments, however, climbed to a total of 13,816,149 (5.09 per cent of the population) of whom 13,115,077 were in recognized schools.[65] There were, that is to say, 1,049,612 more students in schools and colleges in British India in 1936 than there had been in 1932. Table 2 summarizes enrollments, during these years, by type of school.

While the table suffers from some unavoidable statistical defects, the picture which emerges seems relatively accurate. Certain interesting trend characteristics should be noted. To begin with, a modest total increase in enrollments of 7.5 per cent was made during the four years. In no category was there a decrease in enrollments. However, in certain categories the rate of increase was much more pronounced than in others or than the total increase for all categories. Increases in enrollments under direct university teaching were the most marked, and they reflected two facts. The universities desired to become teaching institutions as well as examination agencies so as to guarantee a better quality of training at the graduate and research levels. At the same time, it appears that the demand for such advanced training was on the increase.

Enrollments in arts colleges also increased much more rapidly than enrollments in general. This reflected the continued emphasis on a liberal arts training for "white collar" and public service careers. The increase in enrollments in professional colleges was by comparison relatively modest but was sufficiently rapid to suggest a growth of demand for legal, medical, and engineering training. During 1933 and 1934 colleges of commerce held fourth place among enrollments in professional colleges; in 1935 and 1936 they replaced engineering in third place.

High school enrollments grew more rapidly than did all enrollments during the period under discussion. In interpreting this fact it should be kept in mind that the primary role of the high school

64. *India,* Bureau of Education, *Education in India in 1935–36* (Delhi, 1938), p. 4.
65. *Ibid.,* p. 5

Table 2. *British India: Enrollments in Recognized Institutions, by Category*

Type of institution	*1933*[a]	*1934*[b]	*1935*[c]	*1936*[d]	*1933–36 + (increase or) − (decrease) Per cent*	
					Number	*Per cent*
Universities	10,041	10,762	11,003	11,311	+ 1,270	+12.6
Arts Colleges	75,329	78,669	81,307	83,864	+ 8,535	+11.3
Professional Colleges	18,391	18,917	19,498	20,049	+ 1,658	+ 9.0
High Schools	978,702	1,007,544	1,043,897	1,081,791	+103,089	+10.5
Middle Schools	1,318,365	1,314,720	1,318,107	1,341,127	+ 22,762	− 1.7
Primary Schools	9,531,960	9,806,356	10,089,672	10,308,403	+776,443	+ 8.1
Special Schools	259,339	254,828	257,276	268,532	+ 9,193	+ 3.5
Total	12,192,127	12,491,796	12,820,760	13,115,077	+922,950	+ 7.5

The table is based upon data derived from these sources:

a. *Education in India in 1932–33*, p. 5.
b. *Education in India in 1933–34*, p. 5.
c. *Education in India in 1934–35*, p. 6.
d. *Education in India in 1935–36*, p. 6.

was to prepare students for college admission. The significance of the 10.5 per cent increase in high school enrollments is enhanced by comparing high school figures with those for the middle schools. The latter had the smallest rate of increase in enrollments of any category—1.7 per cent. This fact would seem to reflect two basic circumstances, both of which are relevant for understanding the impact of education in India. In the first place, tiny enrollment increases in middle schools reflects the inutility of literate studies for the numerous lower classes. Middle schools were part of the transmission belt to the high schools and had very little more appeal than the high schools. Lower-class parents were apparently not prepared to leave their children in school beyond the primary grades. By contrast, the literate upper castes pushed their children through middle school into high school. In the second place, the data reflect the substantial drop-out rate characteristic of Indian enrollments.

A second interesting characteristic of the years under discussion is the trend in Muslim enrollments. In 1933 the Muslims were estimated to form just over 24 per cent of the population. In the same year Muslim students accounted for 13.9 per cent of the enrollments in universities and arts colleges, 13.3 per cent of the enrollments in professional colleges, 9.7 per cent of the high school enrollments, and 29.6 per cent of the primary school enrollments.[66] In 1935 the picture was very much the same, with Muslims accounting for 14.1 per cent of university and arts college enrollments, 12.6 per cent of the enrollments in professional colleges, 9.8 per cent of the students in secondary schools, and 29.3 per cent of the pupils in primary grades.[67] The same proportions hold true for 1937, by which time the Muslims were reported to form slightly more than 26 per cent of the total population. These data make it clear that at the secondary and higher levels, Muslims continued to be sadly underrepresented in education.[68]

66. These percentages have been calculated from tabular materials in *Education in India in 1932–33*, pp. 5, 59–60.
67. These percentages have been calculated from tabular materials in *Education in India in 1934–35*, pp. 6, 78–81.
68. Based upon information provided in India, Bureau of Education, *Education in India in 1937–38* (Delhi, 1939), p. 98.

Data summarized in Table 3 carry the information on enrollment by major categories forward for 1938 and 1939. In examining Table 3 it will be noted that it reflects all of the trends exhibited by the data presented for 1933–36 in Table 2. Gains in enrollments in arts colleges and in professional colleges remain relatively high, while middle schools experience a slight downward tendency in enrollments. The number of students in high schools moves up slightly.

Table 3. ***British India: Enrollments in Recognized Institutions, by Categories***

Type of institution	*1938*[a]	*1939*[b]
Universities	10,139	10,919
Arts Colleges	91,099	97,938
Professional Colleges	22,040	23,672
High Schools	1,117,991	1,175,250
Middle Schools	1,274,897	1,329,778
Primary Schools	10,516,353	10,870,045
Special Schools	278,028	403,570
Total	13,310,547	13,911,172

This table is based upon materials derived from:
[a]. *Education in India in 1937–38*, p. 7.
[b]. *Education in India in 1938–39*, p. 7.

An interesting development during 1937–38 was the report that the primary and secondary curriculum in the various provinces was, to a greater or lesser extent, being modified by inclusion of basic manual and vocational training in fields such as woodworking, spinning, horticulture, weaving, and papermaking. The report is vague but indicates that this is a relatively new and, at that time, somewhat uncertain feature except in Madras Province where such training apparently had been fairly well established.[69]

The information given above should enable the student to form a general picture of the major characteristics of the educational system which had been created in India by British agency. It should also be apparent that the Indian setting shaped Western

69. *Education in India in 1937–38*, pp. 39–40.

education in certain prominent ways. The inordinate emphasis on a literate training for a "white collar" career seems to be an instance of the effect of local circumstances; the high drop-out rate by the end of primary schooling is another; the marked disparity in the spread of education to the various communities is a third; the general absence of lower classes and castes in grades above the primary is still another. Similarly, as Kingsley Davis points out, Western education in India has been essentially an urban phenomenon and predominantly a training available to males.[70] Finally, at least in terms of literacy, education had had only a limited effect. In 1941 only 15.1 per cent of the Indian population was regarded as literate and it is obvious that many of those so regarded could at best have been barely literate.[71]

Having discussed the aims of those who established an educational system in British India and the shape their aims gave to the system, as well as the ways in which the Indian setting modified the educational system, we can now ask in what significant ways Western education affected Indian society.[72] The information previously presented requires some interpretation aimed at the underlying processes and the larger context. The interpretation will attempt to suggest changes in Indian society. It is hoped the dimensions of the impact on India may thereby be indicated.

III

It is obvious that Western education directly influenced only a small minority of Indians. That is to say, the basis was laid for the emergence of a new kind of elite, with new kinds of values, new skills, and new aspirations. Lord Meston has expressed the point rather aptly:

> Of all the channels through which western influences flow into Indian life, education is the chief. . . . Widespread knowledge of the English

70. Davis, pp. 152–153.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
72. It would have been sterile to have attempted an artificial separation of the effects of Western education on Indian society from the discussion in previous portions of this paper. Many of the things which have been discussed up to this point indicate effects on India. The remainder of the paper attempts to analyze such effects in a systematic fashion so as to highlight them in their larger context.

language and use of English text-books has drawn the Indian mind into an entirely new line of development. Along that line lie utterly novel conceptions: freedom of speech and the pen, criticism of authority, the questioning of accepted dogmas. . . . The growing familiarity with these has brought a new spirit into Indian life. . . .

Here emerges the crucial problem of the two civilizations. All the western doctrines of freedom and progress are eagerly embraced by the great majority of Indians who have made English their common language; but how will this new current in the end affect the unfathomed depths of Hindu and Muslim life?[73]

As a result of the new skills and values, the educated elite were marked off from traditional society and from the rest of the population. Considerable evidence points to the conclusion that Western education tended to alienate many of its devotees from the social order in which they had been born.[74]

The fact of alienation, though important for an understanding of the effects of Western education, by no means exhausts the matter of influences upon the traditional society. We are equally concerned with the nature of the new elite, so as to be able to evaluate its change-producing potential. The Western-educated elite was significant because its internalized values were, in cer-

73. Lord Meston, "Foreword," O'Malley, p. vi. Also, the remarks by Surendranath Banerjea, quoted in O'Malley, "General Survey," *ibid.*, p. 766, who confirms fully what Meston suggests.

74. Thus, Cunningham, "Education," O'Malley, p. 185, remarks that Western education and a Western occupation have "led to a change of habit and outlook which have alienated him from the simple way of life followed by the mass of his fellow countrymen." O'Malley, "The Impact of European Civilization," *ibid.*, p. 66, puts it more directly, "The first school of thought adopted an aggressive attitude towards Hinduism and openly defied its canons. . . . Intellectually they were children of the English, socially they were a class apart, divorced on their own initiative from orthodox Hindu society. There was little sympathy either between them and their countrymen, or between them and the English; they had been raised out of one society without having a recognized place in another." Mayhew, p. 207, says, "We have sent him back, dissatisfied, to his own world . . . which he is unable to rationalize, or bring into healthy contact with his economic or professional life, and with the outside world to which he is economically and politically bound." Chirol, p. 241, argued early in this century that Indian traditionalists "have long complained that the spirit of reverence and the respect for parental authority are being killed by an educational system which may train the intellect and impart useful worldly knowledge, but withdraws their youths. . . . and estranges them from all the ideas of their own Hindu word." It should not, however, be assumed that all or even most of those who secured Western education were thereby alienated from traditional ways. Among the educated there were those who became staunch supporters of traditional values and ardent chauvinists. I have made an effort to explore this phenomenon in, "Problems of Divergent Developments within Indian Nationalism, 1895–1905," in R. Sakai, ed., *Studies on Asia, 1961* (Lincoln, 1961), pp. 1–14.

tain respects, different from and even hostile to indigenous values and patterns of behavior. Without trying to recapitulate the differences between traditional Indian values and those of modern Europe, one or two examples may be cited.

Traditional society in India has long placed major emphasis on ascription criteria for status, rather than on achievement criteria. Western education reversed the emphasis, and stressed criteria of achievement. This was doubly the case in that the norms inculcated by Western education postulated achievement and established a vivid series of "objective" tests of achievement, and in the sense that access to the new system of education—and therefore to the new career opportunities—was not based upon the traditional system of ascription. Early in the game the Brahmans realized that Brahmanhood, as such, was no longer a guarantee either of admission to college or of graduation therefrom.[75] Moreover, Western education emphasized universalistic values which were significantly different from the particularistic values of traditional society in India.

Central to traditional Hindu values has been the emphasis upon the subordination of the individual to the primary groupings into which he is born. There was, in the traditional society, little scope for the expression of individualism. The new education, by contrast, placed considerable emphasis upon individual decision-making and upon freedom of choice. Perhaps more important, the new education provided viable alternatives and new opportunities for the individual, thus placing before him norms which justified individualism and opportunities which helped to make the exercise of the new individuality possible.

But, as India progressed economically and administratively, those who had the advantage of an English education gradually, by right

75. Chirol, p. 22, speaks of the "dread and resentment of them [Western ideas] by those whose traditional ascendency they threaten. . . ." O'Malley, "General Survey," in O'Malley, p. 767 says, "It was felt that this alien civilization, with its levelling influences and rationalistic methods of thought and interpretation, was destructive of Hinduism or rather of Hinduism as a religion pivoted on the Brahmans. . . . Brahmans found that their power was being undermined and that they were losing their position of theocratic dominance. Their authority was challenged, their beliefs questioned. . . ." Also, Cunningham, "Education," *ibid.*, pp. 181–182, for the rise of lower castes through the new opportunities inherent in the Western system of education.

of the prosperity, authority, and enlightenment it brought them, were to become themselves a leading class as powerful as any of the old, and having this attractive power that its ranks were not closed to the lower castes or to the common people. . . . What 'A' might do under the new rule, 'B' might also do, although 'A' was a Brahman or a Kayasth and 'B' was a thing of naught.[76]

Traditional society placed high value upon the received learning of the past, a tradition cherished by the orthodox and by the priest-class. Western knowledge attacked the basis of many of the traditional systems of belief and substituted for them a rational, critical, and secular attitude toward learning. The fact that Western education had high market value and opened the way to new careers made it attractive. The fact that it was the learning of the ruling power gave it prestige and authority, despite a residual ambivalence. This ambivalence reflected several factors. To begin with, Western education promised more opportunity than foreign rule made practical. At the same time, foreign domination threatened the self-respect of the upper-class Indian. Thompson and Garratt have put it quite well:

The growing national desire for self-respect drove the educated classes to find some explanation for such incapacity (to command their own national destiny). This led ultimately to the worship of the past, a 'back to the Vedas' movement, and the complaint, now grown tiresome from constant repetition, that the 'nation' had been 'emasculated' during the British occupation.[77]

Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence that the Western-educated tended to lose respect for the fundamental assumptions

76. It should be clear, of course, that the new opportunities were accompanied by certain "costs." The quotation from Cunningham, "Education," in O'Malley, pp. 150–151, stresses the new chances for the educated man. But these chances could lead to frustration if they proved to be unfulfilled expectations and they could lead to a basic conflict with traditional society. Thus, Mayhew, p. 44, says, "A junior member [of a joint-family] may be an expert in English literature. . . . But he must take his orders in the home from his grandfather who can and will read nothing but the Ramayana. . . . The rights of an individual member as apart from those of the household are not recognized. The ideas which dominate the occupational life of the clerk or government servant have no validity in the home." Again, Thompson and Garratt, p. 542, remark that "From the first there was much discontent. The old caste tradition encouraged the belief that a salaried and sedentary occupation was the right of anyone who was fully educated; but middle-class unemployment appeared very early in India. Those who did obtain situations were often brought into contact with Europeans who treated all educated Indians as clerks."

77. Thompson and Garratt, p. 463.

of the old order. It was, for instance, from among the graduates of Western education that a vocal and insistent demand was raised for basic reforms of traditional society. This has been true from the days of Raja Ram Mohun Roy and the Brahmo Samaj down to Jawaharlal Nehru's socialist, secular ideal.[78]

Western education not only created a new kind of elite in India and provided it with new criteria of achievement and new avenues to status, it also hastened the overturn of the basis of the old social order, the caste system.[79] Even the lowly untouchable could secure the new literacy—although few did—and by doing so could step out of the position which had traditionally been his. More important, perhaps, is the fact that the new learning established its carriers on an all-India basis and thereby helped to create a national unification which had been unthinkable in the past. The English language became the lingua franca of the educated class in all parts of the subcontinent. For the first time a native elite came into existence which surmounted regional, parochial, and linguistic barriers. This was a major change for a society which had up to that time been noteworthy for its fissiparious localisms.

Beyond this, English education provided the new elite with the

78. O'Malley, "General Survey," in O'Malley, p. 667, says, "It is obvious that the system of Engish education has been a solvent of old traditions and established beliefs. . . . Convictions which seemed ingrained have yielded to the corrosive action of new ideas. A questioning and critical spirit may be seen. . . ." Also S. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale, Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India* (Berkeley, 1962), gives a thorough discussion of reforming ideas among Western-educated Indians.

79. There is considerable disagreement among scholars over the effects of Western education and allied Western influences upon the caste system. Some scholars argue that caste has been severely stricken by new ideas, social mobility, new occupational opportunities, and the new conditions of urban life in India. Other scholars have argued that caste has been strengthened by certain Western influences. Thus, for instance, it is reported that modern means of communication and of travel have made possible a growth in the organizational strength of caste associations. The latter, on a regional basis, are now said to play a greater part in the lives of caste members than was the case in premodern times. This paper cannot attempt an answer to a vexed issue such as this. Suffice it to say, Western education provided the impetus to changes which could undermine caste or at least transform it substantially. Whether Indians will reorient their tradition—by using the new values—so as to destroy the essence of caste or whether they will modify caste so as to accommodate to the impulses arising from Western education is as yet unclear. When men reinterpret their tradition they can move in one of several different directions. The interesting question for Indians today is which direction will the reinterpretation of caste, as part of the Indian tradition, take?

necessary ideology for nationalism and for national unification. It can truly be said, as has been so forcefully argued by McCully, that the origins of modern Indian nationalism clearly lie in the ranks of the Western educated class and in the content of the ideas transmitted to them by Western education.[80] English education supplied the basis for a new nation and for new national aspirations which were, *inter alia,* at least in part subversive of the traditional Indian political and social order.

Finally, English education provided the knowledge and the skills necessary for the transformation of Indian society and the Indian economy through a modernization based upon the application of science and technology to all spheres of life. This basic change is immediately apparent in the growth of new professions such as engineering and medicine, but it is equally apparent in the continuing reconstruction of the Indian landscape by veterinary medicine, scientific institutions, modern agricultural techniques, and giant hydroelectric schemes. Each of these new developments has been based upon Western education and each is having a profound effect on Indian society. With the growth of these new potentialities and opportunities, the old society loses its sway. The new knowledge has meant the ability to control and allocate resources, human and material, to new purposes, while it has at the same time provided new goals and justifications. As such the story of modern India is the story of the impact, direct and indirect, of Western learning. The leading changes summarized in the concluding section of this paper should be expected to lay the basis for the major trends apparent in independent India.

80. McCully, pp. 388f. Also, R. I. Crane, "The Leadership of the Congress Party," in R. L. Park and I. Tinker, eds., *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (Princeton, 1959), pp. 169–187; Sir Verney Lovett, *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement* (London, 1921), p. 54; Chirol, p. 207; Mayhew, p. 140; Majumdar, pp. 4, 38–40, 72–78, 88–89.

• 6 •

Brahmans in an Industrial Setting: A Case Study

Joseph W. Elder°

What are the relationships between India's cultural values, on one hand, and processes of modernization on the other? Beginning with Max Weber and his proposition that rational capitalism could not develop spontaneously within India because of the "spirit" of Hinduism,[1] this question has been dealt with from various directions by such scholars of the Indian scene as Jathar and Beri,[2] Davis,[3] Singer,[4] Goheen,[5] Karve,[6] Srinivas,[7] and Shils.[8] With the exception of Milton Singer, the consensus of these writers is that there are serious discrepancies between Hindu society and culture and the demands of modernization. Goheen states that the tradi-

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1. Max Weber, *The Religion of India,* ed. and trans. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, 1958), pp. 111–117.
2. G. B. Jathar and S. G. Beri, *Elements of Indian Economics* (3rd. ed.; Madras, 1943), p. 23.
3. Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton, 1951), chap. xxii.
4. Milton Singer, "Cultural Values in India's Economic Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CCCV (May, 1956), 81–91; also, "India's Cultural Values and Economic Development: A Discussion," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* VII (Oct., 1958), 10–12.
5. John Goheen, "India's Cultural Values and Economic Development: A Discussion," *ibid.,* 1–3, 9–10.
6. D. G. Karve, "India's Cultural Values and Economic Development: A Discussion," *ibid.,* 7–9.
7. M. N. Srinivas, "India's Cultural Values and Economic Development: A Discussion," *ibid.,* 3–6; also "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization," *Far Eastern Quarterly,* XV (Aug., 1956), 481–496.
8. Edward Shils, *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation* (The Hague, 1961), esp. pp. 117–120.

tional Hindu view that sorrow emerges from material concern is antithetical to social improvement.[9] Shils refers to the "fundamental, inevitable, and conflicting demands of tradition and modernity."[10] Srinivas, in discussing the future of Hinduism as a religion, states, "India might become a completely 'materialist' country in the not-distant future. Hinduism is an acephalous religion, and it may not stand up to the Industrial Revolution even as well as Christianity or Judaism."[11]

The purpose of this paper is to take a close look at a case study in India where "industrialism" and "modernity" have come face-to-face with "traditional Hinduism."[12] The broad question we shall be approaching will be: *Are* the demands of traditional Hinduism on the one hand and industrialism on the other really "fundamental, inevitable, and conflicting"? The focus of our inquiry will center on the Brahmans—the elite of the traditional caste system. If industrialism and modernity are incompatible with traditionalism, then it would follow logically that with the *advent* of industrialism and modernity would come the *displacement* of traditionalism. One aspect of this displacement of traditionalism would be the displacement of the traditional elite, i.e. the Brahmans, whose occupation and status rest so heavily on traditional Hindu cosmology.[13]

If the above logic is correct, then we could set up an hypothesis of the "if A, then B" variety as follows: If there is the introduction of industrialism and modernity,[14] then there will be the displacement of the traditional elite, i.e. the Brahmans.

Evidence for the displacement of the Brahmans would include:

9. "India's Cultural Values and Economic Development," p. 3.
10. *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity,* p. 119.
11. "India's Cultural Values and Economic Development," p. 6.
12. By "traditional Hinduism" I shall mean both (a) the cosmology, and (b) the set of normative injunctions regarding man's relations to man as well as man's relations to cosmological forces. In this regard I believe I do not differ markedly from Goheen, Shils, and Srinivas.
13. For the time being we shall leave unanswered the question whether the displacement of the Brahmans would be an earlier or later feature in the displacement of traditionalism. In either case, because of the close connection between traditional Hinduism and the Brahmans, the displacement of the Brahmans will be considered one of the necessary conditions for the displacement of traditionalism.
14. I shall define "industrialism" as the establishment of large-scale organizations oriented to productivity and to maximization of efficiency in that productivity through such means as the application of mechanical power. For operational pur-

1. Reduction of the status position of the Brahmans below the level they traditionally held.

2. Loss by the Brahmans of their traditional sphere of authority and the emergence of new authority groups replacing the Brahmans in their former sphere.

Having set up our hypothesis, and having established the criteria whereby we shall reject or accept the hypothesis, let us turn to the case study of the meeting of "industrialism and modernity" with "traditional Hinduism."[15]

The Sita-Ram sugar mill and distillery[16] lie less than 200 miles east of Delhi in the state of Uttar Pradesh. In 1939 the wealthy Kapur family, of a Punjabi Khatri caste,[17] had built the sugar mill and distillery in the middle of wheat fields close to a railway junction, thirteen miles from the nearest city of any size. For the early construction work, and later for the hundreds of unskilled jobs, they had hired peasants from local villages, who could work their eight hours in the mill and then return to their homes in the village. But the Kapurs could not recruit their managerial and technical staff from the local villages. Nor could they expect this staff, once it had been brought in from the outside, to find living arrangements within the local villages, for in the villages space was at a premium. In order to house the technical staff, the Kapur family had built a colony of brick houses within the walls of the

poses, I shall define "modernity" as corresponding to "secular education," that type of education endorsing the establishment of objectifiable evidence for proof of phenomena in opposition to the type of education that endorses tradition or faith as the basis for proof of phenomena. This definition does not appear to do violence to Shils' usage of "modernity," and it provides us with a measurable entity.

15. The findings from a case study are, at best, suggestive rather than definitive. With only one unit to analyze, it is difficult to distinguish what elements of that unit are common to other units, and what elements of that unit are unique to itself. A comparison between my study and that of Arthur Niehoff ("Caste and Industrial Organization in North India," *Church Labor Letter No. 59*, School of Theology, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan, November, 1959) shows a similarity of general features along with some close correspondence of specific details. These similarities are especially interesting since the factory he studied is in Kanpur, a highly industrialized city, whereas the factory I studied is in a rural area. However, any sort of definitive statement regarding industrialism and Hinduism would have to be made on the basis of many more case studies in many different regions of India.

16. Sita-Ram is a pseudonym for the sugar mill and distillery being discussed. Although this paper provides no reason for concealing its identity, a forthcoming book on the mill, in fact, does. All other names are also pseudonyms.

17. A caste within the larger Kshatriya class.

mill compound. These houses were provided free of charge to the imported members of the technical staff.

By the time I arrived on the scene in 1956, an unusual phenomenon of Hindu society was emerging within the mill compound—a community of newcomers. For these Hindus moving into the Sita-Ram colony from places as far away as the Punjab, Assam, and Mysore, there was no pattern of their parents or grandparents to which they could refer in relating themselves to those around them. Each family had to decide for itself how much it would associate with castes lower than itself, to what degree it would indoctrinate its children into the niceties of caste, how far it would go in breaking vegetarian taboos within its own home or within the homes of its neighbors, and which household ceremonies it would abandon and which it would continue.

Among the 400 or so men, women, and children living in the mill compound between 1956 and 1958, about 20 per cent were Sikhs from the Punjab, possessing their own religious tradition. Less than 5 per cent were Hindus from the "once-born" classes (albeit from the highest castes within this category—the Kayasths and the Jats). The remaining 75 per cent belonged to castes within the high "twice-born" classes—the Brahmans (about 90), Kshatriyas (about 170), and Vaishyas (about 40), all of whom by tradition are entitled to study the Vedas and to wear the sacred thread.[18]

A further factor contributed to the "twice-born" tone of the mill compound. The colony was divided into "lines," with the highest officials in the mill being assigned to the most spacious quarters in the most prestigeful lines, and the lesser officials being assigned to more crowded quarters in the more-distant lines. Inasmuch as almost all of the Sikhs were machine-shop workers and mechanics, their status was relatively low and therefore they were assigned to the furthest quarters. Here they had their own community life, and here the mill management had provided them with a small *gurudwara* (Sikh temple) in which they could celebrate such

18. The mill compound housed no Muslim or Scheduled caste families. When I inquired what would happen if a highly-trained "untouchable" engineer were hired by the mill and wanted to move his family into the mill quarters, I was told that the situation could not arise, since such a man would not be hired in the first place.

festivals as the birthdays of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh.

This arrangement left the quarters of the high-status lines filled predominantly by Hindus. As if to signify this, the mill management had built a handsome, three-spired white temple at the converging point of the high-status lines. The management had also hired Pandit Ram Svarup, a well-educated Brahman priest, to care for the temple and to serve the religious needs of the Hindu community. A year or so before my arrival, Pandit Ram Svarup had found his duties so pressing that he had persuaded the mill owner to hire a Brahman assistant, Pandit Dev Prakash, to help with the maintenance of the temple and the performance of religious ceremonies.

Much of my material describing the Brahmans in the Sita-Ram mill comes from systematic interviews I conducted with twenty-four of the Brahmans (thirteen husbands, eleven wives) living in the highest-echelon lines of the mill. I used the same schedule to interview Pandit Ram Svarup, the temple priest. Throughout most of this interview, Pandit Dev Prakash, his assistant, sat beside him, usually agreeing, occasionally raising questions, and once disagreeing strongly with an answer that he had just given. As a "control group" for these Brahmans in the mill, I interviewed another fifty-six of the highest-echelon Hindu staff—none of whom were Brahmans.

In the village of Tehri, about a quarter of a mile from the mill, I interviewed Panditji Mohan Lal, priest of the village of Rajpur, where I lived for sixteen months. As a control group to which I could compare the "village" Brahman, I interviewed 120 men and women from Rajpur, none of whom were in the "twice-born" category, much less in the Brahman caste.

Schematically the sample design of the interviews conducted would look something like this:

	Brahman priests	*Brahman non-priests*	*Non-Brahmans*
Mill (educated)	1	24	56
Village (uneducated)	1	none in village	120
	Total Brahmans	26	
	Total non-Brahmans	176	

In addition to the systematic interviews with fixed questions, I had several discussions with two Brahman priests who lived in Rajpur for two weeks while they conducted a series of evening Kattha services. I talked frequently and at length about this topic with a young Brahman clerk in the mill who was my Hindi tutor, and I spent several Sundays in the home of a Brahman college professor in Huseinpur working on translations of the interview schedule and discussing with him the content as well as the wording of the questions. All of these were Brahmans familiar with the Sita-Ram mill. There were individual differences in their interpretations of what was going on, but there were also some marked similarities in their interpretations. From this body of material I think it is possible to obtain a fairly clear picture of what was happening to the Brahmans in the industrial setting of the Sita-Ram mill.

I. Brahmans in the Mill Community

The non-priests

The Hindus whom I interviewed living in the mill lines were members of an "industrial modern" community (see definition above, n. 14). Generally speaking, they had been hired for their technical competence. The amount of their salary and the size of their free quarters were contingent upon their ability to perform given tasks within the industrial-bureaucratic context. Although family connections did play a part in their appointments, caste *as caste* did not (except that they could not have been Muslims or members of the Scheduled castes, see n. 18 above). Thus, in the quarters in line one, the most prestigeful line, lived a Brahman, a Khatri (Kshatriya), an Arora (Vaishya), and a Sikh. They were assigned to these quarters because they were in turn: the manager of the distillery, the chief chemist, the manager of the mill, and the chief engineer, and not because of their castes. These same castes could be found in the considerably lower-status line three, where they were assigned because they were mechanics, com-

pounders, and clerks. Under this system, a Brahman mechanic certainly held a lower status in the mill compound than did the Vaishya mill manager. To this extent, one might say that the evidence supports the hypothesis that Brahmans are being "displaced" in the modern industrial setting.

But before establishing such a conclusion, it may be wise to look at the larger setting within which the mill was operating. The mill compound was built to house technical personnel who could not be recruited locally. To this extent, *anyone* housed in the mill colony held a higher status in the eyes of factory management than the unskilled laborers coming from nearby villages, insofar as status is determined by the relative rarity of the services a man provides. Villagers also shared with management in ascribing generally high status to members of the mill colony. They would refer to them respectfully as the "sahibs," the "big men," and the "learned men."

In addition to their technical competence, for which they received status, it so happened that there was also a correlation between status in the mill and status in the caste hierarchy. Thus, men holding higher-status jobs in the mill were also, generally speaking, from the higher castes. The following figures illustrate this correlation:

Caste Distribution in the Sita-Ram Sugar Mill and Distillery (Hindus only)
I = managerial, clerical, and sectional supervisory
II = skilled, semiskilled, and line supervisory
III = unskilled

Caste status	*Status in mill*			*Total*	*Total no.*
	I	*II*	*III*		
1. Brahman	20%	45%	34%	99%	93
2. Kshatriya	25	32	43	100	79
3. Vaishya	25	29	46	100	24
4. High Shudra	5	38	57	100	121
5. Shudra	0	33	67	100	415
6. Scheduled caste	0	18	82	100	332
					1064

Note from this table that the Brahmans were somewhat higher in the mill status hierarchy than the Kshatriyas or Vaishyas.[19] However, it is when one takes the twice-born castes as a group and compares them with the once-born castes as a group that one obtains dramatically significant status correlations:

Caste status	*Status in mill*			*Total*	*Total no.*
	I	*II*	*III*		
Twice-born	23%	38%	39%	100%	196
Once-born	1	34	65	100	536
Scheduled caste	0	18	82	100	332

Correspondence between status in the traditional caste hierarchy and status in the mill hierarchy exists not only between the "twice-born" and the "once-born,"[20] but also between the "once-born" and the "Scheduled castes."[21] In other words, in a general way the status hierarchy of the Sita-Ram mill *corresponds* to the status hierarchy of the traditional caste system. Brahmans and other members of the twice-born castes have taken advantage of their superiority in the traditional context to see that their children received training for prestigeful posts in a modern, industrial context. The children of those who have done so have been able to move from high status in one system to high status in another at least in part *because* of their superior position in the traditional system.

Despite the fact that within the generally "twice-born" community in the mill compound caste lines and mill-status lines crisscrossed, the Brahmans employed in the Sita-Ram mill, regardless of their mill status, generally maintained a world-view and a style of life that was distinctly "Brahmanical." Ways in which the Brahmans differed significantly from the other "twice-born" living in the mill compound included:

19. Chi-square = 4.14; significant at approximately the 0.14 level. There is a one-out-of-seven probability that this difference occurred merely by chance; hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the mill status of the Brahmans, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas.
20. Chi-square = 107.9, significant at the 0.001 level.
21. Chi-square = 30.7, significant at the 0.001 level.

More concern for personal ritual purity. One aspect of the Brahmans' concern for ritual purity was apparent in their avoidance of meat and eggs. Eighty-eight per cent of the Brahmans were "pure vegetarians" and would eat neither eggs nor meat. Only 52 per cent of the non-Brahmans in my sample were "pure vegetarians" (although another 11 per cent were partial vegetarians—eating eggs but not meat).[22]

The Brahmans' concern for ritual purity was also reflected in their relatively greater reluctance to eat food cooked by someone from a low caste,[23] as well as by their greater anxiety about the difficulties an orthodox Hindu would have living in a city.[24] Reasons the Brahmans gave for these difficulties included the following: "The water in the municipal pipes is ritually impure." "In crowded cities we must be touching untouchables." "In cities we must come into contact with the bodies, food, etc., of lower castes." "It is difficult to get pure food and water in cities. Our water must be holy, drunk from a clean hand. Most pumps use leather suction valves that pollute the water."

These Brahmans whom I interviewed, despite their positions in an industrial modern setting, were not forgetting that they were Brahmans. Furthermore, they felt that one of the mechanisms

22. Chi-square = 7.7, significant at the 0.01 level.
23. *Question:* Would you be able to eat food cooked by someone from a low caste?

	Yes	*No*	*Total per cent*	*Total no.*
Brahmans	33%	67%	100	24
Non-Brahmans	57	43	100	56

Chi-square = 2.9, significant at the 0.10 level. Technically, this is not at the 0.05 level considered to be statistically significant. Nonetheless, when taken in conjunction with the question regarding orthodox Hindus in a big city (see footnote 24), this finding is suggestive.
24. *Question:* Do you think that an orthodox Hindu: (*a*) could live in a big city easily; (*b*) could live in a big city with some difficulty; (*c*) could not live in a big city at all?

	a	*b & c*	*Total per cent*	*Total no.*
Brahmans	42%	58%	100	24
Non-Brahmans	73	27	100	56

Chi-square = 5.9, significant at the 0.02 level.

whereby they could continue in their position of ritual superiority was to practice their traditional purity and avoidance taboos.

Greater awareness of the Hindu philosophical tradition. During the interviews, when I asked the source to which a man should refer in order to discover what his duty was, the Brahmans as a group made significantly more reference to "holy books" than any other caste group.[25] In view of the long tradition of Brahmans studying sacred scriptures, this is perhaps not surprising.

In addition to seeing these ancient books as having more relevance for day-to-day decisions, the Brahmans were also significantly more aware of one of the important streams of Hindu philosophical speculation—that stream of thought dealing with *moksh*, salvation, release from the endless cycle of reincarnations by having one's soul merge with the soul of the universe.[26] Throughout the centuries a number of philosophers expounding upon *moksh* have insisted that it is accessible to members of any caste, or at least to all members of the twice-born castes.[27] Nonetheless, traditionally the Brahmans have been the group most concerned with the possibility of attaining *moksh*. Within my sample of Hindus, this was still the case. The relatively greater frequency

25. *Question:* It is said that every man must perform his duty fully. But how can every man know what his duty is?

	Holy books	*Other*	*Total per cent*	*Total no.*
Brahmans	38%	63%	101	24
Non-Brahmans	11	89	100	56

Chi-square = 6.3, significant at the 0.02 level.

26. *Question:* When a man dies, what happens to his soul?

	Can unite with God (moksh)	*Is reborn in another body*	*Total per cent*	*Total no.*
Brahmans	27%	73%	100	22
Non-Brahmans	8	92	100	48

Chi-square = 13.4, significant at the 0.01 level.

Note: 10 of the interviewees (2 Brahmans and 8 non-Brahmans) did not believe in the continuation of the soul after death. The above figures include only those believing in the continuation of the soul.

27. For example: Mahavira (the founder of Jainism, sixth and fifth century B.C.), Siddhartha Gautama (the founder of Buddhism, sixth and fifth century B.C.), Shankaracharya (the Vedanta philosopher, eighth century A.D.), Ramanuja (the intellectualizer of the Vaishnavite *bhakti* movements, twelfth century A.D.), and Basava (founder of the Lingayat sect, twelfth century A.D.).

with which the Brahmans in the Sita-Ram mill mentioned *moksh* does not mean they themselves expected to attain such a release. Those who spoke of *moksh* usually added that to attain it they would have to renounce their jobs and their families, acts that they were not yet willing to perform. One of them, Lal Sharma, the superintendent of the cane-loading yard, indicated that he might begin trying to attain *moksh,* but only after he retired. For the rest, this reference to *moksh* merely indicated that they were aware that this was one of the alternatives possible at the time of death. It is perhaps worth noting that *in the village not a single respondent mentioned the possibility of* moksh. This might suggest how little the concept has actually penetrated into the majority fabric of Hindu society. For most of the village respondents, the idea of endless rebirths seemed to provide sufficient comfort for them to handle the threat of death to themselves and to their loved ones.

Stronger acceptance of the traditional Hindu cosmological interpretation of the caste system. According to the traditional Hindu view, a man's caste position in this life depends on his actions in previous lives. Thus a Brahman's position of superiority is justified because of merit he acquired prior to this birth. Likewise, an untouchable's position is justified because of sins he must have committed in some former life. The Brahmans in the Sita-Ram mill differed from their "twice-born" neighbors in that a greater proportion of them subscribed to the traditional view that caste differences are justified by the moral order of the universe.[28] In other words, even though they had achieved a new

28. *Question* (modified): When you meet a Bhangi (untouchable) or some other low-caste person: (*a*) do you feel that his being a Bhangi or low-caste person is the result of the sins of his previous life, (*b*) do you feel sorry for him, or (*c*) do you feel some other way?

	a	*b & c*	*Total per cent*	*Total no.*
Brahmans	58%	42%	100	24
Non-Brahmans	38	73	100	56

Chi-square = 2.19; significant at the 0.15 level. There is a one-out-of-six probability that this difference occurred merely by chance; hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis. However, in conjunction with the question on sickness, where

status within the mill hierarchy, significantly more of the Brahmans still subscribed to those elements of traditional Hindu cosmology that either directly or indirectly justified their own high-caste status.

However, one of the areas in which the forces of change seemed to be working against the interests of the Brahmans was in regard to this traditional Hindu cosmological interpretation of the caste system. Many of the Hindus in the Sita-Ram mill had rather consciously abandoned this cosmological interpretation because they felt it ran contrary to the secular values of "equality of opportunity" and "equal justice under law" that India had adopted from the West. To them an untouchable was an untouchable "because of *this* world—not any other world," or "because he just happens to be that way"—not because he deserved it from his previous sins.[29] Furthermore, in their opinion a man should be judged in terms of his performance according to some standard of virtue rather than in terms of the accident of his birth. Thus G. N. Mehta, the Khatri chief chemist, stated, "I do not believe in castes." Ram Das Arora, an engineer, asserted, "Today we no longer recognize high and low castes. We are friends with all castes."

there was a significant difference between Brahmans and non-Brahmans (see below), this finding is suggestive.

Another related question (modified) was: When you see someone suffering from sickness: (*a*) do you feel that the sick person is suffering the results of the sins of his previous life, (*b*) do you feel sorry for him, or (*c*) do you feel some other way?

	a	*b* & *c*	*Total per cent*	*Total no.*
Brahmans	50%	50%	100	24
Non-Brahmans	23	67	100	56

Chi-square = 4.4; significant at the 0.05 level.

29. *Question* (modified): When you meet a Bhangi (untouchable) or some other low-caste person: (*a*) do you feel that his being a Bhangi or low-caste person is a result of the sins of his previous life, (*b*) do you feel sorry for him, or (*c*) do you feel some other way?

	a	*b* & *c*	*Total per cent*	*Total no.*
Mill (educated)	44%	56%	100	80
Village (uneducated)	75	25	100	120

Chi-square = 18.7; significant at the 0.01 level.

This did not mean that these men had abandoned the idea of the cycle of rebirths. To the contrary, the overwhelming majority (88 per cent) of those whom I interviewed subscribed to the view of reincarnation. But in place of caste as part of the divine reward mechanism, these Hindus had substituted the idea of "spiritual" rewards and punishments. God would reward a virtuous man not so much by caste status (or wealth, or long life, or good health) as he would by "peace of mind," "happiness," or "contentment"—rewards that are attitudinal and open to subjective interpretation rather than external and accessible to direct observation.[30] It may be worth noting that *contact with the mill* seemed to correlate with a man's "spiritualization" of rewards and punishments. Thus, villagers from Rajpur who worked in the mill had a more "spiritualized" view of divine rewards and punishments than did their relatives and neighbors who remained in the village pursuing their traditional caste occupations.

It struck me that this type of "spiritualizing" could play a crucial part in enabling a religion to continue—especially when the society of which it is a part is in a state of flux. For when the punishment and reward mechanisms are "spiritualized," detractors of the religion will have difficulty finding objective evidence to challenge the promises made by the religion.

Useful though this "spiritualizing" might be from the point of view of the religion's survival, from the point of view of the Brahmans it held an implicit threat. Given the alternate status system within the mill compound, any superior status they held because

30. *Question* (modified): If a man will perform good works, how will he be rewarded by God before his death?

	"Spiritual" or unspecified rewards	*Empirical rewards (health, wealth, children, etc.)*	*Total per cent*	*Total no.*
Mill men	72%	28%	100	36
Village laborers in mill	45	55	100	42
Villagers in traditional caste occupations	23	77	100	44

Chi-square = 19.6; significant at the 0.01 level.
Note: in a number of cases the same respondent gave multiple responses. The "no." is for the total number of *responses*.

they were Brahmans rested at least in part on the traditional Hindu cosmology. Within the mill compound the cosmology was now being challenged. In the future, perhaps, they would not be able to count on their "Brahman-ness" to bring them prestige. If they wished to acquire prestige in the sphere of religion, they would have to *earn* it through some type of performance observable to their peers—more acts of merit, a holier life, or a purer life.

Despite the three differences noted above between Brahmans and non-Brahmans in the mill compound, I should like to emphasize that these differences were more in *degree* than in *kind.* There were non-Brahmans such as Kadday Lal, the chemist, who were pure vegetarians, but the Brahmans were more frequently vegetarians. Non-Brahmans such as Chote Singh, the section superintendent, knew about the sacred scriptures and the concept of *moksh,* but a larger proportion of the Brahmans knew about them. Such non-Brahmans as the "cane-in-charge," Raj Vihari, subscribed to the view that one's caste position was determined by one's actions in a previous life, but a larger percentage of Brahmans subscribed to this view. Inasmuch as these are differences of *degree,* it seems possible that in time the distinctions between the Brahmans and the other "twice-born" in these matters might decrease, as members of the non-Brahman castes, for example, become more familiar with the Hindu philosophical tradition.

I found evidence that this might happen in the content of the "secular" education to which the children in the mill community were being exposed. The textbooks published by the Education Ministry of Uttar Pradesh carried a strongly Hindu (and Brahmanical) message. In the Hindi reader, for example, between descriptions of how seeds grow into trees and why the seasons change, the children were admonished to follow the traditional virtues: to pray to God upon rising in the morning, to make obeisance to the feet of their elders, to serve the cow, to preserve the lives of birds. Tales from Sanskrit literature were presented as historical events—the *Ramayana,* the *Mahabharata,* the story of the God-fearing boy Prahlad, the God Ganesh's moral victory over his brother gods, King Harsh's bounteous gifts to the Brahmans, Lord Krishna's victory over the cobra, and a range of stories about

virtuous boys serving their Brahman gurus. Furthermore, these materials were frequently taught by Brahmans (for example, three of the four primary-school teachers were Brahmans, and a smaller, though still sizeable proportion of the high-school teachers were Brahmans). To a certain extent, then, the exposure of these children to "secular" education was also an exposure to the Brahmanical tradition and the Sanskrit literature (suggesting that the processes of "Sanskritization" and Westernization may be able to occur simultaneously rather than developing one at the expense of the other).[31]

Given this systematic exposure in the public schools to the Hindu tradition, one might on one hand predict that within another generation, as education increases, the members of the "twice-born" castes will share more of the classical Hindu tradition with the Brahmans. Insofar as the values of vegetarianism and the pursuit of *moksh* are carried by this tradition, they might even subscribe to these values more readily than their parents did. On the other hand, since there did appear to be something within the mill context that eroded the traditional Hindu cosmological interpretation of the caste system (see above, n. 29), one might predict that the Brahmans, as they remain in contact with the mill, will increasingly abandon their position and become more like their "twice-born" neighbors. To these extents, it is possible that the differences I noted between the Brahmans (non-priests) and the non-Brahmans in the Sita-Ram mill will decrease over the years.

The priests

Almost from the day of its inception, the mill had utilized the services of Brahman priests to make sure that everything was being done that could be done to assure the mill's success. Panditji Mohan Lal, the village priest, told me about his first meeting with Seth Ram Kapur, father of the present mill owner, who had come to survey the factory site. When Seth Kapur learned that Panditji

31. For a discussion of this issue, see M. N. Srinivas, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, XV (Aug., 1956), pp. 481–496.

Mohan Lal was a priest, he sent him to the railway station for water to perform a *puja* service. After the worship service, Panditji Mohan Lal asked for his usual fee of a quarter of a rupee. Seth Ram Kapur laughed and gave him fifteen rupees.

Since that day, scarcely a major event had occurred in the mill without appropriate ritual measures being taken. Each year, at the opening of the cane-crushing season, Shankar Kapur (the mill owner) and his wife performed a *havan* (fire sacrifice) on the mill premises under the direction of Pandit Ram Svarup, the mill priest. Later that same day Pandit Ram Svarup performed similar *havans* in the machine shop and the laboratory, with the men employed in these sections participating in the worship. The installation of a new boiler in the mill was occasion for another official *havan.* Other festivals warranted other special ceremonies to honor the machinery. Then there were the events within the families of the mill compound that required the services of a priest —marriages, cremations, living-room readings of the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata,* horoscope consultations, and the like.

Pandit Ram Svarup and his assistant, Pandit Dev Prakash, held a unique position within the secular-status hierarchy of the mill. In terms of income (salaries plus additional fees for special services), both of them received well below the salaries of the mill manager and the chief engineer—or even the assistant engineer and the office superintendent. Their quarters corresponded in size to "line" three where the machinists and clerks lived. But as if to indicate that their status was not to be measured in the same dimension as the status of other mill employees, the mill owners had placed the priests and their families' quarters within the temple garden—completely separate from any of the "lines." This arrangement as much as said, "The men living here are categorically different from any of the other men living in the compound."

In addition to conducting the ceremonies listed above, the two priests officiated at the morning and evening worship services at the temple (marked by the ringing of many bells hanging from the temple ceiling), supervised the special *puja* to God Hanuman on Tuesday evenings (involving the offering of sweets to the god

and subsequent distribution to the many children who congregated for purposes of receiving the sweets), and directed such annual celebrations as those commemorating the birth of Lord Krishna. Saturday mornings "between 9:00 and 11:00," or occasionally in the evenings, they conducted classes in Hindu scriptures for members of the mill community who had an especially religious bent of mind.

In terms of informal relations between the two Brahman priests and the rest of the members of the mill colony, it struck me as interesting that the only people who "hung around" the temple to gossip and pass the time of day with the priests were other Brahmans. One of the Brahman machinists was an especially close friend of the priests, as was a young Brahman clerk from the Punjab. Typically the Brahmans who "hung around" the temple were not those with high secular status. It was almost as if they were trying to reinforce their Brahmanical status by associating with the priests, since they could not hope to attain much secular status in the world outside the temple.

Despite their modest incomes and the lower-status aspects of their informal relations, at certain times of the day or year both Pandit Ram Svarup and Pandit Dev Prakash had supreme status within the mill community. When members of the mill elite sat in hushed silence while the priest entered the sacred center shrine of the temple to emerge with the image of Lord Krishna, when hundreds of local workers and dignitaries from other sugar factories crowded the doorways and stairs to get a view of the priest lighting the sacrificial fire for the opening of the crushing season, when both priests led the chanting procession of followers between the shrines on a Tuesday night—there was ample evidence that at least for the time being *these* Brahmans had not lost much of their traditional sphere of authority.

Before going on to discuss how these two Brahmans were reacting to "industrialism and modernity," it might be useful to include one other category of Brahmans in the discussion, for there were marked similarities between how the Brahman priests in the mill responded and how the village Brahman priest responded.

II. Brahmans in the Village

The priest

Panditji Mohan Lal, although an inhabitant of the village of Tehri, had no clients within his own village. Another family of Brahmans looked after the small shrine and performed what ceremonies were required in the Tehri homes. Panditji Mohan Lal's "diocese" covered three villages, including the village of Rajpur. It was his right to perform any ceremonies within these villages (unless they were ceremonies for untouchables). In addition to the fees to which these services entitled him, he was entitled to donations of grain from each farmer at the end of both harvests, as well as to several glasses of the first sugarcane juice crushed in the season. Furthermore, he was allowed to request a large variety of gifts from any member of the village in a position to give such gifts.[32] Panditji Mohan Lal had a reputation for being somewhat more avaricious than he needed to be, and occasionally I overheard villagers chiding him for his apparent greed. Nonetheless, the villagers accepted his right to make such requests, even if they did not always meet them.

Unlike the mill priest's academic qualifications, which included a high-school certificate and several special diplomas in Sanskrit studies, Panditji Mohan Lal's education had consisted of a few years of regular schooling (he could read Hindi, but not easily) and some training from his father in Sanskrit quotations and prayers (although he gave little evidence of knowing what they meant when he was reciting them). His reference books in-

32. Panditji Mohan Lal considered me to be such a member of the village. Gifts that he talked me into giving during my sixteen-month stay in the village included: two striped blankets, one white blanket, an umbrella, a flashlight, a pair of glasses, photographs, and numerous bananas, oranges, and nuts, in addition to the 5-rupee notes for occasional special *havans* he performed on my behalf. Requests that he made but that I didn't meet included a sword, a bicycle, a tin-lined wooden trunk, an *almirah*, a table, several other blankets, 100 rupees (for an unprecedentedly grand *havan*), another 100 rupees (for another unprecedentedly grand *havan*), 30 rupees (for a theft-insurance *havan*), and numerous 5-rupee notes for more routine *havans*.

cluded some frayed works on astrology and the annual primer on festival dates and lay-out designs for *pujas*. In my discussions with him about the contents of these books, he appeared at best confused as to how they were to be used, and I harbored the strong suspicion that many of the ceremonies he performed reflected his whims of the moment rather than any systematic pattern that he learned from his books.

In his lifetime Panditji Mohan Lal has seen some dramatic changes among his clientele as a result of the building of the mill. For example, in Rajpur alone, one out of five village men was now a full-time employee in the sugar mill. Because Rajpur's farmers were able to sell sugarcane to the mill, there was more cash in the village than there had ever been in the past. The wealthier families were building brick homes where formerly everyone had lived in mud huts. The wealthiest family in Rajpur had even bought a tractor. One out of three Rajpur children of school age was now enrolled in the local primary or high school. Neither Panditji Mohan Lal's father nor his grandfather had ever had to face such sweeping changes in the composition of his clients.

In my long contact with Panditji Mohan Lal, and in my systematic interview with him, I was struck by the way in which he was reinterpreting his Hinduism and his position as a Brahman priest to fit into the changing situation of Rajpur and the Sita-Ram mill. After I had tabulated the results of all my interviews, I was impressed by the marked similarities between Panditji Mohan Lal's responses and those of his better-trained colleague over in the mill temple, Pandit Ram Svarup.

From the point of view of their survival in the changing context of mill and village, perhaps the most important modification both priests had introduced into traditional Hinduism had been their sanctioning of industrial activity. One might claim that they had no choice in the matter, since industrialism was going to come to the area whether or not they liked it. However, I would suggest that they *did* have a choice in the matter. For dramatic evidence of Hindus who, on the basis of their Hinduism, have rejected in-

dustrialism, one need turn only to Mohandas Gandhi and Vinoba Bhave.[33]

Both Panditji Mohan Lal and Pandit Ram Svarup agreed that first of all it was "not impossible" for an orthodox Hindu to work in the mill. Having said this, each of them went on to endorse such participation in the mill. Pandit Ram Svarup added:

> In former times it was the duty of Brahmans to perform *pujas;* of Kshatriyas to wage war, render service, and defend the land; of Vaishyas to serve cows and Brahmans and to be truthful in business; and of Shudras to serve the other three classes. But today times have changed. Whatever job a man can find, that he can do. Only his heart must be pure, and he must serve *gurus.*

Panditji Mohan Lal stated that it was "easy" for an orthodox Hindu to work in the mill. Then he added: "It does not matter if a man leaves his former *karm* (appointed duty). So long as a man's life is pure, God does not mind what work he does to earn a living. God is angry only with those who commit thefts and are dishonest." At one point in the interview, Panditji Mohan Lal even stated that if an opportunity came, *he himself* would work in the mill! The fact that both priests accepted the validity of the mill meant that, at least from their own points of view, they could continue to operate in good conscience within the modern industrial context.

Over and above accepting the existence of industrialism, both Panditji Mohan Lal and Pandit Ram Svarup shared a religious elitist ideology that justified their existence as priests and defined the relationships they felt should exist between themselves and the laiety. Reduced to its basic ingredients, the ideology was as follows: (1) Spiritual forces are the ultimate determiners of what takes place on earth. (Both priests consistently saw Fate as the determiner of all things. Both of them felt that at least in part because of men's sinfulness, the present age was worse than the

33. There are numerous discussions of Gandhi and Bhave's rejection of industrialism. The following are illustrative: S. N. Agarwal, *The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development for India* (Bombay, 1944); N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism* (2nd ed.; Calcutta, 1947); M. K. Gandhi, *Towards Non-Violent Socialism,* ed. B. Kumarappa (Ahmedabad, 1951); and B. R. Misra, *V for Vinoba* (Bombay, 1956).

past, and the future would be worse than the present.) (2) Because of our birth, our training, and our personal purity, we, the priests, are legitimate superior authorities concerning spiritual forces. (Pandit Ram Svarup at one point stated, "We Brahmans hold the highest rank. Even God Himself is lower than the Brahmans.") (3) The laiety should respect our authority. (In this regard the mill priest showed considerably more concern than the village priest.) (4) The laiety should provide financial support for ourselves, our agencies, and our places of worship. Stated this way, the ideology these two Brahmans shared sounds much like the ideology Brahman priests have been sharing for centuries. In fact, stated in the above form, it is an ideology that other religious elite groups have shared in other times and places.

Occasionally this elitist ideology went against the grain of laiety opinion. For example, about half the villagers and over three-quarters of the mill-compound respondents felt that man could have a direct effect on what takes place on earth. Yet both Brahman priests insisted that the ultimate outcome of man's action is in the hands of Providence. What is willed to happen *must* happen, regardless of what man does. Interestingly enough, the mill priest, Pandit Ram Svarup, vacillated on one of the questions which asked whether crops could be improved by the use of new machines and fertilizers, or whether they depended on Fate. Initially he responded that machines might aid production, but he was sharply criticized by the younger priest, and in the end he changed his reply to fit the more "Brahmanical" view that crop yield depends on Fate.

Another point on which this priestly ideology clashed with the ideology of the followers had to do with the legitimacy of Brahmanical superiority. Both of the priests, like the Brahman nonpriests in the mill, subscribed to the view that the caste system was justified on the basis of people's performances in former lives. We have already seen how the laiety's contact with the mill seemed to erode this view. One might predict that in the future the Brahmans will soft-pedal the birth aspect of their authority claims, and will choose instead to stress the training and personal-purity aspects. In fact, it is not inconceivable that the time will

come when Brahmans wishing to be priests will have to complete a certain number of years of formal college or seminary training before they are qualified to practice as priests. Just as the West has seen the abandonment of many denominations of the "personal call" as a sufficient criterion for Christian ministers, so it is happening that in India being born a Brahman is not seen as an adequate reason for being a priest. In addition a man must have sufficient training and sufficient personal purity to warrant his appointment as a priest.

But is this any radical departure from the traditional position of priests? Turning back to the lawbook of Manu one finds the statement that "Brahman-ness" alone is not sufficient to make one qualified for the priestly profession. It is indispensable that he first be trained in the Vedas:

> Neither through years, nor through white (hairs), nor through wealth, nor through (powerful) kinsmen (comes greatness). The sages have made this law, "He who has learnt the Veda together with the Angas (Anukana) is (considered) great by us."
>
> A man is not therefore (considered) venerable because his head is grey; him who, though young, has learned the Veda, the gods consider to be venerable.
>
> As an elephant made of wood, as an antelope made of leather, such is an unlearned Brahmana; those three have nothing but the names (of their kind).
>
> As a eunuch is unproductive with women, as a cow with a cow is unprolific, and as a gift made to an ignorant man yields no reward, even so is a Brahmana useless, who (does) not (know) the Rikas [Veda].[34]

Furthermore, the lawbook of Manu lists a variety of occupations that a Brahman may follow besides that of being a priest, suggesting that in past days, as today, one could find Brahmans in many walks of life. In view of the dynamics of status ascription, it is probably not too far-fetched to assume that in times past, as today in the Sita-Ram mill, Brahmans who chose *not* to

34. *The Laws of Manu, Translated, with Extracts from Seven Commentaries*, by George Bühler (Vol. XXV [Oxford, 1886] of *The Sacred Books of the East*, 50 vols.; Oxford) chap. ii, verses 154–158, p. 58.

be priests forfeited certain elements of status. They gained other elements of status according to their ability or inability to perform well in their chosen secular occupations.

A radical departure from the past would take place if the elements of training and personal purity became so important in the priesthood that *non-Brahmans* who possessed these qualities could become priests. Although the day may come when this will happen, I certainly saw no indication in the Rajpur or Sita-Ram mill setting to suggest that this was about to happen. To be a priest one had to begin by being a Brahman. Above and beyond that, one had to have sufficient training and personal purity.

It is interesting to note that among the Scheduled castes (not entitled to be served by Brahmans) these more universalistic criteria have been used in the selection of their caste priests, or *bhagats*. Among the Chamars, for example, I gathered that any Chamar youth with an interest in religious studies could become a *bhagat* and begin earning his livelihood performing ceremonies and doing *pujas* for other Chamars. These *bhagats* occasionally received a nodding respect from the higher castes; for example, during the rainy-season *melas* (fairs) held in the different villages, *bhagats* set up their flags and other religious paraphernalia, and higher-caste villagers went to them to receive blessings. I was told, however, that Brahmans never showed respect to *bhagats*. Perhaps they recognized in these *bhagats* a potential threat to their monopoly rights on the priesthood. My impression is that the Brahmans' monopoly is still quite secure. If a Chamar group ever had the choice between a Brahman priest and one of their own *bhagats*, I have little doubt that they would choose the Brahman priest.

III. Conclusions

Let us return to our original hypothesis: "If there is an introduction of industrialism and modernity, then there will be a displacement of the traditional elite." We were going to look for two types of evidence of this displacement: (1) reduction of

the status position of the Brahmans below the level they traditionally held, and (2) loss by the Brahmans of their traditional sphere of authority and the emergence of new authority groups replacing the Brahmans in their former sphere.

The findings gleaned from the Sita-Ram mill suggest that the evidence is not forthcoming and that the hypothesis, at least for the present, is invalid. What we seem to have, instead, is the following:

1. A continuation of the demand for Brahmanical priestly services in the present as in the past. In fact, with additional exposure to the ancient Hindu religious and literary sources in the schools, and with additional money flowing into the economy through the activities of the mill, it is possible that this demand for priestly services will actually increase in the future.

2. A continuation of Brahman priestly prestige as a pinnacle of one of several prestige systems. It should be noted that throughout Indian history other status systems have existed side-by-side with the caste status system—these other status systems depending on an individual's wealth, military prowess, or political appointment.[35] Just as in the Sita-Ram mill there was the wealthy Khatri mill owner and there were the lowly Brahman mechanics, so in the past there have been similar status discrepancies.

3. A continuation of the importance of both the hereditary (Brahman) element and the non-hereditary (training and personal-purity) elements as parts of the basis of legitimacy for performing priestly services. It is conceivable that in the future the non-hereditary elements will take precedence over the hereditary elements, but at the present there is no indication that this is occurring.

4. A general correspondence between Brahmanical hereditary prestige and occupationally achieved prestige for those Brahmans who have entered secular occupations. The Brahmans (and other "twice-born" groups), probably because of their former advan-

35. Note the following passage in the *Laws of Manu:* "The seniority of Brahmans is from (sacred) knowedge, that of Kshatriyas from valour, that of Vaisyas from wealth in grain (and other goods), but that of the Sudras alone from age." *Ibid.*, II, 155.

tageous position, appear to have a running start in the new status systems involving industrialism and modernity. However, with the modifications of the traditional cosmology and the "spiritualizing" of divine rewards and punishments noted in this paper, one might predict that, in the future, Brahmans entering secular occupations will increasingly relinquish the right to be respected as Brahmans and will increasingly have to compete for status with non-Brahmans.

For those Brahmans who remain in priestly occupations, the future seems more secure. Just as in the West industrialism and modernity did not destroy the status of priests and clergymen (note the contemporary "religious revival" and the high status religious leaders currently enjoy in the United States),[36] so industrialism and modernity do not seem to be about to destroy Hinduism or the status of the Brahman priests. The gaudy red, blue, and yellow pictures of the gods in the poorer homes, the ochre-tinted bas-reliefs of the gods in the wealthier homes, the clanging of the temple bells at sunrise and at sunset, and the tinkling of smaller bells in front of family shrines bore testimony to the fact that religion was still a vital part of the mill community. So long as men continue to demand answers for the types of questions for which no empirical answers can be given, such as the questions of the meaning of life and death, and so long as men feel that there are ultimate forces controlling their lives which possibly can be manipulated, there will probably be a need for religious institutions and religious personnel. Where there is the need, there will be status for those who specialize in meeting the need.

The following incident, perhaps, illustrates this. One of the questions on the interview schedule read, "If the incomes were equal, what would you like to be: (a) a mill worker, (b) a shopkeeper, (c) a hand craftsman such as a carpenter, tailor, etc., (d) a land-owning farmer." When I asked this question of Panditji Mohan Lal in his little shrine in Tehri village and of Pandit Ram Svarup in the neat white temple in the mill compound, each one

36. W. Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (New York, 1960), esp. chap. iv.

by-passed the four suggestions I had so carefully made. The exact words of their response differed, but their meanings were identical: "I would prefer none of these four occupations to the one I now have—that of being a priest and praising God's name."

• 7 •

The Reception of English Law in India

A. Gledhill[*]

Whereas lawyers of other colonial powers have found conflict between the law of the metropolitan country and the native law of the colony a matter of interest and importance, English lawyers have scarcely been aware of the existence of any problem. A British administration would generally preserve the family and religious law of a subject people and would afford some protection to local custom, but it would not regard the perpetuation of separate systems of general law applicable to different social and ethnic groups as desirable. If Englishmen settled in a country without a civilized government or system of law, they took their common law with them; if a territory with a civilized government or system of law was acquired by conquest or cession, the pre-existing system of law applied, though it was liable to amendment by subsequent legislation.

India was never a colony. When the first merchants of the East India Company, incorporated in the reign of Elizabeth I, arrived in India in the early years of the seventeenth century, they were not regarded by the powerful Mughal emperor as the vanguard of an invading army but as traders from an obscure European power. They felt obliged to secure the services of Sir Thomas Roe to represent them at the imperial court and he advised them not to follow the bellicose example of other European powers but to confine their activities to trade, advice which was

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studiously followed until the French, during and after the War of the Austrian Succession, played high politics in southern India and brought them to the verge of disaster, from which they were rescued only by the unsuspected military genius of Clive.

Though between 1600 and 1765 the East India Company was primarily an association of traders, it exercised political power from its inception until its abolition in 1858. There were two main sources of its political power, one, Indian, to be considered later. The other consisted in a series of charters from the Crown and statutes of Parliament. The first charter granted on December 31, 1600, incorporated the Company, granted it the exclusive right of trade in India for a period of fifteen years, provided for general control of it by a committee of twenty-four, and authorized it to make "reasonable laws, constitutions, orders and ordinances, not contrary to the laws, statutes or customs of the English realm for the good government of the Company and its affairs and to impose such fines or penalties as might be necessary for enforcing the laws."[1] The language employed to describe the legislative powers of the Company was similar to that used to give municipal and commercial corporations power to make by-laws. It is repeated in most subsequent charters. But, as will presently appear, this power was used to make many laws which, at least by modern notions, were repugnant to the laws of England. The notion of impugning laws as *ultra vires* in a court took long to acquire roots in India.

When the original charter was renewed in 1609, it was made perpetual but with power to the Crown to determine on three years' notice. A charter of 1615 empowered the Company to issue a commission to the officer in charge of each voyage to inflict punishment and to declare martial law, subject to the necessity of a jury's verdict in a capital case. A charter of 1623 empowered the Company to issue similar commissions to the presidents of their settlements.

During the Commonwealth the Company's difficulties with the Dutch and with its English rivals almost compelled it to

1. Panchanandas Mukherji, ed., *Indian Constitutional Documents 1773–1915* (Calcutta, 1915), p. xiv.

abandon the enterprise, but Cromwell granted a new charter in 1657 which was conveniently forgotten after the Restoration, when a charter of 1661 gave the Company the right to coin money and exercise jurisdiction over English subjects in India.[2] In the same year Charles II acquired the Island of Bombay as part of Catherine of Braganza's dowry and in 1668 this was transferred to the Company for a quit rent, having been under effective British rule for over three years. The charter under which the transfer was made included clauses dealing with legislative powers of the kind mentioned above and provided for the establishment of courts whose proceedings should be "like unto those that are established and used in this Our Realm of England."[3] In 1687 a charter of James II empowered the Company to establish in Madras a municipality consisting of a mayor, twelve aldermen, and sixty burgesses.[4]

After the Glorious Revolution the Company met with opposition from interlopers, who refused to recognize its claim to a monopoly of trade with India. In consequence of the Company's detention in the Thames of an interloper's ship believed to be bound for India, the House of Commons in 1694 resolved that the right of an English subject to trade in India could only be restricted by Act of Parliament. In 1698 an Act of Parliament granted the monopoly of trade with India, saving for three years the rights of the old Company, to a new company. But the old Company purchased an interest in the new company and outmaneuvered it in India, so that eventually, under pressure from the Crown and Parliament, a preliminary instrument of union was signed in 1702 and union was completed in 1708. Though the amalgamated Company succeeded to the rights of the old Company and received new charters from time to time, its sovereign powers were progressively curtailed until the shock of the mutiny resulted in its abolition and the transfer of its territory, powers, and revenues to the Crown in 1858.

The Island of Bombay was the first part of India to become

2. *Ibid.*, pp. xv, xvi.
3. Sir Charles Fawcett, *The First Century of British Justice in India* (Oxford, 1934), p. 6.
4. P. Mukherji, p. xvii.

British territory. In 1640 a petty Hindu prince granted the right to establish a fortified factory, Fort St. George, around which the town of Madras developed. The hostilities with the French and their indigenous allies, already referred to, reached their turning point with Clive's relief of Arcot in 1751, with the result that Madras became for the time being the most important English settlement in India. Calcutta was founded in 1690, and the purchase by the Company of three villages in 1694 gave it the status of zemindar, which involved the duty of administering justice to the inhabitants of the villages.[5] The factories at Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, which subsequently became known as the presidency towns, ultimately became the Company's three principal settlements in India, exercising control over the smaller settlements. In each of the presidencies there was a governor and council exercising the powers given by the charters mentioned above.

The powers of the Mughal emperor decayed rapidly after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, with the result that imperial viceroys were prone to seek to establish themselves as independent hereditary rulers. Suraj-ud-daula, on succeeding to the viceroyalty of Bengal, determined to get rid of the European settlers, beginning with the English. In 1756 he captured Calcutta, but Clive, despatched from Madras, recovered the city in the following year and compelled the Viceroy to restore the Company's privileges and enter into a treaty of alliance with the Company. Between the allies there was neither love nor trust; in 1757 Clive defeated Suraj-ud-daula at Plassey and placed his creature Mir Jafar on the viceregal throne. There followed what Sir Alfred Lyall has described as "the only period of Anglo-Indian history which throws grave and unpardonable discredit on the English name."[6] The powers of government were exercised in the names of the viceroy and his officers but the *de facto* rulers were the Company's employees, who secured over-generous rewards for their services. In 1760 Mir Jafar was deposed in favor of his son-

5. Fawcett, pp. 208, 209.
6. P. E. Roberts, *Historical Geography of India* (Oxford, 1916), p. 149.

in-law Mir Kasim, who rebelled against his treatment by the Company and was replaced by Mir Jafar in 1763. Mir Kasim fled to Oudh, whose prince enjoyed the title of imperial prime minister. They joined forces with the Emperor Shah Alam and were defeated by the Company's forces at Baxar in 1765.

This victory meant that, apart from the threat from the Mahratta Confederacy in the west, the Company was politically supreme in northern India. Clive, who, during his first term as governor in Calcutta from 1758 to 1760, despite his military valor, had behaved much as others in high places, returned in 1765 to purify the administration. But he was bent on creating a territorial dominion in Bengal, partly because he regarded the position in which the Company screened its activities behind the figure of the viceroy as conducive to corruption. He was in a position to dictate to the Emperor but, had he insisted on an outright cession of territory, that territory, under the law of England, would have vested in the Crown, a result which the Company would not have contemplated with any enthusiasm. The functions of the viceroy were twofold: the diwani, covering the assessment and collection of revenue and administration of civil justice, and the nizamat, the military and police power and criminal justice. The latter was already effectively controlled by the Company; the grant of the former would give the Company the *de jure* status of a ruling power which Clive thought it needed. On August 12, 1785, Shah Alam issued the firman granting to the Company the diwani of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. The Company would provide the emperor with twenty-six lakhs of rupees, provide for the expenses of the nizamat, and maintain forces for the defence of the territory. This is the Indian source of the Company's political power and, like the power derived from the Company's charters, it was exceeded. The emperor was bound by the Sharia and could not grant to the Company anything repugnant to the Sharia. While the Sharia left a wide field of activity to the discretion of the ruler and his deputies, the diwani grant implied a number of restrictions which the Company would inevitably regard as unjustifiable inhibitions on

necessary reform. The terms of the grant would extend to giving Hindus the benefit of their personal law; it would not extend to modifications of the personal law of Muslims. Criminal law lay outside the scope of the grant but in a very few years amendments of the criminal law had deprived it of most of its Islamic characteristics. Even the stipulation for payment of the emperor's annuity was not long honored in the observance.

Originally what was contemplated by the clauses in the Company's charters was the maintenance of order among its employees. There was no necessity for any important legislation. Serious offences were tried in a factory by the governor and council, minor offences by a member of council or senior employee to whom the duty had been delegated, and the law of England, in so far as it was known, was applied. Madras was not the first settlement on the Coromandel coast but almost from the foundation of Fort St. George, either by grant or sufferance of the local prince, jurisdiction over natives was exercised. The court of the governor and council was regularly constituted in 1666, and in 1678 it was constituted a Court of Judicature to sit twice a week and try major civil and criminal cases in accordance with the laws of England.[7] It was superseded by a Court of Admiralty in 1686, presided over by Sir John Biggs, previously recorder of Plymouth, with jurisdiction extending beyond admiralty cases proper, being a general court of judicature. Sir John presided at quarter sessions and when the municipality was inaugurated under the charter of 1687, he became recorder and assistant to the mayor in cases of difficulty. Though he died in 1689, he had established the administration of civil and criminal justice in Madras on a sound basis.

The situation in Bombay was basically different, as the Company's servants there were exercising legislative and judicial powers on British territory by command of the sovereign. Bombay was the first place in India where British justice was administered to natives by a special court. When the Island was handed over to the British in 1665, it had been under Portuguese rule for

7. Fawcett, p. 201.

over a century and Portuguese law was administered. This continued for the non-English inhabitants. It was not until a year after the transfer of the Island to the Company that innovations became evident.[8] In the exercise of the powers of legislation in the charter of 1668, the Company had made laws which reached Bombay in 1669. These were divided into six main sections. The first dealt with religion, enjoining Sunday observance but granting freedom of religious belief and practice generally and providing punishment for insulting another's religion. The second confirmed rights existing at the cession of the Island; required impartial administration of justice; forbade expropriation or corporal punishment except on the verdict of a jury of twelve, unless otherwise provided by law; and required the release of any person incarcerated without warrant or if the cause of his imprisonment were not prosecuted within two court days after his commitment was certified to the court. The third required the establishment of a Court of Judicature under a judge to be appointed by the governor and council, all trials to be by a jury of twelve; where one party was not English, half the jury were to be non-English. There were also provisions for the appointment of justices of the peace and constables, apprehension of criminals, execution of process, sittings, records and registers of the court, court fees, and a right of appeal to the governor and council. The fourth provided for the registration of disposition of immovables. The fifth dealt with crime, the striking feature being the leniency of the maximum penalties in comparison with the English law of the time, which demanded the death penalty for felonies. A similar leniency characterized the sixth section which dealt with military offences and insurrection. Even the purely military offences had to be tried either by jury or by the governor and council.[9]

It was thought that unless someone skilled in the civil law could be sent to Bombay as judge, a court of the kind contemplated by the laws could not be set up, but in 1670 two benches of justices were appointed to sit once a week to try minor causes,

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 1–7.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 14–17.

while the deputy governor and council would sit once a week in appeal and to hear more important cases, administering the Company's laws. It was not until 1672 that the Court of Judicature was inaugurated with some pomp and exhortations to judicial independence from the governor; the other provisions of the Company's laws relating to the administration of justices were implemented. The court continued to function under judges not learned in the law until 1683, when a rebellion led by a royalist named Keigwin caused the closing of the court, and in the resulting disorder the Company's laws were lost. The court reopened in 1684 under Dr. St. John, a civilian, sent by the Company as judge of the Admiralty Court. Unfortunately his relations with the governor and council were not harmonious and he was dismissed in 1687, probably because he was overzealous in repudiating pressure from the governor in cases involving interlopers.[10] There are no records extant of what occurred in the next two years, and in 1689 an invasion of the Mughal navy put a stop to the sittings of the court.[11] The rehabilitation of the Island was difficult. Justice was administered by the council until 1718, when the court was re-established, but the depopulation of the Island due to rebellion and invasion made it impossible to reintroduce trial by jury.

The Company's laws, which have been referred to above, gave no indication of the rule to be applied in hearing civil actions. The Company sent instructions in 1687 to the governor and council to exercise their powers of legislation and make laws

> which we hereby declare shall be binding to all the King's subjects in that Island until they shall be contradicted by his Majesty or ourselves, whom he has entrusted with the exercise of Sovereign Power in all his Majesty's Dominions beyond the Cape of Good Hope and we do enjoin you according to his Majesty's last Charter to govern the soldiers and people of that Island, as well English as others, by Martial Law and jurisdiction, lately established of the Admiralty, for trying controversies between party and party in a summary way and according to the usage of the Civil Law, which is only proper for India. The Common Law of England being peculiar to this Kingdom and not adapted

10. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

in any kind to the government of India and the nature of these people, as we have formerly writ you and have found by long and useful experience.[12]

Possibly the Company's experience with Dr. St. John may have soured its enthusiasm for the civil law.

Apart from Dr. St. John, no one learned in law administered justice in Bombay until 1797; the judges were Company's servants who, in the course of their occupation, must have picked up some knowledge of English law and the law merchant. The cases they tried did not involve complicated questions of law, and more often than not the decision was based on common sense. In 1694 a kazi was appointed to deal with disputes between Muslims on matters of family law, but when disputes between Hindus involved questions of Hindu law, the point was referred by the court to a panel of merchants or the headman of the caste to which the parties belonged.[13]

The appointment of a member of council in Bombay to be governor of Madras in 1678 resulted in the Bombay experiment's being copied there; the governor and council sat with juries, even in civil cases, but by 1686 trial by jury, in civil cases at least, ceased. In 1694 the Company got judgment for Rs 50,000 against Elihu Yale after he had relinquished the office of governor; Yale pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court, maintaining that, by the laws of England, he was entitled to trial by jury. The plea was overruled on the grounds that the charters required cases to be determined by the court, not by juries, and because there were insufficient Europeans to perform the duty of jurors.[14]

In Calcutta the development of the Company's judiciary was very different. One member of council was appointed to collect rents and exercise the judicial power of the zemindar; he summarily tried civil and criminal cases, inflicting sentences of fine, whipping, and imprisonment at discretion; the sentences were carried out forthwith, except in capital cases, when the confirma-

12. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

tion of the governor was necessary. By 1755 the jurisdiction had been extended to cases involving Europeans.[15]

Early death was frequent among the Company's servants in India, and the estates in India of such deceased persons were administered by the courts in the three presidency towns. But the courts at Westminster refused to recognize their jurisdiction, so that the Company was embarrassed by actions instituted by persons in England making claims against the estates of such persons. Despite its dislike of persons' holding royal commissions in India, the Company was obliged to petition the Crown to create by charter in 1726 a mayor's court in each presidency town. This, for the first time, raised in acute form the question whether the civil law of England was to be applied to Indians. It has long been accepted that the charter introduced into the presidency towns common law and statute law as it stood in 1726; it was not until 1753 that a new charter forbade mayors' courts to try actions between Indians unless the parties submitted to the jurisdiction.[16]

But the judges in the courts of the presidency towns generally remained employees of the Company without legal training, though their registers were examined in England by counsel employed by the Company, whose comments, mainly concerned with fundamental principles to ensure fair trial, were annually despatched to the courts. Notwithstanding the introduction of English law by the Act of 1726, the courts took the view that Indian litigants should enjoy the benefit of their own custom unless they chose that English law should be the rule of decision. The bulk of the litigation was between Indians, and in 1731 the number of actions before the Mayor's Court at Madras was comparable with that before one of the common law courts at Westminster. Either because it was ignored or because there was no other satisfactory alternative, the statutory requirement that cases between Indian litigants should be heard only if the parties submitted to the juridiction had little effect. What particularly

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 208, 209.
16. Sir George Claus Rankin, *Background to Indian Law* (Cambridge, 1946), pp. 1, 2.

recommended the mayors' courts to Indians was the speed and efficacy of their procedure in executing judgments.[17] Until the latter half of the eighteenth century, the cases coming before the courts were mostly of a commercial nature, with which the judges were well qualified to deal but, as the century progressed to its end, commerce and territory increased, the cases became more numerous and more complex, and the need of professional judges became evident.

The Company at first endeavored to exercise its powers under the diwani grant through existing native instrumentalities but, partly owing to disappointment with revenue collections, in 1771 it decided to introduce direct rule. To implement the new policy, a civil court was set up in each district and a regulation was promulgated by the governor and council, directing that, in family and religious matters, Hindu litigants were to have the benefit of the Shastric law, Muslims of the Sharia. The judges were Company's servants but each court had a pandit to prescribe the rule of Shastric law and a kazi to lay down the rule of the Sharia applicable.[18]

In 1773 Parliament saw fit to intervene actively in affairs in India. Partly from disgust with the display of easily acquired wealth of repatriated servants of the Company and partly from apprehensions as to the Company's solvency, it sought to impose greater control on the Company's actions. In Calcutta it set up a Supreme Court, in which English lawyers dispensed justice. It also provided for the inclusion of Government nominees in the council of the governor,[19] who were soon at loggerheads with the other members, and the council as a whole was at loggerheads with the Supreme Court, which claimed a jurisdiction repudiated by the council over the Company's servants. The Supreme Court also refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the courts set up in the revenue districts. Accommodation on the last point was reached by the appointment of Sir Elijah Impey, chief justice, as president of the Sudder Diwani Adalat, the final court of appeal

17. Fawcett, p. 225.
18. Rankin, pp. 2, 3.
19. Herbert Cowell, *History and Constitution of the Courts and Legislative Authorities in India* (Calcutta, 1872), pp. 42–50.

from the district civil courts. He observed that the regulations of 1733 made no provision as to the rule of law applicable in cases other than those involving family and religious matters and, on his instigation, the regulation was amended, so that, where no rule was prescribed by statute, the court was to decide according to "justice, equity and good conscience."[20]

This proved a most useful formula for the development of the law of India. In the first place, it resulted in the extension of the personal law of the parties beyond what was first contemplated. But experience showed that the *Shastras* and the Sharia were singularly deficient of rules governing circumstances outside the scope of family and religious law constantly coming before the courts.[21] This would naturally dispose the judge of a district court to seek a rule in the common law. By 1887 it was recognized that "justice, equity and good conscience" meant English law, if applicable to Indian society and circumstances.[22]

In 1781 the dispute between the council and the Supreme Court was settled by an Act of Parliament which limited the jurisdiction of the court to Calcutta, recognized the jurisdiction of the Company's courts, excluded official acts of the council and all revenue matters from the cognizance of the Supreme Court. The Act also recognized the practice, which the Supreme Court had already established, of applying the personal law in succession and contract.[23]

In 1772 the administration of criminal justice and the police was still nominally vested in Indian officials who applied the Sharia, but the Company proceeded to interfere, on the grounds that the administration was oppressive, unjust, and corrupt. In 1790 the territory covered by the diwani grant was divided into four divisions, each with a court of circuit, the judges of which were Company's servants, who dealt with heinous crime, while other Company's servants were given magisterial powers. The supreme court of appeal, the Sadr Nizamat Adalat, consisted of

20. Vincent Arthur Smith, *The Oxford History of India* (3rd. ed.; Oxford, 1958), ed. Percival Spear, pp. 504–507; Rankin, p. 2.
21. Rankin, p. 19.
22. *Waghela* v. *Sheikh Masludin* (1887), L.R. 14 I.A., 89.
23. Cowell, pp. 71–77.

the governor-general and members of his council. Though kazis continued to act as law officers until 1810, the courts were increasingly disposed to override the law laid down by them, if opposed to their own notions of justice. A Regulation of 1793 partially abolished the Muhammadan rules of evidence and procedure and substituted rules of procedure not essentially different from those in force in an English assize court. In 1829 the powers of the courts of circuit were transferred to the commissioners of divisions, who, however, delegated them to the judges of the district courts.[24]

In Bombay and Madras recorders' courts, presided over by English lawyers, superseded the mayors' courts in 1798. The recorders' courts in turn were superseded by supreme courts in Madras in 1801 and in Bombay in 1823. The development of inferior courts in those presidencies generally followed the pattern laid down in Bengal. The result was that in all parts of India subject to the Company's control there was a dual system of courts and a dual system of law. In the presidency towns there were courts established by letters patent from the Crown, generally administering English law and following English procedure; outside them there were the Company's courts applying the personal law and "justice, equity and good conscience." Until 1833, each presidency could make its own regulations and so reduce the sphere of "justice, equity and good conscience" but there were wide differences between the regulations in the three presidencies and, in the sphere of "justice, equity and good conscience," there was so much left to the discretion of the courts that there were important differences between neighboring courts.[25]

The Charter Act of 1813 asserted British sovereignty over all territories under the control of the Company in India. The necessity of reform of the Indian legal system was becoming apparent, and Macaulay, speaking in the House of Commons on the second reading of the bill which became the Charter Act of 1833, said a code of laws was perhaps the only blessing which an abso-

24. Cowell, pp. 179–189.
25. Rankin, pp. 9–19.

lute government was better fitted than a popular government to confer on a nation; no part of the law could be brought to perfection while other parts remained crude; the policy must be uniformity when possible, diversity when unavoidable, but in all cases certainty.[26] The Act of 1833 said it was expedient that such laws as may be applicable to all classes should be enacted and created a law commission for that purpose, presided over by the law member, who sat with the other members of council when engaged in legislation. Macaulay was the first law member and his *monumentum aere perrenius*, the Indian Penal Code, though it had to wait for enactment from 1837 to 1860, was a model for other codifications. It is basically English law, stripped of technicalities, fictions, and historical remnants, adapted to Indian life and conditions; it is drafted in language which, like that in his historical writings, others would be foolish to imitate. But it was readily understood by Indians and this is probably the main reason for its adoption in so many parts of Asia and Africa.

Writing in 1877, Whitley Stokes, formerly law member of the Governor-General's Council, wrote of this code:

> Besides repressing the crimes common to all countries it has abated, if not extirpated, crimes peculiar to India such as *thugee*, professional sodomy, dedicating girls to a life of temple harlotry, human sacrifice, exposing infants, burning widows, burying lepers alive, gang-robbery, torturing peasants and witnesses and sitting *dharna*.[27]

These words indicate the care which Macaulay had taken in drafting the definitions of offenses so as to meet Indian needs. His approach to his task is made clear by the notes accompanying the draft code that he submitted to the governor-general. Typical instances of his attitude are his rejection of profanation of a sacrament as the basis of the crimes of perjury and bigamy, and the tendency to cause a breach of the peace as the basis of defama-

26. Whitley Stokes, *The Anglo-Indian Codes*, I, x.
27. *Ibid.*, I, 71. The *thugs* were organized gangs who, having ingratiated themselves with travellers, seized an opportunity to strangle and rob them. Sitting *dharna* was done by a Brahman at the instance of a claimant at the door of the person against whom the claim was made, having expressed the intention of starving to death if the claim was not met; it was believed by Hindus that the death of the Brahman would involve the person against whom the claim was made in heavy punishment in the next existence.

tion. He would have limited offenses against marriage to deceiving a woman into going through a form of marriage which the offender knows to be invalid.[28]

But Macaulay, in his brief term of office, could not hope to add many pages to the Indian statute book. Much research was necessary and legislative proposals were widely circulated to persons likely to express views about them; the replies, mostly critical, had to be analyzed and considered.

The Charter Act of 1853 provided for a law commission in England, composed of English judges and other members with Indian experience to examine the report of Macaulay and his colleagues. They agreed that it would be more satisfactory to enact a body of substantive civil law than to prepare a digest of English law, as regard could be had to Indian circumstances and the character and customs of its people. The commission also prepared draft codes of procedure.

One aim envisaged by the policy of unification and codification laid down in the Charter Act of 1833 was the abolition of the dual system, but this obviously had to wait until sufficient progress had been made with the codification of the laws. By the year 1861 the time for this was deemed to have arrived. The sadr nizamat adalats and sadr diwani adalats had been separated from the council and amalgamated in 1801. The Indian High Courts Act of 1861 amalgamated the sadr adalats with the supreme courts. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, was then applied to civil proceedings in all courts. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, governed all criminal proceedings. The procedural codes were subsequently re-enacted with amendments from time to time. They are substantially English procedure but, in operation, there are differences from English procedure, which a study of the codes might not make manifest. One feature of Indian procedural law is the very extensive right of appeal and revision. Up to the present it has not been possible to fill the lower grades of civil judges with persons of high caliber and to get the bulk of the criminal work done by unpaid justices as in England.

28. Copy of the Penal Code prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, 1851, pp. 150, 187, 190.

Mistrust of inferior judicial officers has resulted in rules whereby in most cases the presiding officer of a court of first instance is required to make depositions of witnesses and to write a lengthy reasoned judgment. In effect, it would seem that the court of first instance only prepares a dossier on the case; it is in the appellate courts that the real contest occurs. The consequence, of course, is delay in the disposal of cases.

In 1861 a fresh commission, similarly constituted to that last mentioned, took up the task of implementing the conclusions of its predecessor. Its first draft became the Indian Succession Act, 1865, originally intended to apply to persons of Indian domicile who were neither Hindus nor Muslims. Much of the original language remains in the Act of 1925 and has been used in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The appointment of commissions in England did not mean that codification was held up in India. The Marriage Act, 1865, the Companies Act, 1866, the General Clauses Act, 1868, and the Divorce Act, 1869, were all drafted in India.

From 1853 to 1861 the central Indian legislature consisted of the governor-general, the four members of his executive council, the law member, two judges of the Calcutta Supreme Court, and a representative of each governor and lieutenant-governor. They were capable of judging the general expediency of a proposed policy and willing to delegate details to the member in charge of a measure. They all had important duties to perform and were anxious to help their colleagues to do theirs. They had no constituents and no lobbies to appease; they had no temptation to indulge in parliamentarianism. They usually turned out coherent statutes, generally satisfactory to legal experts. But during this epoch there was a tendency in Whitehall to regard the legislature as under a duty to enact without question drafts prepared in England.

A draft code in contract, prepared in England, came before the legislature in 1866 and objection was taken to a clause providing that ownership of goods could be acquired by a buyer in good faith in circumstances not raising a presumption that the seller had no right to sell and to a clause providing that, if a

sum is named in a contract as payable in case of breach, it shall be paid accordingly. A reference to Whitehall provoked instructions to pass the bill, but the legislature refused to be bullied. The Law Commission in England resigned, complaining of the continued systematic and peristent inaction of the Indian legislature.[29]

In the Contract Act, as enacted, the controversial provision enabling a transferrer to confer good title on the transferee was restricted to a pledge by a person in possession, actual or constructive through documents of title, not obtained by crime or fraud, in circumstances raising no presumption that the pawner was acting improperly.[30] The other controversial provision, an attempt to cut through the tangle in the common law of a penalty and liquidated damages, was redrafted so as to render the party in breach liable to pay reasonable compensation, not exceeding the sum named.[31] The Act generally follows English law, but a few of the more obvious departures may be of interest. The Act ignores contracts under seal, *but* a registered written promise made out of natural affection for the promisee, a promise to compensate someone who has done something the promiser might be compelled to do, and a promise in writing to pay a time-barred debt are enforceable without consideration. Consideration need not, however, as in England, proceed from the promisee, and a promisee may accept something less than stipulated for in satisfaction of his rights. The rules governing the devolution of rights and liabilities among joint promisers in effect make all joint contracts joint and several. The original Act contained chapters on sale of goods and partnership, which have been superseded by the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The former closely follows the English statute, with the curious difference that shares are goods for the purpose of the Act. The Partnership Act has little affiliation with

29. Rankin, p. 84.
30. Contract Act, s.178. Its scope has been restricted by an amendment in 1930, restricting its operation to a pledge by a mercantile agent. At the same time s.78A was added giving a pawnee good title against a pawner who got possession under a contract voidable for misrepresentation, coercion, or undue influence.
31. Contract Act, s.74.

the English statute; without actually doing so, it goes as far as possible in the direction of recognizing a firm as a judicial person separate from the partners.

After the resignation of the Law Commission in England, the work of codification was mainly done in India, though sometimes assistance was sought from English jurists. For instance, Sir F. Pollock drafted a bill of torts, which was never enacted. By this time the only blank pages in the Indian statute book which await codification are the law of tort, part of the personal law of Hindus and the personal law of Muslims.

All Indian statutes follow the same plan. An act is divided into sections and when necessary into chapters and parts. The definitions of terms of art must come at the beginning; simpler propositions precede the more complex; the same word should invariably be used in the same sense and technical expressions shall not be used unnecessarily. A feature of the Indian codes is the use of illustrations, in the nature of epitomes of leading cases. The Judicial Committee has held that, unless there is manifest repugnancy between the illustration and the provision of law it illustrates, the illustration is to be regarded as an expression of the law.[32]

The constitutional history of India from 1833 involves the progressive enlargement of the size and powers of the legislatures and progress towards representative and responsible government. In 1862 Indian members first became members of the legislature, and when the Transfer of Property Bill was before the legislature, Sayyid Ahmad, a distinguished Indian member, said

> So far as I am aware, the native public has never raised its voice against codification . . . nor can it be said that codification is unpopular even among the most conservative of my countrymen. I . . . say confidently that, of all the innumerable blessings of British rule, the one my countrymen most esteem is justice; that justice in their eyes means peace and order, which, in other words, means security to life and property, the sole aim and end of government. At present, whilst a splendid Penal Code and Criminal Procedure regulate criminal matters, the civil law is administered on the somewhat vague though noble principle of 'justice, equity and good conscience'—a principle whose beauty is

32. *Lala Balla Mal* v. *Ahad Shah* (1918), 21 Bom.L.R.558.

practically spoilt by the fact that individual judges in similar cases do not take the same view of that noble maxim. . . . Codification alone can remedy the evils which arise from uncertainty of the law; codification alone can enable the public to know their exact rights and obligations.[33]

If codification provoked much disagreement among those involved in the process, there was universal agreement that the personal law of Hindus and Muslims was not a proper subject for codification. Obviously this was political dynamite; a bill to effect a salutary reform might be represented as an insult to religion. But if there were few occasions for statutory interference with the personal law during the British period, the development, particularly of the Hindu law in the courts, has meant the absorption of many principles of English law and unity. With the unification of the judicial system in 1861, the pandits and kazis found their occupation gone. The personal law of Hindus and Muslims became a law known to the courts, and the rule governing the case was to be laid down by the judge and not a law officer. He had to know the *Shastras* and the commentaries, particularly the *Mitakshara* and *Dayabhaga,* to administer Hindu law and Bailee's *Digest of Muhammadan Law* to administer Muhammadan law. But the writers of the *Shastras* wrote of an ideal law, often intermingling positive law with morality and religion. The distinction might be clear to a learned Sanskrit scholar; whether it would be as clear to a law officer of a court, under oath to state the law applicable to a case in accordance with the *Shastras,* may be doubted. In fact, the criticism that has been made of the British administration of the Hindu law, that the administration made the law more rigid without making it more certain, may, in part at least, be due to the defects of the pandits. Still, with the judge under a duty to extract the rule of law governing a case, some rules of interpretation were essential. In one case the Judicial Committee felt impressed with

the necessity of great caution in interpreting books of mixed religion, morality and law, lest foreign lawyers, accustomed to treat as law what they find in authoritative books and to administer a fixed legal system should too hastily take for strict law precepts which are meant to ap-

33. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General, Jan. 26, 1882, p. 63.

peal to the moral sense and should fetter the individual judgement in private affairs, should introduce restrictions in Hindu society and impart to it an inflexible rigidity, never contemplated by the original law givers.[34]

In another case it commented:

It may fairly be argued that one who, having the power to give an absolute command, gives an injunction . . . resting on a reason, is addressing himself to the moral sense of his hearers rather than to their duty of implicit obedience.[35]

But probably the most significant directions are that:

The *dattakas* [Sanskrit treatises on adoption] are not open to examination, explanation, criticism, adoption or rejection, like a scientific treatise because that would exclude custom.[36]

and:

The duty of a judge who is under an obligation to administer Hindu Law is not so much to enquire whether a disputed doctrine is fairly deducible from the earliest authorities as to ascertain whether it has been received by the particular school which governs the district.[37]

The Indian social unit was the joint family, comprising three generations of agnate males, their wives, and female descendents. It had family property, not normally regarded as alienable, but the head of the family could partition it and, on his death, control would devolve normally on the senior agnate male. Women were entitled only to maintenance. However, in course of time, exceptions had to be made to meet abnormal conditions; junior members' rights to demand partition and a special share in separate acquisitions were recognized as well as a woman's peculium. The Sanskirt jurists had to accommodate theory to local practice but, in doing so, instead of abandoning old theories, they tended to emphasize aspects of the theories that were convenient to their purposes. By the time the Company's courts first started administering Hindu law, there were two main schools. The Bengal school, based on the *Dayabhaga* of Jimuta Vahana

34. *Sri Balusu* v. *Sri Balusu* (1899), L.R.26 I.A. 113.
35. *Radha Mohun* v. *Hardai Bibi* (1899), L.R.26 I.A. 146.
36. *Sri Balusu* v. *Sir Balusu* (1899), L.R.26 I.A. 113.
37. *Collector of Madura* v. *Mootoo Ramalinga* (1868), 12 M.I.A. 397 at 436.

(13th century?), emphasized the earlier texts, which maintained that the father had complete control of family property in his lifetime and that partition could take place only at his pleasure. This necessarily involved a single system of devolution of property on death for ancestral and self-acquired property. Elsewhere in India, Vijnanenswara's *Mitakshara* (11th century) was the main basis of the law, but the author recognized two categories of property, *apratibandha daya* or unobstructed heritage and *sapratibandha daya* or obstructed heritage. The former category includes not only ancestral property but also the father's self-acquired property, of which the son is in some sense a co-owner with the father. The latter is other property to which an heir other than the son acquires a right only on the death of its owner. But the courts, while accepting the facts, fitted them into new categories derived from English law. The three generations of agnate males with birthrights in the ancestral property were called coparceners and the property in which they held rights was called joint family property, in which the coparceners were joint tenants with the *ius accrescendi.* The father's self-acquired property, even when he had sons, was placed in the category of separate property, devolution to which was regulated by the rules of inheritance.

Despite the emphasis on custom in the words of the Judicial Committee set out above, it was only in the Punjab and Bombay that much attention was paid to custom, possibly owing to the practical difficulties of proof imposed by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which is mainly based on English rules. In particular, in Madras, the influence of the *Mitakshara* was overwhelming and resulted in the imposition of its rules on people who had never heard of it.

The Shastric law only exceptionally recognized the right of a junior member to alienate joint family property, but the Civil Procedure Code recognized a creditor's right to take any proprietary interest of his debtor. The conflict was resolved by a decision that a coparcener's interest was liable to attachment and sale to purge his debt.[38] It was only a small step further to

38. *Deen Dayal* v. *Jugdeep* (1877), 4 I.A. 247.

hold that, in most parts of India, a coparcener could alienate his interest for value; this was "founded on the equity, which a purchaser for value has, to stand in his vendor's shoes and work out his rights by partition."[39]

It need hardly be said that the effect of these decisions was to increase the number of partitions, which previously were normally only the result of family quarrels. At the end of the British period, it was thought by many that the joint-family law had been so deflected that what was left of it was best swept away. Though this was not specifically done in the codification in 1956, section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, provides that on the death of a coparcener, intestate, leaving a female or cognate heir, his coparcenary interest will devolve as though it were his self-acquired property. This will inevitably speed up the process of the etiolation of the joint family.

Hindu law recognized a variety of persons, owners, or managers of property, standing in a fiduciary capacity. The vexed question was what limitations were imposed on their powers of alienation. In one case the question arose in relation to the manager of the estate of an infant heir. The text relied on, which relates to the exceptional powers of a junior coparcener, follows:

> While the sons and grandsons are minors and incapable of giving their consent to a gift and the like or while brothers are so and continue unseparated, even one person, who is capable, may conclude a gift, hypothecation or sale of immoveable property, if a calamity affecting the whole family require it or the support of the family render it necessary or indispensable duties, such as the obsequies of the father or the like, make it unavoidable.[40]

The Judicial Committee held:

> The power of the manager . . . to charge an estate . . . can only rightly be exercised in case of need or for the benefit of the estate. But where . . . the charge is one a prudent owner would make in order to benefit the estate, the bona fide lender is not affected by precedent mismanagement. The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted or the benefit to be conferred in the particular instance is the thing to be regarded. . . . But if the danger has arisen from any misconduct to

39. *Suraj Bunsi Koer* v. *Sheo Persad* (1879), L.R.6 I.A.88.
40. *Mitakshara*, I.1.29.

which the lender is a party, he cannot take advantage of his own wrong to support a charge in his favour, grounded on necessity which his wrong has helped to cause. . . . The lender is bound to enquire into the necessity for the loan and satisfy himself as well as he can that the manager in the particular instance for the benefit of the estate but if he does so enquire and acts honestly, the real existence of a necessity is not a condition precedent to the validity of the charge and . . . he is not bound to see to the application of the money. . . . Money secured on an estate is likely to be obtained on easier terms than a loan which rests on personal security and therefore the creation of a charge cannot be viewed as improvident management.[41]

On this decision now rest the powers of the manager of a joint family, a woman with a limited interest in property, a manager of a temple, the director of a theological college, and the manager of a lunatic's estate. Until fairly recently, it also restricted the powers of the holder of an estate descending to a single heir. Necessity or benefit in relation to a particular individual or particular circumstances now depends on a large volume of case law. The grafting of English equitable principles onto the concept has considerably assisted the development of the law.

Space will not permit an elaboration of this theme, but what has been said will illustrate the way in which the Hindu law was developed up to the year 1955, by which time it was a large volume of case law, largely the work of Hindu judges, so that rarely was it necessary to refer to the *Shastras.* The statutes of 1955 and 1956, usually referred to collectively as the Hindu Code, were the logical conclusions of the development indicated, but an elected Indian Parliament was freer to dispense with cherished anachronisms than the legislatures of the British period. The Hindu Code, though it retains vestiges of its Shastric origin, covers all the family law, except joint family, and resembles the law of a Western, European country rather than the law in force at the end of the British period. Much of the language of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956, is borrowed from the current legislation in England relating to matrimonial causes, and English decisions are cited by Indian courts as authorities for their findings.

There has been no comparable development in the Anglo-

41. *Haooman Persuad* v. *Mst. Babooee* (1856), 6 M.I.A. 393.

Muhammadan law. There has been some conflict between the Sharia, the procedural law, and the Indian Succession Act, resolved in favor of the statutes, but this has created no great difficulty. A device permitted by the Sharia to evade the rules of devolution on death is the creation of a family wakf, a settlement in perpetuity of an estate in favor of descendants. It might have been possible to create a similar institution in Hindu law by a partial dedication to a Hindu deity, the main beneficiaries being designated by the settler. The courts had no difficulty in preventing Hindus doing this but a declaration that family wakfs made by Muslims were void[42] aroused such an outcry that the legislature set aside the effect of this judgment by enacting the Wakf Act, 1913.

Before the establishment of the Company's courts, parties to judicial proceedings had been represented by vakils. In 1793 the first regulation was made for the appointment of pleaders with a right of audience in the Company's courts; they received their letters of appointment from the Sadr Diwani Adalat and were entitled to fees prescribed by that court. Before long a system of examinations was instituted and, as the codes made their appearance, they became set subjects. Aspirants to pleadership generally found the basic principles of law as set out in the form of codes easier to assimilate than, for instance, the law of tort, set out in textbooks and based on decided cases. It is remarkable how rarely cases of tort are filed in Indian courts.

Leading members of the bar in large cities have the same qualities as their opposite numbers in the United States and the Commonwealth and have for long been able to earn large incomes. But there are pleaders in the most remote parts of India where courts sit, often making a bare living and sometimes the subject of rarely deserved criticism, who generally accept the traditions of the English bar and who have done much to induce the average Indian to accept the laws on the Indian statute book. No doubt, having laboriously acquired knowledge of the codes, they have a vested interest in the exploitation of that knowledge,

42. *Abdul Fata* v. *Rasamaya* (1894), L.R.22 I.A. 76.

but the present writer's fairly long experience of the humbler members of the profession in India suggests that, for the most part, they regard themselves as dedicated men and servants of a law conducive to justice.

The extent of the reception of English law in India may be gauged from the events succeeding independence in 1947. Indian demands for the inclusion of a bill of rights in the Government of India Act, 1935, the last British exercise in constitution-making for India, were repulsed on the ground that the history of Europe after the Kaiser's war suggested that the best way to subvert human rights was to embody them in a constitution and that a bill of rights would be either a string of ineffective platitudes or an impediment to effective legislation. Though the Indian Constitution of 1950 generally retained the framework of the Act of 1935, while eliminating control from London and abolishing specially reserved powers of governors and the governor-general, the Constituent Assembly was determined to have its Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. The former consist mainly of the basic human liberties generally regarded as inherent in the common law and set out in the amendments to the American Constitution and in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. But a mere declaration of rights was not enough; the right to an adequate remedy for a fundamental right was made a fundamental right itself. The remedies prescribed in the Constitution are the prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and quo warranto, of which little had been heard in India in the British period. India took full advantage of this new jurisdiction. There is an enormous volume of case law dealing with attempts to avoid statutes for repugnancy to the fundamental rights. But this has imposed a heavy financial burden on the taxpayer and the precedence given to constitutional litigation has resulted in the litigant who seeks to enforce a mere legal right being pushed a long way down in the queue. Pakistan had the same provisions in the Constitution of 1956, but it seemed possible that, in renaming the fundamental rights "Principles of Law-Making" and leaving their observance to the consciences of legislators in the

Constitution of 1962, Pakistan had taken to heart a lesson learned from India. The lesson has been forgotten and the fundamental rights have been restored by a constitutional amendment.

I have referred to British reluctance to sponsor legislation interfering with the personal law. The present government of India, for similar reasons, finds itself in the same position in regard to the personal law of Muslims, while the military government in Pakistan had no compunction in making amendments to the law of succession, marriage, and wakf[43] which a doctor of Islamic law would regard as inadmissible.

A resolution to set up a new Law Commission to recommend revision of the codes was moved in the Lok Sabha in 1954. In 1955 the Commission, as set up under the chairmanship of the attorney-general, included the chief justices of two high courts, two retired judges, three advocates-general, and three advocates. Two practicing lawyers were co-opted from each state. Questionnaires were issued to persons interested and replies classified and considered. At least fifteen reports, each discussing and making recommendations on a particular subject have been printed; one of them runs to over twelve hundred pages. Some of them deal with comparatively obscure parts of the law, parts which might be amended with little effect on the general body of the law as, for instance, the *First Report*, dealing with liability of the state in tort. But a study of the reports dealing with more general topics reveals no desire for fundamental change; the suggested amendments are mostly changes which have been or might be advocated by lawyers trained in the common law tradition. A few citations from these reports will support the view that there has been a real reception of English law in India. For instance:

> The statement that our present system of judicial administration is not in accord with the genius of our country has therefore no substance. The genius of our country has found expression in our Constitution which enshrine the Fundamental Rights of the people and the Directive Principles of State Policy.

43. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (80/1961), West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959 (Martial Law Regulation 64).

We must emphatically state that the way to reform does not lie in the abandonment of the present system and replacing it by another.[44]

We have examined the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, in the light of judicial decisions in India and in England and we find that, apart from the alterations which are set out hereinafter, it is not necessary to make any other radical changes. In our opinion, on the whole, the Act is comprehensive and adequate enough to meet the growing needs and requirements of Indian trade, commerce and industry and facilitates varied relationships between individuals who intend to associate themselves for the purpose of carrying on trade and commerce.[45]

Having carefully examined the provisions in the light of judicial decisions in India since 1930, the development of the law relating to the sale of goods in other countries, the suggestions made by various commercial bodies and individuals as well as the requirements of the modern welfare state, we have reached the conclusion that the provisions of the Act do not require any radical change.[46]

Our conclusions have all along been influenced by the consideration that it will not be advisable to introduce such radical changes as may unnecessarily upset the concepts which have become deep-rooted in the jurisprudence of the country and which now form part of the accepted notions of the lawyer and the layman.[47]

44. Law Commission of India, *Fourteenth Report* (Reform of Judicial Administration), I, 31.
45. Law Commission of India, *Seventh Report* (Partnership Act, 1932), p. 1.
46. Law Commission of India, *Eighth Report* (Sale of Goods Act, 1930), p. 1.
47. Law Commission of India, *Thirteenth Report* (Contract Act, 1872), p. 2.

• 8 •

Transplantation of Institutions in Both Directions: Examples from India and the U.S.A.

Albert Mayer[*]

It should perhaps be noted that certain characteristics of this paper are not generally encountered in an academic study. First, the paper consists in the main of several fairly detailed case histories of recent or still-current activities in which the writer has had a part—or activities he has observed closely in the course of their development. Second, and proceeding from the first point, these situations are not "closed"; they are still fluid and quite conceivably subject to change in the future. They are situations in mid-passage. There will thus be some discussion of the question whether, or how and to what extent, already observable effects may be modified. Finally, it might be noted that there are two kinds of cases which could be examined in a paper such as this. One might be called the "pure" case, in which the introducer may have no particular intent to produce change, or to sustain and adapt what he is introducing. He innovates because that is his habit of operation. A procedure has worked well or conveniently on his home grounds and should, it seems, work in the new environment. Nor is he seriously concerned with the wider effects. Such is the case, for example, of the explorer-trader or the colonial tax collector. They go forward with the "pure" transplantation—or what they think is pure transplantation—with minimum preconsidered adaptation. Such innovators pay minimal attention to the effects of their

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policies because they have many other matters on their minds. However, in the type of case dealt with in this paper, the innovator has studied the situation beforehand and has probably conferred with people in the new locale. He has already modified the original conception or institution being transplanted so that it will work better in the new situation. Also, the introduction of the particular institution or set of practices is to him a major goal.[1]

A related case to be considered has a special feed-back character. In addition to taking new ideas to the underdeveloped country the foreign agents of change, on their return or in the course of their back-and-forth career, also transplant ideas and experiences from the underdeveloped areas back to their own native habitat.

We will now consider certain case histories. Subsequently some tentative hypotheses, based on these cases, will be suggested.

Rural Community Development in India

Community Development in India is partly a case of conscious adaptation of an institution or process for introduction abroad and partly an altogether original development. As will be noted later, it is also a case of a return, as a new totality, to its original site.

In 1947, when India attained independence, the new government was immediately anxious to tackle rural problems, where 80 per cent of its people were living and working in general poverty. Production per man and production per acre were among the lowest in the world. Physical well-being and active social awareness were at a very low level. There had been over the years a series of unsuccessful efforts to solve these problems. In particular there had been the Grow More Food Campaign which had failed

1. There is an "intermediate" type, where a consultant studies a situation, makes recommendations, which are sometimes introduced, but the original consultant does not stay to help carry them through. This is in fact an unsatisfactory version of the second type. For as will be seen, the form of survival, or even the very survival of any new introduction, depends not only on its suitability for its specific purpose, but on the whole social climate. It may die or be vastly distorted because the outer climate is one of indifference or misunderstanding. If the consultant remains and observes on the ground, further modifications can be made, and the necessary single-minded interest and tenacious resourcefulness can be called on. This time-and-tenacity factor can make an enormous difference.

for lack of motivation on the part of the subsistence farmer, who was not oriented to the market; lack of well-organized extension services and of personnel in numbers, caliber, and motivation; and other deficiencies as well. These circumstances seemed to call for a better, more thoroughgoing system, including something like the American agricultural extension service. However, though the assigned reasons were enough to account for failure, there was another reason which was not quite so evident. The attempt to help agricultural production as a single-pronged effort simply could not thrive because there was no matrix of general alertness to nourish it. The lobe when it developed fell off, as it were, leaving nothing permanent behind. Nevertheless, there were certainly elements in the American extension service that seemed relevant: the caliber and dedication of the men in our service, the theory and practice of "meeting the farmer where he was" and not on some upper impractical plane, the practice of thoroughgoing demonstration by persons who knew so fully what they were doing that they induced the interested farmer to become himself a demonstrator. Elements such as these were important to bear in mind in any proposal for rural development.

Mainly in the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh), there had been another quite separate enterprise called Rural Reconstruction. This had been an effort to improve the physical condition of the villages, in terms of changes that seemed good to the improvers. However, the need and the purpose of these changes had not impressed the villagers, and such efforts were in the main stillborn, not used or tended, largely ignored, and by now mostly forgotten. It is significant that these attempts had failed to animate the people or to change the rural "atmosphere" in any noteworthy manner.

It was clear that neither of the two previous efforts had penetrated with any effectiveness, nor had they involved the people, either in terms of taking part in the proffered outside help or in self-help attempts. Putting together in positive form what these mostly negative observations showed were the needs, we came up with this comprehensive "Statement of Purpose for a Pilot Project":

To see what degree of productive and social improvement, as well as of initiative, self-confidence, and cooperation, can be achieved in the

villages of a district not the beneficiary of any set of special circumstances and resources, such as hydroelectric development. The problem is also to ascertain how quickly those results may be attainable, consistent with their remaining permanently part of the people's mental, spiritual, and technical equipment and outlook after the special pressure is lifted. In the context of India's urgent need, we must not take too long. But we cannot afford to be superficial, nor, if results are to be permanent and self-renewing, must we use high-pressure methods.[2]

The new proposal for rural improvement came to be called Community Development. Although it is a good deal broader than agricultural extension, agricultural extension—modified from the American type—is an important ingredient. The core of the entire effort had to be agricultural productivity, because agriculture and food were closest to the people and because increased productivity was necessary to support the cost of the planned new effort and to feed the country.

The other major elements were: on-going social diagnosis and action-evaluation; "village participation," which included social education; public and individual sanitary improvement; village road building; and educational spread. The element of self-help was stressed, with technical guidance and encouragement for the program. Additional specific elements were introduced later when it was felt we had the skill, the people, and the absorptive capacity. This was, briefly, the doctrine and content of Community Development in its pilot period. After considerable soul-searching and discussion, it was decided not to place the program in the charge of the Agricultural Department—to the considerable surprise of American onlookers and advisers and of some Indians as well. These were the reasons:

1. Much of the program was not strictly agricultural.
2. The Agricultural Department at that time generally had not the technical excellence, the down-to-the-people extension outlook and personnel, the degree of initiative, nor the social viewpoint to handle such a program. Nor did the Agricultural Department particularly wish to undertake this kind of broad program.

2. Albert Mayer, McKim Marriott, and Richard L. Park, *Pilot Project: India* (Berkeley, 1958), p. 37.

3. The co-ordinated help necessary from other government departments was not likely to be available to Agriculture, which was merely another department of government, and of rather limited prestige among them.

So, as in many other instances in underdeveloped countries, it was decided to set up a new organization. At the head was the Development Commissioner. Later when it was decided to multiply this work over the whole country, a national Ministry of Community Development was formed. For various reasons that space does not permit going into, the Community Development work did not, in later periods, continue to emphasize the productive base in agriculture, nor in general did it succeed in raising yields on a nationwide basis as the Pilot Projects had done. Because of this and other disappointments, including initially excessive expectations, the whole movement and particularly the ministry itself came into serious question.

Under the Third Five-Year Plan, much greater stress has been placed on agriculture. In particular, the intensive "Package Program," financed by the Ford Foundation, has been developed, with very heavy emphasis on the direct improvement of agriculture. This led to a pronounced resurgence of the effort to have the program handled and carried through by the Agricultural Department, whose new minister was a strong and charismatic personality. A high-level, unpublicized struggle developed, in which the powerful Planning Commission took the position that in the Indian context it was essential for maximum effectiveness to have the program under the aegis of the Ministry of Community Development,[3] and with major community development content. And so, ultimately, it was decided, although the issue constantly recurs.

The above, which may well sound quite complicated, is in fact a severe simplification of the initial program and of subsequent developments and vicissitudes through which the program for Community Development moved. The account omits some essentials, both initial and subsequent. This is not, however, intended

3. Now the Ministry of Community Development and Co-operation.

as an essay on Community Development; only enough is included to permit examination of questions relating to the problem of transplantation across cultures. By way of summary, the following are some of the salient points illustrated by the case:

Initially: There was basic diagnosis of the need for community awakening both in itself and as an essential for productive improvement. Diagnosis put self-help and productive improvements at the core of the plan. This meant the program had to be considerably more far-reaching than improvement in agricultural practices. This involved learning from, as well as radical adaptation of, the American agricultural extension system. We also had to distill the heart and spirit of the American experience. The latter then had to be applied in an Indian setting.

Subsequently: There transpired the change in emphasis and consequent vicissitudes of the revulsion against Community Development during the period of its rapid expansion across the nation. Meanwhile, the influence of the early proponents diminished. The result was the virtual submergence of the work within the Department of Agriculture. This trend threatened to modify Community Development beyond recognition. In a sense, success at the Pilot Project stage had endangered the long-run, nationwide future of the experiment.

However, there was a return to the original concept of productive improvement in the context of community development and self-help. At this point there were substantial changes in terms of decentralization of controls and of fiscal resources. These changes illustrate the survival value and persistence of the initial set of conceptions, based on a conscious fusion of Western experience and the essentials of the Indian scene, through close observation and recognition of the factors particular to the Indian setting.

The staff meeting in Community Development

Every observer of the Indian scene has noted the rigorously hierarchical system and atmosphere of the government civil serv-

ice. One can also note an almost equally rigid arrangement in most private operations. People at the upper levels engage in almost no fruitful give-and-take contact, either social or professional, with those in middle and lower positions.[4] This represents a serious double loss. For one thing, the upper echelons rarely have the time to be in first-hand contact with field conditions and actualities. The only effective and continuing channel would be through close and recurring contact with the middle and lower personnel who know them intimately. The result of this lack is that with all their skill and devotion those at upper levels, i.e., those who make the decisions and set the policies, have no adequately realistic basis for making decisions.

The other even more serious effect is a loss in effective manpower for which a developing country has such dire need. The middle-level man, including the younger ones who start with a great deal of pent-up initiative, soon develop a self-protective reticence. They do not stick their necks out, either because they have perceptively decided that it doesn't pay, from the point of view of a modest but assured personal career, or because they have actually observed unpleasant consequences for those who did. As a result, there is a bottled-up attitude on the part of the very men who are gifted, who have or had important things to contribute. Not only do they not make their contributions, but their whole outlook is one of cumulative frustration, which trails off into customary, scarcely conscious acceptance and performance definitely below their original potential ceiling.

This explicitly perceived situation is the observation of an outsider. It is certainly not consciously perceived on the part of the Indian upper-level personnel, and is almost as little perceived

4. This is true in general, but it is most apparent in those situations where the lower-level personnel is in a branch of the service from which it cannot ultimately rise to the upper levels. For example, a member of the Provincial Civil Service can only very rarely hope to rise to become a member of the highly select Indian Administrative Service. Likewise, for most people in the "non-gazetted" posts, there is very little opportunity to rise to "gazetted" posts. There is an almost impermeable layer between, with very few openings. Crossing over is so infrequent that it cannot leaven the mass. If an individual does cross over, normally he adopts the rigid attitudes appropriate to his new, superior status. If much larger numbers were to be able to cross over, this situation might change. But it has not happened yet.

consciously by the lower-level personnel, because it is so altogether customary and so much a part of the historically continuing social-organizational scene. And that rather small number at the lower levels who do consciously recognize it, and are consciously frustrated by it, are careful to keep it to themselves.

Having recognized the situation, having felt the tremendous cumulative loss of this set of relationships and attitudes, what to do?

It was clear from our explorations and observations in the field that what was desperately needed was not only a systematic responsive plan of development and of work, but much more urgently an awakening and then self-alerting of the people. In order to achieve that, we needed an awakening, a dedication, an energizing, a sense of significance in our own men. To accomplish that, they needed to feel themselves partners, respected juniors, whose thoughts and experiences were worth listening to and were actually taken into account in setting goals. They would then feel some sense of commitment.

There had never been adequate face-to-face encounters between upper and lower officials, between desk men and field men. Work had been carried on mostly by orders from above or inside and by reports or forms filled in and submitted from below or outside. Instead of this, we introduced the idea of periodic staff meetings, to be participated in by the top operating man, the District Planning Officer,[5] and down the line to the Village Worker, the direct village contact man and villagers' adviser. The more obvious purposes were to go over the work of the previous two weeks, the problems and accomplishments; to discuss and settle on programs for the next two weeks; and to have a short period for miscellaneous thinking and discussion. But the real, the general purpose, of course, was to open up clogged channels, to encourage people to think and speak, to have a free interchange, and to produce among the field workers at various levels a feeling of their own significance and their own creative participation. We were building feed-back into the system.

5. And the still higher district collector and Development Commissioner, when they happened to be in the area.

By and large we had picked a group at both upper and lower levels who were sensitive to these matters and willing to adventure with us along this line of a controlled experiment. Even then, the actual loosening up of the inborn rigidities and impatience on the one side and fear or skepticism or bashfulness on the other still had to be struggled with in spite of intellectual acquiescence at both ends. In the early meetings, 90 per cent of the talking was done by the four or five elite, sitting together in front. One of us Westerners was generally participating or observing, later confidentially appraising and suggesting modifications.

During the several years that we were closely in touch, there finally emerged a great deal of spontaneous progress, growing conviction, and belief in the new kind of meeting. There developed also good practical applications of unself-conscious interchange and discussion. How exciting it was to observe these things in themselves, and how much more exciting to see the unleashing of the younger men, the field men, their enthusiastic and much-improved field performance, improved in both initiative and in total performance. And possibly still more gratifying it was to see how the upper people had thawed. Not uniformly, of course, not totally across the board. And of course it must be remembered that these were specially chosen people. One does not want to be starry-eyed either in evaluation then or in looking back now. But this evaluation was not only a personal observation. All sorts of visitors to the Pilot Projects commented on it and wrote about it. The cork had been pulled out of the bottleneck. Often the meetings were held outdoors and villagers joined in, absorbing the go-ahead atmosphere and not hesitating to make their own contribution. It appeared that we had been successful in transplanting a technique.

This pilot phase was succeeded by a considerable enlargement, as the Community Development effort began to be spread over the country. During the first expansion stage, the original *élan* and sensitive understanding were still largely present. One could still attend such staff meetings almost at random and, as a rule, be excited by the active atmosphere and then by the field performance.

However, the pace of expansion became tremendous. The meetings were still held, the same forms of meeting were followed, but, for various reasons to be noted below, they had become routine. The lower-level people, the field people, generally again became the docile backbenchers, rarely being heard except to make a report when called on or to state how many demonstrations had been made so that the secretary could fill in the proper form. By and large, though with some exceptions, the meetings now mainly served to transmit verbal orders, rather than the older style written orders. This was itself a gain in speeding up field processes. It may be said that the "dialogue" that had flowered for several years was very much diminished, though at times enhanced by a greater liveliness and a give-and-take. By now the hoped-for revolution in human relations was only faintly discernible.

Last year a friend, an acute observer of the local scene, happened to stop by such a meeting. He reported the following incident:

At a monthly staff meeting in a Development Block, the Village Level Workers (VLW's) were being asked by the Block Development Officer (BDO), who is several rungs above them, about the compost pit-digging program for the next fortnight.

The reply of several was, "Three or four are being dug."

BDO: "Can't you raise that to five?"

Answer: "Ye-es, I think so."

All the VLW's then agreed to five as a target, except the last one who with some gumption said, "No, I can get only two or three done."

BDO: "But why not five, if all the others can?"

Last VLW: "Because people are busy with the Dassehra Holiday season and simply won't do that much, with so many holiday chores and preoccupations."

BDO: (To other VLW's): "Well, what about it?"

Answer: "Yes, Ram Gopal is right. It really can't be done. But we didn't want to displease you. . . ."

Unfortunately, there are not very many Ram Gopals in the situation, nor BDO's who are willing to encourage them to speak up.

While this observer is accurate, this single instance is obviously far from conclusive. And the single instance could certainly have

been duplicated even in the heyday of the original impact. It is introduced primarily to give the flavor of such situations. Other observations lead one to believe it is not too uncommon.

In this situation, why the temporary success of the full Western intention not only in an isolated instance, not universally, but fairly widely? And why the present much watered-down or marginal result or effect? The answer, or part of it, seems to be along the following lines: The pace of expansion became so rapid that there was no discriminating choice of personnel nor generally any adequate training in the newly-evolved techniques, whose all-important inner content was not grasped by the trainers themselves. The upper posts were filled by run-of-the-line administrators who had never participated in the new way of doing things. And so the lower-level men who actually had that still-surviving "new" training and high expectations found to their chagrin that the conditions for which they had been trained did not exist in the new setting. The watering-down which resulted from the spread of the program across India had the fairly obvious effect of involving people who had not been exposed to the technique which had been developed in such a promising manner in the Pilot Project stage. But one can suggest another factor which may have played a role in the gradual decline of the vital staff meeting. In almost any bureaucratic system, careers tend to depend upon formal performance. A good deal of formal performance in a bureaucratic context revolves around the completion of reports on what is being done for the perusal of upper-echelon personnel. In India this is certainly true, and it has some rather obvious results. The bureaucrat, if only for career reasons, desires to display a satisfactory record to his superiors, hence, the emphasis upon completion of forms and favorable written reports. Harried by demands upon their time and relatively unaware of the effectiveness of the give-and-take of the staff meeting, career considerations tend to cause all too many bureaucrats to think in terms of chain-of-command rather than in terms of effective staff work.

With a less fabulous rate of expansion, the full value of these staff meetings might conceivably have been retained. There does

not seem to have been any intention to discard the procedure, but in the course of the rush the inner quality and purpose of these meetings became one of the casualties. For they had not yet fully taken hold and would have required a greater awareness and a more conscious effort than were available. It is of course difficult to speculate on the causes of the decline in use of the technique which had been imported.

Middle management levels in industrial projects and business

We have just examined, among other elements, the problem of developing more initiative and full deployment of the capabilities in middle- and lower-level personnel. The need for bringing out the enthusiasms, the skills, and the initiative of middle-level men is possibly even more acute in the launching and operation of the many large concentrated commercial, industrial, and engineering projects now completed, under way, and planned in India. Even so guarded an institution as the World Bank has this to say:

> One of our first tasks has been to try to form a judgement about the qualities of character, vigor and honest endeavor to be found. . . . On these questions we have gained a sense of considerable confidence. . . . We have also been impressed by the capacity of the senior officials and prominent businessmen. Nevertheless once one goes beyond that, managerial talent is scarce and it may prove difficult to carry through decisions effectively. . . .[6]

Ernest Dale, management consultant, who visited India in 1960 for the Ford Foundation, has noted:

> The problem is not that management talent is lacking in India. What ambitious Indians need is the opportunity for proper training. A tremendous amount of potential managerial talent can be recognized in the struggling and striving lower ranks of many business houses; in the high school graduates looking for jobs; and in the millions of youngsters in every city, self-styled entrepreneurs, who shine shoes, run errands and set up lemonade stands, like their counterparts in the United States.

6. Special World Bank Mission to India, excerpts of joint letter to the president of the Bank, quoted in *India Economic News Letter,* Supplement No. 11 (April, 1960) (Information Service of India, Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C.).

There are many management associations in India, and the training sessions are enthusiastically oversubscribed. But the quality of instruction and interchange is not always what it might be. Apart from lack of funds, there is a shortage of adequate personnel. Those who can help—leaders in industry and government—are usually too busy; and those who do help often lack practical experience.[7]

A rough estimate has been made that there were as of 1960 perhaps 200 outstanding top executives and a few hundred excellent middle-level managers in India. Judging by the number and magnitude of projects called for in the Third Five-Year Plan, it has been estimated that this number will need to rise to approximately 5,000–6,000. The need is therefore acute. Management associations exist in considerable numbers, an import which has been a major factor in the West's meeting far heavier growth demands. But as Dale notes, such associations in India lack the necessary dynamic character, largely because the top men are unwilling to give them the time and particularly the necessary personal participation. Too often some not particularly able subordinate will be delegated to attend. A top man will lend his name as chairman, but he simply will not mix with subordinates; and he does not show up. Thus the form of the institution has been imported on a substantial scale, but little of the dynamic content. It has run up against a social-organizational block, more potent than the intellectual grasp of the need and usefulness of the tool.

Dale recommends: "These (management) associations need more help from the West: funds, speakers and advisers, and, above all, capable full-time secretaries (who might be recruited from high positions in industry on a year's leave of absence). They might then be able to solve, in some measure, India's problem of management education."[8] One agrees with this recommendation. But if this case of transplantation is to thrive and flower, it is going to need something longer and more powerful than the recommended one year's presence. For there is as always a dual job: the example, the skill, and the determination to further the specific

7. "Management Gives a Lift: How We Can Help India," *Think*, XXVII (June, 1961), p. 10.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 10

task are needed. However, they must be sustained long enough to penetrate the atmosphere, to have real impact on *attitudes.* For both purposes, and particularly the latter, a much longer period is necessary. Actually, and this is a general observation, the nature and the organic character of transplantation depends to a crucial degree upon something which has too often been disregarded. That is the substantial difference between a hothousing period of, say, one year *vs.* five years. To quote from a previous comment, one may say of such situations: "Whether as of this moment there is a predominantly favorable or predominantly unfavorable complexion, none must be regarded as settled or inevitable or from now on automatically favorable or unfavorable. All require continuing and accelerating effort, ingenuity, determination, resourcefulness."[9] It is this aspect of transplantation that must be fully grasped: the process is not merely one of introduction or "transportation," but the organic one of transplantation. The latter takes time and persistence because it involves qualitative changes.

The back-draft: Urban extension in Pittsburgh, U.S.A.

Now let us examine a case of feed-back. Bernard Loshbough, originally a housing official of Connecticut under Governor Chester Bowles, traveled as assistant to Bowles when he was appointed ambassador to India. After that, he spent four years as assistant director of the Ford Foundation in New Delhi. He was a close observer of the Community Development process in the villages of India, from the Pilot Project state onward, as described in the first section of this paper. He then came back to the U.S.A. and after a short time became executive director of a civic organization, Action-Housing Inc., of Allegheny County (Pittsburgh). Let us see what he said and did. In a talk, "Urban Opportunities—New Challenge for Extension," he said:

Action projects aimed at achieving our objective are shaped and

9. Albert Mayer, "Delhi Plan in Retrospect," a paper presented before the Tenth Annual Town and Country Planning Seminar of Institute of Town Planners, Madras, Oct., 1961.

directed by a continuing study and analysis of basic housing and urban renewal problems. Currently, Action-Housing's major emphasis of this research activity is our Urban Renewal Impact Study, which will put human and economic dimensions on a total renewal program for Allegheny County. . . .

Neighborhood renewal—both physical and human—is the problem on which I shall focus considerable attention to-night.

Within this new urban-rural society, you are obviously concerned not only with the effect of new problems on the well-being of rural people, but with the continued movement of these people to urban areas. . . .

We wonder, then, if it is not time for urban and rural workers like ourselves to establish closer relationships and to share skills, experience, ideas—and by such cooperation, enrich the new society much more than we would by acting separately and apart. . . .

We cannot do this job without the enthusiastic participation of our citizens. As a matter of fact, without their desire to see it done, there is not much point in doing it. . . .

Perhaps I am here tonight because during four years in India, where I was closely associated with county agents from many parts of America on India's Community Development Program, I saw your magic touch at work. I watched it awaken a desire in people for a better life; help them help themselves to acquire new skills; and assist them to use these skills cooperatively to achieve a better and fuller life—a process which broke through indifference, changed attitudes, and even enriched a great culture centuries old.

Let me tell you a story about India. In 1945, two men crossed paths there. One was Albert Mayer, an American architect and town planner from New York City. The other was Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, political leader and statesman. . . .

The following year, he [Mayer] was invited back to India to establish a pilot project in the State of Uttar Pradesh, which then had a population of some 40 millon—more than the combined populations of Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. . . .

It was obvious to him that building beautiful villages alone would not do the job—would not be a meaningful demonstration. He realized that a new social and economic atmosphere had to be created along with physical improvements.

He started with the way of life of the people. He sought to build on the good Indian foundations, to utilize modern techniques, and to fit them into Indian resources and conditions. This was no easy matter, for the resources were limited, and the conditions very different from what he and his colleagues knew in America. . . .

Within four years, 10,000 acres had been restored. Apathy was replaced by constructive energy, and the life of the village revitalized. . . .

Think what could be done in the rich and educated land that is America, if the Etawah approach—your traditional agricultural extension approach—could be put to work in all parts of our nation.

In our cities, the complexities of modern living, the drawn-out tensions of the cold war, and the apparent remoteness from sources of power and decision have diminished the capacity of many urban people to deal effectively with their environment, and have left an apathy as stultifying as that found . . . in Etawah.

What I am proposing tonight is simply that we go after this fog of apathy with a good strong gust of extension—the old fashioned kind—that was sharpened, adopted and found so productive in Etawah in far-away India. It is the kind that includes not merely better agricultural and home managing methods, but fundamental awakening and alerting of the hearts and minds of people—the exciting, challenging kind that inspired the nation's first country agents a half-century ago.

It is ironic—perhaps shocking—that an urbanite like myself had to travel 10,000 miles to India to learn that a home-grown product like agricultural extension can very likely be adapted for effective use in urban centers.

I guess you could call this Foreign Aid—in reverse. Here in the United States of America, for a half-century the agricultural extension process had been developing just beyond our city limits, and we have overlooked it as a tool for urban use.[10]

This seems the clearest and most explicit statement possible of feed-back, of retransplantation from India of a concept and process applied there which had been taken from roots over here and heavily modified both before being applied in India and in the application process. Of course, as usual in such cases where something really happens, the soil and the timing were right. Also, it is clear that the American milieu was not ill-equipped to deal with the feed-back. But it can be seen that there were special emphases and orientations introduced which stem from the Indian experience.

We may now go further and see how this process has been Americanized in the transplantation. In the American case, community development is heavily elaborated and rounded out with

10. Southwestern Regional Administrative Conference, Co-operative Extension Service of the Pennsylvania State University, April 5, 1961. Speech released under letterhead of Action-Housing Inc., "News Bulletin."

citizen and staff personnel, committees, and research that certainly do not exist in the simpler prototypes of India and may quite possibly overload the actual action-situation here. In India, we could have used more organization and research than we could possibly get. In the U.S.A., one may have to be resourceful to cope with the amount and variety of tools, skills, and action-research available.

In the Homewood-Brushton area in Allegheny County, there are 9,000 families. For this area, there are two general committees, the Homewood Community Research Association and the Homewood-Brushton Citizens' Renewal Council. The Renewal Council Steering Committee has set up twelve committees: Code Enforcement and Housing, Finance, Communications, Planning Liaison, Citizen Participation, Education, Social Problems, Public Safety, Recreation, Health, Economic Resources, and Church Impact. There is also an Evaluation Committee, and there are subcommittees. There are, in addition, the usual network of voluntary citizen organizations, social-work groups, and welfare organizations as well as branches of city-wide organizations, governmental and non-governmental. While it is desirable to have activity groups in ample measure, both for practical reasons and for giving citizens a sense of participation, it will be interesting to see whether all this is manageable, whether there is any law of diminishing returns. It will also be interesting to see whether it will be possible to overcome those twin causes of diminishing citizen participation: passage of time and solutions to the original emergency of pressing problems.

Another aspect of this example of re-Americanization is worth bringing out. The same Action-Housing group in Pittsburgh made an application to the Ford Foundation for a test demonstration of this *Urban Extension* to be carried out in four neighborhoods of differing types, of which the Homewood-Brushton neighborhood is one. It is a stimulating and ambitious scheme, but its full subject-matter content, or even an outline of it, is not needed here.[11] Two of the elements are relevant in our context: the first

11. Application for a grant from the Ford Foundation for a test demonstration of *Urban Extension* to be carried out in the Pittsburgh area.

is the inclusion of current and continuing evaluation from within the project. In the early Pilot Project work in India, we tried to achieve this, and did so, to a limited extent, with our meager resources. When Community Development was extended to a national scale, an evaluating organization was created—an important innovation in the Indian context. But it was a separate organization, hence there were psychological handicaps to the acceptance of its advice by the operating organization, which generally reacted defensively, or rather defensively-aggressively. In addition, the evaluations were annual, so that very often they were too late for maximum effect on operation. The evaluation proposal in the Pittsburgh case jumps off from those two experienced inadequacies. This is an important and significant step.

The second element involves a telescoping of the time process. As would be seen from perusal of the application, the enterprise is an extremely complex one, on many levels, involving numerous interworking disciplines and several types of workers conforming to a specification not yet existing.[12] This program of action, research, and evaluation is planned to be underway within one year. To make such telescoping possible, four universities are to be involved in the research, training, and manpower aspects. In one case, the following departments are said to be available: Graduate School of Social Work, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Graduate School of Public Health, School of Engineering, School of Law, Department of Sociology, Department of Anthropology, Department of Psychology, Department of Geography.

The success of this kind of telescoping or accelerating in time and in discipline-range is by no means assured, to say the least. And yet, if it is found possible, it is a real and vital breakthrough. It would show convincingly that the projective application of

12. E.g., "... Qualities [of the urban generalist] include thorough urban background; sensitivity; common sense; ability to learn rapidly; extensive interest; pioneer spirit; tenacity; team work; intense dedication; maturity; empathy; organization experience; integrity; administrative ability; knowledge of planning social welfare services; government; educational skills." Aside of the obvious difficulty of finding or creating this galaxy of qualities, knowledge, and skills, certain ones have in the past been felt to come only from actual experience and development on the specific job, which takes time.

social science and of cross-disciplinary organization could very considerably cut down the time needed for development. If fully understood, this could in turn be a fresh configuration for a new transplantation abroad. However, it may be that such a development-in-depth could only happen in the United States. If so, it is relevant to this paper because it would suggest the implications of the operation of transplantations in a real situation. The chance of substantial success should be enhanced by the introduction of continuing evaluation. If this is penetratingly and skilfully carried on and continually communicated or funneled, what looks like excessive acceleration may in fact work satisfactorily.

Note in this case, as in the first case in this paper, the importance of the individual. If Loshbough had not been witness to the Community Development work in India, with community awakening at its core and self-help as a major means, something like it would no doubt have happened in Allegheny County any way, because that is what is needed and what our country is seeking. But certainly the specific form and configuration are due to the experience and observation of the man, i.e., the agent of change.

Some hypotheses based on the above

One need not attempt conclusions from these cases. It is, actually, too early to do so on the basis of current cases. But by offering some tentative observations or hypotheses on specific aspects, one may start to clarify possibilities and increase the chances of maximum survival and usefulness of transplantations, which are now taking place with such great frequency. In considering these "hypotheses," it should be borne in mind that they do not undertake a full coverage of the factors involved. It is the intention, rather, to call attention to several factors which these experiences seem to underline, and which, so far as I know, have not been brought out effectively in the literature.

One hypothesis is that what happens to a transplantation is by *no means* inevitable, by no means predictable by social science. This is not to derogate social science, for the help, analyses, and

forecasts of social science are indispensable, offering a tremendous new tool which I have continually used with profit. When it is good, perceptive social science, it can help enormously in the initial diagnosis of the need, in the shaping of the transplantation to the new conditions, and in subsequent continuing, sensitive observation as part of the actual operation. But the point being made is that the outcome is frequently not inevitable. It is often a very near thing whether it will turn out one way or another. It depends on a balance of forces which is often not irrevocably weighted one way or the other. It sometimes depends on the strength and tenacity of a single individual, and particularly on his character, which could well tip the balance.

Other things being equal, society will grind away and grind very fine. But society has a great deal on its hands at any one time, and the individual or the small determined group can often make the difference. Thus, unless an operation is egregiously conceived and altogether unsuitable (which the intelligent use of social science should preclude), it is this personal or group factor to which we must give great weight and attention. The importance of due attention to the role of the individual or the group may be seen in two kinds of instances. Given identical projects, the chances of one's working as against the other will be greatly enhanced if there is a powerful and tenacious minister or a powerful opinion-leader behind the one project and not behind the other. This, in my judgment, would be true even if the second project happened to have been given, at least theoretically, a more logical focus. The view just expressed is a truism, known to all experienced men of action. But it has not been widely noted in the social science literature.

Much of my thought and time in introducing new undertakings has been devoted to finding the best innovator and getting him deeply involved in and committed to the undertaking. On one large planning project, I knew as soon as it was assigned to a certain official that it would never have the drive or the prestige required for success. And it didn't. My experience proves the proposition: the successful implementation of an innovation re-

quires the involvement of an appropriate innovator or group committed to innovation.

There is a second factor on which the hypothesis is based: the length of time of the direct involvement of the proponent or innovator, i.e., the agent of change. After proposing a program, how long does the innovator stay with the task? In my judgment, this is a crucial matter, though it has rarely been considered to be such in the literature. Too often the expert disappears after he has delivered his expertise. As he goes, so goes his *élan*, his advocacy, his sensitivity in operation. As he leaves, the identification of the project with him is lost, along with many of the crucial friendships and connections he has formed. Often, perhaps in most cases, his successor is not so vitally interested or so deeply involved. Perhaps the successor has not fully grasped the totality and the nuances. At times the successor may have quite a different orientation, with all of its consequences. Thus the project may look the same, but it will usually not be the same in actuality as what had been originated. The presence of the innovator is needed especially during the early period of operation when it is having heavy weather or even needing only interpretation and adjustment. What would happen, for instance, to Losbough's elaborate project if for some reason he had to leave it after six months? Would so new and complex a conception move along or fall apart, or be only very partially what he had proposed? Yet this is what is happening all the time with the expert in the underdeveloped country under present conditions, and without the depth and choice of replacement that is available here. Presumably, if the project has validity, it will one day fully catch on in the local scene and become fairly independent of the originator, who is no longer indispensable. But such flowering is by no means automatic; no scheme is so good that its original protagonist is quickly interchangeable. Also, no matter how nationalistic the "host" country and its people are, the individual foreigner does have a prestige and an aura that can add, to the potential of accomplishment, a differential factor in its favor.[13]

13. A simple anecdote explicitly illustrates this remark. During a time of cement shortage, a project had critical need of 100 bags of cement to finish before

The second hypothesis or experience-observation is that the skills of social science as they have been developing in the West over the last twenty years or so are in general not sufficiently called upon, or even permitted to operate, in underdeveloped countries. This lack is particularly evident at two points where its application is essential: First, at the time of local observation, analysis, and formulation of the initial plan and project; and then in operation, where these skills are needed in continuing or preferably continuous observation and guidance, with recommendations for modification as necessary. By and large and almost without exception, the underdeveloped nation is not seeking or getting or accepting the full twentieth-century totality that the foreign industry or engineering complex has developed. Large-scale enterprise in the West has at various levels the advice of social science in such matters as the effect of the selection and organizing of the labor force, and of its attitudes, on efficiency and output, and in continuing observation and adjustment. A particularly crucial situation in the new countries is the new labor force, often from primitive rural areas, or from tribal or other disparate sources. This involves basic issues of how to achieve labor's earliest full commitment.

There is another major and critical area, in that new lands are being opened by huge irrigation projects in so many developing countries. There are the new farm colonies opened up to migrants from other areas. These people are generally not adequately preselected or preconditioned, not specially observed and helped for a considerable period after arrival. In the extreme but fairly frequent cases they leave, after a quite non-productive and unsatisfactory stay. How much heartbreak, social and economic waste there has been in these unnecessarily hit-or-miss operations. Another quite neglected aspect of this same and of other in-migrant situations (in cities for example) is the attitude and the reactions

the monsoon, but it seemed impossible to get. Desperate, the foreign adviser called on the Secretary for Civil Supplies, the last resort for such a permit for cement, which was a "controlled" item of supply. The Secretary called in his assistant, wrote out a chit and said: "See that Mr. X gets his cement. If he has come all the way from the USA to help us, we certainly can't let him down for a few bags of cement."

of the existing inhabitants. They often feel they are being encroached on. There are mutual resentments and even hostilities that should have been anticipated and at least much minimized.[14]

The only exception to this that I know of is Israel, which has made and continues to make social science studies of these situations, both remedial and projective. And there, not only are such studies made, but even more notable, they are frequently heeded by the planners and action men, and they are taken into account in formulating subsequent enterprises.[15]

There is a single interesting case, part of an overall study for the proposed 4-country Mekong Valley hydro-electric and irrigation project. The project analysis group has included anthropologists on its study team. There is an account of the part that could be played by anthropological-sociological-archaeological research and analysis. This project is only in the report stage. The referenced document shows at considerable length the social-cultural factors that are to be analyzed and taken into account, and to a great extent this has been done, at least in a preliminary way.

But generally the asking country wants the straight technician or the consulting physicist or chemist; this overlooks the whole realm of social science in modern planning and development that is available. And this is very much lacking on the plane of government undertakings in India, including Community Development and the whole new plunge into democratic decentralization or Panchayati Raj, where such research is so desperately needed. "Common sense" and the good sense of the people are considered enough. The presence or absence of the social science factor and its genuine utilization to the full extent of its potential (provided skilled, seasoned, imaginative personnel are secured, and the choice is discriminating[16]), can certainly make an enormous differ-

14. A cumulative presentation of examples of the failure to achieve satisfactory results in people's attitudes and in productive change due to absence of social science analysis and field application is found in Kusum Nair's *Blossoms in the Dust* (London, 1961). This is an account of an all-India observation tour of projects by a perceptive and sympathetic reporter.

15. Reference is made to numerous studies by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research (Jerusalem), of which Louis Guttman is director, and to studies for the Jewish Agency, by Alex Weingrod, Raanan Weitz, and others.

16. This remark is included because there are only infrequently available among the nationals of underdeveloped countries skill and capability of the level needed,

ence in the acceptability, usefulness, effectiveness, and efficiency of an undertaking. This is particularly true vis-a-vis the all-important time factor, the safe diminution of the time-period of effective acceptance.

A final word of explanation. In singling out these two hypotheses, there is no intention to over-emphasize what they can accomplish, though they *can* accomplish a great deal. There are, of course, very deep currents running, quite beyond the reach of these suggestions. Where the new transplantations in concept or in process are excessively counter to these, such suggestions are obviously of no help. But within the very wide range, before this unusual and hypothetical region is reached, the two elements just discussed can be very potent indeed.

even though there are people holding degrees in these fields. But consider the huge amount of study, field work, imaginative observation, papers, and books there are by gifted social scientists who have actively researched and are actively researching in Asia, Africa, Latin America. Their writings are mostly in learned journals and thick books, and they are unfortunately mostly or exclusively heard and read by each other and their students. If only this ringed circle could be breached and if only the policy men of some of the underdeveloped countries could enter this magic circle, they could absorb and reflect on what appears there. Could not one of the foundations call an action-*cum*-thinkers' conference to explore these possibilities?

• 9 •

The Transplantation of Trade Unionism to British Africa

Frank T. de Vyver°

Followers of a faith may be expected to spread their particular gospel to less fortunate people who have not yet seen the light. Thus Christian missionaries have always followed the dictates of their founder and have gone into the world to spread the Gospel to all mankind. Followers of Muhammad have been known to exert pressure upon infidels; members of the John Birch Society seek to spread their "one true faith"; profit-sharing companies are organized to tell others of their faith; and believers in one or another form of government have even been known to attempt to impose their beliefs upon others.

It is little wonder, then, that labor groups, especially those nurtured upon trade unionism as a protest movement, have also sent missionaries into the field. Such sallies within their own country can be explained on economic grounds. Trade-union leaders learned long ago that it is difficult to maintain an organization in an industry half union and half non-union. For best results a union must cover the area of competition.

Organizing in an underdeveloped country is another matter. Although perhaps involving some economic motives, such attempts generally seem to be motivated as is any other missionary effort—no person should be denied the opportunity to hear the gospel. Furthermore, it makes little difference whether a new

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religion is needed or wanted; there being only one true religion, everyone should have it whether he wants it or not.

This paper will deal with the efforts of British trade unions to develop unionism in some of the underdeveloped areas of the Commonwealth and empire. Following a general review of these efforts, I shall analyze some of the economic problems which have hindered the best attempts of the missionaries and describe certain basic factors which have shaped the developments of a transplanted institution.

The basic legislation for trade unions in England is found in the Trade Union Act of 1871. That legislation, in addition to defining the term "trade union" and setting up machinery for registration of unions, made it clear that unions were no longer illegal under common law because their purpose was restraint of trade.[1] Today unions are protected in all areas of the Commonwealth and in the colonies by similar legislation and in some instances by legislation more like American laws, which not only allow unions to organize but protect the workers' rights from employer activities which interfere with these rights.

During the Labour Government of the 1930's, Lord Passfield, better known as Sidney Webb, was Labour secretary of state for the colonies. At his urging, the several colonies that did not already have trade-union legislation enacted laws similar to the British ones except that registration, rather than being permissible, was generally mandatory.[2] In 1940 further impetus was given to colonial trade-union growth by a clause in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act requiring that there must be reasonable facilities for the establishment of trade unions before money could be spent for the purposes of the Act.[3] There followed a general move throughout the colonies to amend trade-union laws to meet the British government's requirements, which included such basic trade-union principles as recognition of the

1. Walter Bowen, *Colonial Trade Unions* ("Fabian Research Series," No. 167 [London, 1954]), p. 4.
2. B. C. Roberts, "Labor Relations in Overseas Territories," *The Political Quarterly*, XXVIII (Oct.–Dec., 1957), 390.
3. Bowen, p. 4.

right to strike and the protection of union funds against civil suits.[4]

About the same time the new colonial act was passed, the British government moved to help the colonial workers form their unions by sending out more than a score of experienced trade unionists to the colonies. Colonial workers had taken little advantage of the 1930 legislation, and the government apparently felt that lack of leadership rather than lack of need had been responsible.[5] The government's move was certainly a new departure. No European government had ever felt the necessity for such missionary work among its own workers. Chief Justice Hughes once said that unionism had grown "out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer."[6] In fact, European governments, rather than stimulating the growth of labor organizations, had repressed them for many years and more recently had sought to regulate their activities for the common good and for the protection of the individual worker. The thesis of the British government apparently became that workers in a developing country need trade unionism; although unionism might eventually develop out of "the necessity of the situation," there should be no waiting; therefore, every effort should be made to get the workers organized as quickly as possible by supplying training and, if necessary, outright leadership. This policy is well stated in an official document on the colonial territories:

> The development of a strong and responsible trade union movement is essential to progress towards self-government. It has an important part to play not only in promoting good industrial relations, but also in affording opportunities for instilling among the people that spirit of

4. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
5. Roberts, p. 392.
6. *NLRB* vs. *Jones-Laughlin Steel Co.* (1936), 301 U.S. 1, at 33.

service to the community at large which is one of the contributions that sound trade unionism can make to a democratic system.[7]

The program for organizing trade unionism in the colonies, begun by the government in the 1930's and considerably expanded under the Labour Government of the late 1940's, has continued into the present.

Private trade-union organizations, namely, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) of the United Kingdom, and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) have reinforced the efforts of the government. These groups have sponsored schools for leaders, helped finance local trade-union offices, provided fellowships for overseas study, and in general have spent considerable time and money to establish trade-union movements.

The ICFTU, since its founding in 1949, has devoted a considerable amount of its budget to organizing African workers and training leaders to carry on that work. During 1950 and 1951 delegates from the organization "visited practically every country between the Sahara Desert and the Union of South Africa" to survey local conditions "and establish the necessary contacts." These initial efforts have been followed by such moves as the establishment of a West African Information Centre in Accra and an office in Nairobi, Kenya, to provide service for East Africa.[8]

To carry on its educational work, the international organization has held a series of regional conferences, the first in Accra in 1957. To this meeting came delegates from eleven African nations or dependencies. They were addressed by the Prime Minister, Dr. Nkrumah, as well as by a score of other leaders who told the delegates about trade unionism and its potential benefits for African workers.[9] Two other conferences have been held, one in 1959 and the other in 1960.[10] Such conferences no doubt have had educational results, although the trend of the matters discussed has been political rather than economic.

7. *The Colonial Territories (1950–51)* [Cmd. 8243], as quoted in Reference Division, Central Office of Information, *Labour in the United Kingdom Dependencies* (London, 1956), p. 7.
8. *Trades Union Congress Report, 1956* (London, 1956), p. 184.
9. *Report of the First African Regional Trade Union Conference, Accra, January 1957* (Brussels, 1957).
10. John Riddell, *Free Trade Unions in the Fight for African Freedom* (Brussels, 1961), pp. 33, 34.

Economic matters, however, have been discussed in training schools for potential African leaders. Such a course was held in January, 1953, near Accra, which was attended by seventeen students from Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the British Cameroons, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. The syllabus "was devoted to the practical daily problems of trade union organisation and administration, methods of increasing membership, collective bargaining and trade union publicity."[11] So great was the demand that similar institutes were held during the following years in various parts of the continent.

The culmination of the educational program was the dedication in June, 1961, of the College of the Equator in Kampala, Uganda, sometimes called Kampala Labour College. In a building costing £125,000, under the principalship of Sven Fockstedt, a staff of nine or ten trade unionists from the United States and the United Kingdom gave four-month residential courses to thirty to forty students each session. In addition, what might be called extension courses have been arranged in various parts of East and West Africa.[12]

The Trades Union Congress in England has aided in these efforts toward international aid, but it has also carried on its own program. Under the direction of its Colonial Advisory Committee, the TUC has provided an active program of assistance. From 1950 to 1955 office equipment and essential books on trade unionism were supplied throughout British Africa. Furthermore, additional help was promised. "It is clear to the General Council," said a 1956 report, "that the main emphasis of their aid will lie less in the field of general advice and education, and none in the field of direct organization." Money to pay office rent, money to pay salaries of full-time officers, money to supply transport in the territory—these were the areas where help was required and the Congress resolved to help. In 1956 a budget of £32,000 was established for assistance to colonial trade unions during the following fifteen months, and the Congress raised the affiliation

11. *The College of the Equator—The Story of the I.C.F.T.U. Educational Activities in Africa* (Brussels, 1961), n.p.
12. *Ibid.*, n.p.

fee to the TUC by 3d. per member in order, among other things, that more could be spent on overseas assistance.[13] Furthermore, the next year £500,000 was allocated to the ICFTU to be used for advancing trade unionism in underdeveloped countries.[14] The TUC has also aided the several educational programs of the ICFTU, and has sent British trade-union leaders to participate at the Labour School and in the short courses for trade unionists. Furthermore, fellowships to Ruskin College at Oxford have been arranged for African leaders, although the policy now seems to be to have the educational activities in Africa, where the teachers can reach more people.[15]

On paper, at least, these combined efforts of the British government and the Trades Union Congress working with ICFTU have been successful. The British model of the Western institution of trade unionism has been transplanted to British territories in Africa, or at any rate there are now trade unions operating in all of these areas.

The story in Ghana is typical. No trade unions existed in Ghana prior to 1941, "when modern trade union legislation was enacted." The International Labour Office's *African Labour Survey* reports as follows:

> In 1942 two officials recruited from the British trade union movement were assigned to the Labour Department, with the specific object of assisting in the development of trade unionism. At the end of 1956 there were more than 80 organizations registered under the trade union legislation; a number of those were, however, small and had little practical activity, while a number of others were rather in the nature of guilds, for example, tailors' associations, motor drivers' associations and similar bodies.[16]

13. *Trades Union Congress Report, 1956*, pp. 214, 463.
14. Roberts, p. 398.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 399. The new policy has received high praise from one student of the subject, Dr. V. L. Allen, lecturer at Leeds University. In an article appearing in the *Free Labour World*, he praises the ICFTU for the local training of African leaders but concludes as follows: "But the ICFTU is not the only agency in the field. Other agencies draw officials away from their environments and take them out of Africa. Sometimes this action results in the collapse of unions; at all times it has a prostituting influence upon the people involved for it tends to accentuate their separation from the ordinary workers, to encourage a taste for gracious living, and to bring them into contact with ideas which are irrelevant to African conditions." (V. L. Allen, "Trade Unionism in East Africa," *Free Labour World*, CXLIII [May, 1962] 164.)
16. International Labour Office, *African Labour Survey* (Geneva, 1958), p. 235.

In Table 1 are presented figures for several British African areas which show the percentage of the number of people employed as wage and salary earners who were members of trade unions in 1958. All of these figures are approximations but the membership figures are particularly difficult to estimate accurately. Many unions have "large paper memberships and few regular dues-payers" except when the check-off of dues is provided or required.[17] Except for Ghana and Nigeria, the percentage of eligible workers who are members of unions is still low compared to any Western country.

Table 1. ***Registered Workers' Organizations and Union Membership in Selected Countries of British Africa, 1958 (number of workers in thousands)***

Country	*Approximate number employed as wage and salary earners*	*Workers' organizations*		*Approximate Percentage of union membership*
		Number	*Membership*	
Nigeria	500	67	175	35
Kenya	553	25	45	8
Tanganyika	409	16	40	9
Uganda	240	12	4	2
Rhodesia-Nyasaland	1,207	65	60	5
Ghana	250	16	128	51

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of International Labor Affairs, *Directory of Labor Organizations, Africa* (Feb., 1958), except for Tanganyika and Rhodesia-Nyasaland, for which the figures of column 2 are from "Population and Labour Force in Africa," *International Labour Review*, LXXXIV (Dec., 1961), 513.

The reasons for the slow growth are numerous, but may be classified broadly under two categories. In the first place, many basic difficulties involved in the culture of the area make trade unionism difficult to sell to Africans. A second reason for the slow growth is found in the type of trade unionism which the British government and the labor movement have tried to install.

The Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa concluded in 1955 that "the attempt to encourage the growth of

17. Allen, p. 164.

trade unions on the British model is likely, for some time to come, to represent an expenditure of effort which might be employed in other directions."[18] Much as the General Council of the TUC might "greatly regret that this statement was made,"[19] the fact is that there was much validity to the commission's observation.

Among the important difficulties for organization in colonial Africa is the fact that there is hardly what the Webbs would have called a permanent wage-earning class. Hodgkin, giving what he calls a "rough approximation to the facts," reported an extremely small labor force in relation to the total population. In British Africa this ranged from 1.5 per cent in Nigeria to 24 per cent in Southern Rhodesia. In Kenya 8 per cent and in Tanganyika 6 per cent of the population were wage earners.[20] In the United States in 1960 the comparative percentage was 58.3.[21] Even these percentages probably overstate the case (in Africa) because of the considerable use of migrant or temporary labor. Thus the major industries may draw a large part of their work force from adjacent territories. These migrants, who usually arrive without their families, are in the labor market for a few months and then return home. Their replacements come in for a similarly short contract period.

Commenting on this aspect of the African labor market, a royal commission stated:

> It is probable that the main factor is the impermanence of the labour employed and its reluctance to form part of a settled labour force. This in turn may be attributed to the desire of labour to maintain contact with the native areas from which it has come and where it considers that the safeguard for its security resides. . . . Impermanence of the labour supply adds to the costs of employing labour and lowers the price for labour which employers are able and willing to pay; while on the other hand a labour supply which knows that it is temporary and is reluctant to settle is likely to be willing to accept a lower wage than

18. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1955–1956, Vol. XIII (*Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors, and Others*, Vol. 4), Cmd. 9475, June, 1955, *East African Royal Commission Report*, p. 410.
19. *Trades Union Congress Report*, 1956, p. 217.
20. Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London, 1956), p. 118.
21. U.S. Department of Labor, *1961 Statistical Supplement—Monthly Labor Review, Part I* (Washington, 1962), p. 1.

would be acceptable to a settled labour force with its normal family commitments.[22]

Not only will such migrant workers "be willing to accept a lower wage" but also they make poor trade-union material for the same reason. In many ways they are like students and housewives working to earn a little during tomato-canning time or during the Christmas rush. They earn the extra money but they do not think of themselves as permanent wage earners interested in an organization to improve their lot.

Furthermore, in mining and plantations the migrants most often are housed in compounds where they are subject to semimilitary discipline. An organizer would not be welcomed.[23] Even in such areas as the Northern Rhodesian copper belt, where the two mining companies have sought to build villages and develop a permanent work force, the communities are isolated and remind one of the Southern mill towns of thirty years ago with all of their aspects of benevolent paternalism. Such situations are not fertile soil for organizing workers into unions.

A second factor which makes organizing difficult is the high percentage of the wage earners working in agriculture. In Kenya and Tanganyika the number employed in agriculture is nearly twice as great as in any other industry; and in the other British areas, although government employment is nearly as great, the portion of the population engaged in agriculture is still large compared, for example, with the small percentage in the United States.[24] Agricultural workers ordinarily do not join unions as easily as industrial workers or craftsmen. In this country, despite the best efforts of the CIO, agricultural workers remain virtually unorganized. In 1960, for example, there were only 52,000 union members in agriculture and fishing out of approximately 6 million employed in agriculture alone.[25] A variety of reasons has been given for this propensity of agricultural workers to remain unorganized. Thus, in an agricultural economy such as that found in

22. *East African Royal Commission, 1953–1955 Report,* p. 153.
23. Hodgkin, p. 119.
24. *Labour in the United Kingdom Dependencies,* p. 31.
25. *1961 Statistical Supplement—Monthly Labor Review, Part I,* p. 34.

colonial Africa, union membership will be small even though the government and the trade-union movement help organize.

A third militating factor is the makeup of the African work force. Generally the African worker fills the unskilled or at least the semiskilled jobs. This is another group of workers who are difficult to organize. The earliest unions in the growing industrial England and the United States were among the skilled craftsmen and not among the more poorly paid unskilled workers. Here again a variety of reasons has been suggested to explain this fact. Perhaps the most logical reason is that the supply of unskilled laborers is so elastic that a worker hesitates to join a union and complain when he can be so easily replaced. African advancement into the skilled and semiskilled jobs has been slow. As late as 1959, Rhodesian Africans could not be apprenticed, and it was not until 1961 that the white or European trade unions of the copper belt agreed to a program of "job improvement" for the black workers.[26] Bargaining power among skilled workers gives them a purpose for unionization. Unless the labor movement is the "one big union" type, with the skilled workers sharing their power, as early developed in the Knights of Labor in the United States, economic unionism among the unskilled is likely to be impotent.

The difficulties of organizing this mass of migrant, agricultural, and unskilled workers are enhanced by linguistic complexities and illiteracy. In spite of the fact that in most industrial towns many languages are spoken, Hodgkin claims that there is a growing tendency for a local vernacular to be accepted as a workers' language. In the South African gold mines, for example, all workers and supervisors are taught a basic language called Fanakold. In East Africa, Swahili seems to be generally accepted.[27]

The number of industrial workers employed by government is another factor of restraint. It is not true, of course, that government employees do not join unions and do not strike. Nevertheless, political action rather than collective bargaining is the usual

26. Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union, *African Advancement Proposal* (Kitwe, Northern Rhodesia, 1960).
27. *East African Royal Commission 1953–1955 Report*, p. 184.

method for improving the lot of civil servants. Statistics of employment are fragmentary, yet the statement of Trachtman with respect to Ghana, while not true for all of British Africa, certainly is true if one excepts agriculture. He says, "The largest single employer is the government which employs about half of the wage earning labor force and sets the wage pattern for the entire country."[28]

The government of Ghana has tight control over all trade-union activities. Some bargaining is allowed for non-government employees, but the Ghanian government has by legislation removed from unions of civil servants any economic activities such as are usually considered a part of Western trade unionism. It is little wonder that government workers do not make good trade unionists.[29]

28. Lester N. Trachtman, "Ghanaian Labor Legislation Since Independence," *Labor Law Journal*, XII (June, 1961), 547.

29. Summarizing their opinion on trade unionism in East Africa, the Royal Commission says: "The reasons why Africans in East Africa display so little interest in trade unionism are not difficult to discover. Some of them have their counterpart even in Great Britain today. We cite some of the more important: (*a*) the ordinary African still has a background of peasant agriculture and the background dominates his interests even when he is a wage-earner in towns; (*b*) industry is still in an early stage of development and urban employment has not ceased to be a novel experience; (*c*) a large part of urban employment is obtained by labourers who are migrant in the sense which has already been described in our Report. To be effective, a trade union must be a stable and continuous association of workpeople, but stability and continuity are not readily to be found in urban employment where the stable labour force is so small; (*d*) many of the matters, such as working hours, overtime rates, and, in some cases, minimum wages, which in the United Kingdom would normally be dealt with by the ordinary procedure of collective bargaining, are in East Africa dealt with by legislation; and (*e*) the organizing experience and ability which are required if trade unions are to be effective are not readily to be found in a people so recently introduced into the climate of the modern world." (*East African Royal Commission 1953–1955 Report*, p. 161.)

A similar comment has been made by Dr. Allen in his discussion of trade unionism in East Africa. "The East African labour force," he says, "is largely migratory, predominantly illiterate, fresh from tribal subsistence societies and resident in an uneasy, unstable political environment. The only similarity here with Western industrial countries is that the workers sell their labour to employers." "Furthermore," he continues, "the unions which have been established are confronted with a problem of membership turnover which would daunt even the most efficient German, British, or American union. They are trying to extract contributions regularly from workers who are unaccustomed to the act of paying out money as a form of insurance rather than in direct exchange for something, and who in any case earn so little that they can ill afford to spare anything. They are trying to practice internal democracy—which requires an informed as well as literate membership—with workers who are illiterate. Little wonder that so many of the East African unions have large paper memberships and few regular dues-payers; that the officials are often overwhelmed by the size of their tasks

Considering these several basic difficulties of organizing, we little wonder that Western trade unionism has made so little progress in colonial Africa despite the efforts of the British government, the TUC, and the ICFTR. There are, however, more basic difficulties involved in the institution itself, as found in England and the United States.

Theories of the labor movement are numerous. The Webbs saw unions developing as a permanent wage-earning class came into existence. John R. Commons suggested that the union was necessary because of the expansion of the product market which followed the break-up of the guild system. Perlman developed a theory based upon scarcity and others have presented additional concepts.[30] Although they differ widely, all of these theories seem to consider trade unionism as an offset to capitalism, a type of countervailing power that may be explained in a variety of ways and that may carry out its objectives in many ways as well.

Kerr and Siegel suggest that any theory of the labor movement based upon capitalism cannot be a general theory.[31] They suggest, therefore, that industrialization is what must be studied, and that in the rule-making which must accompany industrialization (whether that takes place in Russia, China, the underdeveloped countries, or western Europe) is found the reason for the development of a labor movement. Industrialization must involve industrial discipline and the setting of wages and hours. This function may be carried on unilaterally by the state, employers, or workers; bilaterally by any two of these same groups; or by the three groups negotiating together. Which method is used depends upon the situation in the particular area.

None of the requisites stipulated by the early theorists is pres-

and are preoccupied with the task of balancing accounts which will not balance; and that the financial position of so many unions is so precarious that they cannot themselves afford to pay the salaries of full-time officials or even the costs of simple administration and are incapable of withstanding the shock of strikes or lesser strains." (Allen, p. 164.)

30. Mark Perlman, "Labor Movement Theories: Past, Present, and Future," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XIII (April, 1960), 338.

31. Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Structuring of the Labor Force in Industrial Society: New Dimensions and New Questions," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, VIII (Jan., 1955), 151. Also Clark Kerr, *et al.*, "Industrialism and Industrial Man," *International Labour Review*, LXXXII (Sept., 1960).

ent in British Africa. Neither a permanent wage-earning class nor an expanded product market has developed, and the very weakness of workers and management organizations alike make the attempt to transfer the institution of free collective bargaining extremely difficult.[32] In this situation, rule-making, to follow the Kerr-Siegel hypothesis, cannot be a joint effort but must be done unilaterally by the employer or by the government. In colonial Africa, where racism and nationalism have become so important and where the employer has ordinarily been a white man, rule-making has devolved upon the government.

Interestingly enough, British areas have long recognized the need for government intervention when strong organization is lacking. Two illustrations will suffice. In England itself wage boards operate when organization is non-existent or weak. The hosiery industry does have a union and there is an association, yet a wage board actually makes the decisions about wages and rules. In South Africa, where unionism is comparatively weak, wage boards write the basic regulations and determine the wages in numerous industries.[33]

In colonial Africa the expected has happened. Faced by almost insurmountable difficulties, the trade-union leaders from England and from the ICFTU have made little progress in building a strong trade-union movement to which, with the employers, could be entrusted the task of formulating the rules necessary under an industrialized society. As industrialization has continued, however, the function of rule-making had to be carried out and governments have had to accept the task.

Another expected development has also taken place. Weak though it has been as a partner in rule-making, the African trade-union movement has helped to develop leaders. More or less frustrated in their economic programs, these leaders have turned

32. Some free collective bargaining does, of course, take place in British Africa, but as Mr. Kassolow of the AFL-CIO wrote recently, "It is not that there is an absence of collective bargaining but it hardly occupies the position of central thrust that it does in the Western labor movements." (E. M. Karralow, "Factors Affecting the Development of Labor Movements Abroad," Washington, [1961], mimeographed, p. 20.)

33. Frank T. de Vyver, "South African Labor Relations," *Labor Law Journal*, XI (Sept., 1960), 837–855.

to politics, and with independence here or approaching, they are playing their part in taking over the government that will make the rules for industrialization. In Kenya, Tom Mboya, presently a cabinet minister, was head of a labor federation; in Tanganyika Mr. Kawawa is a labor leader; many political leaders in Rhodesia, Ghana, Nigeria, and other British areas are also labor leaders.

This phenomena of political unionism has been noted in Italy, another underdeveloped country. Professor Neufeld[34] points out that Italian unionism has remained weak for a variety of reasons. His analysis of the reason for his conclusions, however, differs from that presented herein. "Can Italy," he writes, "or any nation limited in native resources and traditions of self rule, but rich in social hatreds and unrest, meet the economic needs of its people fast enough to uphold and extend the institutions of democracy? Can strong and free trade unionism arise and endure except under conditions of exceptional economic, social, and political good fortune? The Italian past would seem to indicate a prophetic answer: No." Under such circumstances political unionism will prevail.

Recent developments in Ghana illustrate what may happen in the other developing countries of colonial Africa. Some of the earliest attempts to organize workers were made in that country, apparently with considerable success, if one is to believe some of the published reports. In Ghana the ICFTU held its first African regional conference in 1957, at which Nkrumah was one of the principal speakers. He praised free trade unions and urged that still greater efforts be made to organize the workers.[35] Shortly after full independence had been achieved, however, the Prime Minister apparently had second thoughts about the place of free trade unions—British style—in a developing country.

The Trade Union Congress of Ghana quickly lined up with the

34. Maurice F. Neufeld, "The Inevitability of Political Unionism in Underdeveloped Countries: Italy the Exemplar," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XIII (April, 1960), 363. Also Felicia J. Deyrap, "Organized Labor and Government in Underdeveloped Countries: Sources of Conflict," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XII (Oct., 1958), 104.
35. *Report of the First African Regional Trade Union Conference*, p. 5.

Convention People's Party (CCP) and has "openly and repeatedly declared that 'the CCP and the TUC are one.' "[36] The TUC, formerly "an ineffective body lacking an adequate continuing source of income and a firm base from which to operate" became a powerful organization of twenty-four specifically named constituent national unions. To it has been given exclusive bargaining rights where such are allowed, and the latest amendments to the Industrial Relations Act now require union membership with a check-off of dues.

The TUC, however, is certainly not what can be called a free trade-union movement. It can best be considered an arm of the government by which the demands of the labor movement are subordinated to "the basic plans for the economic development of the country." The government allows limited collective bargaining through the TUC for non-government employees; the law practically forbids strikes and provides for arbitration of disputes; the government has the right to say which union may represent any group of workers; and the government "has the authority to seize the funds of the TUC, set the rules for its operation, control its finances, and determine its constituent members." For all practical purposes the TUC has been forced or has agreed, for the purpose of advancing its own organization or leaders, to government or party domination. Free trade unionism, Western model, has disappeared.

Trachtman summarizes the situation in Ghana when he says, "The union movement is therefore no longer basically a protest movement seeking 'more' for the workers or a better position for them in society. It is becoming an organ of the state, to be used in accordance with the needs of the state. Worker rights and conditions of employment are looked after by the union only as a by-product. And in return the welfare of the workers becomes a direct responsibility of the state."[37]

Chief villain in this "sell-out," according to the ICFTU, has been John K. Tettegah, general secretary of the TUC. Writing in 1961, John Riddell of the ICFTU says:

36. Trachtman, p. 548.
37. Lester N. Trachtman, "The Labor Movement of Ghana: A Study in Political Unionism," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, X (Jan., 1962), 165.

We will leave it to the general secretary of the Ghana T.U.C. to explain before his own conscience how he reconciles the appeal to which he then [at the 1957 meeting] subscribed—to write under the banner of the I.C.F.T.U. "to forge the instruments of our political, economic, and social liberation"—with his later attempts to undermine the efforts of the African unions to build a powerful regional organization backed up by the whole international free trade movement and designed to achieve precisely the aims outlined in the [1957] Accra manifesto. Whatever the reasons for this astonishing somersault, they are most certainly not due to any lack of interest on the part of the I.C.F.T.U. in the struggle for African emancipation.[38]

The pattern in Africa does not differ from the pattern that Neufeld found in Italy, except that in Africa the first political use of the embryonic trade union was as an instrument of nationalism. In fact, says Riddell, "The founders of the ICFTU clearly foresaw that the fight for trade union freedom and that for national liberation could never be kept in watertight compartments."[39] Once having attained "national liberation," however, the African trade-union movement in Ghana, instead of moving toward the traditional economic institution of Western trade unionism, has become a servant of the government. The same situation may be expected in other underdeveloped areas of British colonial Africa. During the industrialization process, unions must perhaps be content with the "disciplining of labor" function and leave to government the "wage-welfare" function, if the labor unions are made to serve as an instrument of government policy.

To summarize, the best efforts of British trade unionism and of the non-Communist worldwide organization of trade unions have been devoted to building a trade-union movement in Africa based upon the British or, in some instances, an American model. Because of numerous basic difficulties, these attempts have met with little real success. Professor Neufeld presents a different set of reasons for trade-union weaknesses in Italy, but in each instance the weaknesses of the organizations are obvious.

As industrialization has developed or has been sought in colonial Africa, the rule-making provisions of any industrialized

38. John Riddell, p. 9.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

society have to be developed. Because of racial problems and an inherent weakness in the trade-union movement, African labor unions are incapable of carrying out the needed negotiations with the predominantly white management. The alternatives are unilateral rule-making by management as found in unorganized areas of the United States, or rule-making by government. The former choice is obviously distasteful to an African government as well as to African workers. This leaves government to make the rules. Faced with this fact, African union leaders have concentrated their efforts on the political area. Embryonic trade unions have of necessity been forged into political movements.

We must conclude, therefore, that the transplanting of the well-developed economic, political, and social institution of free trade unionism from England to British Africa has not been successful. This is particularly evident in the scarcity of mature collective bargaining and rule-making generally carried on by joint conference between employers' associations and labor unions. Nevertheless, the seed for unionism has been planted and has adapted itself to the new soil and climate. The plant bears the same name but the fruit is different.

Returning to the missionary effort described in the early pages, perhaps the experience of the Christian church is of some value in considering trade unionism in underdeveloped Africa. At its very beginning the Christian church found paganism. Instead of fighting what would have been a losing battle, the church without, of course, setting aside certain basic principles, adapted itself to what it found. Thus, today in the United States many evangelical churches forbid dancing, and even square dancing must be called "folk games." Yet twenty miles from Durban under the auspices of a Christian church, an annual event to honor the founder of the particular sect is all-day dancing by half-clothed Zulu maidens and women. British trade unionism has been accepted, but it has had to adapt itself to local customs and traditions and for the present, at least, to become political rather than economic.

• 10 •

The Transfer of Western Economic Institutions in Africa

*William E. Moran, Jr.**

As independence has come since 1957 to Africa south of the Sahara, Africans have taken over from Europeans responsibility for their own future. As a part of the struggle for independence, there developed a desire for improved social and economic well-being on the part of much of the population and a demand among African leaders for greater national status. Satisfaction of these demands depends on rapid, substantial economic growth. External sources, Europe, the United States, the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the United Nations, have demonstrated a willingness to assist efforts in this direction with men and money. The ability of African countries to achieve economic growth with any speed, even with substantial external help, will depend on the suitability and efficiency of their economic institutions.[1] Until 1850, Africa south of the Sahara had not participated in the economic growth which characterized western Europe. The growth which has taken place over the last hundred years has resulted from the introduction to Africa of Western economic institutions by Europeans. These institutions, an overlay of Western institutions on the indigenous structure, have already begun to be changed by the newly responsible African leaders for political and, to a lesser extent as yet, economic reasons. The purpose of this paper is to

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1. W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (Homewood, Ill., 1955), pp. 57–163.

examine the current status of economic institutions in Africa south of the Sahara and the direction in which they seem to be evolving as this pertains to efforts to promote economic growth. This will be done through an examination of the precolonial indigenous structure; a study of the way in which institutions have been introduced and the effect of that introduction on indigenous institutions, i.e., the extent to which there was transfer; and an analysis of changes in economic institutions already made or proposed by African governments as a means of gauging the potential evolution of such institutions. Since the historical and statistical data available are limited and fragmentary, this study will be preliminary in nature, but it is hoped that it may suggest questions and areas in which more detailed examination is needed.

Precolonial Africa[2]

Africa south of the Sahara is a vast area and its peoples are many and varied. Any statement about social organization is, therefore, subject to exceptions. But, on the whole, there was a certain homogeneity in the social organization and the economic institutions in that area up to 1850 when the great explorations had gotten well under way and the institution of European colonies was imminent.

The Africans were organized in communal groupings of relatively small size and occupied not too well-defined geographic areas, frequently the subject of dispute with their neighbors. These groupings varied considerably in organization. They included relatively formal organizations, such as the Kingdom of Abyssinia, the Buganda Kingdom of Uganda, and the Hausa sultanates of the interior of West Africa; somewhat less formal confederations, such as the Ashanti confederation of the Gold Coast and the BaKongo Kingdom, as well as individual tribes like the Masai of East Africa; and loosely organized groups without chiefs, such as the Ibo of eastern Nigeria and the Kikuyu of

2. M. F. Smith, *Baba of Karo: a Woman of the Muslim Hausa* (New York, 1955); Louis S. B. Leakey, *Mau Mau and the Kikuyo* (London, 1952); Elspeth Huxley, *The Red Strangers* (London, 1952); and I. Schafers, ed., *Livingstone's Private Journals, 1851–1853* (Berkeley, 1960).

Kenya. Some of them were relatively settled agricultural people, as the Ashanti, Kikuyu, and Ibo; others were nomadic pastoralists, such as the Fulani and Masai; while still others were migrating warriors, such as the Zulu. They were, however, all characterized by communal patterns, limited acceptance of individualism or experimentation with new ideas, and adherence to strong traditions.

There was a glamorous trans-Saharan caravan trade of limited economic significance between North Africa and the interior of West Africa, with the North African traders introducing Mohammedanism and bartering salt and trade goods for ivory, gold, and slaves. A number of "empires" had been founded in the interior of West Africa—Ghana, Songhai, and Mali—and by 1850 the Muslim Fulani had loosely organized a large part of that area in a Muslim political form. The slave trade for the Americas had been long installed at western coastal ports and coastal tribes did a fair trade in slaves. The slave trade in the east was organized by Arabs, who penetrated rather extensively into the interior. (This trade seems to have done more to disrupt existing institutions than it did in the way of introducing new ones.) The Boers of South Africa had established small settlements in the interior of that area, but these were mostly of a subsistence nature themselves. None of this activity seems to have had much lasting effect on the traditional organization of the African peoples in the economic sphere. There was little intertribal trade, and trade within groups was largely of a barter nature. There was little specialization; the strictly local blacksmith, weaver, and carver were the most representative. Specialized groups, with a fairly wide trading area, such as the cloth dyers of Kano, were exceptional. There was a limited use of money, in the form of cowrie shells, iron rods, and copper crosses, but very little in the way of a market economy. The wheel, the plow, and the use of beasts of burden were unknown.[3]

3. Great Britain; Parliamentary Papers 1955–1956, Vol. XIII (*Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors, and Others,* Vol. 4) Cmd. 9475, June, 1955. "East African Royal Commission 1953–1955 Report" pp. 10–28; and Diedrich Westermann, *The African Today and Tomorrow* (New York, 1949).

Thus, when the European colonies were established, the African people were grouped communally and lived in an unsophisticated subsistence economy with little specialization and the rare use of money. Private property, independence of the individual, experimentation and development of technology, individual entrepreneurship, production for the market, money, savings and investment were little known. They had organized most effectively to assure the continued life of the group in a hostile environment, but this form of organization was not well adapted to timely change and growth. Whether, how, and to what extent it might have adapted to new conditions by itself cannot be guessed since the Europeans came to Africa and made major changes.

The European intrusion

In the era of colonization, roughly 1850 to 1900, Europeans entered this scene at all points of the compass for a variety of purposes. Their impact differed with their number, intent, and approach. For this reason, European intrusion will be examined under a series of separate headings.

The missionary[4]

European missionaries, when they were not like Livingston explorers themselves, followed closely on the heels of the explorers. They spread over most of Africa south of the Sahara and were frequently well installed before the European colonies were established. In addition to preaching, many of them opened schools and some introduced trade. The combination of the new religion, education, and trade opened up new prospects to many Africans. The new religion challenged the traditions which had formerly ruled life and, where accepted, threatened the existing social organization. Education, almost exclusively of an academic type and at the primary level, provided little of use in improving a man's position in his rural, tribal setting, but did open the way to clerical employment with trading firms and colonial gov-

4. Charles Pelham Groves, *The Planting of Christianity in Africa* (London, 1948).

ernments. The missionary made the first attack on the existing institutions, whether intentionally or not, and, through education, started the move of peoples from their tribal groupings and traditional institutions to the largely detribalized cities and towns. They instituted schooling, in part at least a modern economic institution.

The missionaries were essentially men of religion whose involvement in education was incidental to their main endeavor. They were not social scientists or technicians. When they set up schools, they established copies of the schools of their own countries. They were convinced of the value of schooling and neither looked into African culture to determine the validity for it of the schooling provided nor gave any serious thought to its possible effects. In the early years, the need of companies and colonial administrations for clerks provided an outlet for those students not employable by the missionaries. Later some students found employment as teachers. However, the output of the schools soon outran such job opportunities. This schooling was not adapted to improving the capacity of the local people as farmers, traders, or craftsmen, and those so educated were rarely content to remain in rural areas. They migrated to urban areas and in increasing numbers swelled the ranks of the unemployed.[5] In recent years some few missionaries have begun to provide practical training in improved farming methods and in crafts and trades but they have been in the minority.

The missionaries were still largely in charge of education, frequently with subsidies from colonial governments, until the Second World War, after which many of the colonial governments began increasingly to take over direct responsibility for education.

The trader[6]

The traders were active in coastal areas in the west, shifting from slaves to agricultural commodities such as palm oil, when the explorers began to open up the interior. The traders were a

5. Joyce Cary, *Mr. Johnson* (London, 1939).
6. John E. Flint, *Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria* (London, 1960); A. J. Hanna, *The Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia* (London, 1956); and E. Torday, *Causeries Congolaises* (Brussels, 1925).

varied lot. There were individuals seeking their fortune, the rare one of which, like Goldie of Nigeria, founded a major trading company; there were well-financed European groups, such as the Compagnie Congolaise pour le Commerce et l'Industrie in the Belgian Congo; and there were the chartered companies with grants of rights over extended areas and with large delegations of governmental powers. They collected palm oil and rubber in coastal areas, gold and ivory in the interior, for export. They first exchanged trade goods for these products but later moved to the use of money as a medium of exchange and opened stores at which imported goods could be bought. They introduced new crops and assisted in developing production of existing crops or those otherwise introduced. They provided the market that was instrumental to the rapid expansion in the production and export of rubber, coffee, cocoa, cotton, fibers, and the edible oil crops over the past hundred years. Increased production for the market and a more generalized use of money grew out of the efforts of the traders.

The traders did little to move the African into new practices or to involve him in Western economic institutions save as this was necessary to the trader's own profits. Where possible, traders preferred to move into plantation production or rely on European producers, as in the Congo and Kenya, rather than promote indigenous production. Where plantations were not possible or feasible (the United Kingdom forbade them in West Africa), or in areas which did not lend themselves to cotton production and there were no settlers, the trading companies retained as much control over indigenous production as was possible. In the Congo and Mozambique[7] they retained a very considerable control over the planting, processing, and marketing of cotton, and in West Africa they retained control of the purchase and marketing of cocoa, ground nuts, and oil palm products as long as this was possible. They, or the Indians on the east coast, retained control of processing facilities—e.g., oil mills and cotton gins—until they were driven out by political processes as in Uganda, or until

7. Marvin Harrie, *Portugal's African "Wards"* (American Committee on Africa, *Africa Today*, Pamphlet No. 2 [New York, 1960]), pp. 33–34.

governments forced a way for individual or co-operative indigenous effort.

The traders were not notorious for their efforts to bring Africans into trade as entrepreneurs or managers. In Ghana and Nigeria a significant move started about 1950, when it became clear that independence was imminent, to train and advance Africans to management positions in the trading houses. Some of the big trading firms there also began to assist ex-employees to get into business on their own. This has been the exception. Even in West Africa it might be noted that the first courses in management were introduced in the University College of Ghana as the result of the founding of a chair by Socony-Mobil only in 1958. The big firms controlled the import-export business and had their own stores throughout the country in West and Central Africa. The Indian moved in as the village-level merchant in the east. There were few groups of African traders of any significance, the most outstanding being the Mammy traders of Ghana and Nigeria and the Hausa traders. The African in trade on a modern basis, above the bazaar level, is still most rare. Trade has had an important effect on the economies of Africa, but the African has for the most part participated as peasant producer, plantation laborer, clerk, or laborer in European establishments.

Colonial administration[8]

Colonial administration in Africa was characterized by the limited numbers of Europeans involved. A few hundred men established European rule. Little groups of a few dozen then administered territories of great size; the Congo, for example, is a third the size of the United States. Individual European district officers administered areas, not served by modern communications, as large or larger than their home countries with the help of a handful of indigenous troops or police and two or three indigenous clerks.

8. Lord Hailey, *An African Survey* (London, 1938); L. P. Mair, *Native Policies in Africa* (London, 1936); and L. Gray Cowan, *Local Government in West Africa* (New York, 1958).

These administrators were mostly non-technical persons from a laissez-faire environment where it was not thought that government had any role in commerce or industry and where the idea of the social responsibility of the state or the employer was only beginning to develop. They came out to establish peace and bring the slave and liquor trade to a halt. Quite apart from their attitudes, it is remarkable that they did this so well. By the end of the nineteenth century they had pretty well eliminated the slave trade, even in the east. Tribal conflict had been reduced to a minimum, and a remarkable peace had been installed in the area. Whatever else they might have done, had they been so inclined, there probably just wasn't time.

In many areas, colonial administrations did install railroads, build roads, and begin to make navigable the few river systems, but in others, such as the Congo and the Rhodesias, even this function was left to the private sector, along with the opening up of mines, plantations, and trade. Education was left almost exclusively in the hands of the missionaries. The administration did establish rudimentary tax systems to meet its own costs. When it was found that local peoples did not come forth to provide the labor required by developing trade and industry, hut and head taxes and even forced labor was resorted to by the administration. Until the 1920's this was about the only sense in which colonial administrations deliberately pushed Africans to accept modern economic institutions.

In the interwar period much thought was given to colonial responsibilities. Major studies were undertaken, such as the *African Survey* of Lord Hailey and the parliamentary inquiry by Belgium in 1929. These gave rise to a better understanding of Africa and stimulated decisions by colonial governments to make substantial changes. Unfortunately, the world depression intervened and only a few limited steps were possible before the Second World War. Technical officers, foresters, and agriculturalists were attached to colonial administrations in limited numbers; special services paying attention to language and customs were begun in some areas; a few anthropologists were detailed to colonial administrations; agricultural research and experiment

stations, such as the Moore Plantation in Nigeria and the National Institute for Agronomic Research in the Congo, were opened; and interdisciplinary study centers, such as the French Institute for Black Africa, were started. In addition, colonial governments began to take increasing responsibility for education, first by subsidizing missionary education and establishing standards and then by assuming responsibility directly for some aspects of education. A beginning was also made in assuming responsibility for social and economic development beyond the immediate financial capacity of the territories with the institution of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund by the United Kingdom. These were, however, only beginnings and were limited in their development by the depression and then brought almost to a halt by the war.

These ideas were picked up again during the period of reconstruction in Europe after the war. First emphasis was placed on expanding the contribution in raw materials and foreign exchange which colonial territories might contribute to that reconstruction. This attitude characterized the first postwar colonial development plans, particularly those for the French territories. In these plans, material or economic factors, e.g. location of natural resources and improvement of transportation, predominated. In the second round of plans in the early 1950's much more attention was paid to social development, e.g. education, public health, and expansion of indigenous production.

Revenue in most of the territories depended primarily on taxes on exports and imports because of the ease of administration; there was no development of direct, progressive taxes, other than head or hut taxes, except for income taxes in some cases for the European community. An additional retrograde step lay in the development of marketing boards for export crops which bought from the producers at prices lower than those of world markets when they were high and higher than world markets when they were low. This was done to restrain prices of raw materials and as a move toward stabilization of the incomes of indigenous producers. This practice did control inflation, but has not generally been successful in stabilizing prices. In West Africa, partic-

ularly Ghana, the boards have been used as a means of taxing producers. The resulting tax is indirect and not progressive. This failure to install tax systems which bring home to people the cost of government services and their own responsibility is yet another area in which modern economic institutions have not been introduced.

There has been a great expansion of schooling in Africa since the war.[9] Primary schooling has been most widely extended. Vocational and secondary schools have expanded more slowly and remain the great bottleneck in most countries. Universities and technical schools were started after the war in many of the countries and territories except the Portuguese, although they have come late in the Congo and the former French territories. For higher education, there has been an enormous expansion of schooling abroad, in Europe, the United States, and more recently in Russia and eastern Europe. This has, again, been an expansion of European-style education. Primary education of this character is not well adapted to improving traditional, rural life or creating modern farm communities, but rather induces those who receive it to join the migration to the urban areas where they most often join the jobless. Secondary schooling of an academic nature does not provide the personnel needed for middle-level and supervisory jobs, but it creates the desire on the part of those who receive it for the next step, university education. Academic education at the university level, particularly in the predominant European pattern, provides politicians, lawyers, and a few teachers but few of the badly needed professional, technical, and managerial personnel. Only in the last few years in a few countries, such as Nigeria,[10] have manpower-requirement studies been started and education planned on the basis of the skills which will be required in a developing society. No real

9. *UNESCO International Statistics Relating to Education* (Paris, 1959); U. S. National Commission for UNESCO, *Africa and the United States, Images and Realities* (Boston, 1961); and Betty George, *Education for Africans in Tanganyika* (Washington, 1960).
10. See Federation of Nigeria, *Investment in Education* (London and Lagos, 1960).

success has yet been realized in planning educational systems really attuned to African requirements, although Ghana announced its intention in 1958 to revamp its system to that end.

Other aspects of education as it applies to social change and economic growth, such as agricultural demonstration centers and extension services, industrial extension services and productivity centers, supervised credit for indigenous farmers, tradesmen, craftsmen, or industrialists, were still rare as the African countries approached independence.[11] Such institutions of this nature as did exist often catered more to Europeans than to Africans, perhaps because it was easier to provide these services to Europeans. In any event, the whole area of introduction of Western economic institutions was largely neglected. Co-operatives were pushed by the British, particularly in West Africa, but with limited success. (The outstanding success, that of the Chagga in Tanganyika, grew up with limited help and seems to be *sui generis.*)

Some efforts have been made to find new forms of rural organization or land tenure which are more suitable to expanded African production. In the Congo, the Belgians experimented with the *paysannats indigenes,* in which the communal form was retained but the people were settled on carefully selected land in such a fashion as to allow permanent settlement while retaining the best aspects of shifting cultivation. This system also allowed the introduction of mechanization, better seeds, insecticides, and fertilizer.[12] It is too early to say how successful this approach has been, but even before independence there were signs that it was often resented by the people because it had been imposed. In Kenya, under the Swinnerton and related plans, in an area where individual ownership of land was traditional, promising experiments were begun with land reclamation, regrouping of indigenous holdings, clearance of title, and the

11. *East African Royal Commission 1953–1955 Report,* pp. 96, 148, 180, 264, 331, and 373.
12. "Contribution to l'étude du problème de l'Economic Rurale Indigène au Congo Belge," Special number of the *Belgian Congo Agricultural Bulletin,* XLIII (1956), 7, 135, 159, and 245.

development of new patterns of mixed farming on small holdings.[13] (The mixed farming is only possible because this is an area relatively free of tsetse fly.) These schemes seem already to be showing some success but they have been slow because of the time required to gain acceptance. Attempts at resettlement of indigenous families on modern farms in Nigeria in the late 1940's under the Niger Project,[14] and again more recently, have shown that this approach is extremely costly and probably beyond the means of the newly independent countries.

Some limited effort has been made, in a few places, to create the concept of local responsibility for change. Most notable, perhaps, has been the setting up of native authorities (local government) in East Africa with their own treasuries, limited authority to tax, and fixed responsibilities. These, and a few other similar efforts, are exceptions. The community development efforts are not included because they did not approach the problem with the idea of developing a feeling of local responsibility. In most colonial territories power and responsibility were retained at the center. Thus, little was done to bring home to the people the relationship between their own work and the realization of their dreams. Where local taxes are needed, if only in part, to make possible a new school, market, or clinic, and for the payment of the personnel for such services, they create a direct incentive for the people involved to enter the market economy and produce more. The same result does not obtain where taxes are paid to a remote central authority which in turn dispenses largesse.

Plantations

Plantations were established by Europeans and later by Americans to provide an assured supply of quality tropical raw materials at reasonable prices. They began in Africa with oil plantations. British and Dutch soap producers found palm oil from Africa a better source than coconut oil from the South

13. Elspeth Huxley, *A New Earth* (New York, 1960).
14. K. D. S. Baldwin, *The Niger Agricultural Project* (Oxford, 1957).

Pacific.[15] When the British refused to allow the establishment of plantations in their West African territories, the companies settled on the Belgian Congo, where they were welcomed. It became the site of some of the world's largest plantations. Beginning with palm oil, British and Belgian producers later branched out into rubber, coffee, and, to a limited extent, cocoa. These large plantations were supplemented by smaller ones owned by European settlers. No African-owned plantations, individual or co-operative, grew up. In the same way, but on a smaller scale, coffee plantations were established in Angola, coffee and banana plantations in French West and Equatorial Africa, banana plantations in the British Cameroons, and sisal plantations in Tanganyika. None of these induced African emulation, although government-owned rubber plantations were established in the British Cameroons. In the mid-1950's, as labor for the plantations in the Congo became more costly and scarce, there was a move to assist African employees to set themselves up as producers through grants of land, cuttings, technical assistance, and purchase of product. It had not come to much by the time of independence in the Congo. (It might be noted that small-holder production of rubber was common in the Far East and peasant production of cocoa and palm oil existed in Ghana and Nigeria.)

In an attempt to assure its own supply of rubber outside cartel control, Firestone established extensive plantations in Liberia in the 30's. In order to promote goodwill in this independent country, the company made it a practice to give clones (cuttings) and technical advice to interested Liberian planters. They also provided them with a market for their production. Over the years this has given rise to the growth of a substantial number of small African rubber plantations. It should be noted that these planters were Americo-Liberians who were not previously organized on traditional lines but were already owners of their own individual farms.[16]

It was the exception when these plantations gave rise to Afri-

15. Charles H. Wilson, *History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social Change* (London, 1955).
16. Wayne C. Taylor, *The Firestone Operations in Liberia* (Washington, 1956).

can initiative. The fact that indigenous production of export crops did not grow in areas where such crops were produced on plantations but that indigenous production of similar crops did grow elsewhere suggests that plantations stood in the way of indigenous African production. Nor did they do much to train Africans in skilled labor, or in technical or managerial work. Owners, management, supervisors, and technicians were almost exclusively European, except for the occasional use of Asians in East Africa.

Settlers[17]

Some of the area south of the Sahara, usually because of altitude in tropical areas, lent itself to European settlement, although most of it knew the European only as a temporary resident. The Union of South Africa, Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, the Congo (Leopoldville), Mozambique, and Angola all had sizable European settler populations. In addition, East Africa, from Uganda to Mozambique, and the Union had Asian settlers.

The European settlers acquired land in a variety of ways, by colonial grant or sale, or by purchase from indigenous owners, or by outright seizure, of which many are still a source of conflict with the Africans. They introduced modern farming and ranching techniques as the settlers had in Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, and the Union. They were often given assistance by the colonial or national government, and they were heavy employers of African labor, although the Portuguese did forbid employment of Africans by the immigrants they brought to Angola and Mozambique after the last war.

The settlers introduced modern agricultural techniques to Africa, and they adapted them, at some difficulty and expense, to local conditions. They often established modern, efficient, economic farms and made a contribution in employment, revenues,

17. Isak Dinesen, *Out of Africa* (New York, 1952). Isak Dinesen, *Shadows on the Grass* (New York, 1961), pp. 15–20; and Colin Leys and Crawford Prutt, *A New Deal in Central Africa* (New York, 1960), pp. 98–109.

and foreign exchange to the territories and countries involved. However, they made little or no contribution to introducing Africans to these new methods and even worked to prevent Africans from growing export crops, as with coffee in Kenya, because of their fear that African production might threaten their own livelihood in one way or another. African agriculture did not advance as rapidly where there was European settlement as it did elsewhere.

Asian settlers did not ordinarily engage in agriculture even though the Indians were brought to the Union as labor on the sugar plantations and did to some extent move into agriculture there. The Asian did, however, take many middle-level supervisory and skilled jobs in East Africa in addition to entering the village-level retail trade.

Mining and industry

Mining was the first significant form of industry in Africa south of the Sahara and still continues to make the greatest industrial contribution to its economy. Mining has become more industrialized in the strict sense with the processing of ores to metal and the production of mining necessities, particularly in the non-ferrous mining areas in the interior.

Indigenous mining of gold has gone on for centuries in the interior of West Africa and in East Africa. There was some primitive mining of copper in Central Africa before the European intrusion. The first modern mining started with gold, then diamonds, in the Union, which also mines coal, iron ore, and numerous other minerals. Here the mining industry as well as steel production is significant in the economy. The next most important mining area is that of the copper belt in Northern Rhodesia and the Katanga province of the Congo, which is an important world producer of copper, cobalt, and uranium as well as zinc, manganese, and rare metals such as germanium. The Congo is, in addition, an important world producer of diamonds and tin. Diamonds are mined in Angola, Tanganyika, and Guinea. Sierra Leone and Liberia have diamond mines and important iron ore

mines. Ghana has gold and manganese in addition to its diamonds. Southern Rhodesia produces coal, chrome, asbestos, and gold. Nigeria has long been a coal and tin producer and gives promise of being an important source of petroleum. New mining installations are being made in Gabon and Mauritania. These are not the only mining activities in the area but they are the most important. All of these mining activities contributed to the introduction of a modern economy to Africa. They gave rise to the development of transportation which served other economic purposes; they provided wage employment for Africans; and they provided a market for local production. However, only the big non-ferrous mines proceeded very far with local processing of ores and the build-up of industrial concentrations to serve their installations. These were most noticeable in Northern Rhodesia and the Congo. A comparison of the impact on Africans of these mines and those of the Union may best illustrate the effect of the mines and associated industry generally in introducing Africans to modern economic institutions.

In the mining and mineral industries as in industry, agriculture, and trade generally, the Union's policy of *apartheid* and *baaskap* has made itself felt. In the mines themselves the African, hired on labor contracts of limited duration and often imported from considerable distances outside the Union, is employed as unskilled or semiskilled labor. This is part of the general policy of the government limiting skilled and supervisory jobs to whites. No effort has been made to provide facilities for African families to settle at mining sites or for Africans or their children to acquire skills. Nothing has been done to integrate the African into this economy other than as a laborer.

In Northern Rhodesia the mines were installed following the beginnings of white migration from the Union and England to neighboring Southern Rhodesia. The white miners, who were employed in their installation and were essential to their rapid growth during the last war were, in effect, settlers. They organized a strong union and have made every effort to protect their position against the danger of African infiltration. The history of this mining industry, which has gone far into industrialization

through processing of ores, is one of a struggle for African advancement. With the political change of the past few years there has been movement in this direction. The African employee is settled and relatively permanent; he lives with his family at the mine site. After years of reservation of skilled jobs for the whites, a new position has been taken progressively over the last five years: to provide the African the opportunity to advance into semiskilled and skilled jobs. Provision has also been made for training the miners and improving educational facilities for their children. The first African clerks were hired by the mining companies within the past five years, and none has as yet been introduced into management or management training. The white farmers and contractors in Northern and Southern Rhodesia obtained a priority position in supplying the mining industry, and there has been no growth of indigenous farmers or contractors in this field.

Next door, in the Congo, developments were different. There were no white settlers and such white labor as was used was imported on a temporary basis. In the late 1920's a parliamentary commission looked into the effect of recruitment of labor for the mines on traditional society. Appalled at the effect of the withdrawal of large numbers of adult males from the villages, they recommended that the mining industry should change its practices and provide permanent facilities for African laborers and their families. There was some resistance at first, but the large mining companies began providing housing facilities for African families. Productivity increased among those workmen who stayed longer at the mines and became more accustomed to the work. The system of a permanent labor supply proved itself to be economical and the companies accepted it. The copper and tin mining companies in the Katanga and the diamond mines in the Kasai provided formal training and on-the-job training for Africans. They provided health services and schools for the workers' families.[18] In June of 1960 the managing director of Union Miniere explained to the writer that salaries for their African employees were based on productivity. He said that skilled workers were achieving rates of productivity comparable to those of Belgian

18. *Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, 1906–1956* (Brussels, 1956), pp. 242–259.

workers in Belgium in similar jobs. Low rates of productivity were noted only among recently hired unskilled labor. Africans made up the great bulk of the labor and clerical employees in these mines by 1960. However, Union Miniere hired its first Africans in management, seventeen of them, in 1960. It provided business for indigenous contractors and suppliers where they existed, but neither the company nor the government had taken steps to promote the growth of such businesses. Geomines, the tin producer in the northern Katanga, had made it a practice for some years to buy agricultural supplies from local African producers and even to stimulate such production. On the other hand, as late as 1960, Union Miniere was importing maize from Southern Rhodesia rather than buying it locally because it was cheaper; the maize in Southern Rhodesia was largely produced by whites.

The Congo mining experience was exceptional. In the Congo itself nothing comparable happened in industry or trade. As late as June, 1960, the textile industry had not found a formula for training African foremen although they had recognized the necessity for such action years before. Only in the mines and in transportation was African advancement a practical reality.

Banking

Banking was European except for one African bank in Liberia, a few African banks in Nigeria, and Asian banks in East Africa. The great bulk of the banking still remains in the hands of European concerns, with some recent American participation. These banks were established to assist with commerce, which in turn was largely in the hands of Europeans. They did not ordinarily provide opportunity for the African to acquire experience above the clerical level. They did not cater to Africans as savers or borrowers, except for the very few Africans who had achieved some business success.[19] Governments made some attempt to promote African savings through postal accounts; the most active drive was made in the mid-1950's in the Congo, where African

19. *East African Royal Commission 1953–1955 Report*, pp. 96–104.

wage employment was important. The banks were essentially commercial and little interested in medium- or long-term credit activities. When these functions became important in recent years, they were taken over almost exclusively by new institutions, the development banks, created with government help and participation.

Extent and character of institutional transfer

Modern European economic institutions were widely introduced to Africa over approximately one hundred years of colonialism. They were introduced by Europeans and remained substantially European. Africans have had little experience in their management and have not generally accepted or adopted them. This may well be a factor of time. A comparison with India, which has seen a wider transfer of European economic institutions, is of interest. Colonial rule came to India earlier and stayed longer. For example, Indians were serving as agents of the East India Company by 1820, universities were started in India in 1850, Indians were an important part of the business class already in 1900.[20] For comparative purposes it might be noted that the first universities were started in Africa after the last war.

Africans have been introduced to education and have shown a great willingness to work to acquire it for themselves or their children. They have been introduced to wage employment on a fairly extensive scale and, where given an opportunity, have shown a willingness to accept such employment and an ability to advance in it. They have been introduced to individual or small-holder production for the market, largely export, and have shown considerable ability to adjust to this great change in some areas. A very few have become traders and some few have found the means of working together in co-operatives. A limited number have had a rather extensive introduction to Western civilization through advanced education in Africa or abroad, and they have shown considerable competence in the short time they have had.

20. B. B. Misra, *The Indian Middle Classes* (Oxford, 1961)

Modern economic development in Africa has largely followed a free enterprise pattern. However, many Africans in their European education and some as a result of experience in Africa have had an introduction to different economic theories. Many of the Africans educated in England or in English-speaking territories were introduced to socialism in school as were others by Englishmen who helped organize African labor unions; for the most part this was more Fabian than Marxist socialism. French-speaking Africans were frequently introduced to Marxism in school in France or by Marxists, whether Communist or not, among the colonial administrators or the labor leaders with whom they worked after the war. Thus there is in Africa a part of the elite group of Africans who have some knowledge of and interest in socialist theories.

African economies in the period of independence

When Ghana became independent in 1957 it was the first colonial territory to achieve that status. The movement was rapid thereafter; of recent years one has to get up early in the morning in order not to miss some fresh accession to the roll of independent African states. As these countries reach independence, they find a distinct duality in their economies.[21] The market economy, on which their governments must rely for revenues and their peoples for wage employment, is almost exclusively in the hands of Europeans, often non-residents. The great mass of their people are still engaged in traditional agriculture primarily for subsistence. Those of their people in the market economy are mostly at low levels of skill and earning. Indigenous savings are limited, the habit of modern investment is uncommon, indigenous entrepreneurs are rare, and local skills in management and technology are scarce. In most of these countries the foreign businessman has become conscious of the problem of the new states by the time of independence. He has shown a willingness to train and advance Africans in business and industry. But the demands of

21. William J. Barber, *The Economy of British Central Africa: A Case Study of Development in a Dualistic Society* (London, 1961).

government for Africans in its services alone are so great that the chances of an early substantial African take-over of the managerial function in these private businesses with the best will in the world on both sides is slight. New business ventures have frequently shown a willingness to accept African partners or state participation, and even some existing ventures have shown such a willingness, but individual Africans ready and willing to play such a role are rare, and most of the new states lack the financial ability. There is a distinct duality in these economies and no easy way seems open to change the situation quickly.

During the struggle for independence the African people, even where the struggle was brief and relatively peaceful, were imbued with a hope that with independence would come the realization of all their dreams. They came to believe that independence meant the expansion of schooling, improvement of health services, and raising of living standards. They did not see the hard struggle required to realize their dream. It was a rare thing for one of their own leaders to attempt to disillusion them in this, as have Banda in Nyasaland and Nyerere in Tanganyika, and even where it has been attempted there is some reason to doubt how effective it may have been. This means the new African leaders are under considerable pressure from their people to provide social services which are beyond their abilities.

Many of the African leaders resent what they characterize as the exploitation of their countries under colonialism. They feel that continued European control of their economies is the result of actions under colonialism which kept Africans from acquiring any position in the market economy. Most of them fear a substitution of economic control for the political domination which they have overcome. Some of them have witnessed an important flight of foreign capital as independence approached, as in the Congo and Kenya. Others have seen plans for major foreign investments put in question or put aside because of fears attendant on independence, as the Volta scheme in Ghana and the Konkoure dam in Guinea. Most of them want a rapid expansion of economic growth to meet the aspirations of their peoples and to improve the standing of their countries in the world. They are

torn between their desire for this growth and their resentment of continued domination of their economies by foreigners whom they do not fully trust.

It is in the framework of these conditions and these attitudes that consideration must be given to the character which economic institutions may take in the new Africa.

African reactions to independence

It is extremely difficult to fix the picture of a society in transition and even more difficult in a strange environment. There are at least two levels at which the question of the transfer of economic institutions needs to be examined if one is to secure any understanding of the character of their evolution in a setting such as that of Africa south of the Sahara. The first is the grass-roots level, the peasant, villager, and laborer. The second is the leadership level. There is of course interpenetration, but in Africa there is a considerable gap between the two, and it is not at all clear that the leadership, made up primarily of a European educated elite newly come to power, understands or reflects grass-roots attitudes. In the early stages it would seem that the leadership will determine the broad character of the economic institutions which will prevail. Over a longer period the attitudes of the mass of the people toward economic institutions may begin to be felt.

Little is known in detail of grass-roots opinion about economic matters in Africa. Few studies of any consequence have been made. Valid studies of this nature are difficult and may have to await development of African interest and competence. The difficulty of such studies is portrayed in a report of village-level study in India.[22] The limited information available suggests the following: communal living still prevails, but it is not clear whether the traditional institution is vital or whether the form alone survives; it is not clear how adaptable this might be to modern forms, such as co-operatives. Individual land tenure is

22. P. K. Mukherjee, *Economic Surveys in Under-Developed Countries: A Study in Methodology* (London, 1959).

known to only a limited number in a few areas, usually where this form was traditional. Participation by the laborer or farmer in the market economy has increased, but it is not clear how important it is to the mass of the people. The sense of local responsibility for achievement of aspirations, e.g. building and maintaining schools, is limited. The idea of nation or country and the economic or social responsibility of the citizen is rare; most of the people seem to have little sense of belonging to any group larger than their own tribe or tribal confederation.

Observations of the views and actions of the elite leader groups are easier, but even here there are limits. This group has been in power for a very brief period, and the approach which its members may take toward economic institutions is not yet clear, though some of their early steps are indicative. Actions and statements which seem to be pertinent and of a general nature in selected countries are therefore described.

Ghana, which was unique in having substantial financial reserves at independence, has from the beginning put considerable emphasis on development of state-owned industries. It has been willing to accept foreign private investment in large undertakings which were clearly beyond its own capacity, such as Volta Aluminum, but has preferred to develop other industries on its own or with a large participation of the state. It has experimented with new forms of rural organization and with attempts to put people back on the land. With the help of Israel, it has started work on co-operatives of the *kibbutz* type. It has created a "Builders Brigade" of a semimilitary type to open up new land or improve land and start settlements. The ruling party has taken over control of the labor unions and of the agricultural co-operative movement, and it seems to be moving in the direction of state-owned co-operatives. Most recently it has moved to oppose the growth of an indigenous private sector. It has as yet, however, taken no steps to expropriate foreign holdings; on the contrary, the party has been careful, for example, to buy out foreign-owned gold mines when the owners were not prepared to comply with government wishes.

Guinea seems to show the same attitude toward large industrial

enterprises. The government has thus far acted properly towards the big privately-owned FRIA alumina company. Guinea has, however, moved much further towards the creation of a socialist state. It took over all internal and external trade after independence and has now taken over all banking functions. It has also acquired some plantations and tried to operate them on what appears to be a basis of state or communal co-operatives. It has instituted a program of human investment in an attempt to make up with voluntary labor what it lacks in capital. It is too early to determine how successful any of this may be, but recent difficulties suggest it has not worked too well.

President Senghor of Senegal has spoken out for a socialist solution. The former Prime Minister, Mamadou Dia, made clear in a series of published works his conviction that the organization of African economies generally must follow a socialist pattern.[23] Senegal has remained closely associated with France since independence. But it has quietly proceeded to nationalize the large private trading firms through purchase and seems to be aiming at an economic solution akin to that of Guinea.

Prime Minister Nyerere of Tanganyika is often thought of as a moderate in Africa, yet he has made explicit what may well be the attitude of many African leaders about the need for a socialist approach. It is interesting to note that his statement was made in a Pan-African political context. On August 5, 1961, in a speech to the Second Pan-African Seminar of the World Assembly of Youth, he said,

> Before we can talk complacently about "African Unity," we should examine carefully the external ideas which are likely to be imposed upon us; imposed not for the purpose of uniting us but for the purpose of dividing us!
>
> Now today the world is divided into two blocs: what one might call the Capitalist Bloc and the Socialist Bloc. They are generally referred to as the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc; I have said Capitalist Bloc and Socialist Bloc for a good reason—it makes it easier to understand the forces behind these divisions.
>
> What is wrong with Capitalism? To my mind, Capitalism went

23. Mamadou Dia, *L'Economie Africaine: Études et Problèmes Nouveaux* (Paris, 1957).

wrong when it divorced wealth from its true purpose. The true purpose of wealth is to satisfy the very simple needs—the need for food, the need for shelter, the need for education and so on. In other words, the end of wealth is the banishment of poverty—and wealth is to poverty what light is to darkness. There is enough wealth in every state for every individual to satisfy these simple needs. But the moment individuals in any single state begin to use wealth, not for the satisfaction of those needs, not for the banishment of poverty, but for the purpose of acquiring power and prestige—then there is no longer enough. Then wealth tolerates poverty; then wealth is no longer to poverty what light is to darkness. For there is not enough wealth in any nation to satisfy the desire for power and prestige of every individual. So what happens, there is then the ruthless competition between individuals; not to get wealth to feed themselves or to clothe themselves, or to house themselves—but to seize enough wealth to give themselves more power, more prestige than their fellow. That is, wealth which exceeds their real needs and which will enable them to dominate other individuals. When that stage is reached, one millionaire is prepared to spend millions simply in order to destroy another millionaire.

I believe that the purpose of Socialism was to remove this sin of Capitalism and to return wealth to its original use—the satisfaction of simple human needs, the banishment of poverty. I think it would be hypocrisy on the part of the capitalist countries—the so-called "Western" countries—not to recognize the fact that this is happening in the socialist countries; that within those countries personal wealth is not a symbol of power or prestige and wealth is used to banish poverty.

But I believe that the Socialist countries themselves, considered as individuals in the larger society of nations, are now committing the same crime which was committed by capitalists before; I believe that on the international level, they are now beginning to use wealth for the purpose of acquiring power and prestige! It would be equally hypocritical on the part of the socialist countries to deny this. Internationally they are engaged in using wealth in exactly the same way, now, as the capitalist countries are using it—for power and prestige. And Socialist countries, no less than capitalist countries, are prepared to behave like the millionaire—to use millions to destroy another millionaire; and it need not necessarily be a capitalist "millionaire": it is just as likely to be a socialist "millionaire." In other words, socialist wealth now tolerates poverty—which is an even more unforgivable crime!

I believe that no under-developed country can afford to be anything but socialist. I think therefore that we in Africa are bound to organize ourselves on a socialist pattern. But let us at least provide another corrective to Socialism and prevent the wealth we are beginning to

build in our own countries from being used for the purpose of acquiring national power and prestige. Let us make sure that it is used solely for the purpose of raising the standard of our people. Let us not allow the wealth that we are creating to live side by side with poverty, and tolerate that poverty.

Nigeria, the largest of the new African states, has thus far stood out against this trend. All of the public announcements from that country have been in favor of private enterprise and foreign private investment. Government action has been in accord with those statements. Even here it should be noted that there have been formed development institutions with state participation or control, and these often expect the right to take a substantial participation in any new investments. This may, however, be because of the lack of individual Nigerians capable of participating in such investments.

The transfer of Western economic institutions to Africans has been limited in nature and extent. There is an African resentment of some of the limitations; there are political reasons why it is difficult for Africans to accept very long a situation in which their economies are dominated by foreigners. The mass of the African populations are not engaged regularly or fully in the market economy at all. As a result, only a small part of the population produce in excess of their immediate needs and thus accumulate savings or are able to pay taxes. Without such engagement the realization of African hopes will continue to depend heavily on external help. Under these circumstances it can be expected that there will be considerable experiment with new economic forms in Africa. The direction of the evolution of these forms will depend on the attitude which the West takes towards such experiments. If it takes a "private enterprise or nothing" attitude it may hand over the game to the Sino-Soviet bloc. If it takes a sympathetic attitude and is prepared to assist with experimentation, it is possible that mixed economies with a certain amount of freedom may develop. It is still not clear how the West may react.

Western economic institutions have been introduced in Africa but have not been widely adopted. Africans have now achieved a

position, but only a short while ago, in which they can decide the extent to which they wish to retain these institutions. It will be politically difficult for African leaders to retain them in their present form because this leaves them open to the charge that they have not achieved real independence. It will also be difficult because it is doubtful that the African countries can achieve their minimum aspirations for growth in the context of the existing institutions. Some experimentation is inevitable and a socialist direction is indicated. The attitudes of the masses of the people toward change is not known, nor is it known what methods may induce them to accept change and to what extent or how quickly change may be induced. Experiments will inevitably fail and the failures will have political repercussions. Autocratic methods, along the lines of Ataturk in Turkey, may be resorted to in many of these countries. It will be some years before it can be determined with any accuracy just what economic institutions will be finally accepted in Africa south of the Sahara.

Any attempt at this juncture to describe African economies in Western terms will be deceiving and no other framework in which they can be adequately described is at hand. Whether such economies are approaching the take-off point, whether a given investment is or is not likely to be viable, whether a given African economy will expand or decline over the next few years, all depend on a series of social and political decisions which are only now being made.

• 11 •

Problems of Raising African Agricultural Productivity*

*M. Yudelman***

I

Introduction

This paper is concerned with several aspects of raising agricultural productivity among the indigenous populations in parts of South, Central, and East Africa that are or have been under British dominion. These include South Africa, Tanganyika, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Swaziland, Kenya, and Southern Rhodesia. There is a wide range of social and economic differences among these countries. These differences stem in good measure from the relative size of the non-African population; however, with the exception of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, no country in this region has a non-African population greater than 5 per cent of the total population (see Table 1, p. 303). There are wide differences in climatic and physical conditions in the region being, as it is, seven times the size of France and stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to the equator.

Yet these countries have several common characteristics: with the possible exception of South Africa, they are all underdevel-

* Much of this material was taken from the MS of my book, *Africans on the Land,* published by the Harvard University Press in 1964. I am grateful to Harvard University Press for permitting me to use this material.

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oped. They all have a relatively small wage-earning labor force (see Table 2, p. 304). They are all relatively sparsely populated and have low population densities (see Table 3, p. 305). Throughout the region the bulk of the indigenous population in all these countries is self-employed in agriculture. With limited exceptions, the levels of output and productivity among the indigenous producers are extremely low, and a very high proportion of that output does not enter the exchange economy.

Regardless of short-run plans to industrialize and expand the size of the wage-earning sector in industry and mining, agriculture will continue to be the major "employer" throughout the region as a whole. Agriculture will have to provide the food and fiber for expanding populations; it will also have to provide the savings to finance development programs. In addition, as most of the population will be engaged in agriculture, the size of the internal market for industrial products will be determined, in large part, by incomes earned in the agricultural sector.

Throughout the continent, aspirations are rising; at present, however, total factor productivity in most of African agriculture is so low that average per-capita incomes are very low. The "revolution of rising expectations" can only be matched if there is a technological and human revolution in African agriculture. This paper considers four aspects of the technological revolution: the need for modification and changes in institutions that govern rights to land and land use, the need for change in the concept of "security" in tribal society, the problems of changing attitudes toward creating a marketable surplus, and finally problems of changing techniques of production. These problems can only be resolved through changes in existing institutions within African agriculture.

The early African economy

The Africans encountered by the first European settlers, hunters, explorers, mineral seekers, and others who entered the region in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were a primitive people. As a population group they are now denoted as the Bantu.

With the exception of a few tribes, notably those in northern Kenya and eastern Tanganyika who are Nilo-Hamitic, the people of this linguistic grouping inhabit most of Africa south of the Sudan.

The most important units in the traditional social fabric of the Bantu are those of the tribe and the extended family or kin system. The kin system is based on the patrilineal or matrilineal line, and the kin group is a body of males tracing their descent from a common ancestor for several generations in either the male or female line: in southern Africa it is usually through the male line while in the northern areas it is frequently through the female line. Many of the relationships within kin groups and between kin groups are closely knit, and almost all of the actions of the group are dictated by the requirements of the community. Individualism and enterprise are not necessarily in keeping with these requirements.

The tribe headed by a chief can be traced to the association of kin groups for defensive or offensive warfare. The tribe's origins were through a central group of families descended from a common ancestor or ancestors who assimilated other groups or tribes. The central group provided the traditional councilors of the tribes in accordance with inherited status. The major unifying factor in the tribe was usually the chief who was considered to have some mystical association with his ancestors and the lands. In a manner of speaking, he was the "owner" of the land, not so much in the Western legal sense, but rather in that he was the traditional guardian of the land; in this role, the chief or his subordinates allotted land for cultivation by individual members of the tribe. Thus even today in many of the areas there is no concept of individual ownership of land, though in some groups and tribes the use of land is inheritable, e.g., in Bugisa in Uganda and in parts of Northern Rhodesia and Kenya.

The level of material achievement of the Africans as a whole was undoubtedly low, though there were some exceptions. An example of one view of the backwardness of the Africans of East Africa is that given by Sir Phillip Mitchell, a former governor of Kenya. He described the Africans encountered in East and Central Africa at the turn of the present century as follows:

Inland of the narrow coastal strip they had no units of government of any size or stability: indeed, with a few exceptions such as Buganda, nothing beyond local chiefs or patriarchs. They had no wheeled transport and, apart from the camels and donkeys of the pastoral nomads, no animal transport either; they had no roads nor towns; no tools except small hand hoes, axes, wooden digging sticks and the like; no manufactures and no commerce as we understand it and no currency although in some places barter of produce was facilitated by the use of small shells; they had never heard of working for wages. They went stark naked or clad in the bark of trees or the skins of animals, and they had no means of writing, even by hieroglyphics, notches on a stick or knots in a piece of grass or fibre: they had no weights and measures of general use. . . . They were pagan spirit or propitiators in the grip of magic or witchcraft their minds cribbed and confined by superstition.[1]

Tribal production systems were based almost entirely on a non-market, non-commercial economy and a system of production for subsistence; theirs was a simple economy centered largely around a plentiful supply of land. This applied to both pastoral and agricultural producers and was most pronounced in areas of uncertain and sparse rainfall. The pastoralists required land for extensive grazing, moving their livestock as the occasion demanded, whenever grazing areas were overgrazed or water supplies diminished. The agriculturists, and in the southern regions of Africa many of these were also cattle owners, required extensive supplies of land to practice shifting cultivation and bush fallow.

Generally, this system of agriculture involved a form of land

1. This excerpt is quoted from the *East African Royal Commission Report.* However, this is the view of an administrator; the view of an anthropologist might differ. Note the interpretation of behavior of a "savage" group in Northern Rhodesia as cited in Philip Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia* (London, 1958), p. 45:

"The Lozi are the best people to illustrate one broad generalization about the Bantu of Central Africa, not because they are typical but because they display the point more clearly than anyone else. By the time they met the first Europeans, the Bantu-speaking people had not so far shown much initiative or invention in material matters; they had however developed an extremely complicated system of social relationships, and in some cases complicated political and administrative arrangements. To a European of today it may well seem that if only the Lozi had spent less time and thought on the loyalties, the jealousies, the social subtleties of their kingdom, they might have made more progress in material inventions; it may be that this argues a profound difference in their outlook on the world."

It is also interesting to note that according to Ritter the Zulus under Chaka also attained a very high degree of social and military discipline including a well developed supply system though their level of material achievement was never high. See E. A. Ritter, *Chaka, King of the Zulus* (London: Longmans, 1955).

rotation whereby land is used as long as it is fertile, possibly up to three to four years; then, once its fertility is diminished, it is left to revert to bush until it is restored. The producers in the interim move to another patch of land. On some occasions and in some areas, as long as twenty years would elapse from the initial abandonment of land to its regeneration; frequently, too, entire African villages would move as the need arose for new lands.

The implements used were the digging stick, the hoe, and the ax; today they are supplemented in some areas by the plow, the harrow, and the planter.[2] Because there was no need for intensive production, extensive low-yielding means of production were used. Techniques were primitive; manure was not used, nor were selected seeds; there was no straight line planting, nor was there much of the simplest form of crop rotation; fertility was maintained by rotating the land. The major crops produced in much of the area were maize, small grains, groundnuts, beans, peas, and, in northern areas, cassava and yams.

There was some division of labor on the basis of sex; men usually tended the cattle and did some of the heavier work that led to capital formation such as bush clearing and building huts. Women usually performed the day-to-day tasks of agricultural production—hoeing, weeding, and threshing. Often though, the work was carried out communally with mutual help, parties exchanging their labor for a later call on the labor of other kinsmen.

Many of the obligations in tribal society were social obligations rather than obligations incurred in an exchange economy. These obligations included offers of gifts and labor among kin and friends, both as a matter of course and during ceremonial occasions, and there was a great deal of reciprocity in this process. The importance of this has been pointed out by Goodwin and Schapera as follows:

> The main incentive to conformity with these obligations is reciprocity. In the relative absence of industrial specialisation and consequent economic interdependence, kinship serves to establish greater social cohesion within the community, and to integrate its activities into a wider

2. The digging stick is still to be found in many of the more remote areas such as the West Nile area of Uganda.

cooperation than obtain within the restricted limits of the household. The so-called communal system of the Bantu is largely a manifestation of this close bond of solidarity and reciprocity arising out of kinship and affecting well nigh every aspect of daily life.[3]

Transactions expressing social obligations and production were part of the social fabric: transactions were not divorced from social obligations and the production process was not related to an obligation to pay for services. The production process was not one which fits into the usual economic models based on a continuous relationship between inputs, factor costs, and outputs.

From a production point of view, the system of shifting cultivation made both agronomic and economic sense in the circumstances in which it was operated. Agronomically, it was concession to the nature of the soil. In many parts of this region of Africa, the soil is generally poor, particularly in the arid and semi-arid regions that bulk large in Kenya and Tanganyika, as well as in other areas where the soil has little humus. Tropical soils in general are not well suited for intensive cultivation. At one time it was the belief among European scientists that the shifting system was destructive and took a heavy toll of the soil; they suggested that it should be replaced by continuous cropping. It now seems to be appreciated that under the system of shifting cultivation a relatively sparse population had been in ecological balance with its environment.[4] The problem of today is that the environment has changed. The population has increased, and in some instances the allocative process of land has been such that land supply available for shifting cultivation has been reduced; at the same time many of the traditional methods of production have persisted, taking a very heavy toll of the soil.[5]

3. Isaac Schapera and A. J. H. Goodwin, "Work and Wealth," *The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa: An Ethnographical Survey,* ed. Schapera (London, 1937), p. 166.
4. G. B. Masefield, *A Short History of Agriculture in the British Colonies* (Oxford, 1950), p. 77. Also, John Phillips, *The Development of Agriculture and Forestry in the Tropics* (Frederick A. Praeger: New York, 1961), chapter vii.
5. This is most apparent in the countries where population pressure has increased or where limitations have been imposed on the area to be farmed by Africans and where climatic conditions are relatively harsh. Soil erosion is a major problem in many of the reserves in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia as well as in Basutoland. This problem does not appear in its most destructive form in countries such as Uganda where land is plentiful.

Economically, within the limit of his horizons, the African producer was rational in his production methods; land was plentiful, labor was relatively scarce, and capital virtually non-existent. The plentiful and free land supply was substituted for any intensive labor effort that might have required extra energy-inputs (which undoubtedly had a cost), thus land was used extensively to produce a limited output. This being a non-capitalistic society where there was no waiting and wanting, everything was produced for consumption within the span of the season before new crops were reaped. There was no diversion of effort for "round-about" production, no irrigation, and no capital formation other than some land clearance and the making of primitive storage for short-term needs. It was a truly backward society in that there was no surplus and so no choice other than to produce to live. Today, in many areas, with the increase in population, continuation of earlier techniques of production, and very little capital to substitute for land, resources have been recombined in such a way that the land is used intensively over a shorter time period. The result in many areas, as has been pointed out, is considerable depletion of the land resources—in the form of soil erosion—with subsequent declining fertility of the soil. In a sense the African producer is depleting his basic stock of capital—the land.

II

Land use and land tenure

Systems of customary tenure vary considerably in the areas under survey. Typically though, tribal authorities allocate land to individuals as they need it. Thus typically, when a son was about to be married, the father would approach the tribal authorities and secure a piece of land for his use. The extent of land allocated would depend on a variety of factors, but the primary consideration would be on the area needed to maintain a family. This area would not be clearly demarcated; it would be approximate in size, and it might be modified as population pressures increased.

In the main, many of the institutions governing individual land use and land tenure in the region are still governed by custom rather than by European-introduced changes, though some of them are being changed through the pressure of external forces. Customary tenure and customary rights to land vary considerably throughout South, Central, and East Africa, but one major common characteristic has already been mentioned: the virtual absence of the concept of private ownership in a Western legal sense. Perhaps the difference between the Western and African concepts are best illustrated by the following quotation from a report on land tenure in Tanganyika.

It would be impossible to overemphasize that there are fundamental differences between the average African's and the average non-African's mental attitude to the matter of land tenure. To the African, land is essential for his actual physical survival and he takes largely for granted both its availability and unwritten rules by which he obtains and retains the right to use a part of it. He does not consciously tabulate those rules, nor does he attempt to criticize them. Above all, he is bound by no such exact legal definitions as is the non-African in such cases as the measurement of land, the maintenance of boundaries, lapse of time, the attainment of majority, and usually, the performance of an act. As examples of these instances, with the non-African land is measured to within a hairsbreadth; boundaries are jealously guarded; a lease is written and for a fixed term; majority is attained, e.g. on the 21st birthday, and a man is married or he is not. With the African (in Tanganyika) only one tribe (Hehe) has yet been found which has adopted a known size, measured in acres by pacing, for the standard minimum new allocation to an individual; boundaries where they are marked are intended usually to exclude domestic stock or wild animals and *not* to indicate the extent of a holding; loans of land are by the season or crop, unwritten and undated; one cannot get closer to the date of majority in the Nyamwezi or Ha tribes than that it is the date on which it becomes clear that a child is now capable of managing his own affairs; while the ceremony of marriage (which is relevant in land tenure) often consists of a series of transactions spread over many years. The non-African expects a straight answer to a straight question and will indulge in legal argument as to the exact meaning of both, whereas the average African does not habitually define either the question or the answer within the strict meaning of words. Moreover the African is bound by his own code of behavior which is rather different

from those of non-Africans with their jealous regard for land ownership. One of the standard questions is "What is the Local Land Authority's customary redress should an individual ignore his authority, e.g. by taking land without formal allocation?" This is a perplexing question for Africans, for the reason that their standard of behavior ensures that in almost every area such cases simply do not arise, as in another which asks whether a settler pays an initial or seasonal fee to the land allocator; for the African will, if he can, give hospitality to a man who befriends him, and does not differentiate in his own mind between the friendly pot of beer (which has a saleable value), and the payment in cash of a due. Much more could be written on this topic but enough has perhaps been said to introduce a generalization as regards land tenure. The African does not look on Tanganyika in terms of the Ordinance Survey, as a chess-board of well-defined parcels of land governed by clear-cut rights, laws and records. Instead, he regards the country as a chessboard of tribal areas, in which the individual may enjoy rights, from his local community, which are defined chiefly in man's memory, his instincts and his unwritten conceptions of equity, and which can even be varied by the weight of public opinion during the course of his occupation.[6]

It is important to recognize that even though there was a high degree of mobility and an absence of clear-cut boundaries under the customary system of land use, there was and still is a considerable degree of security of individual rights. Land was invariably held by the community as a collective unit, but eligible members of the kraal (or village) could vest subsidiary rights in particular portions of the area allocated to them if they cultivated it. Generally individual rights to arable land were protected under customary law provided the cultivator occupied the land or was presumed to have an interest in a particular holding. Clearly, abandoned land would be available for re-allocation, but if a claim for this land conflicted with that of a previous occupier, then the previous occupier would have precedence in being awarded the use of this land. Grazing lands were communal. Unoccupied land was held for the benefit of the community as a whole for grazing, collecting wood, gathering clay, collecting water, and so forth.

6. A. A. Oldaker, C.B.E., *Interim Report on Tribal Customary Land Tenure in Tanganyika* (Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, 1957).

The concept of security

The system of customary tenure and kinship obligations provides security, but it is a security which emanates from an entirely different set of relationships from the form of security found either in a Western legal system or as conceived by economists. Security in tribal agriculture is premised on the knowledge that one could always return to one's tribal home where there would always be accommodation of a tribal member. Every tribal member was secure in the sense that he had an inalienable right to share in the whole according to his reasonable requirements. Security lay in belonging to a group, and as a part of that group there were always the rights of a group member: the right to a piece of land and the right to a subsistence level of income. As a result, land is viewed as much more than a mere factor of production to be sold or bought; rather, the availability of land and the right to a share in the available land were fundamental factors in guaranteeing a hereditary right to exist in one's preferred milieu. They also provided the means whereby one could cling to a way of life that was familiar and secure—secure in the sense that it was closely linked to an enduring past which in turn had little association with pressures for increased productivity, increased labor inputs, and rising levels of income.

It is here that there is a basic conflict between the traditional concept of security and that of security provided by an expanding economy. It is undoubtedly correct to say that individuals of all societies may view economic security in terms of savings which may provide a safeguard against loss of employment, old age, and illness. But it is equally true to say that economic security in the broader sense arises from an expanding economy with rising levels of real income. Rising levels of income resulting from expanded output and increased productivity in the economy as a whole provide the opportunity for more people to enjoy a higher level of living, with more education, more and better health services, and higher levels of consumption. These end products of expansion are precisely those that are the desired ends postulated

as part of the revolution of rising expectations and are sought after by most of the indigenous population. However, it is patent that they cannot be obtained in predominantly agricultural societies where the factors of production, particularly land, are viewed as a means of providing security at a basic subsistence level rather than for providing a marketable surplus.

If there is to be a surplus, then the traditional concepts have to be changed, and attitudes toward land have to be changed. Emphasis has to be on the most productive use of land rather than on a pattern of use geared to provide security at a low level of production. Furthermore, if the goal of policy is to raise productivity and expand production, it will be necessary that the whole concept of tribal security be modified. The concept of tribal security is incompatible with the most productive use of land because it is based on need rather than use; the most productive use of land calls for land to be combined with other factors of production in such a way that it maximizes returns. This does not accord with a system where land is held merely to fill the need of each individual to have a minimum subsistence income. It is quite apparent, however, that if the traditional system is to be changed, then the benefits to be derived from any change must be substantial, and in the long run, must be greater than the advantages that may be lost in the change.

The direction of change[7]

What changes in tenure and relationships of land and man will stimulate increased productivity and improved land use? All experience indicates that reform in tenurial arrangements alone cannot lead to increased productivity; changes in rights to land have to be accompanied by the provision of a supply of complementary factors of production and the incentives to use them. Assuming that such supply is made available, most of the Western experience indicates that if land were to be converted from a

7. I am not concerned with problems of land redistribution between racial groups in countries such as South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Kenya where the primary allocation is between racial groups.

non-negotiable asset to a negotiable factor of production, there would be pressure for improved use of land and so increases in productivity of land. Here again, however, the change in the concept of land has to be accompanied by a high degree of mobility of resources and the creation of an efficient market for land.

Under the customary system of tenure, land in most of the African areas may be viewed as a rationed but free good. This is a paradoxical situation; land is rationed because it is not unlimited in supply, with the process of rationing being the tribal allocative process. It is a "free good" in economic terms because it has no price or market value. That is not to say that land has no intrinsic or psychic value—on the contrary, the problem is that the psychic value would tend to surpass the monetary value if land were to be considered a factor of production with a market price related to its capitalized output. Regardless of its psychic value, in terms of the market all land is free; land in good location with good potential has the same zero price as poor land, particularly if both pieces of land are considered primarily as a means of producing subsistence income.

It may be argued that if land were to be converted into a negotiable asset and if there were to be a market for land which would relate its market value with its potential, then there would be sharp differences in the price of different lands. Land which could be used to provide a saleable surplus would command higher prices than land which did not have the attributes to provide such a surplus. Consequently, in these circumstances if there were an efficient market for land, then a circular action would come into play. Better land would be higher priced because it could produce more, but because it was high priced there would be pressure to use it to yield higher returns, and so better land would have to be used to greater productive purposes than poorer land. It might also be argued that once land had a price then it would have to yield an income which would at least be the equivalent of that which could be realized from comparable investments in fixed income-bearing securities. This would preclude emphasis on subsistence production and would ultimately lead to specialization of production and commercialization of agriculture, two of the

essential ends of the economic development in the African areas.

Following on this view, so long as land remains a free good, there will be no cost factor to encourage greater productivity of land. Reliance will have to be placed on the usual "pull" factors (such as desire for higher incomes) to encourage more productive land use; hitherto, these have not been very effective in themselves. It is possible that a "push" factor would be introduced by having a variable land tax graduated on the basis of land potential, but such a tax cannot be implemented without a clear definition of the size and nature of holdings. In addition, experience has indicated that there are great difficulties in assessing production potential of land and in the administration of any such tax program. By and large, it would seem that an effective "push" factor would come from the creation of an effective land market. The creation of a land market would encourage the concept of land's being a valuable, costly asset and so would lead to greater efforts to sustain its capitalized earning capacity. In other words, if land were to be given a price rather than to be a free good, it may well be that the rate of depletion of soil might be diminished, for the soil would be an asset to be preserved.

An additional and perhaps more important argument in favor of converting the land into a negotiable asset is that it would encourage the emergence of entrepreneurial and managerial ability among African people. Managerial ability is the scarcest of factors in African agriculture, and where this ability does exist, it may well be stifled through lack of opportunity to acquire land. At present land is allocated on the basis of need and status. Within narrow limits there is a range in the distribution of holdings by size, and it appears that status does have a bearing on this distribution. An impersonal land market would enable ability to replace status; the progressive producer could expand his holdings to the limits encompassed by his ability and his financial resources, and the latter could be supplemented by special credit programs for able producers. This would lead to the creation of units the size of which would economize on the availability of the scarce factor of managerial ability and so help to maximize its use.

The creation of a market for land does not necessarily imply that there has to be a system of private ownership of land per se.

It is possible to envisage a program of nationalization of all land with the right to use land being marketed; the market price would be for usufruct, or the right to use the land, rather than for the possession of land itself. This is the system being adopted in Southern Rhodesia. However, the direct ownership of land and the inalienable rights that go with it may be considered an important element in encouraging productivity through encouraging investment in improvement of land. The direct ownership of land, in contrast to other forms of tenure, is generally considered to provide an important incentive to improve land—this is assumed to be so because the capitalized value of improvements would accrue to the landowner should he wish to sell his land.

In considering changes in tenure, one has to bear in mind the type of society being created as well as the economic consequences of these changes. The creation of a market for land will surely mean that there will be a renter and rentier class; however, adequate controls can prevent the emergence of a large-scale land-holding hierarchy if this is desired. While large-scale units with a division of labor between the functions of managers and laborers may be much more productive than small-scale units, the prospects of large-scale efficient units' arising in the African areas appear to be remote. The absence of complementary factors of production and the problems of deriving technological returns to scale where management is in such short supply appear to make their appearance unlikely. But if the purpose of reform is to encourage the rise of the self-owned, self-operated family farm, then the distribution of holdings will tend to be egalitarian and may well result in a more efficient use of land than if there were to be no limit to the size of holdings. However, whatever system is introduced, there should be opportunities for the more enterprising producers to progress and acquire land.

Regardless of what system of tenure emerges whereby interpersonal allocations are changed to market allocations, holdings will have to be clearly defined and identifiable. Contracts will have to replace verbal agreements, and contracts call for precise definitions of acreage; there would have to be surveys, allocations, and demarcations. It is this essential requirement which introduces rigidities into the allocative process that are com-

pletely alien to the customary system. Once there has been a cadastral survey of holdings and they are clearly defined, then a specified area of land belongs to an individual. This in turn would negate the group concept of rights to share in all land, though there may well still be a right to share in the products of the land. The elasticity of the tribal system of land-sharing would no longer obtain, and the old concept of security that was part of the right to share the land would be destroyed. Land would no longer be a free good, villages would have to be stabilized, and techniques of production would have to change. At the same time the creation of a land market might be an important step in changing attitudes towards moving away from subsistence production to producing for the market.

III

Production for the market

The advent of the European has brought many fundamental changes to the indigenous African economy, the major change being, of course, the transfer of the institution of the exchange economy. The African now requires a money income which he earns either by diverting resources from subsistence production to production for the market or by selling his labor. However, the majority of Africans are not fully committed to the market economy and most Africans are neither specialized producers nor part of a regular, stabilized wage-earning labor force—many are both agriculturalists and laborers in the wage economy.

As far as their role as agricultural producers is concerned, they may be characterized as being in transition from the earlier system of devoting reasources to subsistence production to one of specialized production.[8] This transitional process can be loosely

8. Subsistence production as used here is production for direct consumption or for barter; the term "subsistence crops" is not used as frequently for some crops, such as maize or groundnuts, which can be consumed directly, sold for internal consumption, or exported. For a further discussion of this, K. C. Abercrombie, "The Transition from Subsistence to Market Agriculture in Africa South of the Sahara," *Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Production and Statistics,* X, No. 2 (Feb., 1961).

defined as passing through four stages: (*a*) Purely subsistence production leaves nothing for the market. (*b*) The greater proportion of inputs is devoted to production for direct consumption though there is some ancillary production for the market. (*c*) The greater proportion of inputs is devoted to production for the market though there is some production for direct consumption. (*d*) All inputs are for specialized production for the market alone.

At present there are very few producers in the first category of purely subsistence producers other than those who live in remote and inaccessible pockets which have not been breached by traders or tax collectors, e.g., in parts of Kalahari.[9] It is probable too that there are some producers who produce only foodstuffs for direct consumption while relying on wages and cash remittances earned by absentee members of the family to satisfy their money needs. At the other end of the scale, there are very few producers in the fourth category of specialized producers. Possibly there are some coffee growers in Uganda or Kenya, or some vegetable farmers in Southern Rhodesia who produce wholly for the market, though their numbers must be few indeed. The bulk of the African producers in South, Central, and East Africa are in the second and third categories.

There are very few reliable statistics on agricultural output from indigenous agriculture as a whole and even less of the proportion of output that is not marketed. One series of estimates indicates that about 60 per cent of the value of total output (African and non-African) in Kenya and Tanganyika is for subsistence, and close to 85 per cent of the value of production by African farmers in the Central African Federation is subsistence production.[10] In Uganda, which has the most notable record of African production for the market, more than 40 per cent of the value of agricultural output is considered to be for subsistence.[11]

9. Payment of taxes is an important inducement for seeking employment outside of the indigenous users. A survey of 297 males in Bechuanaland in 1947 indicated that close to 40 per cent reported that they left home to seek work in the Union of South Africa because of the need for money to pay taxes. (I. Schapera, "The Economic Causes of Labour Migration from Bechuanaland," *Migrant Labour and Tribal Life: A Study of Conditions in the Bechuanaland Protectorate* [London, 1947]).

10. Abercrombie.

11. Author's estimate.

In South Africa it has been estimated that 95 per cent of the crop production and 60 per cent of the livestock production of the African areas is consumed directly by producers within those areas.[12] While figures are not available, a recent report on Basutoland stated that "agriculture is conducted almost entirely on a subsistence basis" and that producers in Bechuanaland are still basically subsistence producers.[13]

The division of inputs between production for the market and production for consumption is extremely difficult to estimate. But it is apparent that a high proportion of resources throughout Sub-Saharan Africa is devoted to subsistence production—one estimate is that around 1950, subsistence production accounted for an average of 65 to 75 per cent of the total crop area cultivated by the indigenous population in tropical Africa. (This included an estimate of more than 80 per cent of the area under crops in Tanganyika and 93 per cent in Kenya as being under subsistence production.)[14]

Even in Uganda which has the most widespread system of peasant production for the market, more than 60 per cent of the country's cultivated acreage is devoted to subsistence production. The case of Uganda provides a measure of the low productivity of the cultivated land used to produce for direction consumption: the 40 per cent of the land that produced export and other crops yielded an output for the market valued at around £60 millions while the remaining 60 per cent of the land under cultivation produced subsistence crops with an imputed value of around £25 millions.[15]

The extent to which producers divide inputs between production for the market and production for subsistence depends on

12. "Tomlinson Report" or "Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa" (Betonia, South Africa, 1955), p. 86.
13. Commonwealth Relations Office, *The Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland.* Report of a Mission organized by the Colonial office and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (London, 1960), H.M.S.O.
14. Abercrombie.
15. These figures indicate that on the basis of value of output per cultivated acre, land under subsistence production was only 20 per cent as productive as that under production for the market.

many factors. A partial list of these would include the availability of means of production, the desire and opportunities for increasing incomes, and the relative returns for effort in choosing between subsistence and other forms of production.[16] Space does not permit a detailed discussion of these factors, though some observations may indicate the reasons for the high degree of subsistence production.

Generally, as has been pointed out, indigenous producers consider production for the market to be marginal to production for home consumption. Subsistence production is viewed as a hedge against uncertainty and food shortage. If experience in Southern Rhodesia and Uganda can be generalized, production of food crops is associated with a notion of security that is coupled with a distrust of the existing distribution system and exchange economy. This distrust may stem from inexperience and misunderstanding of the exchange economy or from actual defects in the distribution system such as a physical shortage of food supplies when these are in demand. In some areas this desire for security transcends purely economic considerations. In Uganda (where land is not in short supply) and in parts of Nyasaland the first call on available labor is to produce food crops. Where the production of these low-value crops clashes with high-value non-fungible export crops the latter are neglected.[17] This concept of first priority for food crops and so an element of non-substitutability of inputs also prevails in parts of Southern Rhodesia.

In other areas where land and labor appear to be plentiful, some producers restrict production for the market to levels that satisfy limited materialistic ambitions. This is undoubtedly a transitional phenomenon but it is a real one. After producing to satisfy family food requirements and to meet the desired low level

16. The nature of crops produced is also important, e.g., where there are perennial tree crops there is no particular reason to grow other crops, while where there are annuals such as groundnuts or cotton they are usually rotated with food crops to conserve the soil and maximize returns.

17. Seasonal labor requirements for labor-intensive crops present difficulties in many parts of Africa—it is doubtful if the Gezira scheme would have been a success if the annual pilgrimages to Mecca did not bring thousands of itinerant pilgrims from West Africa into the area at a time when they were able to earn their passage by helping with the harvest of the crop.

of income requirements the marginal opportunity cost of producing for the market rises sharply, in terms of foregoing leisure or non-economic activities, to the extent that there is a self-imposed restraint on increasing labor inputs to expand production for the market. Thus an important factor in increasing the proportion of inputs for the market is the need for incentives which will spur materialistic ambition.

Two further elements that must be considered in this brief review are the return for effort and the size of the market for indigenous production. The question of return for effort is one that bears on internal price policies, particularly for export crops.[18] In several countries—notably Uganda—prices for export crops are controlled and marketed through marketing boards. The government has followed a policy of holding down internal prices and using the difference between internal and external prices as a stabilization and development fund. By this means it has reduced the element of uncertainty because it has partially stabilized producer prices and it has also accrued development funds through a form of "forced savings." The problems of taxation in raising savings from indigenous agriculture are interesting in themselves, but the issue here is whether reduction of uncertainty discourages production for the market, i.e., whether the transfer of the institution of the marketing board is appropriate in this context.

Reduction of price uncertainty is generally considered to be desirable as it enables producers to plan ahead with confidence. This requires decisions on the rational allocation of resources to maximize returns at the margin. However, in many of the indigenous African areas the issue has to be considered in terms of the nature of the society involved. Thus it might be argued that the important need is to pull producers out of subsistence production into production for the market. This may best be done by allowing prices to fluctuate, on the assumption that once producers move away from subsistence production the decision to produce for the market is, by and large, an irreversible one.

18. The problem of world prices for export crops is not considered here nor is that of relative prices of different export crops.

When there are high prices (due to changes in the terms of trade) the limited output for the market brings windfall profits; these in turn raise the producers' disposable incomes so that they can move to a higher plateau of expenditures and so acquire new tastes. Once on this plateau they will not move off it—if prices fall, then they will increase inputs (and output) to maintain levels of expenditure to satisfy newly acquired tastes. If there are further windfall profits they will move to a higher plateau and so on. It follows that price stabilization and reduction of uncertainty may reduce output for the market (while keeping subsistence output constant) because it does not encourage shifts in the demand curve for consumer goods.[19]

A further related factor in determining the division of inputs between subsistence and export crops are the limitations imposed by the size of the market for certain products. In Uganda, for instance, the principal export commodities, cotton and coffee, are grown in limited areas where producers also grow foodstuffs. The producers in the other areas grow bulk staples with low-unit value and high-unit transport costs. The quality of these products is poor and, as Uganda is remote from the major export markets, they involve high freight charges so that producers must rely on the internal markets for their outlets. However, as in other parts of Africa, the urban, wage-earning population is small and 80 per cent of the rural population of Uganda produce their own

19. An opposing view is that of Professor Raeburn who argues that: "The conditions of production impose even more obvious limitations on the economic commercialisation of agriculture—specialisation in accordance with comparative advantages. Consider the position, for instance, of the typical Kikuyu farmer with say 4¼ acres of land in South Nyeri District. On paper, single-value estimates of cost and returns from this range of possible products clearly suggest that to use his limited land for coffee would be by far his most profitable alternative. But capital would be required both to establish the coffee and to make up for the food crops he would lose while waiting for the coffee to bear. His risk and uncertainty bearing would increase both because of the pests of coffee—not all of which are completely and cheaply controllable—and because he would become much more dependent on the widely fluctuating price ratio—in his own locality—of coffee to foodstuffs. Now with lack of capital, short lives, high risks and, often, disruption of old social organizations, this rate of interest can be quite high—even more than 20 per cent. Also farmers' ideas of the effects of present outputs on future outputs, and more particularly of present inputs, especially new types of input, on future outputs and savings of future inputs, may be far more pessimistic than those of experts who, *nota bene*, may be assuming very low or even zero rates of interest." John R. Raeburn, "Some Economic Aspects of African Agriculture," *The East African Economics Review*, V, No. 2 (Dec., 1958), 45, 47.

foodstuffs. There is also a high degree of regional self-sufficiency. Basic patterns of diet are satisfied by localized production. It is unlikely that, say, plantains produced in the south would find an outlet in the north in competition with locally produced grains. Local "comparative advantages" are heightened by high transport costs. The opportunities for marketing bulky staples in the rural areas are limited.

The number of wage earners in Uganda are low—242,000 out of more than 6 million inhabitants. They probably consumed a fair proportion of the £8 to £10 millions of marketed agricultural output that was consumed within the country in 1959. However, their average incomes are low, and unskilled workers in Kampala—who represent the bulk of the wage-earning labor force—already spend 58 per cent of their incomes on foodstuffs, and a high proportion of that is on staples. The marginal expenditures on locally produced commodities is low, and the expansion of the size of the urban market for bulk staples would depend on increasing the number of wage earners while the market for specialty products would depend on those employed having higher incomes. In the present circumstances, however, the absolute size of the internal market for staples is limited, and the export market for these products is restricted because of poor quality and high costs of transport per unit value of these commodities. Because of this, in the present circumstances, there is little wonder that producers restrict output for the market—frequently their products remain unsold, as the total cost of production and distribution is such that returns for effort are close to zero.

In the circumstances that prevail in African agriculture, it is hardly surprising that incomes in the African areas are so low, particularly where the main purpose of production is to devote resources to feed the family rather than to maximize money incomes. While questionable statistics make estimates of incomes hazardous, one estimate of "imputed money value per head of subsistence activities" was less than $14 per head in tropical Africa in 1951. Cash incomes from indigenous agriculture, where so large a proportion of resources is devoted to production, for

consumption is low, and according to the same UN estimate, are less than $16 per capita in Tanganyika, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and Kenya. In Uganda in 1960 average cash incomes are higher than the regional average, being in the neighborhood of $25 per capita; similarly, they are increasing in Kenya. In South Africa the per capita cash income of indigenous producers has been estimated as being less than $10.

Prices and incentives

In general, supply appears to be inelastic in respect to market prices, but the apparent inelasticities of supply may mask the price responsiveness of some producers. It follows that as the degree of price consciousness among producers grows, so the market forces will exert increasing influence. Thus, for instance, as tradition gives way in regard to the role of cattle as a prestige factor and for bride-buying, so livestock prices will become increasingly important factors governing the flow of beef to the market.[20] Similarly, as the influence of the traditional values wanes, so the concept of priority for visible food supplies, based on the traditional need for security from famine (and a distrust of the food distribution system), will give way to increasing specialization of production. This will make allocation of resources for domestic consumption less automatic irrespective of prices; prices will play an increasing role in influencing output.

The problem of the elasticities of supply is further compounded where there are sharp regional differences in their attitudes toward the market among producers. In Uganda, for instance, a high proportion of coffee is grown in Buganda. The significance of relative prices for cotton and coffee and livestock are important factors influencing supply, and there is little doubt that the majority of the producers living in Buganda are sophisticated and commercially oriented. Cotton production has spread to

20. "The first problem of supply is to persuade the African owner to part with his cattle . . . there is some evidence that the traditional unwillingness to part with his cattle is breaking down. A number of African producers seem to be abandoning the concept that cattle are assets to be sold only in the case of necessity and are accepting the view that they are a marketable commodity." *Report on Economic Development of Basutoland,* etc. (see n. 13), pp. 56–57.

other areas in Uganda where there are fewer alternatives and where growers appear to be less price conscious than the Buganda. At this stage of their development, increased prices may or may not elicit increased supplies from these producers. They appear to fall between being traditionally oriented (i.e. placing a premium on non-economic activities) and being directed by material ambition. On the other hand, the Karamojong, who are primarily cattle producers, are a primitive people who fall in the category of being traditionally oriented. They have few alternative sources of income; they appear to have limited materialistic ambitions and a high preference for leisure over income. These regional differences create policy problems that cannot be resolved by a blanket acceptance of the usual role of prices, i.e. the notion that there can be a wholesale transfer of Western market-oriented value systems to African agriculture. If the object of policy is rapidly to decrease the number of livestock (to prevent erosion or to increase meat supplies), the most suitable price policy in Karamoja might well be to reduce prices of livestock. The assumption underlying this move would be that there is a backward-bending supply curve, and so it would follow that producers would market more livestock at lower prices than Uganda prices to attain their limited income goals. However, such a policy would not be appropriate in Buganda. Reducing prices would merely lead producers to substitute inputs from one producing commodity to another so as to produce a different "product mix." In this region relative prices are important, and there is response to price changes. Thus, within one country there might be need for differing regional approaches to price policy. Undeniably, though, over time the spread of education and the "revolution of rising expectations" with its materialistic connotations will replace the force of traditional values rooted in a pre-exchange economy. Thus the present differences in response may be considered to be temporary phenomena. Nevertheless, these differences present vexing policy issues at this time.

Regardless of price and marketing policies followed, there may well be other means of encouraging producers to increase their output and marketable surplus. Their means include programs

that utilize the transfer of Western institutions but use these institutions to encourage production. One such means relates to the availability of incentive goods. At present, in many areas the only sources of these goods are small trading posts. Most of these stores are undercapitalized, and compared with similar institutions in areas such as Central America, they carry a very narrow range of uninspiring goods. If the need is to stimulate the materialistic ambitions of producers, then the "demonstration effect" of a wider range of more attractive consumption goods may well provide the stimulus for producers to forego leisure and non-economic activities and to increase output. In this context, the emphasis is on the ready availability of consumer goods to whet the appetites of producers to a point where they will move increasingly into the money economy and expand the exchange economy. However, many traders would require financial assistance to expand their range of goods; consequently, if this view that incentive goods are important is a valid one, it may well be sound economic policy for governments to create agencies to provide that financial assistance. The rate of return on this type of investment might well exceed that of comparable direct investments in agriculture.[21]

Another approach to the problem may be to provide an incentive which is more meaningful to producers than higher cash incomes per se. This is particularly relevant in the less commercialized areas. In many of these areas (as elsewhere) the overriding ambition and desire of Africans is to see their children educated. However, they do not appreciate the relationship between increased output, higher tax revenues, and the provision of educational facilities. If the provision of local facilities for education could be linked directly to localized increases in output, it may well encourage an expansion in production. The system could operate at a local level by having quotas of production

21. The need for incentive goods may also be a factor in discouraging hoarding. This would require an expanding range of goods as well as a wider distribution of these trading posts. The location of an attractive range of consumer goods near the site of livestock sales in Southern Rhodesia, for instance, might well encourage cattle owners to sell their cattle and, for those who have sold, to produce consumer goods rather than move their receipts from sales out of circulation by hoarding.

with the assurance by the local or central government that if the quota was exceeded by a given percentage, then certain educational facilities would be made available for the families of local producers.[22]

Technological change

If there is to be an increase in output and a technological revolution in African agriculture, then the first requirement is to increase the services available to African producers. This would include the use of methods developed in the Western world: increased research, extension of the research results, and the provision of working capital at the producer level. At present there is little applied research into problems of indigenous production in these areas. Very little is known of the problems of continuous cropping as opposed to shifting cultivation, of the long-term relationship between fertilizer use and its effect on tropical soils. In addition, very little is known about some of the peculiar needs of present-day African agriculture.

One illustration of this is that if labor is a limiting factor on expansion of production, then there is an urgent need for the development of labor-saving equipment suitable for the peculiar needs of African agriculture. An important requirement in many areas is to remove the drudgery of physical work so that areas of cultivation can be extended beyond the limit imposed by sheer physical endurance. This is particularly true in the areas of hoe culture. At present, most mechanical equipment available in these areas is machinery developed for use in commercial farming systems in Europe or the U. S. A. This is wholly uneconomical in African conditions. There is a demand for research into small-scale mechanical equipment or animal-drawn equipment that is economic under African production systems; this includes equipment both for cultivating and harvesting, particularly the

22. The author conducted an experiment in Rhodesia by asking a group of producers whether they would agree to follow certain farming practices if they were paid bonuses. The response tended to be negative. However, when it was suggested that a school and teachers would be provided if the producers followed these practices, the response was overwhelmingly enthusiastic in favor of the adoption of these practices.

latter, for in some production systems the factor limiting extension of cultivated acreage (by mechanization) is the shortage of labor for labor-intensive harvesting operations.

Among the many research requirements, one that has peculiar significance for Africa is for investigation into methods of simplifying food preparation. Women are multipurpose workers in many areas. But a great deal of their time is spent in tedious means of preparing foodstuffs. Present methods are highly labor-intensive and so are costly. If simple power mills or stamping machines could be introduced to substitute for hand-crushing of maize, or if pedal-driven grinders could substitute for hand labor in the preparation of manioc meal, then it would ease the physical drudgery of work and at the same time free large inputs of labor for tasks such as harvesting.[23] Substantial increases can result in good part because present methods are so backward technologically and because the present level of output is so low. The problem is to encourage the use of knowledge by producers. Historically, in some areas new crops were introduced through compulsion by tribal chiefs acting on the behest of colonial authorities.[24] Average levels of management can be im-

23. There appear to have been no studies of labor inputs in these operations in the areas under review. However, in the former Belgian Congo, it was found that the greater part of labor inputs in finger millet, sorghum, maize, and rice was in the post-field operations; 28 per cent of the total labor time was devoted to field harvests prior to harvest, 34 per cent for harvesting and immediate post-harvesting operations including transport, but 38 per cent of the total labor time was used for operations of threshing, grinding, etc., required shortly before the grain is to be consumed. With respect to manioc production in West Africa, W. O. Jones has pointed out that it takes 44 man days to transform one ton of fresh roots into meal and that the large and costly input of producing manioc meal could be reduced substantially with the use of either foot-pedal rotary graters or power graters. While conditions in East Africa differ from those in West Africa, these general observations seem to apply in both cases.—Information from Bruce F. Johnston, *The Staple Food Economics of Western Tropical Africa* (Stanford, 1958).

24. This appears to have been the case with cotton in Uganda and may have accounted for its rapid prewar growth. The gradual change from rule through chiefs to representative government has ended this means of technological change and so the government has to rely on persuasion to increase output. This may account in part for the fact that the cotton output has never equalled the 1938 figure. In a discussion with a group of African members of the then legislative assembly, on the question as to how the cotton crop could be increased in the national interest, several were in favor of reverting to the prewar methods of compulsion.

See too, Cyril Ehrlich, "Cotton and the Uganda Economy," *The Uganda Journal,* XXI (Sept., 1957).

proved through pressure. Perhaps the most notable example of where this has succeeded is in the Gezira scheme in the Sudan.[25] Here producers are given prescribed production practices that have been evolved through local research.[26] Those who do not follow these prescribed production methods are penalized and face the loss of their rights to use irrigation facilities. This principle has also been incorporated in the Land Husbandry Act in Southern Rhodesia where farmers can lose rights to land if they do not follow prescribed farming practices. In this instance, however, the element of compulsion is invoked in the name of preventing destruction of the land, which is considered to be national patrimony.

It is difficult to justify harsh penalties for not following prescribed practices. However, if the goal of policy is to secure an increased output and the conventional methods are too slow—as demonstrated by the past experience in Rhodesia—the decision to use sanctions against unco-operative farmers might be the only resort available to obtain added inputs of labor and good timing of farm operations. Nevertheless, this approach is one which does not appeal to persons who believe in a democratic society where producers have a free choice among the alternatives open to them.

If techniques of production are to be improved by persuasion, then the important link between applied research and the producers is the extension service. By and large, the principle of extension is a relatively new one in most countries that have a heritage of British administration. This is partly due to the fact that in the prewar and immediate postwar years there was little emphasis on expansion of output. The emphasis was more on

25. A. Gaitskill, *The Gezira Scheme* (Oxford, 1962).

26. Though the level of this research may leave something to be desired, the position in the Gezira illustrated the relationship between research and capital-output ratios with land in fixed supply, and the major investment being in irrigation work, the more intensively land and water could be used, the more favorable the capital-output ratio. At present, crop rotations involved leaving several acres fallow per year; if a rotation system could be designed that would enable land to be used more intensively, then the return on capital outlays would be much higher than under the present system. At the time of writing, research is being undertaken to find out whether there are feasible production systems that will enable land to be used more continuously, primarily through the introduction of a new cash crop (wheat) in the rotation.

orderly administration, physical moves to improve soil conservation, and the improvement of African nutrition. In Rhodesia, for instance, the first agricultural technician employed specifically to do demonstration or extension work in the African areas was employed only in 1924; in Uganda to this day there is only the beginnings of an extension service; while in Tanganyika the creation of an extension service is very much a postwar phenomenon. The same applies to the protectorates in Southern Africa, e.g., the concept of an extension service was introduced in Bechuanaland only in 1947.

The importance of extension education as a principle for increasing output has been amply demonstrated by the author elsewhere.[27] The impact of extension-education is apparent in most of the African farming areas.[28] While an expanded extension service is desirable, there is no formula for determining the optimum number of extension workers required to promote development. Nor is there any precise knowledge of the relationships between increasing extension and increasing output.[29] This will

27. M. Yudelman, *Africans on the Land* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).
28. One illuminating, though selective, example is sufficiently startling to be cited. In Bechuanaland: "The extension service is making a successful though limited contribution to the increase in agricultural efficiency. Results achieved before and after instruction by several representative pupil farmers, which are more revealing than the fact that maize yields obtained are 10–15 times the African acreage, have been as follows:

		Gross value of output	
Farm	*Acreage*	*Before*	*After*
1	60	£ 45	£409*
2	25	30	167
3	10**	22	85
4	140***	210	405

* plus £60 from creaming operations
** later increased to 20 acres
*** with some hired labor

Report on Economic Development of Basutoland, etc., p. 166.
29. Prof. W. A. Lewis has suggested that there is such a relationship. His view is that: "Research is a pre-requisite to extension, so where the basic research has still to be done, there is not yet scope for agricultural extension. However, once the knowledge becomes available, the need for extension workers is tremendous. If we assume that there should be one extension worker to every thousand persons gainfully employed in peasant agriculture, that two-thirds of the population are so employed, and that to maintain an extension worker costs four or five times as much as a farmer receives, then the cost of the service, including supervisory staff works out at more than a quarter of one percent of the national income. Add to

vary under differing conditions particularly with regard to the receptivity to new ideas. In African agriculture, where there are large numbers of illiterate conservative producers on small holdings, the need or requirements may well be greater than in societies with progressive producers operating on a large scale. The diseconomies of low levels of literacy are great in this kind of work. However, it is axiomatic that if improving management is partly a function of extension-education, then the larger the numbers who are to be reached the better, and so the larger the extension service the better, provided the spread of a service does not neglect the more receptive in favor of the less receptive (or those who would resist change despite the output of many hours of extension work). At present, the level of services is inadequate, and a major limitation on expanding the service is the absence of qualified personnel, particularly African personnel.[30]

The present shortage of trained persons throughout southeast Africa stems from a variety of reasons. One of these is the absolute and relative shortage of African secondary-school graduates. The disproportionate ratio between primary-school and secondary-school students is most noticeable. Until there can be a greater flow of secondary-school students, there will be keen competition for those graduates. In common with many other

this the desirable cost of agricultural research . . . and we arrive at the conclusion that the Department of Agriculture should be spending on research and education somewhere between three-quarters and one percent of the national income. The United States of America maintains something like this ratio of service expenditures to agricultural income; it has one extension worker to every 700 persons gainfully occupied in agriculture, and it spends upon agricultural extension and research about three-quarters of one percent of net agricultural output. The United Kingdom also has a ratio of 1 to 700, but among the poorer countries of the world the only country which spends at this level upon agricultural services is Japan (it is also the only one which has had spectacular increases in peasant production)." (W. A. Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth,* [Homewood, Ill., 1955], p. 188.) This is a very bold statement, particularly as it is difficult to isolate the contribution of the service per se and because the external economies or diseconomies of education vary from region to region. For example, would the same criteria be used among the African producers in Southern Rhodesia and Uganda?

30. The recent World Bank Survey Mission to Uganda (of which I was a member) found the shortage of qualified personnel to be more of a limitation on expansion of all services in Uganda than financial needs (though for reasons discussed below there are peculiar problems in borrowing funds for expanding these services). The survey team was found to limit its recommendations on expanding all services, and also, because of these shortages, the rate of increased investment in the agricultural sector. Consequently, the size of the investment program in agriculture for 1960–65, the most important sector of the economy, was relatively small.

parts of the world, many high school graduates prefer to study subjects other than agriculture. Among the limited numbers studying for higher degrees in Basutoland, Kenya, Uganda, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, only 156 of 1,862 students, or 7.1 per cent of all students studying for higher degrees are studying agriculture. This excludes the numbers studying abroad, but even if an equal number were working for degrees overseas, the total numbers being trained would be small compared with needs.

If the required level of services is to be attained, then there has to be an increase in the number of training institutions and the numbers of Africans who pass through them. There are manifold examples of the shortage of trained persons, but perhaps two examples in East Africa can highlight the magnitude of the problem. Agricultural scientists for Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika are trained at the University College of East Africa at Makerere. The college has a capacity to graduate twenty-four trained agricultural students a year (to serve a population of close to 20,000,000, at least 90 per cent of whom are engaged in agricultural production); but in 1959 there were only ten students in their final year studying agriculture and eighty-seven students in all years taking agricultural degrees. The second example is an illustration of the need to provide specific training facilities. At present there is only one veterinary officer for each 100,000 head of cattle in East Africa, compared with one for each 3,500 in the United Kingdom and 6,800 in the United States of America. This number of veterinarians in East Africa falls woefully short of requirements, particularly as the livestock industry provides great potential for development and offers a means of diversifying the present limited range of exports from the area as a whole.[31]

It is clear that expanded training facilities are required and that there is need to encourage young Africans to study all

31. In addition to this, the livestock industry requires close observation because of its susceptibility to disease. If disease control services are not maintained, not to mention expanded, there is the ever-present possibility that some diseases which are under control, such as rinderpest, could get out of hand and assume epidemic proportions with disastrous economic consequences. Despite all this, as late as 1960 there was no training course offered for veterinarians in East Africa.

branches of agricultural sciences. This is not only to provide skilled manpower for agricultural services but also to train better farm managers. The problems of inducing young men to enter agriculture are not confined to Africa; it is a common phenomenon that young men all over the world tend to prefer to follow professions other than agriculture. Generally, the reasons for this are disdain for rural life, low salaries, and the prestige associated with professions such as medicine, law, engineering, and those related to the humanities. However, there are few areas in the world where agriculture is so important and where there is such a paucity of trained agricultural scientists as in most of Africa.

There have been striking instances of success in handling the problem of attracting capable young graduates to study agriculture in other parts of the world, notably in Mexico. There the Mexican government and the Rockefeller Foundation have undertaken a joint research and training program which has produced outstanding results. Mexico now has the largest cadre of trained scientists in Latin America, in addition to which agricultural science is now a respected and relatively popular profession. As far as can be gathered, a major factor in the success of the training program has been the opportunity for those interested in field work to study for advanced degrees both in Mexico and abroad. Young men who proved their ability while working in the field alongside their senior counterparts were given opportunities to study for degrees; on their return, if they demonstrated competence, they were given further opportunities to advance themselves through fellowships to study for higher degrees.[32] The initial inducement to enter agriculture was the opportunity for free study, for the urge for education is as strong a driving force in Mexico as it is in most of Africa. The desire of scientists to enter and to remain in government service was also fostered by the

32. This program was initiated in 1941. By mid-1961 some 500 to 600 agronomists have received some internship in field training; 166 have been awarded scholarships in the U.S.A.; 30 of these have either completed or about to complete their doctorates, and there are in excess of 90 persons who have received their master's degrees. The whole program, including field operations, has cost the Rockefeller Foundation about $5 million. The visible benefits of this program have been widespread. They include the breeding of new wheat strains that have facilitated the expansion of production. All in all, this project is a most successful example of a skill-intensive technical assistance project; as such, it is a classic in itself.

government's recognition of the importance of their role in agricultural development.

There are valuable lessons for Africa in many aspects of this program. However, the economic development of Mexico is ahead of that of most of those areas under review; there is not such a basic shortage of trained manpower of all kinds in Mexico as in southeast Africa. Presumably, the ambitious educational programs in Africa will increase the supply of secondary-school graduates within the near future so that there will be competition for employment opportunities. As the supply increases and the flow into non-agricultural professions continues, there will be pressure on wages in these professions, particularly if alternative opportunities expand at a slower rate than does the supply of applicants for employment. Consequently, the relative attraction of agriculture and its study will increase.

It is apparent that in the absence of trained African persons there will have to be heavy reliance on expatriates for the foreseeable future if the present levels of services are to be retained. This will be costly as the unit cost per expatriate is high, relative to domestic average per capita incomes; the expatriates have to be recruited in competition with salary offers in their home countries, and these are related to a much higher level of per capita income than in the African territories. In addition, expatriates have to be provided with all manner of perquisites that add to their unit costs.

It is also apparent that there will have to be stopgap or interim measures to expand these services. These could include the creation of new categories of technicians as temporary substitutes for fully trained scientists and technicians pending their availability. Such measures have been suggested for Uganda and Tanganyika by World Bank missions.[33] There is also a great need to provide training for farmers' sons, who number nearly half the boys leaving school. Commenting on this, W. A. Lewis adds that "they should be encouraged to return to their farms for two or three years, and at the age of 18 to enter farm schools for a year's prac-

33. See *The Economic Development of Tanganyika* (Baltimore, 1961); and *The Economic Development of Uganda* (Baltimore, 1962).

tical training. Most African countries do not have this facility; they train a small number of agricultural assistants for the government's extension program but do not offer facilities for training young people who want to be efficient farmers." There are very few schools or training courses of this kind. In Southern Rhodesia, it costs £15 to train a farmer. Trained farmers have invariably done better than untrained farmers so that the returns on this type of investment have been very high. Yet the proportion of funds allocated for this purpose is very low.

Agricultural credit

The stress thus far has been to acquire and spread knowledge about improved techniques of production. However, even if knowledge is made available to producers, they have to have materials such as fertilizers, seeds, equipment, and spare parts whereby they can apply this knowledge and change or modify their techniques of production. In many areas the need for these materials is becoming more urgent as the opportunities for expansion through direct labor inputs is diminishing. In areas such as the greater part of Rhodesia, most producers cannot reduce their minimal consumption expenditures to save enough to acquire these materials. The only way they can augment whatever supplies they might have is through credit or direct subsidies.

Generally, African agriculture is debt-free. To those who have to cope with problems of severe indebtedness in India, this may be considered to be a blessing. The absence of usurious interest rates is to be applauded. But can there be development without an expansion of credit so as to enable low-income producers who have a plentiful supply of land to expand their productive capacity by acquiring seed, fertilizer, implements, and other production goods?

The extent to which credit has been made available to most African producers is severely limited because of the transfer of orthodox, European methods in granting credit. Private lending agencies are concerned with profit, and they consider most African producers to be bad risks because, except for those who have

export crops to pledge against loans, they have little collateral. They cannot pledge their land, the principle source of mortgage credit in most Western countries, for they do not hold title to land. In addition to the risks involved in the absence of security, private agencies are loath to take the added risk of advancing credit to producers whose incomes are so low that they could only be considered to be poor banking risks. Furthermore, there is little understanding among Africans of the distinction between production credit and credit for consumption. This further reduces the inclination to lend to African producers. Finally, even where producers might satisfy collateral and income requirements, private lenders, concerned as they are with security and profits, are likely to discount loans very heavily because of the natural hazards of agricultural production.

In the absence of private lending, other than through some credit advanced against crops by traders, the main burden of providing credit has fallen on public agencies. Generally, the creation of public lending agencies is an innovation in most of these countries, and the level of loans that have been made is low. The first program of government lending to Africans in Southern Rhodesia was initiated only in 1958. In Uganda, the first public lending program was begun in 1954; in Tanganyika, public lending commenced in 1947. All these programs are limited in scope and are small in size. In Southern Rhodesia, the funds available for lending were less than £100,000 in 1958, while in Uganda in 1960 only £125,000 was advanced, and in Tanganyika the public loan funds had £200,000 at their disposal.[34] In other words, in these three countries together there were less than £500,000 for a total population of around 18,000,000, the major part of which was engaged in agriculture, or around 7d, or less than ten cents, per head.

Even though only limited funds and limited credit facilities are available, there has often been excess lending capacity; for example, in Tanganyika in 1959 the principal sources of loans are through loan funds, which have £100,000 at their disposal; in 1959 they had committed only £49,000 of this amount.[35] Simi-

34. *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, p. 114.

larly, in Rhodesia where the very meager sum of £100,000 was allocated for loans, only a small portion of that (around £30,000) was lent in the first year. In Bechuanaland, where there had been credit facilities since 1929, only four loans had been approved, while in Swaziland there are provisions for a public lending agency but it had no resources.[36]

The reasons for the low levels of loans are not hard to discover. The public lending agencies follow the same orthodox banking principles as private lenders (though their rates of interest may be lower). They do not view their operations as part of a development effort, nor are they inclined to take what they consider to be unnecessary risks. Even though they do not compete with private banks and have different aims, they require collateral and will lend to only "sound risks"; this view tends to coincide with that of private bankers and, as most Africans do not have title to land or an assured income, they lend but little. In addition, this high rate of default on loans has made them doubly cautious.[37] The result is that there is a very limited infusion of badly needed operating capital into African agriculture. One unique form of guaranteeing loans was the group approach in Uganda. Loans are made to individuals if the tribal group will guarantee 50 per cent of the loans. The method whereby the tribal group forces producers to pay such loans would be an interesting topic for study. However, because of the difficulties of securing repayment, the tribal groups have become reluctant to pledge themselves as security for repayment by individuals.

In view of the low incomes of producers and the need to induce changes in management techniques, it may well be that what is needed is a combination of direct subsidies and credit. Subsidies may be most effective in situations such as that which relates to the cotton crop in Uganda. There the spraying of cotton crop with DDT could reduce losses through pest control to the point where output would rise threefold. Because of the structure of export

35. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
36. *Report on Economic Development of Basutoland*, etc., pp. 86, 462.
37. In Tanganyika, for instance, about 50 per cent of the loans made by the African loans fund were in arrears by the end of 1959. (*The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, p. 118.)

duties, the expanded production and export would yield the government a greater return than it would invest in making sprays and chemicals available to producers. (In addition, it would raise producers' incomes substantially.) Until such time as farmers are familiar with this new technique of production—acceptance of which should not impose too many difficulties as it is additive rather than substitutive—then it may be well to subsidize the provision of supplies. Thereafter, once the profitability of this technique has been demonstrated, the subsidies could be reduced and, if necessary, the difference could be made up through the provision of credit until such time as the subsidies fell away.

In other situations, depending on circumstances, credit or subsidies will have to be provided on a much more selective basis. They will have to be provided to those who can use materials effectively. These would be the progressive farmers who have demonstrated their farming ability; possibly the credit or subsidies should be made available in the form of materials to insure that advances are not used for consumption purposes. However, irrespective of the form which it takes, if credit is to be made available, it should be long-term and at low interest rates. In addition, there should be less emphasis on orthodox banking requirements and more on development. Inevitably, if there are credit programs, the proportions of losses will be high, for many African producers are unfamiliar with the whole concept of credit. These losses should be minimized, but when they prevail they should be viewed as costs that encourage innovations; there should also be a relaxation of the rigid requirements for collateral. For example, up until the present, livestock have not been considered to be suitable for collateral; there are good banking reasons for this, but as they are the principal asset held by many Africans, the lending system should be adapted to the African situation.

Ideally, it would be desirable if credit could be made available to be used under close supervision. This would entail every producer's having a 'farm plan' and a budget and loans to implement that plan. He would be assisted by extension agents and others, and the use of the credit would be supervised to see that it fits

in with the plan. Programs of this nature would insure that the credit was being used for the purposes for which it was provided and would also assist the producers. However, this type of program is extremely costly in terms of the use of trained manpower —in Brazil, for instance, where a supervised credit program has been introduced, it has been found that one agricultural expert is required for every thirty farmers who cultivate an average of about ten acres. Obviously, the manpower is not available in African agriculture for this type of skill-intensive operation.

How much for agriculture?

Up until the present the proportions of total direct government investment and levels of current expenditure devoted to agricultural development have been extremely low compared to the importance of agriculture. In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as a whole the agricultural sector contributed 22.1 per cent and 20.2 per cent of the gross domestic product. In 1958–59, however, only 7 per cent of the total government current expenditures were allocated to agricultural development, and only 0.9 per cent of the total capital development program for 1957–61 was for agricultural development. In Tanganyika in 1958 the agricultural sector contributed 59.1 per cent of the gross domestic product, yet in 1958–59 only 5.6 per cent of total government current expenditures and 5.3 per cent of the capital expenditures were for agriculture; in Kenya and Uganda expenditure represented 42 and 58 per cent of the gross domestic product but only 6.8 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively of total current expenditures were for agricultural services, while 33.0 and 6.0 per cent of the capital development budgets were in the agricultural sector. These figures on current expenditures contrast unfavorably with the 12.1 per cent of current expenditures in Ghana which has a gross domestic product smaller than that of the Federation but considerably larger than that of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika.

There are many competing demands for all manner of investments in African development. Most countries do not have the

resources to meet even the minimum of these demands, and the economic problem is one of utilizing the available resources so as to maximize returns both in the short and long run. Priorities have to be established, and there has to be a balance between slow maturing investments in social overhead and those concerned primarily with raising productivity in the short run.

There is no "ideal" balance between these investments. The most pressing popular demand in the African areas is for increasing investment in general education; but agriculture will, by and large, continue to provide the basis of a livelihood for the bulk of the African population for the foreseeable future. Education and agricultural development are linked in many ways. At present, for example, the lack of qualified graduates limits the numbers available for specialized training. These can be made available by a modest investment in expansion of the existing educational services.

The major need in these areas is for increased investment in agricultural development. In view of this, the proposals for investment in general education as presented at the Special Conference on Education in Sub-Saharan Africa are open to some question. At that conference it was suggested that investments in the order of $4 billion should be made available between 1961 and 1965. It was estimated that this amount would be required to implement a program to increase enrollments from 40 per cent of the age group in primary schools to 51 per cent and from 3 per cent to 9 per cent in the secondary schools and to maintain the 2 per cent in higher education. It was estimated that $1.3 billion would have to be provided by external sources to meet these requirements.[38]

These investments are out of all proportion with the ability of the countries to finance these programs. Unless they raise their national incomes very sharply, they will be unable to meet anything approximating these levels of investment. Furthermore, they will have to rely heavily on increased agricultural output to provide a large component of the "growth factor" in raising gross

38. United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa and UNESCO, *Final Report: Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa,* (Addis Ababa: May, 1961).

output and national incomes. Consequently, it would appear that there is a misplaced emphasis on extremely large investments in slow-maturing general education rather than on strategic investments that balance both long term and short term needs and consider both the "consumption" and "production" aspects of education. Within this program only around 7 per cent of the total investment in general education would be allocated for all forms of vocational and technical training.[39] The need is to raise agricultural productivity so as to sustain greater investments in social overhead programs. The imbalance in the proposed approach of very heavy added investment in education is made more striking when there is an examination of present expenditures on education and agricultural development in societies where the population is largely rural.

For example, in Tanganyika in 1957, expenditures on education represented 18 per cent of all government expenditures, while agricultural expenditures represented only 7 per cent of the total. In Uganda between 1955 and 1956, and 1959 and 1960, expenditures on general education represented 18.3 per cent of total recurrent and non-recurrent expenditures while those on all economic services only represented 13.5 per cent of the total.[40]

The proportion of funds allocated to agriculture has been low compared to agriculture's contribution to total output and low compared to expenditures for education. If there is to be an increase in agricultural output through a pattern of expenditures along the lines outlined in this section, there will have to be a

39. For a general comment on the need for stressing agricultural education, see Thomas Balogh, "What Schools for Africa?" the *New Statesman*, LXIII (March 23, 1962), 412. The writer is primarily concerned with the need to integrate agricultural training into the existing educational system. He points out: "Africa is more rural than any other continent. 80–95% of the population live in villages and depend on agriculture . . . What is needed for them is primarily (by no means exclusively) a rural and technical education programme. Only if the large masses in agriculture can be brought to produce more . . . can the first tentative steps be taken to prosperity . . . it should be stressed moreover that for the next 50 years no conceivable rate of expansion in industry will be able to absorb the whole rise in population far less relieve the misery of those who are now living on the land. The African future . . . depends absolutely on a peaceful yet speedy transformation of African agriculture and a rural renascence is inconceivable without a revolution in rural education."

40. *The Economic Development of Tanganyika*, p. 30, Table 4. The same general ratios apply to Southern Rhodesia.

large increase in expenditures. These expenditures are mostly in the category of recurrent exenditures, though manifold small-scale capital outlays are required for roads, water holes, small dams, cattle-dipping facilities, stock routes, pest-control programs, and so forth. Collectively, the sum of recurrent expenditures and minor capital outlays required to make a substantial difference in output may well be such that, even if other expenditures are reduced, the country concerned may not be able to finance a program which will be adequate to make a substantial difference in output.

The very nature of these requirements makes it difficult for many countries to borrow to finance these projects.[41] The provision of development services does not fall under the same category of a self-financing "bankable" project as multipurpose dams or public utilities. The financing of the required development services comes under the heading of current expenditures and lending agencies do not usually provide loans for this type of budget support. Most of the external aid for African agriculture has been in the form of grants.[42] This is a great drawback for if

41. This does not apply to the African areas of South Africa and Rhodesia—in these instances the problem is to transfer additional funds from the developed sector of the economy to the underdeveloped sector.

42. The flow of external public assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has not been large; excluding the Union of South Africa, grants and loans totalled $1,065 million between 1954–58 and $387.5 million between 1957–59, or an annual average of $205.0 and $193.8 per annum respectively.

Excluding South Africa, the breakdown of multilateral and bilateral aid among the countries and territories concerned has been as follows (in millions of dollars):

Sources: 1954–58, Table 159 of United Nations, *Statistical Year Book*, 1959. 1957–59, Table of the United Nations "International Economic Assistance to the Less Developed Countries," 1961.

The principal source of external aid has come from the United Kingdom. The

		Bilateral aid		*Multilateral aid*			
Country	*Years*	*Grants*	*Loans*	*Grants*	*Loans*	*Total*	*Total per yr.*
British East Africa[a]	1954–58	83.3	53.6	2.1	15.6	154.6	31.0
	1957–59	40.5	11.1	1.7		53.3	26.6
British High[b] Commission Territories	1954–58	9.4	12.9	0.4		22.7	4.5
	1957–59	7.5	1.6	0.1		9.2	4.6
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	1954–58	15.8	51.6	0.2	38.9	106.5	21.3
	1957–59	4.2	12.1	0.1	18.8	11.0	5.5

[a] Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika
[b] Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland

improvement of development services is important, then they must rank higher in priority than large-scale "bankable" projects. If loan funds are not available for these purposes, there is a tendency to borrow for lower priority projects which are less productive but might be "bankable," even though the important element needed to raise African agricultural productivity is to improve levels of management by the measures outlined above.

To revert to an earlier point, there is no known "optimum relationship" in expenditures between such facets of development as education and other requirements for growth, but if there are to be increases in agricultural productivity there has to be a vast expansion in all manner of agricultural services and provision of supplies. There is no "optimum ratio" of expenditures between different services within the agricultural sector. All that can be said is that there should be some semblance of balance in these expenditures. If there is advanced research and no extension service, then obviously there should be a large increase in the extension service; the same applies to credit and subsidy programs—if producers appear willing to expand but are limited by lack of supplies, there must be increased expenditures on making supplies available.

However, in most of African agriculture there is so great a need for all services that some strategy has to be adopted to utilize the

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Colonial Welfare and Development Act of 1929, subsequently amended, enabled the United Kingdom to disburse direct aid to the tune of £117 millions to Sub-Saharan Africa by mid-1959 (with Nigeria receiving one-third of this total). About one-quarter of this amount has been for roads and communications, a further quarter for agriculture (water supplies, development services, etc.) and about half for social services, principally education and health. Loans were also provided at commercial rates through Exchequer loans and the Colonial Development Corporation; in addition the Colonial Service Vote assisted in meeting current expenditures and providing emergency relief. There is also a Commonwealth Services Vote which provides grant aid and technical assistance to independent countries within the Commonwealth.

Additional aid has come from the IBRD. As of the end of 1960 the Bank had lent 515.1 million dollars to countries in Africa south of the Sahara. The largest of these loans was the credit of $80,000,000 for the Kargiba Hydroelectric project. It had, however, only made two small loans of $5.6 million each for African agricultural development. These were in Rhodesia and Kenya and did include an element for development services.

The Bank is eager to make loans to African agriculture but the absorptive capacity of African agriculture is such that within the Bank's framework of operations it cannot find "bankable" projects. Presumably this restriction will not apply to the policy of the IDA.

limited resources available for agricultural development to maximum advantage. This does not necessarily accord with a strategy that would be applicable in Western society.

A strategy for providing supplies should be dictated by the existing scarcities in the economy. There are scarcities of skilled manpower and capital. These factors must be employed so as to give maximum economic returns. For this to happen, they must be made available to those who can use them most effectively. In this regard, it has been stressed that there are differentiations among peasant producers. Some have more initiative and enterprise than others; these producers are the ones who can make the most use of scarce services and supplies offered to them, and, as such, they are the producers who must be given every encouragement. This does not mean that the other producers must be denied facilities. Rather it calls for a "two-tier" program which attempts to balance the use of scarce resources to provide services for all producers with their use to provide special facilities for progressive producers.

The first type of program would include allocation of resources in a way that does not necessarily encompass fundamental changes in management, but does increase output. It does not call for improved education and changes in production techniques; rather, it calls for additive investments that reduce losses. It would include the provision of roads, water supplies, storage, and general education that benefit all producers irrespective of levels of management. It would include such programs as locust control by aerial spraying which cut losses and so raise productivity without producers changing management techniques; other programs that fall in this category are livestock disease control to cut mortality rates without any changes in production techniques, and the spraying of crops—measures to increase output without calling for alterations in basic levels of management (though spraying requires added labor inputs and must be done on time).

In general, programs of this nature depend on exogenous factors rather than endogenous factors—in a sense they may be considered to be analogous to measures that have increased the world's population. These programs have reduced mortality rates

through the spread and application of many health measures such as the use of DDT and malaria control; they have been undertaken without increasing levels of education or changes in habits of the people concerned (though the consequences of these measures probably led to changes).

In contrast to this type of program, the improvement of the techniques of management requires initiative, enterprise, innovation, and change at an individual level. Thus where producers have become "master farmers" or "co-operators,"[43] or demonstrated the potential to become "master farmers," then they should be provided with special credit facilities and services for improving their methods of production. It is these producers who should benefit from waiving orthodox credit requirements and should be granted loans based on character and ability rather than on collateral and present incomes. This implies that there must be discrimination in the allocation of resources between "progressive farms" and others, but in view of the limitations of resources, particularly services, and the differences in receptivity and ability to use these resources, there is little option but to use them where they produce the highest returns.[44]

Conclusion

This paper has touched on some of the issues relating to African agricultural development. It has considered the problems of tenure and changing land, expanding production for the market, and the need for expanding development services. There are many other factors involved in the development process, but these three, all of which require the transfer of Western institutions to traditionally oriented societies, are the prime essentials for increasing African agricultural productivity.

43. This terminology is widely used in British Africa to distinguish between progressive producers and others.

44. This is somewhat similar to the approach being taken in India, where the Indian government has a "normal" program and a "special" program. The failure to meet targets under the second five-year program has not led to the abandonment of general programs; instead there is to be the added program concentrating on selected producers in selected areas. This program will provide those selected with supplies and services which are not normally available to the bulk of the producers.

Table 1. *Estimated Population and Composition of Population in 1960 (in thousands)*

	Total	*African*	*Percentage of total*	*European*	*Percentage of total*	*Other*	*Percentage of total*
South Africa	15,841	10,807	68.2	3,067	19.3	1,965	12.4
Southern Rhodesia	3,070	2,830	92.1	223	7.2	16	.5
Northern Rhodesia	2,430	2,340	96.2	76	3.1	10	.4
Nyasaland	2,830	2,810	99.2	9	.3	12	.4
Kenya	6,550	6,265	95.6	67	1.0	218	3.3
Uganda	6,523	6,436	98.6	10	.1	75	1.1
Tanganyika	9,232	9,123*	98.8	22	.2	87	.9
Basutoland**	802	800	99.7	2	.3	—	—
Bechuanaland	298	295	98.9	3	1.0	—	—
Swaziland	252	243	96.4	7	2.7	2	.7
Totals	47,828	41,949	87.7	3,486	7.2	2,386	4.9

* Includes small number of Arabs
** Source of these estimates is *Report on Economic Development of Basutoland,,* etc.

Table 2. *Estimated Labor Force in Paid Employment and Inter-Territorial Migrations in Africa, c. 1956, Selected Countries*

Country	African population (millions) (1)	Indigenous Africans in paid employment domestically (2)	Emigrants employed in foreign countries (3)	Percentage of Population in paid employment (domestic & foreign) (4) (2) & (3) / (1)	Foreign Africans employed (immigrants) (5)	Total number of Africans in paid employment domestically: Number (6) (2) & (5)	Total number of Africans in paid employment domestically: Percentage of population (7) (2) & (5)	Percentage of domestic paid labor force consisting of foreign Africans (8) (5) / (2) & (5)
Nyasaland	2.6	141,000	170,000	13.1	8,000	149,000	5.7	5.3
Northern Rhodesia	2.1	220,000	70,000	13.8	20,000	240,000	11.4	9.9
Southern Rhodesia	2.3	300,000	17,000	13.8	310,000	610,000	26.5	51.0
Uganda	5.5	(252,000)	—	4.0	(85,000)	(337,000)	6.1	25.2
Kenya	5.9	525,000	(5,000)	9.1	15,000	540,000	10.3	3.2
Tanganyika	8.3	372,000	6,000	4.5	52,000	424,000	5.1	12.2
Union of South Africa	8.5	(1,680,000)	—	20.0	(420,000)	(2,100,000)	24.7	25.0

This table provided by country by Dr. Eliot Berg of Harvard University, who is preparing a manuscript on ratios in Africa.

Table 3. *Population Densities in Selected Countries*

	Area 000 of km²	*Population (1960) millions*	*Population per km²*
Union of South Africa	1,223	15,841	12,952
Central African Federation			
Northern Rhodesia	746	2,430	3,257
Southern Rhodesia	389	3,070	7,892
Nyasaland	117	2,830	24,188
East Africa			
Kenya	583	6,550	11,235
Uganda	243	6,436	26,485
Tanganyika	937	9,123	9,736
British Protectorates			
Basutoland	30	800	26,666
Bechuanaland	712	290	407
Swaziland	17	243	14,294
Totals	4,997	47,613	9,528

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